IAF Tactics to Reduce S-400 Vulnerability

AI graphic showing an IAF S-400 launcher evading counter battery fire

It's been widely reported that the IAF has reduced the vulnerability of its S-400 systems by launching missiles on the move. 

It's important to put the IAF achievement in the correct perspective.

The S-400 system is a mobile system but does not have launch on the move capability like short-range SAMs such as the Pantsir-S1 or Tor (which are explicitly designed for firing on the move).

The S-400 is a  mobile (up to 60 km/h on roads, 25 km/h off-road) system that can reach "ready to fire" status in as little as 5 minutes from a marching column without full redeployment (rapid-reaction), or 10–15 minutes in full development mode where the entire battery or regiment properly positions into its battle formation.

In firing position, the TEL deploys hydraulic stabilizer jacks (typically two on each side of the trailer/chassis) to level and steady the vehicle. 

IAF's New S-400 Operatoions Tactics

Using the IAF's newly developed tactics, a S-400 battery prepares for launch while still moving at low speeds (~5–7 km/h). When ready to launch, it stops, stabilizes, fires quickly, retracts its stabilizing pads and speeds away (scoots).

With the launcher continuously moving, AWACS or satellite based reconnaissance cannot provide counter battery missile systems the exact coordinates of the S-400 component systems.  

During Op Sindoor, IAF batteries reportedly evaded counter battery fire by quickly relocating. 

The IAF new tactics are more advanced and make counter battery fire very challenging for the adversary. 

The IAF tactics requires training and situational awareness - satellite pass schedule and airborne ISR assets positioning. It possibly also relies on surveyed and flattened terrain to launch with lower levels of stabilization. 

It's conceivable that the launch tubes are raised to a vertical position while on the move and then the platform is lightly stabilized for immediate launch. 

It's unlikely that the IAF has made any hardware modification to the equipment though software tweaks cannot be ruled out.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

MBDA and IAF Sign MRO Agreement for MICA Missiles

Image by @Grok

MBDA and the IAF have signed an agreement to set up MRO facilities for the MICA missile in India.

Currently, MICA missiles need to be shipped to MBDA for refurbishment. An indigenous capability will save time and reduce costs.

The IAF will operate the MICA MRO facility, undertaking inspection, repair, component replacement, and mid-life upgrades throughout the missiles’ service life, with MBDA providing tools, data packages, training, and support.

Mid-life work on an air-to-air missile typically involves software upgrades, seeker enhancements, renewal of pyrotechnic elements (especially solid rocket propellant), batteries, electronics, and other aging components.

At the 2025 Paris Air Show, MBDA and the Indian company AXISCADES formalized the creation of an industrial unit in Bengaluru dedicated to the manufacture and integration of missile launch systems. The MICA MRO agreement is a progression of that tie-up.

AXISCADES Technologies is a Bengaluru-based Indian multinational company specializing in high-end engineering solutions and technology services. It focuses primarily on Aerospace, Defence, and ESAI (Electronics, Semiconductor, and Artificial Intelligence), delivering end-to-end product lifecycle support — from design and development to manufacturing, assembly, testing, and R&D.

Its current order book includes over ₹600 crore worth of advanced sub-systems for indigenous platforms.

IAF and MBDA MICA

The IAF has operated MICA missiles since 2016, initially with the Mirage 2000 and later with Rafale fighters as well.

The IAF Rafale fleet, which currently comprises two squadrons (36 aircraft), is set to expand with the induction of an additional 114 Rafale fighters under the MRFA program. The MICA MRO agreement will help ensure cost-effective sustainment of the fleet’s combat capability.

MBDA weapon systems currently in use by the IAF include the MICA, Meteor, ASRAAM, and Mistral.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

IAF’s 5th Gen Need Meets a US 4th Gen Pitch!

Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh engaged with U.S. Air Force leaders during a visit to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, April 9, 2026. The visit focused on joint exercise opportunities and aligning modernization efforts to build a foundation for interoperability.

During his recent weeklong visit to the US starting April 6, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Amar Preet Singh, flew a familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Routine Visit?

Officially, the CAS was on a routine exchange visit to foster deeper relations between the IAF and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). High-ranking air force officials from both nations routinely visit counterpart nations to discuss interoperability, joint training, shared strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and modernisation.

In the past 15 years, four IAF Chiefs have made official visits to the US, as follows:

1. July 2013: Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III.

2. May 2015: Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation.

3. September 26–28, 2017: Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa to attend the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium in Hawaii.

4. April 6–13, 2026: Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh to strengthen the India–US defence partnership and deepen cooperation between the two air forces.

The USAF Chief of Staff/Secretary of the Air Force has visited India three times in the same period, as follows:

1. August 2016: Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James to discuss defence and trade cooperation.

2. February 1–7, 2018: Chief of Staff Gen. David L. Goldfein to discuss Indo-Pacific cooperation.

3. March 21, 2023: Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall to advance the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership and bilateral security cooperation.

From the above, it is clear that exchange visits don't take place at predetermined intervals. Instead, they are based on invitations. As such, despite being labelled as routine visits, they are neither routine nor mere optics. There is always a strong undercurrent aimed at adding depth to the partnership. From the US point of view, CAS visits are either aimed at selling US weapons to India, aligning India more sharply with US unipolar global ambitions, or both.

Recent CAS Visit

Based on media reports, the invitation to ACM AP Singh to visit the US was likely aimed at laying down the modalities for surveillance by US MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones being sold to the IAF and the possible sharing of data.

The ACM's familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet was likely aimed at softening any IAF resistance to the purchase of the Boeing F-15EX fighter and its weapon systems.

During the MMRCA procurement process, the US had pitched its F-16 and F-18 fighters to the IAF, which ultimately chose the French Rafale fighter. However, due to irreconcilable differences over ToT, France and India could not finalise a contract. In 2018, the MoD placed an interim order for 36 Rafales and terminated further procurement under the MMRCA program.

Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) Program

The MoD then initiated the balance procurement of 110 fighters under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program. On April 6, 2018, it released a fresh RFI stipulating that a maximum of 15 per cent of aircraft were to be procured in flyaway condition and 85 per cent would be manufactured in India based on transfer of technology (ToT) under “Make in India.” The RFI mandated the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times.

The F-15EX was a late entrant in the MRFA program, which was initially confined to former MMRCA contestants.

New Delhi first showed interest in the F-15EX in October 2020, shortly after the U.S. Air Force awarded Boeing a nearly $1.2 billion contract to build the first lot of eight F-15EX advanced fighter jets to help the service meet its capacity requirements and add capability to its fighter fleet.

“There is a possibility that the F-15EX could be sold on a government-to-government basis,” a top government official familiar with the discussions told Hindustan Times at that time.

However, at that point, Boeing had not yet been licensed to sell the F-15EX abroad.

On January 28, 2021, the US government granted Boeing a marketing licence to offer the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet directly to the Indian Air Force (IAF) under its MRFA procurement program.

It is not clear if Boeing’s pitch of the F-15EX conformed to the Indian MoD RFI of April 6, 2018, particularly regarding its willingness for ToT and local manufacture in India under “Make in India.”

Notably, the Boeing fighter was never offered for evaluation to the IAF, which raises doubts about the sincerity of the Boeing pitch.

Meanwhile, the IAF, having invested heavily in creating the maintenance and logistics infrastructure for Rafale, continued to display enthusiasm for additional procurement of the French fighter, which had performed creditably in Op Sindoor.

The CAS, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:

“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”

However, he acknowledged that a decision in favour of Rafale would depend on French willingness to share manufacturing technology with India.

Alluding to the 2018 RFI that mandates ToT with the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times, he said, “So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he added.

Rafale Procurement Go-Ahead

In January 2026, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reportedly gave its go-ahead to an Indian Air Force proposal to buy 114 French-origin Rafale jets.

Contract negotiations between India and France are underway. The DPB go-ahead has to be cleared by the DAC, headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. Finally, before the contract is signed, it would need to be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Source Code Issues

Some unverified media reports suggest that the French government has refused to provide India with the source code for the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite.

These reports may sound alarming to many defence enthusiasts, but they need not be.

The IAF does not need the full source code of the Rafale. What it needs is programming access to the full source code. In an earlier analysis for the Eurasian Times, I explained in detail the difference.

A programming interface provides access to the underlying code through a layer of abstraction.

There is no reason for France to withhold full programming access to the Rafale source code, just as there is no reason for the IAF to ask for the transfer of the full source code.

It is the author’s belief that good negotiations can adequately seal the deal while safeguarding the interests of both France and India.

MRFA – A Near Done Deal

The IAF has made its choice clear in favour of Rafale. The renewed US pitch for the F-15EX aims to leverage the controversy wittingly or unwittingly created by the media over the source code. The IAF is unlikely to pursue a red-herring offer; notably, however, the US has made one—exposing its insincerity.

Need for Stealth Fighters

The IAF has officially projected to the MoD a need for 2–3 squadrons of a stealth fighter to address an emerging stopgap requirement. Ironically, what the US is ready to offer is not the F-35, but a Su-30MKI substitute that will drain billions from the IAF's capital expenditure over the next few years in acquiring the aircraft, creating a logistics and maintenance infrastructure, and procuring a whole new line of weapon systems.

The loss of four F-15EX fighters during the recent Iran war would be difficult for the IAF leadership to ignore were it inclined to change its mind at this late stage.

According to ANI, during ACM AP Singh’s visit, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach welcomed India’s procurement of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian drone. I wonder if the CAS found the endorsement reassuring, considering how easily Iran has been able to shoot down these very expensive drones.

In summary, what the IAF urgently needs is not the F-15EX, but an upgrade to the highly potent BrahMos-wielding Su-30MKI, which can also be adapted for launching Indian-developed hypersonic aeroballistic missiles in the future.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Getting the Rafale on India’s Terms: The Source Code Question

@Grok Generated Image of Rafale Receiving Software Update

The French government’s reported refusal to provide India with the source code for the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite should prove sobering to the GoI.

Under the circumstances, an emotionally charged debate is raging on social media around the question: should India still go ahead with the Rafale deal?

Ironically, some of the most vociferous participants in the debate don't understand what really is at stake because they don't clearly understand the role of software in a fighter aircraft.

In the following paragraphs, I will try to explain the value and role of software in a fighter aircraft.

Software by Value

Approximately 30–40% of the total cost of a modern fighter like the Rafale is typically attributed to software development/integration. What that means is—if the OEM doesn't supply the source code along with the fighter, you get only 60% of the aircraft despite paying for 100%.

As technology advances, it's likely that the percentage cost representing software will increase well past 50%.

However simplistic it may sound, a nation does get shortchanged when it buys a fighter, and in the future the shortchanging will be even greater.

Dependency on OEM

More importantly, when nations buy modern fighters, they have to keep reverting to the OEM to address any requirements for changes in the software with evolving tactics and weapon systems. In a manner of speaking, the money paid for software changes is money burnt because software alterations have zero tangible value. You pay for the tweak, but physically you return with what you had earlier.

The continued dependency on the OEM may prove crippling, for example, if the OEM does not allow software changes required to integrate third-party weapon systems. For example, if Dassault disallows integration of the Russian R-37M missiles on the Rafale.

No OEM Will Provide Full Source Code

Software in fighter aircraft is built in layers of abstraction. This hierarchical design (often called a "layered architecture") separates concerns, improves reliability, and allows independent certification and upgrades.

Lowest-level software layers

These provide hardware access abstraction and include device-driver layers. They directly interface with sensors (radar, INS, EO/IR), actuators (flight controls, weapons release), data buses (MIL-STD-1553, AFDX), storage devices, and processors. They translate raw sensor signals into usable data.

Medium layers

These include operating system services and common libraries that provide universal, reusable functionality not tied to any single mission. Examples include:

Data read/write services (file systems, database-like buffers, or ARINC 653 partitioning)

Mathematical function libraries (e.g., Kalman filters, coordinate transformations, floating-point math)

Other common services: timing, memory management, communication protocols, and real-time operating system (RTOS) primitives

In fighters, this layer often includes certified middleware that abstracts the underlying RTOS (e.g., VxWorks, INTEGRITY), so higher layers don’t need to know hardware details.

Highest layers

These are the application/mission-specific layers.

They implement operational logic unique to a task (e.g., sensor fusion, target tracking, weapons release sequencing, flight-control laws, electronic warfare response, or cockpit display management).

The highest layers can be thought of as the personality or the potential of the aircraft. The layers define the aircraft's maneuvering and combat capabilities. The layers serve as the interface between the pilot and the aircraft as a whole, including the weapons that it's armed with.

The entire source code of the Rafale will comprise millions of lines. IAF programmers would take years, perhaps decades, to acquaint themselves with the entire code. More importantly, it would serve little purpose because the low-level and medium-level layers are well proven and extensively tested.

Most likely, what the IAF seeks from Dassault is access to the sensor- and hardware-specific lowest layer to fit new sensors and weapon systems, and possibly the highest layers to tweak combat load and maneuvering parameters.

It's important to understand that providing access to a software layer is not the same as transferring the full source code of the layers.

Access to the underlying code can be provided through a layer of abstraction without transferring the code. Coding new functionality through a layer of abstraction entails using a programming interface. When working through such an interface, the user cannot know how the source code actually functions.

The Real Issue

A programming interface provides limited and safe abstract access to limited segments of the internal source code.

It's likely that Dassault is ready to provide an interface to integrate indigenously developed weapons that are currently operational or under development. However, over the years, the interface may not prove adequate for integrating the IAF’s future weapons and other operational requirements because weapon systems are fast evolving, both in terms of technology and concepts.

For example, in the future, the IAF may want to launch drones from the Rafale or launch weapons from an unmanned collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) operating with the Rafale. For such requirements, the IAF would require a more extensive programming interface to the underlying source code.

Accidental / Intentional Limitations

There is another problem with interface-only access to source code. The underlying code may have accidentally or deliberately planted limitations that the operating country is not aware of. These limitations, which could have been coded or escaped detection during testing, may not show up when the aircraft is operating in the OEM country.

In the early 1980s, the IAF acquired Durandal runway-penetration bombs for the Jaguar aircraft. The IAF acquired the Durandals based on their successful integration with French and Royal Air Force Jaguars.

Several years after acquiring the bomb, the IAF realised that its Jaguars could not release the bombs, which had been lying unused as strategic reserves for years, due to a software bug.

A software tweak fixed the issue, but it was fortunate that the issue was discovered during a planned demonstration of the lethality of the Durandal for the Raksha Mantri at the Pokharan range, not during an operation.

So, if and when a requirement emerges, the OEM must be willing to provide a more extensive interface than the one initially provided, at a nominal cost. The IAF must pay for the source code only once.

Conclusion

India should not buy the Rafale unless France commits to providing access to any part of the source code that the IAF needs to access.

The additional access should be provided at a very nominal, pre-negotiated cost. If the OEM declines to provide additional access, it must surrender the source code.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

IAF Signals Hypersonic Ambitions With IISc-Led Propulsion Challenge

A Gemini rendition of the launch of a S-200 with a DMRJ powered curise missile

The Indian Air Force on January 29, 2026 signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)  with the Foundation for Science Innovation and Development (FSID), IISc Bengaluru to indigenously develop an advanced high-speed air-breathing propulsion system.

Announcing the MoA, the IAF's official X handle stated that the MoA "underscores IAF’s commitment towards Atmanirbharta by development of high-speed flight systems with dual-use capabilities."

Copies of documents and diagrams posted on social media and associated with the MoA indicate that the proposed “advanced high-speed air-breathing propulsion system” is a dual-mode ramjet/scramjet engine (DMRJ), intended for use in propelling missiles or combat aircraft.

DRDO has already developed ramjet and scramjet engines for missiles. The former operate efficiently at high supersonic speeds and the latter operate efficiently through hypersonic speeds. 

DMRJ Engines Explained

In a ramjet engine the air entering the engine is slowed to subsonic speed and consequently compressed before combustion. In a scramjet engine, the air is similarly slowed down and compressed but remains supersonic throughout the combustor. 

Ramjet engines operate efficiently roughly from Mach 3 to Mach 6. Scramjet engines are needed for speeds beyond Mach 6–7

DMRJ, which combines ramjet and scramjet propulsion, can operate efficiently across a very wide supersonic to hypersonic speed envelope by switching how combustion occurs inside the engine.

DMRJ Development Status

The DMRJ concept has been tested but never operationalised.

Russia reportedly tested a hydrogen-fueled dual-mode scramjet  developed by the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM) in the 1990s under (Kholod Project). 

It modified a 5V28 missile from the S-200 long-range air defence system, replacing the warhead and guidance system with a DMRJ and its liquid hydrogen fuel tank.

To test a DMRJ, it first has to be accelerated to high supersonic speeds that can facilitate ramjet light-up. The S-200 is a heavy missile with a launch weight exceeding 7,000 kg and substantial payload capacity. The S-200’s solid boosters and liquid-fueled sustainer were well suited to accelerating the payload to hypersonic velocities. This modified S-200 served as a cost-effective, readily available booster, leveraging existing infrastructure.

Boosted to high speeds by the missile’s liquid rocket motor, the DMRJ successfully transitioned from ramjet propulsion to scramjet propulsion, achieving speeds over Mach 6.4, with scramjet mode sustained for 77 seconds across seven flight tests (1991–1998).

Russia used the data gathered from these tests to develop the 3M22 Zircon, which can achieve speeds near Mach 8. However, the Zircon uses a scramjet engine not a DMRJ. It is boosted to hypersonic speed directly by its solid-propellant rocket booster. 

Similarly, DRDO’s Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) and its follow-up system under development, the Extended Trajectory–Long Distance Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), both use scramjet propulsion, not DMRJ.

DMRJ Limitation

A notable limitation of a DMRJ is its inability to operate from zero airspeed. It needs to be accelerated to a high airspeed that can generate air compression due to airflow path constriction. To overcome this limitation, a dual-mode ramjet (DMRJ) can be paired with a rocket booster when used in a hypersonic cruise missile. 

For use in a combat aircraft, the DMRJ is paired with a turbine engine in what is called a Turbine-Based Combined Cycle (TBCC) architecture.

In a TBCC-powered combat aircraft, at speeds below ~Mach 2.5 to 5, a turbofan or turbojet provides thrust. The turbine is then shut down and bypassed, and the DMRJ takes over propulsion.

Combining a turbine with a DMRJ allows a combat aircraft to take off conventionally using a turbine engine and then accelerate all the way to hypersonic speeds.

Using TBCC propulsion, a combat aircraft can take off and loiter at subsonic cruise. When desired, it can accelerate to supersonic speeds using its turbine engine and then switch to DMRJ propulsion for sustained hypersonic cruise. Such a flight profile is impossible with a pure DMRJ + rocket booster combination.

TBCC Challenges

Ramjets, scramjets, and DMRJs are conceptually and mechanically relatively simple to build, as they involve no moving parts. However, the materials and techniques required to sustain supersonic and hypersonic combustion do pose significant challenges.

While a DMRJ can be combined with a turbine engine in a TBCC configuration, the engineering challenges are extremely complex, and the concept remains experimental.

The air flowing into a turbine engine has to be subsonic and at relatively low temperatures, whereas the airflow in a DMRJ has to be supersonic and at very high temperatures.

As such, the two engines share the inlet and nozzle, but not the combustor.

Smoothly switching from turbine to ramjet and then to scramjet operation is a particularly major challenge. Any pressure mismatch can cause the engine to fail to start or experience flameout.

Conclusion

As already noted, the engineering challenges of building a reliable ramjet that can transition to scramjet mode within the form factor of a compact missile fare immense.

While standalone scramjet and ramjet missiles exist or are being developed, true DMRJ designs remain in research and flight test demonstration programs rather than fielded systems

As already noted, there are no operational missiles powered by DMRJ propulsion, let alone the even more complex TBCC architecture.

Viewed in this light, the IAF’s MoA with IISc is clearly aimed at funding long-term research. This investment is unlikely to yield operational benefits for the IAF for at least a decade.

IISc has actively participated in the HSTDV programme, which successfully met its stated objectives. It therefore possesses the experience and technical depth required to undertake the development of DMRJ propulsion, and eventually progress to TBCC systems.

Supporting long-term technology development is, without doubt, a sound approach for the IAF.

However, there also appears to be a subtle but important message in the IAF’s tie-up with IISc:

While the IAF is willing to invest in future technologies, its immediate operational requirements cannot wait. These must be met through fast-paced procurement, preferably from domestic OEMs, but where necessary through foreign partnerships that guarantee continuity of support and supply.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Menacing Chinese Stealth Threat : IAF Needs Adversary Sobering Combat Capability, Not Make-in-India!

Nearly eight years after initiating procurement under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is finally poised to sign a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Roughly speaking, India currently operates around 600 fighter aircraft and is now poised to acquire 114 more.

In contrast, in 2025 alone, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is estimated to have inducted an additional 120 J-20A/J-20S heavy stealth fighters. (The J-20A is the dual-seat variant of the J-20.)

Also in 2025, the PLAAF inducted between 100 and 170 additional fighters, including the J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT, and J-10A/B/C.

In other words, the PLAAF may have added up to 300 heavy stealth and non-stealth fighters to its inventory in a single year.

A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projection suggests that by 2030, around 1,000 J-20A/S fighters and 900 J-16s will be in service with the PLAAF.

The number of J-20s manufactured increased from around 150 in August 2022 to 208 in November 2023. Production rates likely reached 100 aircraft per year in 2023 and have since stabilised at approximately 120 aircraft annually.

In addition to the projected 1,000 J-20A/S stealth fighters, the PLAAF may also induct several hundred land-based J-35 variants. The J-35 is believed to be in low-rate initial production, but output is expected to ramp up in the coming years. Based on the rapid ramp-up of J-20 production, between 200 and 300 J-35s could be operational by 2030. Notably, the J-35 will field highly capable sensors and weapons derived from systems painstakingly perfected for the J-20.

India's Foolhardy Nonchalance

Oblivious to this burgeoning threat, Indians are hotly debating the need for additional Rafale fighters. Worse still, the Indian government appears to be ignoring the Russian offer, despite the fact that the IAF has projected the need for two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter to plug a widening operational gap.

Frankly, the only plausible explanation for India sitting on the Russian offer appears to be deep Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States military–industrial complex (MIC) penetration of Indian corporates, the bureaucracy, and the political leadership. If so, Indian sovereignty is largely illusory. I hope this assessment is wrong—but the issue warrants serious reflection.

Photo Credit: RuMoD

Urgent Need to Delink ToT from Weapon Acquisition

The primary reason for the approximately 30 per cent decline in the IAF’s squadron strength—from 42 to 29 squadrons—has been persistent delays in the delivery of the Tejas fighter and its follow-on variants, including the Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-2.

Shockingly, the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership never moved beyond superficial tinkering with procurement procedures to address these crippling delays. The outcome was predictable: the process stalled and eventually ran aground. Was this paralysis by analysis? Possibly. More likely, despite the optics, defence has never been more than a desultory priority for the political leadership.

Let us focus on the optics. No one disputes the need—or urgency—of Make in India for defence-related equipment. But where is the logic in allowing defence procurement to collapse because Make in India timelines cannot be met?

The problems with Make in India cannot be addressed through procurement policy changes alone; they are endemic to the current state of India’s industrial base.

For many technologically advanced components used in modern weapon systems—such as aero and marine engines, sensors, and advanced materials—India possesses neither the industrial base nor the technical know-how required for local manufacture. Indeed, the absence of know-how is itself a consequence of the absence of a mature industrial base.

The industrial base of any country evolves in response to market dynamics. When substantial demand emerges, the private sector—driven by profit incentives—moves rapidly to meet it. Firms upgrade industrial capacity, enter technology transfer arrangements, raise capital, hire skilled personnel, and undertake a range of other, often complex, adjustments necessary to compete.

India’s inability to develop several critical weapon-system components is not a failure of intelligence or talent. It stems from the absence of a mature industrial base, which in turn limits engineering excellence, advanced semiconductor fabrication capability, materials science depth, and related competencies. The gap is so fundamental that India is not even positioned to reverse-engineer, let alone replicate, cutting-edge technologies.

Defence Procurement and Make in India Are Parallel Processes

For reasons that remain unexplained, the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India (GoI) have tethered India’s defence preparedness to the Make in India programme. This flawed linkage has allowed national security to be held hostage to industrial policy.

It is a dangerous and indefensible conflation.

A familiar refrain follows: India should not buy Rafales because France has not agreed to transfer technology. This framing is faulty. It is not France but Dassault Aviation that has declined extensive transfer of technology—and understandably so. How can a private design house be expected to part with its core intellectual property when India lacks the industrial base and the pool of trained, experienced personnel required to absorb it? Moreover, Dassault’s very survival depends on intellectual property accumulated painstakingly over decades.

This raises a more fundamental question: why is India insisting on transfer of technology as part of every fighter aircraft procurement deal?

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) already know how to design and manufacture fighter aircraft. They have done so twice—first with the HF-24 Marut, and later with the Tejas.

What they may need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps—high-temperature engine technology, for instance. Such transfers should be negotiated independently, rather than being tied to acquisitions meant to address urgent operational shortfalls.

Indeed, Safran and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) are reportedly poised to sign a contract to co-develop an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter. The deal—reportedly cleared by the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and the Finance Ministry—is awaiting final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

The proposed agreement, valued at over ₹30,000 crore, reportedly involves full transfer of technology for a 120–140 kilonewton thrust-class engine, with joint intellectual property ownership and manufacturing in India.

So why does India need Rafale engine technology at all? After all, HAL has been assembling and partially manufacturing the AL-31F engine for the Su-30MKI locally for decades.

The core issue is this: if every fighter aircraft acquisition is made contingent on comprehensive transfer of technology, will India ever acquire fighters from abroad at all? Revisit the opening paragraphs and ask whether India can realistically counter the Chinese threat through local production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, LCA Mk-2, and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), supplemented by roughly 150 Rafales and about 270 Su-30MKIs—many of which have not undergone a major upgrade in nearly 25 years.

Conclusion

China’s military build-up has already reached overwhelming proportions.

Indian Air Force light fighters such as the Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-1A lack the range and payload required to effectively defend Indian airspace against the PLAAF—particularly against its stealth fighters (J-20A/S, J-35) and heavy multirole aircraft (J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT).

The IAF must urgently rebuild its combat strength to the authorised level of 42 fighter squadrons—and not with just any aircraft, but with platforms capable of credibly countering the PLAAF’s current and emerging threat.

Make in India remains an important long-term objective. It cannot, however, be India’s immediate operational strategy.

 Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

The Rafale Deal: A Necessary Compromise Explained

The recent ANI report states that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is poised to begin negotiations on a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter jets from France.

According to the ANI report, the indigenous content in the aircraft would be limited to around 30 per cent. There is no additional transfer of technology (ToT) commitment beyond this 30 per cent indigenous content.

The source codes will remain exclusively with the French side.

Widespread Consternation

There is widespread consternation on account of the following:

1. Rafales manufactured in India will have only 30 per cent indigenous content.

2. The deal encompasses no additional transfer of technology.

3. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will not receive the source code for integrating indigenous weapon systems without French assistance.

“What happened to Make in India?” is the lament. Why cannot India look for an alternative? Russia, for example, has offered full transfer of technology and local production for the Su-57!

In the following paragraphs, I will place the proposed deal and its limitations in the correct perspective. We begin with the imperative for the new deal.

TINA – There Is No Alternative

The Indian Air Force proposes to acquire additional Rafales under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme. The IAF has also proposed that the government acquire two to three squadrons of a stealth fighter to plug the operational gap that will exist until at least one squadron of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is inducted.

These two acquisitions are proceeding on parallel tracks. One cannot substitute the other.

The MRFA programme is a follow-on to the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme. The Ministry of Defence initiated procurement under the MRFA programme in April 2018. Aircraft that competed under the MRFA programme included the Gripen NG, MiG-35, Su-35, and F/A-18E/F.

Under the MRFA procurement track, there is no real alternative to the Rafale for two compelling reasons:

1. The IAF evaluated the competing fighters during the MMRCA programme and concluded that the Rafale was the best option.

2. The IAF has already invested heavily in infrastructure, training, and logistics to operate and maintain the Rafale.

The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:

“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”

“Now, whether it is Rafale or something else, it really doesn't matter, but yes, Rafale is easy to absorb,” he added.

MRFA and LCA Mk-2

Given France’s decision to cap transfer of technology at 30 per cent, and considering that the IAF has already waited eight years for the MRFA programme to materialise, could the IAF wait longer in support of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-2?

The problem is that, based on past Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivery records, it will be quite some time before the LCA Mk-2 project takes off and reaches an operationally viable stage. A protracted wait would further erode IAF's squadron strength.

What must be clearly understood is that raising or re-raising squadrons to full operational status, after they have been number plated, is a process that takes years.

Adding to the uncertainty, the LCA Mk-2 will be powered by the General Electric (GE) F414 engine, increasing India’s vulnerability to United States pressure or sanctions.

Limited Transfer of Technology

During the interaction referred to earlier, the Chief of the Air Staff notably expressed his reservations regarding French unwillingness to transfer technology for local manufacture of the Rafale to the extent desired by India.

The 2018 Request for Information (RFI) for the MRFA programme mandates transfer of technology, along with a guarantee of 75 per cent aircraft availability at all times.

“So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he said.

Viewed pragmatically, the proposal is worth consideration despite limited ToT. Higher percentage of technology transfer could prove counter productive. Indigenous content beyond what Indian industry can deliver quickly would only lead to delays and mutual recrimination.

Whatever Indian industry can manufacture rapidly and reliably should be made in India; the rest should be imported.

DRDO and HAL have already designed and developed two fighter aircraft—the HF-24 Marut and the Tejas. They do not need 100 per cent technology transfer. What they need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps, such as the inability to develop aircraft engines capable of sustaining higher turbine inlet temperatures. Such technology transfers should be negotiated separately, rather than being tied to acquisitions that are critical for maintaining the operational readiness of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

After all, the acquisition of additional Rafales is intended to arrest the decline in fighter squadron strength, which is currently reported to be 29 squadrons against an authorised strength of 42.

Source Code Issues

According to the ANI report, the Indian side is also seeking French support to enable the integration of Indian weapons and indigenous systems into the aircraft under the government-to-government deal.

However, the source codes will remain with the French side.

It may be recalled that during negotiations for the 2015 deal to acquire 36 Rafale F3R fighters, the IAF had sought access to operational source codes from Dassault Aviation and Thales Avionics for the mission avionics and the fly-by-wire flight control system, in order to retain a “unilateral upgrade” capability.

Access to the source code would have enabled the IAF and HAL to implement mid-life weapons and avionics upgrades by leveraging open architecture, without having to revert to Dassault and Thales.

The ANI report appears to confirm that the Rafale variant now proposed is the F4 variant, not the F3 variant acquired earlier, and that the source code architecture of the F4 has changed.

Rafale F4 Variant

The Rafale F4 incorporates significant upgrades, including:

1. A new Thales software-defined radio (CONTACT), offering improved security, enhanced data links, and integrated civil and military satellite communication capability.

2. An improved RBE2 radar capable of detecting mobile ground targets.

3. An upgraded infrared optronic system.

4. An enhanced SPECTRA self-protection suite, with expanded low- and high-frequency coverage to counter future threats.

5. New weapons, including a mid-life-upgraded SCALP cruise missile, MBDA’s MICA-NG air-to-air missile, and a new version of the AASM air-to-ground weapon. The MICA-NG offers longer range and improved detection and acquisition capability.

6. Predictive maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capability to improve dispatch reliability.

It was earlier reported that the French Ministry of the Armed Forces had publicly confirmed that India is pursuing a plan to acquire 90 Rafale F4 fighters, with an additional option for 24 Rafale F5 aircraft.

Conclusion

The proposed acquisition of 114 additional Rafales is essentially a continuation of the earlier deal under which India acquired 36 aircraft.

In September 2018, following sustained criticism of the government over the limited purchase, then Raksha Mantri Nirmala Sitharaman clarified that the induction was restricted to 36 aircraft because the Indian Air Force’s infrastructure and technical capacity did not permit a larger induction at the time.

The induction of just two squadrons was the outcome of an emergency purchase, she explained:

“Air Force … will tell you that for any emergency-based induction, it is always two squadrons and not more than that.”

Notably, even under the current proposal, 12–18 Rafale jets are expected to be acquired in fly-away condition, most likely because the IAF is inducting the Rafale F4 variant.

Finally, it is worth noting that strategic imports from France have historically come with no political strings attached—albeit often with an ever-increasing price tag. France also remains the only fighter aircraft supplier capable of resisting sustained United States pressure.

Update on January 16, 2026:

My discussion with Abhijat Shekhar on the proposed Rafale deal on Navbharat Times. Some plain speaking and rabble rousing! 1. Why does HAL pay an increasing amount as dividend to the GoI every year? Why not invest the amount in R&D? In the past three financial years, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) paid the following dividend amounts to the Government of India (GoI): FY 2022-23: ₹1,257 crore FY 2023-24: ₹1,413 crore FY 2024-25: ₹1,820 crore 2. For 25 years, MoD / IAF have made no serious attempt to upgrade Su-30MKI. In contrast, with the Rafale, it plans to quickly move from F3R to F4 to F5 variants. 3. The reasons why Dassault will not and can not part with the full source code of the Rafale. Dassault is not exploiting an Indian weakness, it is protecting it is safeguarding its own competitive edge. 4. DRDO appears more interested in adding to the number of projects that it is working on rather than focusing on the projects that are most critical to India's defence requirements. Is it more focused on increasing its establishment, rather than delivering on its promise?

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.