Sunday, January 20, 2019

Rafale - Nature of the India Specific Enhancements (ISEs)

Rafale at Aero India 2017

The Rafale contract envisages 13 India Specific enhancements (ISEs) valued at Euro 1.3 b. There is no official list of the ISEs in the public domain, however, based on media reports the ISEs include:

  1. More powerful engine
  2. Radar enhancements
  3. Helmet mounted display
  4. Towed decoy system
  5. Radar warning receiver
  6. Low band jammer
  7. SATCOM
  8. Radio altimeter (CFIT avoidance?)
  9. Ability to start and operate from High Altitude Airfields
  10. 10-hr flight data recorder
  11. Infrared Search and Tracking (IRST)
  12. Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS)
The ToI reported on January 20, 2019 that the 13 India-specific enhancements or upgrades on the 36 jets would become fully operational only by September-October 2022 as they will require another six months to undergo "software certification" after all the fighters have arrived in India. In the past, there were reports that the ISEs would be carried out in India for all but the first Rafale to be delivered. The ToI in its above report states 

The first Rafale jet with the 13 ISEs is currently undergoing flight-testing in France, which is expected to achieve certification by April 2022. By this time, the other 35 fighters with the requisite hardware upgrades will be delivered to India in batches of 4-6 each. "Thereafter, it will take another six months to finish the certification for the software to drive the ISEs for all the 36 jets," said another source.

The above quoted and other past reports suggest that the ISEs are largely software related. 

The nature of the ISEs also reinforces the likelihood of they being primarily software related. If indeed that is the case, it would suggest that Dassault would be supplying India the source code of the sensors and display systems as part of the ISEs. Using the source code and ISE implementation documentation supplied by Dassault, IAF personnel would be able to customize the existing algorithms used and hone them to address the specific threats that the IAF faces. 

The IAF would also be able to customize and if required tweak the display layout and symbology associated with multi-function and head up displays. That would explain why the IAF cannot detail the ISE specifics despite questions being raised about the high price being paid for them. 

The following is an illustrative example. One of the ISE is LBJ (Low Band Jammer). However, LBJ is part of the Spectra EW suite that equips the F3R variant that India is purchasing from Dassault, so why is it listed as an ISE? Well.., because through customization the algorithms used to jam low band RF can be tweaked to handle the specific threats faced by India. The nature (frequency band, pulse characteristics, etc.) of RF emissions of Indian adversaries would be well known to India but not France. So software customization would be best handled by IAF personnel. 

Similar would be the case for the AESA radar, towed jammer, IRST, MAWS, CIFT avoidance, SATCOM, etc.

The IAF would also want to customize the layout and symbology used on the fusion displays for standardization across platforms. It is unlikely that the IAF would have bought a software intensive platform such as the Rafale without the ToT for deep customization. The ToT would additionally allow the IAF to use Indian developed weapon systems like the Astra BVR missile and in the future weapon systems such as the NGARM.

There is another facet to the need for ISEs, Rafale would be operated by at least two other countries friendly to one of our adversaries leaving a window  ajar for leaks of critical algorithms used in the Rafale. (The other adversary is an IPR thief of repute and would steal from any country - friendly or not!)

This post is based on this twitter thread posted on January 19, 2019.

Is Russia Adding Formidable 6th Gen Capability to its Su-57 fighter?

via Twitter
Recently, the T-50-3 was observed in new pixelated camouflage pattern with an insignia on the tail depicting a Okhotnik UCAV radio linked to a T-50. (See above)

The T-50-3 featured three new protrusions on the fuselage - A under fuselage sensor slightly ahead of the cockpit, an over the fuselage antenna just behind the cockpit, and an antenna on the underside of the tail boom in between the exhaust nozzles.

The insignia and the protrusions have fueled social media speculation that the aircraft has been upgraded to control and guide LO drones capable of penetrating contested airspace to attack targets or relay targeting data

The ability to control stealthy drones for penetrating heavily contested airspace, or legacy aircraft operating as loyal wing-man weapon trucks is a sixth generation fighter features. For example, the Franco - German - Spanish FCAS, which is planned to enter operational service in 2040, will feature this ability.

Okhotnik (Hunter) UCAV

A see through model of the Sukhoi Okhotnik (Hunter) UCAV was first unveiled by KRET at MAKS-2015. The UAV model closely resembled Northrop’s carrier-based X-47B demonstrator, but added two lift fans on each wing and vertical stabilizers.

See through Okhotnik model at MAKS 2015 [via Twitter]


The heavy (20t)  UAV, reportedly capable of flying at 1000 kph, performed its first T/O run trial at the Novosibirsk Aircraft Production Plant in November 2018 reaching a speed of 200 kph.

Compensating for the Su-57's Lack of All Aspect Stealth

The Su-57 features good front aspect stealth, but not so good side and rear aspect stealth making it a capable head on interceptor, but not such a capable offensive platform. Ground based radars and AWACS would pick up a Su-57 much more easily than they would a F-22 Raptor which features good all aspect stealth.

Good front aspect stealth in combination with L-band leading edge AESA radar and good front sector optronics make the Su-57 a formidable interceptor of LO observable attack aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightening 2, and the J-20. In order to keep the aircraft affordable, an economically stretched Russia initially concentrated on the defensive capabilities of the Su-57.

Sukkhoi Okhotnik UCAV (via Twitter)

The ability to guide a LO sensor / attack platform into contested adversary airspace to obtain targeting data would now give the Su-57 formidable attack capability. It would also explain why Russia has invested heavily in developing long range stealthy cruise missiles such as the Kh-59MK2  for internal carriage on the T-50.

The limited weapon load of the very stealthy F-22 Raptor is its greatest shortcoming. By opting for differently-abled stealth platforms specialized for different roles with the ability to work as a single system, Russia may be poised to once again score with its asymmetric approach to countering American economic and technical prowess.