Chetak, Cheetah Replacement: Still Hovering After Two Decades

 

LUH on display at DefExpo 2020

On May 20, 2026, an Indian Army (IA) Cheetah helicopter crashed in the Tangste (Tangtse) region near Leh in Ladakh during a routine high-altitude sortie.

The helicopter was carrying three IA officers — two pilots and passenger Major General Sachin Mehta, General Officer Commanding of the 3 Infantry Division.

All three survived with minor injuries. They walked away from the wreckage in high spirits, as was evident from a selfie posted by them on social media that went viral.

Ageing Chetak, Cheetah Helicopter Fleet

The crash drew attention to the IA's ageing fleet of around 350 Cheetah and Chetak helicopters. For over two decades, the IA has been seeking replacement of the 1960s-vintage French helicopters manufactured in India by HAL.

In 2010, HAL, based on its experience and learning from manufacturing the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters, as well as from developing the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter, announced that it would develop a Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) to replace the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters.

On a parallel track, Indian PM Narendra Modi, during his visit to Russia in December 2014 for the annual summit meeting, signed an agreement to jointly manufacture Kamov Ka-226T light utility helicopters in India at HAL.

As per the agreement, India and Russia were to produce at least 200 Ka-226T helicopters for the Indian Armed Forces, with additional units potentially manufactured for civilian use and export.

The LUH is a 3-tonne, single-engine light utility helicopter. Powered by the Safran HE Ardiden-1U engine, rated at 750 kW, the LUH has a maximum AUW of 3,150 kg. It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 350 km with a 400 kg payload. It can seat six — a crew of two and four passengers.

The Ka-226 is a slightly larger 3.6-tonne, twin-engine, multi-role light helicopter with coaxial contra-rotating rotors (no tail rotor). It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 600 km. It has a crew of one to two and can seat six to seven passengers.

LUH Hot & High Altitude Trials September 2020

LUH Program Status

The programs to replace IA Chetak and Cheetah helicopters with the LUH and Ka-226 helicopters are both woefully behind schedule.

The LUH program has been delayed by technical challenges, supply-chain issues, and certification problems. Technical challenges include main rotor blade refinements and noise/vibration issues. The imported Automatic Flight Control System (autopilot) from Safran faced supply disruptions during COVID and integration problems. There has also been scope creep, with the Army adding advanced autopilot requirements that were not part of the original specifications.

Nine of the 12 Limited Series Production units had been built but remained undelivered as of May 2026.

Certification, which was targeted for late 2025, will likely slip to late 2026.

Ka-226 Program Status

The Ka-226 program failed to make headway due to disagreements over local production costs, technology transfer issues, and Russia's inability to meet 70% indigenous content targets because the aircraft was powered by French engines.

In January 2022, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reviewed the Ka-226T manufacturing project as part of India's efforts to reduce dependence on foreign defence equipment. Following the review, the project stalled, likely due to two key factors:

1. Development of the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): The DPB considered HAL’s indigenous LUH program a viable alternative. The LUH, a 3-tonne-class helicopter, was being developed to meet both military and civilian requirements.

2. Restricted Access to French Engines: At the time of contract signing in 2015, the Ka-226T was powered by French Arrius 2G1 engines. However, following geopolitical tensions, France denied Russia access to the engine. Consequently, Russia could not meet its obligations to fully support Ka-226T manufacture in India as the OEM.

Russian Import Substitution Alters the Landscape

Meanwhile, Russia continued to develop the Ka-226T to fulfil Indian requirements.

Following Russia's estrangement from France, the UEC-Klimov enterprise announced in 2019 the development of a new VK-650V gas-turbine turboshaft engine with a takeoff power of 650 hp.

The VK-650V is intended to replace the French powerplant on Russian Ka-226T and Ansat helicopters. According to UEC, variants of the VK-650V could also be adapted to power drones and hybrid propulsion systems for aircraft.

In June 2024, UEC delivered the first prototype VK-650V engines for flight tests on an Ansat helicopter.

On February 7, a Rostec press release stated that UEC “has received type certification for the VK-650V turboshaft engine, designed for light helicopters. The VK-650V is now ready for serial production and operational deployment.”

On May 22, 2026, a prototype Ka-226T helicopter equipped with two new Russian VK-650V turboshaft engines completed its first full-fledged circular flight in Tomilino near Moscow.

Potential Ka-226T Revival with the VK-650V Engine

The certification of the VK-650V engine could potentially revive the stalled project to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India.

Since contract negotiations were suspended, Russia has replaced many foreign components on the Ka-226T with locally manufactured ones. At the time of contract signing, only 72% of the components were of Russian origin. As a result, Indo-Russian Helicopters can now begin production of the Ka-226T with a higher level of indigenous content than before.

HAL is significantly behind schedule in delivering an LUH conforming to the requirements of the Indian Armed Forces. Keeping in mind the large number of light helicopters due for replacement, it could be over a decade before the Chetaks and Cheetahs are finally phased out.

In any case, there is market potential for two locally manufactured helicopters targeting the Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, law-enforcement agencies, the civil sector, and exports.

Relying solely on HAL’s LUH program is a high-risk strategy, given HAL’s uncertain delivery timeline.

Both the LUH and Ka-226T programs conform to the Make-in-India paradigm. The indigenous content and level of technology transfer (ToT) absorption for both the LUH and the Ka-226T are expected to be similar.

If the Russians were to agree to limited or complete manufacturing ToT for the VK-650V engine, India would gain much more than a helicopter engine, keeping in mind the possible use of the engine as a drone powerplant.

India Walked Away from the FGFA. The Need for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter Did Not!

 The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which India and Russia once planned to co-develop, was envisioned as a two-seat variant of the Su-57.

The IAF’s requirement was never for a stealth fighter — it was, and likely continues to be, for a twin-seat stealth fighter!

It's likely that the IAF’s preference for a twin-seat fighter was based on its experience operating the Su-30MKI. Besides pilot training and operational conversion, a twin-seat fighter could also support multi-role operations benefiting from a second crew member, such as complex strike coordination, electronic warfare/attack roles, and reconnaissance.

The reported reasons for India opting out of the FGFA program — lack of supercruise and unproven operational capability — were always unconvincing, considering that India, as a co-developer of the fighter, would eventually have addressed those shortcomings.

The Rationale for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter

All 4th-generation fighter development programs foresaw the eventual need for a twin-seat variant. The initial designs provisioned for a second seat, usually by placing a fuel tank and relocatable electronics behind the cockpit. That space could later be utilized for a second cockpit by moving the electronics and dispensing with the fuel tank.

Stealth fighter development programs for the F-22 and F-35 chose to depart from the twin-seat convention for the following reasons:

1. A twin-seat configuration compromises stealth shaping to some extent.

2. It reduces internal fuel-carrying capacity, thereby compromising range. (Stealth fighters cannot carry fuel externally in drop tanks.)

3. The fighters were primarily designed to penetrate contested airspace; it was believed that sensor fusion would be adequate to enable a single pilot to fly such missions.

In brief, it was believed — with good reason — that twin-seat stealth fighters would add complexity, reduce internal fuel or payload in some cases, and increase radar cross-section.

MUM-T Operations

It has now been clear for several years that the choice of single-seat-only stealth fighters did not anticipate the emergence of the requirement for Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) operations.

The Su-57D, for example, is reportedly designed to team up with four S-70 Okhotnik modular drones configured for roles such as SEAD, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and aerial combat. The control and coordination demands of MUM-T operations far exceed what sensor fusion and AI alone can enable a pilot to manage.

South Korea's KF-21 Boramae Stealth Fighter

South Korea followed a pragmatic approach in developing its KF-21 stealth fighter — an approach that is paying rich dividends in terms of meeting performance and development timeline goals.

Specifically:

The KF-21 features significant reduction in RF observability rather than all-aspect low observability. (To achieve the latter, it would have required materials that the nation had not yet developed.)

The KF-21 features a twin-engine, semi-stealth design with external weapons carriage (no internal weapons bay in the early blocks).

Of the six prototypes built, two were twin-seat variants.

The first prototype rolled out in April 2021 and flew in July 2022. All prototypes collectively conducted roughly 1,600 sorties over 42 months of incident-free flight testing, achieving supersonic flight, aerial refueling, and weapons integration. System development concluded in early 2026.

The first serial-production KF-21 to roll out in March 2026 was, significantly, a trainer!

Initial deliveries to the ROKAF are slated for the second half of 2026, with 40 Block I aircraft targeted by 2028 and up to 120 total aircraft (including Block II) by 2032.

Block I prioritizes air superiority; Block II will add full multirole air-to-ground and anti-ship capabilities. Block III variants will address stealth shortcomings and include internal weapons bays.

The two-seat variant will play a pivotal role. It will not only accelerate pilot training and operational conversion but also facilitate the development of advanced variants and future concepts such as loyal-wingman operations.

An electronic warfare/attack variant — the KF-21EA — is planned, with a dedicated Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) station in the rear cockpit.

China's J-20S

Ahead of the KF-21, China’s J-20S — a two-seat variant of the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon — became the world’s first operational twin-seat fifth-generation stealth fighter.

The fighter was unveiled at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow.

Prototypes first flew in 2021; the aircraft entered, or approached, PLAAF operational service in 2025, with frontline markings appearing by mid-year.

The J-20S is reportedly optimized for combat (MUM-T operations), not training or operational conversion. The second crew member — a Mission Systems Officer — manages MUM-T-related sensor fusion, electronic warfare/jamming, and tactical command and control.

While the pilot focuses on flight and air superiority, the Mission Systems Officer directs loyal-wingman drones for coordinated strikes, reconnaissance, and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences).

Su-57D

Russia’s UAC announced on May 19, 2026, that the Su-57D — a two-seat, multifunctional, fifth-generation fighter — had commenced flight testing. The Su-57D is now the third stealth fighter with a twin-seat variant.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Russia provisioned for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 from the start of the aircraft’s development.

Reliable Russian social media recently reported that the Su-57D “was converted from the already existing 055 aircraft in the shortest possible time.”

“The Indians wanted such an aircraft, and we customized it for them.”

Converting an existing single-seat airframe into a twin-seater in a short time would not have been possible had Sukhoi not designed the aircraft for such a conversion.

The most likely reason Sukhoi did not develop a twin-seat variant earlier was that the Russian Aerospace Forces never projected the need for one.

However, over the past couple of years, Sukhoi has completed development and operational testing of the S-70 Okhotnik stealth combat drone. Su-57 fighters have successfully carried out operational Su-57 + S-70 MUM-T missions in Ukraine.

The need for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 has now been firmly established, and Russia’s Ministry of Defense has already ordered a batch of the twin-seaters.

HAL Likely to Offer a Customized Su-57D Variant

Russia has offered to help HAL build a customized variant of the Su-57D for the IAF. The offer reportedly involves ToT and industrial participation, including joint-venture production of components in India, licensed assembly, MRO facilities, and possible avionics customization.

If Rosoboronexport and HAL successfully negotiate the technological and financial terms of their collaboration, HAL is likely to offer the customized Su-57D variant to the IAF.

The HAL–Rosoboronexport tie-up is unlikely to be derailed by any CAATSA sanctions because U.S. leverage over HAL is limited. Any U.S. move to stop the supply of GE F404 or F414 engines to HAL is likely to hurt Boeing as much as it hurts India. From India’s perspective, such sanctions now would be preferable to sanctions imposed when the LCA Mk-2 and AMCA programs are approaching maturity and serial production.

DRDO’s ULPGM : Quixotic Counter-Drone Concept Sidesteps the Real Technological Challenge

 

The MoD on May 19 announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes.

ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.

Conceptually, ULPGM is a loitering munition designed to engage adversary drones and helicopters attempting to attack Indian Army (IA) assets. As such, it is an area-defence counter-drone weapon system, unlike interceptor drones that are designed to protect platoon-level deployments of soldiers. Interceptor drones are relatively cheaper and can be widely deployed along the battlefront.

The PIB release announcing the completion of the flight trials states:

"Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully completed the final deliverable-configuration development trials of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile (ULPGM)-V3 in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes at the DRDO test range near Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. The trials were carried out using an integrated Ground Control System (GCS) to command and control the ULPGM weapon system. The GCS features state-of-the-art technologies to automate readiness and launch operations."

ULPGM Capability

The PIB release does not reveal critical weapon-system specifications such as:

1. Range 2. Type of seeker 3. Warhead weight and type 4. Accuracy

However, past news reports have claimed that the missile features a 2-kg warhead and has a 1-metre circular error probability (CEP).

The ULPGM missile has been developed by Research Centre Imarat, Hyderabad, as the nodal lab, along with other DRDO laboratories, namely Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad; Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), Chandigarh; and High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), Pune.

The missile has been produced entirely through the Indian defence ecosystem, based on a mature domestic supply chain. As such, it is ready for "immediate serial mass production."

Launch Platform

The launch platform used for the trials — a multicopter developed by Newspace Research and Technologies, Bengaluru — is unlikely to emerge as the final platform.

Multicopters use commercially available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) microcontrollers, propellers, batteries and gyros. They are easy and relatively inexpensive to configure but lack the speed, stealth, payload capability and range of drones featuring conventional winged airframes.

As such, it is possible that the IA will eventually deploy the ULPGM on a medium-sized drone with a conventional airframe shaped for stealth. Whether such a drone is already under development is not known.

Analysis

A long-endurance, area-defence loitering drone with both air-to-air and air-to-ground capability is not known to have been deployed thus far in the Ukraine war, despite the conflict having emerged as the seminal crucible for drone warfare.

The fact that the concept of an area-defence drone has not been battle-tested should be reason for pause, not a claim of a conceptual breakthrough.

Let me elaborate. As the war in Ukraine has evolved, troop deployments along the line of contact have become increasingly thin. Reconnaissance drones now make the battlefield completely transparent. Troop concentrations and weapons deployments are immediately detected and attacked with fibre-optic-cable-guided FPV drones. Each drone is like a precisely aimed artillery shell and costs as much, possibly less.

In the absence of troop concentrations and the deployment of large weapons along the front line, an area-defence-based counter-drone weapon system lacks relevance in emerging warfare.

Unwieldy, Vulnerable Architecture

The ULPGM relies heavily on the GCS for successful interception. This makes the weapon system unwieldy and vulnerable.

An interceptor drone with 2–3 hours of loitering capability would have to be a medium-sized drone. A medium-sized multicopter drone would be easily detectable in flight and would be immediately engaged by ground-launched air-defence missile systems. A launch platform with a conventional airframe would be even more detectable, as it would require a launch catapult.

An adversary, using drone-based and ground-based electronic eavesdropping, could easily locate and attack a GCS. Indeed, counter-drone warfare is increasingly gravitating towards attacking and destroying drone control centres rather than the attacking drones themselves.

For a successful ULPGM engagement, the adversary target, the ULPGM launch platform and the GCS would all have to be in close proximity — roughly within 10–15 km. As such, adversary attack drones could easily skirt the GCS deployment to strike deep into the interior.

Let us not forget an important lesson from the war in Ukraine: drone strikes are all about finding gaps in the adversary’s air-defence system.

There is another possibility. The adversary could also easily saturate the ULPGM deployment. It is important to understand that the low cost of drones means that a peer adversary will always have a large number of drones at its disposal.

Electronic Warfare

Under the ULPGM architecture, the GCS would control the launch platform, detect the target and launch the missile. The architecture is heavily reliant on communication channels. How likely is it that these communication channels would not be jammed or interfered with through electronic warfare?

Also, the combined cost of the ULPGM, its launch platform and the GCS would far exceed the cost of the target.

Manpower Intensive

The architecture would require the deployment of several trained personnel to launch and operate the ULPGM platform and detection sensors (RF, optical, IR). The deployed personnel would have to be positioned in close proximity to the line of contact. GCS personnel and their equipment would be easily targeted by the adversary.

Conclusion

Drone warfare is gravitating towards the use of relatively inexpensive drones and their deployment in large numbers across the entire battlefield, both for attack and defence.

Counter-drone capability based on low-cost interceptor drones makes sense. Counter-drone capability based on high-cost, high-technology, manpower-intensive drones makes less sense.

The DRDO concept is a total departure from battlefield realities.

Drone warfare is trending towards AI-based autonomous operations, both for attack and interceptor drones. DRDO would better serve the nation by focusing on developing autonomous drone technology based on indigenously manufactured chipsets and sensors, rather than attempting to field unproven and technologically laggard capabilities based on COTS electronic components on drones manufactured by private-sector players like Adani Defence Systems & Technologies Limited, Hyderabad, whose credentials in defence technology are dubious.

It appears that the ULPGM architecture is designed to protect VAs and VPs in the interior, not on the battlefront. The system could well be intended to protect against attacks on political rallies, a role in which it would indeed be effective.

However, the thought leaves one depressed.

MBDA and IAF Sign MRO Agreement for MICA Missiles

Image by @Grok

MBDA and the IAF have signed an agreement to set up MRO facilities for the MICA missile in India.

Currently, MICA missiles need to be shipped to MBDA for refurbishment. An indigenous capability will save time and reduce costs.

The IAF will operate the MICA MRO facility, undertaking inspection, repair, component replacement, and mid-life upgrades throughout the missiles’ service life, with MBDA providing tools, data packages, training, and support.

Mid-life work on an air-to-air missile typically involves software upgrades, seeker enhancements, renewal of pyrotechnic elements (especially solid rocket propellant), batteries, electronics, and other aging components.

At the 2025 Paris Air Show, MBDA and the Indian company AXISCADES formalized the creation of an industrial unit in Bengaluru dedicated to the manufacture and integration of missile launch systems. The MICA MRO agreement is a progression of that tie-up.

AXISCADES Technologies is a Bengaluru-based Indian multinational company specializing in high-end engineering solutions and technology services. It focuses primarily on Aerospace, Defence, and ESAI (Electronics, Semiconductor, and Artificial Intelligence), delivering end-to-end product lifecycle support — from design and development to manufacturing, assembly, testing, and R&D.

Its current order book includes over ₹600 crore worth of advanced sub-systems for indigenous platforms.

IAF and MBDA MICA

The IAF has operated MICA missiles since 2016, initially with the Mirage 2000 and later with Rafale fighters as well.

The IAF Rafale fleet, which currently comprises two squadrons (36 aircraft), is set to expand with the induction of an additional 114 Rafale fighters under the MRFA program. The MICA MRO agreement will help ensure cost-effective sustainment of the fleet’s combat capability.

MBDA weapon systems currently in use by the IAF include the MICA, Meteor, ASRAAM, and Mistral.

Harsh Realities Force Pause on India’s BrahMos-2 Hypersonic Dream

India's quest for the BrahMos-2 hypersonic cruise missile has come face to face with some grim reality checks, and BrahMos Aerospace, which was to develop the missile in partnership with Russia, has reportedly paused development of the missile.

Three factors appear to have weighed in the decision to push back BrahMos-2 development:

1. The high cost of the BrahMos-2 missile

2. The high precision and air defence (AD) penetration capability of the BrahMos missile

3. Russia's reluctance to transfer hypersonic flight scramjet engine technology

The BrahMos-2 is projected to cost approximately $12.5 million. In contrast, BrahMos-1 variant costs range from $3 million to $4.5 million.

The BrahMos-1 established a good accuracy and penetration track record during Op Sindoor. Similarly, Russia's Onyx missile, a BrahMos-1 analogue, has established a good track record in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The penetration capability of the hypersonic BrahMos-2 will be marginally higher than the BrahMos, but not enough to justify its much higher cost. Under the circumstances, it would make more sense for India to increase its inventory of BrahMos missiles through a production ramp-up that will additionally cut down unit cost.

Russia’s reluctance to provide full transfer-of-technology access for scramjet propulsion systems derived from its 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missile isn't surprising. Russia is a world leader in scramjet propulsion, and its need to preserve that lead is existential in nature.

Indigenous Hypersonic Development

Deprioritising BrahMos-2 development could energise several DRDO R&D programs aimed at mastering hypersonic flight and scramjet propulsion.

DRDO has already developed ramjet and scramjet engines for missiles. The former operate efficiently at high supersonic speeds, and the latter operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds.

DRDO developed a ramjet engine for its Akash air defence missile and locally manufactures the ramjet engine that powers the BrahMos missile. A project to develop an indigenous alternative ramjet engine for the BrahMos missile is reportedly underway.

DRDO’s Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) successfully demonstrated short-duration scramjet engine operation.

Under the follow-up Extended Trajectory–Long Distance Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM) program, the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) successfully demonstrated long-duration scramjet propulsion. On January 9, 2026, DRDL operated its actively cooled, full-scale scramjet combustor, achieving a run time of over 12 minutes at its state-of-the-art Scramjet Connect Pipe Test (SCPT) facility.

Earlier, on April 25, 2025, DRDL had successfully ground-tested a subscale actively cooled scramjet combustor for more than 1,000 seconds at the same facility.

The maiden ground test of the full-scale combustor, lasting 120 seconds, took place on January 21, 2025.

With these successful tests, the scramjet combustor is now poised for full-scale, flight-worthy testing.

Dual Mode Ramjet (DMRJ)

In a ramjet engine, the air entering the engine is slowed to subsonic speed and consequently compressed before combustion. In a scramjet engine, the air is similarly slowed down and compressed but remains supersonic throughout the combustor.

Ramjet engines operate efficiently roughly from Mach 3 to Mach 6. Scramjet engines are needed for speeds beyond Mach 6–7.

A DMRJ, which combines ramjet and scramjet propulsion, can operate efficiently across a very wide supersonic to hypersonic speed envelope by switching how combustion occurs inside the engine.

The Indian Air Force, on January 29, 2026, signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the Foundation for Science Innovation and Development (FSID), IISc Bengaluru, to indigenously develop a dual-mode ramjet/scramjet engine (DMRJ), intended for use in propelling missiles or combat aircraft.

BrahMos-2 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Program

India's quest for a hypersonic cruise missile started as far back as 2008 when, during a visit to India by Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, the two countries signed an agreement to develop a hypersonic follow-up to the BrahMos missile.

In September 2009, the two countries finalised the technical QRs for the missile and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

However, the project has failed to make any headway since then. Meanwhile, Russia has gone on to complete development of a BrahMos-2 analogue, the Zircon. Russia operationally deployed the missile as part of its Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Launched from coastal batteries, the Zircon has proven more destructive and difficult to intercept than even the Russian Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile.

During an interview in June 2024, BrahMos Aerospace's CEO Atul Dinkar Rane and Deputy CEO Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Joshi told Sputnik India that while BrahMos-2 remained in the pipeline, project development would be initiated only after completing development of the BrahMos-NG missile, a lighter, scaled-down version of the BrahMos that would facilitate launch by Tejas and MiG-29UPG.

"Hypersonic BrahMos is in our pipeline. However, a definite timeline for its development cannot be provided at this stage. Presently, we are working on the BrahMos-NG programme. Once we realise it successfully, we would consider working on the more advanced hypersonic BrahMos variant."

In July 2025, RT India reported that Russia and India could reach an agreement to rekindle the BrahMos-2 hypersonic cruise missile project during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India.

Prioritising BrahMos-NG Development

Much like the BrahMos-2, the BrahMos-NG missile development project has remained in limbo since it was first announced in 2011.

However, recent reports suggest that development of the missile may have started, though the project is yet to receive an official nod.

On September 9, 2025, TASS reported that BrahMos Aerospace is designing the missile and intends to begin autonomous testing next year.

TASS quoted Alexander Maksichev, Russian Managing Director of the JV, as saying:

“We are currently at the working design stage… and then we will move on to autonomous tests.”

He added that it was too early to discuss the timeline for actual flight testing.

"Autonomous testing" is likely ground-based testing. Flight testing could require an additional year or two, considering the need to upgrade a test aircraft—likely an IAF MiG-29—with supporting hardware and software.

More recently, it has been reported that the new missile would be capable of launching from standard submarine torpedo tubes—similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpene submarines.

Clearly, BrahMos Aerospace has its hands full with the development of the BrahMos-NG and does not have the resources to develop the BrahMos-2 at this point in time.

Conclusion

The lethality, penetration, and accuracy of the high-supersonic-speed BrahMos-1 missile can adequately meet the operational needs of the Indian Armed Forces for the time being.

Embarking on the development of the hypersonic BrahMos-2 through a collaborative project would dramatically raise costs, make the missile unaffordable in large numbers, and result in very little technological gain. Indeed, a hypersonic capability could well prove destabilising, considering that we share land borders with our nuclear-armed adversaries. The shorter flight time of hypersonic missiles would lower the nuclear threshold.