Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.

Decoding the Lethal Upgrade in Russia’s Latest Su-57 Deliveries

A Su-57 from the batch delivered on February 9, 2026

On February 9, 2026, Russia's UAC delivered a large batch of Su-57s which, according to a UAC press release, were “in a new technical configuration.”

“The aircraft have received upgraded onboard systems and a new weapons complex.”

According to a TASS report that quoted experts, one of the main changes in the modernized Su-57 aircraft is the upgraded 101KS onboard optical-electronic self-defense system.

The new 101KS has an infrared channel, believed to operate in the medium and long-wave ranges, in contrast to the system of the previous batches. 

101KS Atoll Electro-Optical (EO) System

The 101KS Atoll Electro-Optical (EO) system is designed primarily for complete situational awareness. The system additionally assists the pilot in operation of the aircraft at all stages. It is used for air-to-air and air-to-surface target engagement, piloting & landing, and as a defensive suite.

The 101KS is a passive sensor suite that emits no radiation - IR or RF - thus providing the Su-57 with increased stealth and survivability. 

The suite includes the 

1. 4 x 101KS-U Omnidirectional UV based MAWS (U/01 - Dorsal aft & Ventral aft; U/02 Either side behind cockpit)

2. 2 x 101KS-O: DIRCM Laser-based counter-measures against infrared missiles (Dorsal fore, Ventral behind cockpit)

3. 101KS-P: Opto-electronic sensor

4. 101KS-V: Omnidirectional IRST for airborne targets

5. 101KS-N: Targeting pod

IRST 101KS-V

IRST is installed atop the aircraft's nose, near its windscreen. Photo: UAC Russia

The Su-57 sports an advanced infrared search and track sensor in the traditional position on Russian fighters—installed atop the aircraft's nose, near its windscreen. The positioning adversely impacts front aspect stealth of the aircraft but the ability of IRST to passively engage stealth aircraft from increasingly greater distances makes up for the LO erosion.

101KS-V forward looking IRST

The fore sensor suite on the Su-57 with elements of the N036 AESA and Atoll EO System

101KS-O, 101KS-U

Like the F-22, the Su-57 has a number of missile launch detector apertures scattered around the aircraft but the Su-57 also has turrets that fire modulated laser beams at an incoming missile's seeker to blind it and throw it off course. The IRST, and DIRCM turrets are mounted dorsally behind the cockpit and ventrally under the cockpit. 

Upper and lower 101KS-O bubbles are visible in the photo at the top.

The 101KS-O turrets on the Su-57 duplicate the functionality of the 101KS-V Opto-electronic (IRST) unit placed ahead of the cockpit but additionally feature IR homing suppression laser to blind an attacking missile providing DIRCM.

The 101KS-O system consists of two laser-emitting turrets, with one placed behind the cockpit on the dorsal side, and the other beneath the cockpit on the ventral side.

The Su-57 is the first fighter in the world to feature a DIRCM. Hitherto, the system has only been used on transports and helicopters only, invariably placed on the ventral side in the past as defense against MANPADS. The use of DIRCM to blind an air-to-air missile is unprecedented.

101KS-O turret on display at MAKS 2019

101KS-O turret on display at MAKS 2019

The 101KS-U MAWS UV sensors (below) of the Su-57 Atoll detect approaching IR missiles and the 101KS-O DIRCM blinds their IR homing sensors with laser.

101KS-U MAWS sensors on the Su-57

101KS-P Thermal Imager

The 101KS-P high resolution thermal imager of the Su-57 Atoll is installed on the wing leading edge & provides low altitude piloting and landing at night

101KS-P Thermal Imager

101KS-N Targeting Pod

101KS-N Optical Pod

The 101KS-N is a multi-channel optical sighting system designed to detect, identify and engage ground targe. The pod features its own thermal stabilization system. 

Situational Awareness

According to First Deputy Igor KRET Nasenkov, the Su-57 features a smart skin that provides the pilot 360-deg situational awareness.

The term "smart skin" refers to the fact that many of the surface of the aircraft are versatile antenna systems that facilitate integrated use of all resources of the aircraft. 

S-71 Integration

Since the UAC press release talks of a new weapons complex, it is possible that the fresh batch of Su-57s delivered is capable of carrying the newly developed air-launched stealthy combat UAV designated S-71, a weapon first unveiled during Army 2024.

The S-71 is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction. Deploying and controlling the Su-57 would require an upgrade of onboard systems. 

The S-71 began captive-carry trials in April 2024 at Russia’s Flight Research Centre in Zhukovsky, with test flights involving the Su-57 fighter.

You can read more details about the S-71 at my Thumkar blog post here.

On January 17, 2026, it was reported that an S-71K “Carpet” for the first time demonstrated its effectiveness by successfully destroying the highly mobile M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket system.

The cruise missile–drone hybrid has been developed by GosMKB Raduga JSC and can be used by 4++ generation multirole fighters, including the Su-35S, Su-30SM/SM2, as well as Su-34 NVO fighter-bombers.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Russia Moves to End Reliance on Chinese Chips for Su-57 and S-400 Systems

Gemini Generated Image

Microwave microchips for the Su-57 fighter and S-500 Prometheus air-defence systems are expected to be manufactured within Russia by the end of 2027.

The governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Denis Pasler, recently announced that an enterprise has begun designing and constructing the country’s first factory capable of serial production of microwave microchips across the full technological cycle.

According to Pasler, the planned production capacity of the facility will be up to 2,000 silicon wafers per year.

Microwave microchips are integrated circuits (ICs) designed to operate at microwave frequencies, ranging from roughly 300 MHz to 300 GHz. They are used in applications such as radar, satellite communications, unmanned systems, wireless networks, and high-speed data processing.

A common example is the Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit (MMIC), which integrates components such as transistors, resistors, and capacitors onto a single semiconductor substrate—typically gallium arsenide (GaAs) or silicon—to process microwave signals efficiently.

These chips handle ultrafast data and wireless signals in real time for tasks including signal decoding, radar tracking, and pattern recognition.

The Su-57’s N036 Byelka airborne radar is likely to rely on such microwave chips, as do the 96L6-CP radar of the S-350A Vityaz air-defence system and the 98L6 Yenisei radar used with the S-500 and S-400 systems.

Su-57 Byelka Radar

The N036 Byelka (“Squirrel”) is an advanced X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system developed by the Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP) for the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter.

It serves as the aircraft’s primary fire-control radar, featuring a nose-mounted N036-1-01 array with approximately 1,514–1,526 gallium arsenide (GaAs) transmit/receive (T/R) modules. This is supplemented by two side-looking N036B-1-01 X-band arrays, each with around 358–404 T/R modules, providing an expanded azimuth coverage of up to ±135°. In addition, L-band arrays embedded in the wing leading edges support IFF and electronic-warfare functions.

The GaAs substrate offers high electron mobility, low noise, and efficient operation in dense electronic environments, although it lags behind gallium nitride (GaN) in power density and heat dissipation.

Key capabilities reportedly include detection ranges of up to 400 km against targets with a 1 m² radar cross-section, simultaneous tracking of 60 airborne and 30 ground targets, and engagement of up to 16 air and four surface targets. Air-to-air and air-to-ground modes can operate concurrently.

The system incorporates sensor fusion and additional rear-facing elements to provide near-360° coverage, enhancing situational awareness, resistance to jamming, and survivability in contested airspace.

S-400 / S-500 Yenisei Radar

The Yenisei radar is an advanced S-band AESA system developed primarily for the S-500 Prometey air-defence system.

It features a large AESA array—approximately 3 × 4 metres—based on gallium arsenide technology. The radar offers long detection ranges of up to 600 km, high resolution, precise tracking of both ballistic and aerodynamic targets, and strong resistance to electronic countermeasures.

Designed for continuous, long-duration operation, it also incorporates low-probability-of-intercept characteristics.

Although developed for the S-500, the Yenisei can be integrated with S-400 batteries as a multifunctional fire-control radar, improving missile guidance accuracy and overall system effectiveness in dense electronic-warfare environments.

Russia's Dependence on China

There is speculation that Russia is dependent on China for microchips and MMICs fitted on its high end systems. While there is likelihood that the speculation reflects reality, it is important to note that Russia produces MMICs domestically through firms like Mikropribor and Istok. However, the MMIC production has relied on imported components and machinery. It's possible that MMIC production was disrupted after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2022 limiting Russia's access to advanced semiconductors. 

It is likely that now at least some MMICs in the Su-57's N036 Byelka radar and S-400's associated radars (such as the 92N6E Grave Stone or integrable Yenisei) are sourced from or via China.

The evidence for this is circumstantial. For example, in 2023-2024, China supplied ~90% of Russia's microelectronics, including specialized chips for guidance, radar, and military applications.

However, since production at Mikropribor pivots around components sourced from the West, it is likely that China is being used primarily as a conduit for importing Western components that go into MMICs. 

For example, the S-400 system depends on foreign radar substrates (e.g., US-made RO4003C laminates) obtained via China/Hong Kong. 

Because of China's limited holding of S-400 system, it is unlikely that they are locally manufacturing major electronic components that go into the system. As such, China likely supplies to Russia other electronic material such as PCB laminates. 

It's important to note that the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Denis Pasler announced that the new plant would be the "country’s first factory capable of serial production of microwave microchips across the full technological cycle."

Impact on India

India, which currently operates three S-400 systems, is likely to acquire at least ten eventually. Local manufacture of S-400 systems is also being considered.

Meanwhile, HAL is in advanced technical negotiations with Russia’s UAC for the local manufacture of the Su-57 stealth fighter.

Based on the analysis above, it is highly unlikely that IAF S-400 or Su-57 systems would be negatively impacted by Russia’s likely limited and transient dependence on Chinese electronic components.

Russia’s investment in full-cycle design and development of MMICs will ensure that India does not become dependent on China.

In addition, India already has design capabilities and ambitious plans to manufacture MMICs as part of its broader semiconductor push under the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM). Indian design plans reportedly include advanced 3 nm nodes.

MMIC manufacturing capability is also emerging through plans that include a US–India joint fab for GaN and SiC semiconductors by 2029.

Within a reasonable timeframe, India would be in a position to manufacture the electronic components required for the S-400 and Su-57 systems.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

HAL Pursuing Su-57 Joint Production Offer with Sukhoi

The Indian Express reported on January 19, 2026, that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has tasked a Russian team with calculating the costs HAL would incur if it were to participate in a joint venture with Sukhoi to locally manufacture the Su-57. While calculating the total cost, the team will include expenses related to technology transfer (ToT), infrastructure, supply-chain development, and human resources.

Two months earlier, representatives from the Sukhoi Design Bureau and other Russian defence entities stated in a proposal to HAL that the company already possesses roughly half of the infrastructure required for the local production of the Su-57. This assessment is based on the fact that HAL has been locally manufacturing the Su-30MKI at Nashik, Maharashtra (airframe); Koraput, Odisha (engine); and Kasaragod, Kerala (avionics).

The Russian team is expected to submit its report later this month.

Indian Express sources have clarified that the Government of India (GoI) has yet to take a decision on which stealth fighter to acquire to meet the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) projected operational requirement of two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter, intended to bridge the projected 10-year gap until the induction of the AMCA.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Menacing Chinese Stealth Threat : IAF Needs Adversary Sobering Combat Capability, Not Make-in-India!

Nearly eight years after initiating procurement under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is finally poised to sign a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Roughly speaking, India currently operates around 600 fighter aircraft and is now poised to acquire 114 more.

In contrast, in 2025 alone, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is estimated to have inducted an additional 120 J-20A/J-20S heavy stealth fighters. (The J-20A is the dual-seat variant of the J-20.)

Also in 2025, the PLAAF inducted between 100 and 170 additional fighters, including the J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT, and J-10A/B/C.

In other words, the PLAAF may have added up to 300 heavy stealth and non-stealth fighters to its inventory in a single year.

A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projection suggests that by 2030, around 1,000 J-20A/S fighters and 900 J-16s will be in service with the PLAAF.

The number of J-20s manufactured increased from around 150 in August 2022 to 208 in November 2023. Production rates likely reached 100 aircraft per year in 2023 and have since stabilised at approximately 120 aircraft annually.

In addition to the projected 1,000 J-20A/S stealth fighters, the PLAAF may also induct several hundred land-based J-35 variants. The J-35 is believed to be in low-rate initial production, but output is expected to ramp up in the coming years. Based on the rapid ramp-up of J-20 production, between 200 and 300 J-35s could be operational by 2030. Notably, the J-35 will field highly capable sensors and weapons derived from systems painstakingly perfected for the J-20.

India's Foolhardy Nonchalance

Oblivious to this burgeoning threat, Indians are hotly debating the need for additional Rafale fighters. Worse still, the Indian government appears to be ignoring the Russian offer, despite the fact that the IAF has projected the need for two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter to plug a widening operational gap.

Frankly, the only plausible explanation for India sitting on the Russian offer appears to be deep Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States military–industrial complex (MIC) penetration of Indian corporates, the bureaucracy, and the political leadership. If so, Indian sovereignty is largely illusory. I hope this assessment is wrong—but the issue warrants serious reflection.

Photo Credit: RuMoD

Urgent Need to Delink ToT from Weapon Acquisition

The primary reason for the approximately 30 per cent decline in the IAF’s squadron strength—from 42 to 29 squadrons—has been persistent delays in the delivery of the Tejas fighter and its follow-on variants, including the Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-2.

Shockingly, the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership never moved beyond superficial tinkering with procurement procedures to address these crippling delays. The outcome was predictable: the process stalled and eventually ran aground. Was this paralysis by analysis? Possibly. More likely, despite the optics, defence has never been more than a desultory priority for the political leadership.

Let us focus on the optics. No one disputes the need—or urgency—of Make in India for defence-related equipment. But where is the logic in allowing defence procurement to collapse because Make in India timelines cannot be met?

The problems with Make in India cannot be addressed through procurement policy changes alone; they are endemic to the current state of India’s industrial base.

For many technologically advanced components used in modern weapon systems—such as aero and marine engines, sensors, and advanced materials—India possesses neither the industrial base nor the technical know-how required for local manufacture. Indeed, the absence of know-how is itself a consequence of the absence of a mature industrial base.

The industrial base of any country evolves in response to market dynamics. When substantial demand emerges, the private sector—driven by profit incentives—moves rapidly to meet it. Firms upgrade industrial capacity, enter technology transfer arrangements, raise capital, hire skilled personnel, and undertake a range of other, often complex, adjustments necessary to compete.

India’s inability to develop several critical weapon-system components is not a failure of intelligence or talent. It stems from the absence of a mature industrial base, which in turn limits engineering excellence, advanced semiconductor fabrication capability, materials science depth, and related competencies. The gap is so fundamental that India is not even positioned to reverse-engineer, let alone replicate, cutting-edge technologies.

Defence Procurement and Make in India Are Parallel Processes

For reasons that remain unexplained, the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India (GoI) have tethered India’s defence preparedness to the Make in India programme. This flawed linkage has allowed national security to be held hostage to industrial policy.

It is a dangerous and indefensible conflation.

A familiar refrain follows: India should not buy Rafales because France has not agreed to transfer technology. This framing is faulty. It is not France but Dassault Aviation that has declined extensive transfer of technology—and understandably so. How can a private design house be expected to part with its core intellectual property when India lacks the industrial base and the pool of trained, experienced personnel required to absorb it? Moreover, Dassault’s very survival depends on intellectual property accumulated painstakingly over decades.

This raises a more fundamental question: why is India insisting on transfer of technology as part of every fighter aircraft procurement deal?

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) already know how to design and manufacture fighter aircraft. They have done so twice—first with the HF-24 Marut, and later with the Tejas.

What they may need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps—high-temperature engine technology, for instance. Such transfers should be negotiated independently, rather than being tied to acquisitions meant to address urgent operational shortfalls.

Indeed, Safran and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) are reportedly poised to sign a contract to co-develop an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter. The deal—reportedly cleared by the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and the Finance Ministry—is awaiting final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

The proposed agreement, valued at over ₹30,000 crore, reportedly involves full transfer of technology for a 120–140 kilonewton thrust-class engine, with joint intellectual property ownership and manufacturing in India.

So why does India need Rafale engine technology at all? After all, HAL has been assembling and partially manufacturing the AL-31F engine for the Su-30MKI locally for decades.

The core issue is this: if every fighter aircraft acquisition is made contingent on comprehensive transfer of technology, will India ever acquire fighters from abroad at all? Revisit the opening paragraphs and ask whether India can realistically counter the Chinese threat through local production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, LCA Mk-2, and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), supplemented by roughly 150 Rafales and about 270 Su-30MKIs—many of which have not undergone a major upgrade in nearly 25 years.

Conclusion

China’s military build-up has already reached overwhelming proportions.

Indian Air Force light fighters such as the Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-1A lack the range and payload required to effectively defend Indian airspace against the PLAAF—particularly against its stealth fighters (J-20A/S, J-35) and heavy multirole aircraft (J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT).

The IAF must urgently rebuild its combat strength to the authorised level of 42 fighter squadrons—and not with just any aircraft, but with platforms capable of credibly countering the PLAAF’s current and emerging threat.

Make in India remains an important long-term objective. It cannot, however, be India’s immediate operational strategy.

 Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.