BrahMos at Risk: Is India Losing Its Missile Edge?

The Navbharat Times (NBT) Online has reported, based on inputs from “reliable sources,” that the production of BrahMos missiles has plunged to below 50% of the level achieved a year ago.

The disconcerting report partly attributes the drop in production to the transfer of around 56 employees from Hyderabad to Lucknow and Pilani over the last few months, leading to employee disgruntlement and resignations.

At Lucknow, BrahMos Aerospace is in the process of setting up an integration and testing facility for existing BrahMos variants and future BrahMos-NG production.

At Peepli, in the Pilani area of Rajasthan, BrahMos Aerospace has a production unit where subsystems fabricated at various Indian and Russian work centres are delivered for final missile integration, checking, mechanical and electrical assembly, fuel filling, storage, and related activities.

BrahMos has additional integration centres in Hyderabad and Nagpur.

Reliable sources have told NBT Online that BrahMos Aerospace has alerted the Indian Navy to the possible delay of a few years in the supply of BrahMos missiles.

On March 1, 2024, the Indian Navy placed an order for 220 BrahMos-ER supersonic cruise missiles, along with associated shipborne launch systems, primarily for deployment on Indian Navy warships (including Visakhapatnam- and Kolkata-class destroyers).

Large-scale transfers of employees between geographically dispersed integration units can understandably disrupt the family lives of affected personnel. If unavoidable, such transfers require deft management to preclude employee disgruntlement.

No Go-Ahead for BrahMos-NG

Besides the over 50% drop in BrahMos production levels, the NBT report also states, based on its sources, that the BrahMos-NG project has not yet been approved by the MoD.

It is ironic that the Government of India formally approved and initiated construction of the BrahMos-NG development and testing facility in Lucknow on December 26, 2021—when Defence Minister Rajnath Singh laid the foundation stone—yet has not approved development of the missile itself.

BrahMos-NG: Historical Perspective

BrahMos Aerospace first announced the BrahMos-NG missile concept in March 2021. The missile was expected to:

Be carried by lighter fighter jets such as the Tejas Mk.1A and MiG-29UPG.

Fit inside the internal weapons bay of the FGFA, the stealth fighter India and Russia were co-developing at the time.

The NG is not a BrahMos variant; it is a clean-sheet, high-supersonic missile design that will be smaller and lighter than the current BrahMos.

The missile was initially projected to be 6 m long and 0.5 m in diameter, with a top speed of Mach 3.5 and a 200–300 kg warhead, and a maximum range of 290 km.

In July 2019, a BrahMos official reportedly told India Today that the missile would be 5 m long—possibly to enable torpedo-tube launch.

More recently, it has been reported that the new missile would be capable of launching from standard submarine torpedo tubes—similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpene submarines.

BrahMos-NG – Misleading Development Timelines

Over the years, BrahMos officials have made overly optimistic statements about the development timeline of BrahMos-NG.

A senior defence official reportedly told Times Now in November 2017 that the air-launched BrahMos-NG was “currently in the design stage,” adding that the missile would be ready by 2019.

In February 2024, BrahMos Aerospace’s Export Director, Pravin Pathak, stated that flight tests of BrahMos-NG would begin before the end of 2025.

He said:

“In parallel with construction of the (Lucknow) plant… the first flight samples of the new BrahMos-NG rocket will be assembled for flight testing… before the end of 2025.”

Finaly, Development Start

There is good reason to believe that development actually started in September 2025.

On September 9, 2025, TASS reported that BrahMos Aerospace is designing the missile and intends to begin autonomous testing in 2026.

TASS quoted Alexander Maksichev, Russian Managing Director of the JV, as saying:

“We are currently at the working design stage… and then we will move on to autonomous tests.”

He added that it was too early to discuss timelines for actual flight testing.

After 14 years of announcements, it finally appeared that the project was making progress.

A New Ramjet Engine

Because BrahMos-NG must be significantly smaller and lighter, it requires a new, scaled-down ramjet engine.

During Aero India 2019, a BrahMos official stated that Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeyenia is developing this new engine.

This engine, like the missile itself, is a clean-sheet design. Feasibility studies and engineering analysis were reportedly completed around 2020.

Link with the Su-57

Russia has made a compelling offer to India to procure its Su-57 stealth fighters for the IAF.

In July, the IAF projected a requirement for 2–3 squadrons of stealth fighters to the Indian government, given the depletion of its fighter inventory, delays in AMCA development, and the evolving threat environment.

If the government accepts the Russian offer—which appears attractive due to the inclusion of transfer of technology—the IAF would want BrahMos-NG to be compatible with the Su-57 variant it acquires. The missile would need to fit within the aircraft’s internal weapons bays and conform to their load-carrying limits.

During the Dubai Airshow 2025, the Su-57 displayed a pair of Kh-58UShK anti-radiation missiles in its forward internal weapons bay during flight demonstrations.

The Kh-58UShK has a launch weight of 650 kg. By extrapolation, the forward internal bay’s maximum payload capacity appears to be around 1,300 kg.

In March 2019, BrahMos CEO Sudhir Misra stated that the Tejas underwing hardpoint can support a maximum load of 1,250 kg, including the launcher. This implies that BrahMos-NG would weigh less than 1,250 kg.

For comparison:

Standard BrahMos weighs ~3,000 kg

BrahMos-A weighs ~2,500 kg

Thus, miniaturisation is critical.

In addition to physical fitment, radar and mission-computer integration would require close Russian-Indian collaboration.

If Not Su-57—AMCA Compatibility

If India does not pursue the Su-57, the missile will need to be compatible with AMCA’s internal bay—an uncertain proposition at this stage of AMCA development.

Conclusion

Any significant drop in the production of BrahMos missile variants at this stage would be a serious setback, potentially weakening the deterrence capability of the Indian Armed Forces.

Any delay in approving the development of BrahMos-NG could necessitate the import of a comparable system to keep the IAF’s MiG-29 and LCA fleets operationally viable.

Russia has already begun work on the engine and a new high-supersonic air-launched missile. India must now decide whether to participate meaningfully—before timelines slip again, as they did in the case of the FGFA.

IAF’s 5th Gen Need Meets a US 4th Gen Pitch!

Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh engaged with U.S. Air Force leaders during a visit to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, April 9, 2026. The visit focused on joint exercise opportunities and aligning modernization efforts to build a foundation for interoperability.

During his recent weeklong visit to the US starting April 6, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Amar Preet Singh, flew a familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Routine Visit?

Officially, the CAS was on a routine exchange visit to foster deeper relations between the IAF and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). High-ranking air force officials from both nations routinely visit counterpart nations to discuss interoperability, joint training, shared strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and modernisation.

In the past 15 years, four IAF Chiefs have made official visits to the US, as follows:

1. July 2013: Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III.

2. May 2015: Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation.

3. September 26–28, 2017: Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa to attend the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium in Hawaii.

4. April 6–13, 2026: Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh to strengthen the India–US defence partnership and deepen cooperation between the two air forces.

The USAF Chief of Staff/Secretary of the Air Force has visited India three times in the same period, as follows:

1. August 2016: Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James to discuss defence and trade cooperation.

2. February 1–7, 2018: Chief of Staff Gen. David L. Goldfein to discuss Indo-Pacific cooperation.

3. March 21, 2023: Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall to advance the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership and bilateral security cooperation.

From the above, it is clear that exchange visits don't take place at predetermined intervals. Instead, they are based on invitations. As such, despite being labelled as routine visits, they are neither routine nor mere optics. There is always a strong undercurrent aimed at adding depth to the partnership. From the US point of view, CAS visits are either aimed at selling US weapons to India, aligning India more sharply with US unipolar global ambitions, or both.

Recent CAS Visit

Based on media reports, the invitation to ACM AP Singh to visit the US was likely aimed at laying down the modalities for surveillance by US MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones being sold to the IAF and the possible sharing of data.

The ACM's familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet was likely aimed at softening any IAF resistance to the purchase of the Boeing F-15EX fighter and its weapon systems.

During the MMRCA procurement process, the US had pitched its F-16 and F-18 fighters to the IAF, which ultimately chose the French Rafale fighter. However, due to irreconcilable differences over ToT, France and India could not finalise a contract. In 2018, the MoD placed an interim order for 36 Rafales and terminated further procurement under the MMRCA program.

Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) Program

The MoD then initiated the balance procurement of 110 fighters under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program. On April 6, 2018, it released a fresh RFI stipulating that a maximum of 15 per cent of aircraft were to be procured in flyaway condition and 85 per cent would be manufactured in India based on transfer of technology (ToT) under “Make in India.” The RFI mandated the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times.

The F-15EX was a late entrant in the MRFA program, which was initially confined to former MMRCA contestants.

New Delhi first showed interest in the F-15EX in October 2020, shortly after the U.S. Air Force awarded Boeing a nearly $1.2 billion contract to build the first lot of eight F-15EX advanced fighter jets to help the service meet its capacity requirements and add capability to its fighter fleet.

“There is a possibility that the F-15EX could be sold on a government-to-government basis,” a top government official familiar with the discussions told Hindustan Times at that time.

However, at that point, Boeing had not yet been licensed to sell the F-15EX abroad.

On January 28, 2021, the US government granted Boeing a marketing licence to offer the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet directly to the Indian Air Force (IAF) under its MRFA procurement program.

It is not clear if Boeing’s pitch of the F-15EX conformed to the Indian MoD RFI of April 6, 2018, particularly regarding its willingness for ToT and local manufacture in India under “Make in India.”

Notably, the Boeing fighter was never offered for evaluation to the IAF, which raises doubts about the sincerity of the Boeing pitch.

Meanwhile, the IAF, having invested heavily in creating the maintenance and logistics infrastructure for Rafale, continued to display enthusiasm for additional procurement of the French fighter, which had performed creditably in Op Sindoor.

The CAS, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:

“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”

However, he acknowledged that a decision in favour of Rafale would depend on French willingness to share manufacturing technology with India.

Alluding to the 2018 RFI that mandates ToT with the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times, he said, “So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he added.

Rafale Procurement Go-Ahead

In January 2026, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reportedly gave its go-ahead to an Indian Air Force proposal to buy 114 French-origin Rafale jets.

Contract negotiations between India and France are underway. The DPB go-ahead has to be cleared by the DAC, headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. Finally, before the contract is signed, it would need to be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Source Code Issues

Some unverified media reports suggest that the French government has refused to provide India with the source code for the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite.

These reports may sound alarming to many defence enthusiasts, but they need not be.

The IAF does not need the full source code of the Rafale. What it needs is programming access to the full source code. In an earlier analysis for the Eurasian Times, I explained in detail the difference.

A programming interface provides access to the underlying code through a layer of abstraction.

There is no reason for France to withhold full programming access to the Rafale source code, just as there is no reason for the IAF to ask for the transfer of the full source code.

It is the author’s belief that good negotiations can adequately seal the deal while safeguarding the interests of both France and India.

MRFA – A Near Done Deal

The IAF has made its choice clear in favour of Rafale. The renewed US pitch for the F-15EX aims to leverage the controversy wittingly or unwittingly created by the media over the source code. The IAF is unlikely to pursue a red-herring offer; notably, however, the US has made one—exposing its insincerity.

Need for Stealth Fighters

The IAF has officially projected to the MoD a need for 2–3 squadrons of a stealth fighter to address an emerging stopgap requirement. Ironically, what the US is ready to offer is not the F-35, but a Su-30MKI substitute that will drain billions from the IAF's capital expenditure over the next few years in acquiring the aircraft, creating a logistics and maintenance infrastructure, and procuring a whole new line of weapon systems.

The loss of four F-15EX fighters during the recent Iran war would be difficult for the IAF leadership to ignore were it inclined to change its mind at this late stage.

According to ANI, during ACM AP Singh’s visit, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach welcomed India’s procurement of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian drone. I wonder if the CAS found the endorsement reassuring, considering how easily Iran has been able to shoot down these very expensive drones.

In summary, what the IAF urgently needs is not the F-15EX, but an upgrade to the highly potent BrahMos-wielding Su-30MKI, which can also be adapted for launching Indian-developed hypersonic aeroballistic missiles in the future.

Getting the Rafale on India’s Terms: The Source Code Question

@Grok Generated Image of Rafale Receiving Software Update

The French government’s reported refusal to provide India with the source code for the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite should prove sobering to the GoI.

Under the circumstances, an emotionally charged debate is raging on social media around the question: should India still go ahead with the Rafale deal?

Ironically, some of the most vociferous participants in the debate don't understand what really is at stake because they don't clearly understand the role of software in a fighter aircraft.

In the following paragraphs, I will try to explain the value and role of software in a fighter aircraft.

Software by Value

Approximately 30–40% of the total cost of a modern fighter like the Rafale is typically attributed to software development/integration. What that means is—if the OEM doesn't supply the source code along with the fighter, you get only 60% of the aircraft despite paying for 100%.

As technology advances, it's likely that the percentage cost representing software will increase well past 50%.

However simplistic it may sound, a nation does get shortchanged when it buys a fighter, and in the future the shortchanging will be even greater.

Dependency on OEM

More importantly, when nations buy modern fighters, they have to keep reverting to the OEM to address any requirements for changes in the software with evolving tactics and weapon systems. In a manner of speaking, the money paid for software changes is money burnt because software alterations have zero tangible value. You pay for the tweak, but physically you return with what you had earlier.

The continued dependency on the OEM may prove crippling, for example, if the OEM does not allow software changes required to integrate third-party weapon systems. For example, if Dassault disallows integration of the Russian R-37M missiles on the Rafale.

No OEM Will Provide Full Source Code

Software in fighter aircraft is built in layers of abstraction. This hierarchical design (often called a "layered architecture") separates concerns, improves reliability, and allows independent certification and upgrades.

Lowest-level software layers

These provide hardware access abstraction and include device-driver layers. They directly interface with sensors (radar, INS, EO/IR), actuators (flight controls, weapons release), data buses (MIL-STD-1553, AFDX), storage devices, and processors. They translate raw sensor signals into usable data.

Medium layers

These include operating system services and common libraries that provide universal, reusable functionality not tied to any single mission. Examples include:

Data read/write services (file systems, database-like buffers, or ARINC 653 partitioning)

Mathematical function libraries (e.g., Kalman filters, coordinate transformations, floating-point math)

Other common services: timing, memory management, communication protocols, and real-time operating system (RTOS) primitives

In fighters, this layer often includes certified middleware that abstracts the underlying RTOS (e.g., VxWorks, INTEGRITY), so higher layers don’t need to know hardware details.

Highest layers

These are the application/mission-specific layers.

They implement operational logic unique to a task (e.g., sensor fusion, target tracking, weapons release sequencing, flight-control laws, electronic warfare response, or cockpit display management).

The highest layers can be thought of as the personality or the potential of the aircraft. The layers define the aircraft's maneuvering and combat capabilities. The layers serve as the interface between the pilot and the aircraft as a whole, including the weapons that it's armed with.

The entire source code of the Rafale will comprise millions of lines. IAF programmers would take years, perhaps decades, to acquaint themselves with the entire code. More importantly, it would serve little purpose because the low-level and medium-level layers are well proven and extensively tested.

Most likely, what the IAF seeks from Dassault is access to the sensor- and hardware-specific lowest layer to fit new sensors and weapon systems, and possibly the highest layers to tweak combat load and maneuvering parameters.

It's important to understand that providing access to a software layer is not the same as transferring the full source code of the layers.

Access to the underlying code can be provided through a layer of abstraction without transferring the code. Coding new functionality through a layer of abstraction entails using a programming interface. When working through such an interface, the user cannot know how the source code actually functions.

The Real Issue

A programming interface provides limited and safe abstract access to limited segments of the internal source code.

It's likely that Dassault is ready to provide an interface to integrate indigenously developed weapons that are currently operational or under development. However, over the years, the interface may not prove adequate for integrating the IAF’s future weapons and other operational requirements because weapon systems are fast evolving, both in terms of technology and concepts.

For example, in the future, the IAF may want to launch drones from the Rafale or launch weapons from an unmanned collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) operating with the Rafale. For such requirements, the IAF would require a more extensive programming interface to the underlying source code.

Accidental / Intentional Limitations

There is another problem with interface-only access to source code. The underlying code may have accidentally or deliberately planted limitations that the operating country is not aware of. These limitations, which could have been coded or escaped detection during testing, may not show up when the aircraft is operating in the OEM country.

In the early 1980s, the IAF acquired Durandal runway-penetration bombs for the Jaguar aircraft. The IAF acquired the Durandals based on their successful integration with French and Royal Air Force Jaguars.

Several years after acquiring the bomb, the IAF realised that its Jaguars could not release the bombs, which had been lying unused as strategic reserves for years, due to a software bug.

A software tweak fixed the issue, but it was fortunate that the issue was discovered during a planned demonstration of the lethality of the Durandal for the Raksha Mantri at the Pokharan range, not during an operation.

So, if and when a requirement emerges, the OEM must be willing to provide a more extensive interface than the one initially provided, at a nominal cost. The IAF must pay for the source code only once.

Conclusion

India should not buy the Rafale unless France commits to providing access to any part of the source code that the IAF needs to access.

The additional access should be provided at a very nominal, pre-negotiated cost. If the OEM declines to provide additional access, it must surrender the source code.