AD-1, AD-2 and India's THAAD: What the Latest DRDO Tests Reveal

AD-1 interceptor Test. Note the use of large maneuvering fins for the endo-atmospheric interceptor. PIB Photo

 The DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

BMD Phase 2 InterceptorsThe DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

AD-2 Interceptor test from July 2024. Note the small initial steering fins for the exo-atmospheric interceptor : PIB Photo

BMD Phase 2 Interceptors

BMD Phase 2 employs two interceptor missiles: AD-1 and AD-2.

The AD-1 is designed for both endo-atmospheric and low exo-atmospheric interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as aircraft. It is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor and achieves hypersonic speeds of Mach 6–7. Guided by an indigenous Ka-band RF seeker, the missile features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-2 is designed exclusively for exo-atmospheric interception. Like the AD-1, it is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor to hypersonic speeds. The type of seeker employed is not known to the author. It too features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-1, with its limited exo-atmospheric capability, is expected to engage medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000–3,000 km range) and aircraft. Higher-flying intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be handled by the AD-2.

Together, the AD-1 and AD-2 are intended to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 5,000 km.

AD-1 Interceptor Launch - PIB Photo

Past AD-1 Test

DRDO successfully tested the AD-1 interceptor on November 2, 2022.

The PIB release announcing the test stated:

"During the flight test, all the sub-systems performed as per expectations and were validated by data captured by a number of range sensors, including radar, telemetry and electro-optical tracking stations deployed to capture the flight data."

Past AD-2 Test

The AD-2 interceptor was first successfully flight-tested on July 24, 2024. Subsequent tests have focused on validating its exo-atmospheric interception capability against longer-range ballistic missile threats.

Notably, the trial validated the complete network-centric warfare system consisting of long-range sensors, a low-latency communication network, and Advanced Interceptor missiles. 

A low latency communication system is absolutely essential for long range missile interception. 

BMD Phase 2 Explained

DRDO is developing India's BMD system in two phases under a capability based deployment plan. In the first phase, which has been completed, the DRDO developed a system for defence against missiles with less than 2,000 km range, like Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen missiles and China's solid-fuel Dongfeng-21 (NATO designation: CSS-5). 

BMD Phase 2 is intended to defend against ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 km, including missiles equipped with decoys and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. 

Longer range missiles not only climb higher following a ballistic trajectory but also hurtle down on the target at much greater speeds than shorter range missiles. During their terminal phase, ICBM warheads can reach speeds twice those of intermediate range missiles. 

The Phase 2 system will feature longer range radars (with a detection range of 1,500 km, compared to 600 km for Phase 1 radars), and hypersonic interceptor missiles flying at Mach 6-7 (as opposed to Mach 4-5 for Phase 1 missiles) with agility and the capability to discriminate against ballistic missile defence countermeasures. 

The Phase 2 system is expected to offer capabilities broadly comparable to those of the US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system. THAAD missiles can intercept ballistic missiles over 200 km away and track targets at ranges in excess of 1,000 km.

In addition to new interceptors, Phase 2 also required a new radar and test ranges. 

Phase 2 Radar

DRDO is developing an Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar for Phase 2, based on the Swordfish radar acquired from Israel. Israel will provide some equipment and consultancy for the new radar, which would feature 80% indigenous components.

Test Range

India initially had two missile test ranges at Chandipur and Wheeler Island. These are suited for testing missiles with ranges up to 300 km. Missile launches require evacuation of nearby areas, and testing different trajectories/altitudes was difficult.

Phase 2 testing of the BMD system requires two ranges placed well apart along the missile trajectory. DRDO is developing two new missile ranges at Machilipatnam in Seemandhra and Rutland Island in the Andamans. 

In October 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the establishment of a new missile testing range in Nagayalanka in Krishna district, Andhra Pradesh. 

A total of 154.42 hectares has been proposed for the project, covering the test facility in above six hectares and technical facility, a few launch pads, control centre and state-of-the-art communication infrastructure in 130 hectares.

Floating Test Range

In support of BMD Phase 2 development, India has now also deployed a floating test range (FTR), a ship that features a launch pad, launch control centre, and mission control centre, along with advanced telemetry and tracking systems.

The FTR facilitates live tests (instead of simulations) for varying trajectories, different altitudes, and longer ranges (up to 1,000–1,500 km). 

The vessel was specifically intended to support the development and testing of the BMD Phase 2 system. 

The FTR (INS Anvesh) has a displacement of approximately 10,000–11,300 tonnes, is about 200 metres long, and was built by Cochin Shipyard Limited with DRDO design input. It was commissioned into the Indian Navy in March 2022.

INS Anvesh features 4 × Ship Launch Systems (SLS) — Vertical launch systems installed in the aft section. These rest flat when not in use and raise to a vertical (90°) position for firing.

On April 21, 2023, DRDO carried out the maiden flight trial of a sea-based endo-atmospheric interceptor missile (AAD Ashwin interceptor of BMD Phase 1). The MoD described the test, carried out off the coast of Odisha in the Bay of Bengal, as  the first sea-based BMD interceptor test by India.

INS Dhruv MRIS

In addition to INS Anvesh, India also has a missile-range instrumentation ship (MRIS), equipped to monitor trajectories of longer-range ballistic missiles. The 15,000 tonnes displacement ship built by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) Visakhapatnam was handed over to the Indian Navy in September 2021.

The MRIS features an X-Band primary AESA radar and an S-Band secondary AESA radar.

The tracking radars can track the inbound flight trajectories of surface and submarine-launched ballistic missiles,  including any manoeuvrable warheads released by the missiles.

In addition to long-range missile tracking, the ship can track satellites and conduct electronic intelligence (ELINT) missions. 

Conclusion

DRDO first tested the AD-1 interceptor in November 2022. At that time, the AD-2 interceptor was still under development.  The AD-2 was eventually tested in July 2024. 

Both interceptors were tested in quick succession during the June 10–11 trials, suggesting that the system is maturing rapidly.

The commencement of user trials in the near future would be a significant milestone and a welcome development for Indian defence planners, particularly given the growing importance of ballistic missile defence demonstrated by recent conflicts in the Middle East.

China's Railgun Breakthrough Is a Wake-Up Call for DRDO

ChatGPT visualisation of a PLAN warship firing a railgun

China has achieved a significant breakthrough in electromagnetic railgun (EMRG) technology. It has successfully demonstrated the ability to integrate guidance and control systems into a railgun projectile.

The breakthrough paves the way for precision-guided railgun projectiles capable of self-steering to distant targets. The achievement highlights China's ongoing progress in electromagnetic launch systems for potential naval and long-range strike applications.

The breakthrough could give PLAN ships a formidable anti-shipping and surface-attack capability.

Hypervelocity projectile (HVP) railguns can also be employed very effectively for air defence. Their extremely high projectile velocity can facilitate the interception of not only aerodynamic targets but also fast-moving threats such as hypersonic missiles, relying on kinetic impact rather than explosive warheads.

Railguns Explained

Conceptually, railguns are straightforward weapon systems that use electromagnetic force, instead of explosive detonation, to accelerate a conductive projectile along two parallel conductive rails to extremely high velocities, often Mach 5–7 or higher.

The use of electromagnetic force facilitates sustained acceleration of a projectile to much higher speeds than those achievable using explosives. For example, bullets fired from conventional military guns typically reach muzzle velocities of around 1–2 km/s. Railguns, in contrast, can potentially accelerate projectiles to speeds potentially exceeding 10 km/s.

The high speed of railgun projectiles considerably reduces flight time, improving accuracy. In addition, their higher kinetic energy provides greater destructive potential, obviating the need for an explosive warhead.

Railgun Development Challenges

Conceptually, the science behind railguns is straightforward. However, implementing the concept poses formidable technological challenges.

Railguns do not involve explosions, but the enormous electrical currents involved result in resistive heating, friction, arcing, and plasma formation at the projectile-rail interface, causing severe wear and tear.

The weapon requires massive electrical currents, measured in mega-amperes, to generate the intense magnetic fields needed to propel the projectile. Consequently, railguns require compact yet powerful electrical generation and storage systems.

Perhaps the most formidable challenge in developing railguns arises from the forces experienced by the projectile as it accelerates from rest to Mach 7 within the length of the barrel. Depending on barrel length, the projectile can experience accelerations ranging from 15,000 g to 65,000 g. In contrast, conventional artillery shells typically experience accelerations ranging from hundreds to a few thousand g.

Projectile Control and Guidance

The extremely high g-forces experienced by a railgun projectile would be of merely academic interest if there were no need to fit guidance equipment and electronics within the projectile. However, that is not the case.

The relatively higher accuracy of a railgun projectile, arising from its greater speed, becomes less significant as engagement range increases. The longer the desired engagement range, the greater the need for seekers and guidance systems to correct trajectory errors.

The real challenge is developing electronic and mechanical guidance components capable of surviving accelerations exceeding 20,000 g as well as the intense magnetic pulse generated during launch.

The US Navy almost shelved its naval railgun programme after failing to solve the guidance-survivability challenge. Japan has largely sidestepped the issue by focusing on a smaller-calibre railgun intended for short-range defensive applications.

US and Japanese Efforts

The US Navy began developing a railgun around 2005. The concept was first tested in October 2006 at the Dahlgren facility. In July 2017, the Navy conducted a public demonstration involving multi-shot salvos. The demonstration marked a significant step towards proving a practical rate of fire capable of delivering several rounds per minute.

The railgun tested demonstrated a range capability exceeding 100 nautical miles.

In July 2021, the programme was paused due to technical challenges involving barrel life, power generation, and rate of fire. Prototype testing resumed in 2025 at White Sands. The weapon has yet to be operationally fielded.

The United States is also developing technology that could provide guided projectiles under the Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) programme. HVPs have been successfully tested from existing 5-inch naval guns, including aboard USS Dewey in 2018. Guidance-system development and at-sea testing remain active.

Following initial development, the US Navy explicitly expanded the railgun's role to include air and missile defence, highlighting the potential of HVPs.

In 2022, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced its intention to develop electromagnetic guns capable of countering hypersonic missiles.

Chinese Breakthrough

It was recently reported that a Chinese prototype projectile survived a 20,000 g overload lasting eight milliseconds and exposure to a 7-tesla magnetic pulse during an actual railgun firing test. A magnetic flux density of 7 tesla is roughly 140,000 times stronger than Earth's magnetic field.

The projectile carried a delicate guidance chip housed within a protective silicon shell featuring a multilayer shielding system that included copper, iron, polyurethane dampers, and μ-metal.

The Chinese breakthrough is a landmark achievement. So far, there has been no publicly available evidence of an HVP surviving actual railgun launch stresses while retaining guidance functionality.

Notwithstanding the breakthrough, broader challenges such as rail erosion remain unresolved.

India's Quest for EMRG

In 2017, it was reported that DRDO had successfully developed an electromagnetic railgun capable of accelerating projectiles to Mach 6, or approximately 4,600 miles per hour.

DRDO stated that a 12 mm square-bore EMRG had been successfully tested and that work was underway on a 30 mm version. The objective is to accelerate a one-kilogram projectile to a velocity exceeding 2,000 m/s using a 10-megajoule capacitor bank.

Why the BrahMos-NG Delay Could Be Good News for Indian Self-Reliance

Development trials of the BrahMos-NG missile have been pushed back by at least a year, TASS reported on June 10.

BrahMos Aerospace Joint Venture (JV) Managing Co-Director Alexander Maksichev told TASS on the sidelines of the International Maritime Defense Show Fleet 2026:

"Flight tests of the new-generation BrahMos-NG missile have not yet begun due to the fact that the customer has slightly changed its requirements. Therefore, we still have to make some improvements."

"In other words, the requirements for the missile have become stricter and more demanding, so we will need some time to upgrade this missile and meet the new requirements. So we are still acting according to plan," Maksichev said.

The redesign of the BrahMos-NG is expected to take about a year, Maksichev noted.

BrahMos-NG Project Genesis

BrahMos Aerospace first announced the BrahMos-NG missile concept in March 2011.

The BrahMos-NG is not a BrahMos variant; it is a clean-sheet, high-supersonic missile that will be smaller and lighter than the current BrahMos.

Initially, the missile's qualitative requirements included:

Weight and dimensional compatibility for carriage by lighter fighter aircraft such as the Tejas Mk.1A and MiG-29UPG.

Internal carriage by the FGFA, which was to be jointly developed by India and Russia.

The missile was initially projected to be 6 m long and 0.5 m in diameter, with a top speed of Mach 3.5, a 200–300 kg warhead, and a maximum range of 290 km.

However, in July 2019, a BrahMos official reportedly told India Today that the missile would be 5 m long—possibly to enable torpedo-tube launch.

More recent press reports have claimed that the new missile will be capable of launch from standard submarine torpedo tubes, similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpène submarines.

Clues to the Likely Cause of Delay

In September 2025, Maksichev told TASS:

"We are currently at the working design stage, which we will complete next year, and then we will move on to autonomous tests."

He added that it was too early to discuss timelines for actual flight testing.

In April 2026, Navbharat Times reported that the BrahMos-NG project had not yet received government clearance.

It now appears that the clearance may have been withheld to accommodate an additional qualitative requirement.

Considering that torpedo-tube launch capability was first publicly discussed in 2019, it is clearly not a new requirement. So what additional requirement has emerged?

One possibility is the use of an indigenously developed ramjet engine instead of a Russian-designed ramjet.

A New Ramjet Engine

Because the BrahMos-NG must be significantly smaller and lighter, it requires a new scaled-down ramjet engine.

During Aero India 2019, a BrahMos official stated that Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia was developing this new engine.

This engine, like the missile itself, is a clean-sheet design. Feasibility studies and engineering analysis were reportedly completed around 2020.

It is possible that India's Ministry of Defence, currently the only customer for the BrahMos-NG, now wants the missile to be developed around an Indian-designed and Indian-developed ramjet engine.

Initially, BrahMos Aerospace assembled BrahMos missiles in India using ramjet engines produced at a plant in Russia's Orenburg region. Later, BrahMos Aerospace signed a technology-transfer agreement with its Russian partner to facilitate indigenous manufacture of the engine.

India has since begun using locally manufactured liquid-fuelled ramjet engines in BrahMos missiles.

Major airframe assemblies that form an integral part of the ramjet engine are now indigenously produced by Indian industry. These include metallic and non-metallic airframe sections comprising the ramjet fuel tank and pneumatic fuel-supply system.

Indigenous Ramjet for the NG

Building on the ramjet technology acquired through the BrahMos JV, India launched its own liquid-fuelled ramjet (LFRJ) design and development programme.

DRDL, a DRDO laboratory, is developing a technology-demonstrator LFRJ engine with a diameter of 350 mm for potential application in missiles and aerial targets.

The technology demonstrator powers DRDO's Supersonic TARget (STAR) project. Primarily intended for training surface-to-air and air-to-air weapon systems, STAR features a booster-ramjet combination and can achieve speeds of Mach 1.8–2.5, ranges of 55–175 km, and operating altitudes between 0.1 and 10 km.

STAR is also evolving into a combat-capable platform, with potential anti-AWACS, anti-radiation, and low-cost anti-ship variants.

An LFRJ derivative is also reportedly being developed to power the BrahMos-NG.

In November 2025, DRDO reportedly issued a Request for Information (RFI) to select a Development-cum-Production Partner (DcPP) for an LFRJ engine. The RFI may be aimed at developing a suitable LFRJ for the BrahMos-NG. If so, DRDL has likely firmed up the engine's design specifications.

The design changes now being requested for the BrahMos-NG may well be intended to accommodate a DRDL-developed ramjet engine rather than a Russian engine.

Ramjet engines are mechanically simple, but their development involves demanding challenges in materials, inlet optimization, combustor design, and fuel-flow management. As a result, the propulsion system is often among the most difficult subsystems of a missile to indigenize. Under the circumstances, it is conceivable that the DRDO-developed ramjet does not match the dimensional specifications of the Russian engine originally envisaged for the BrahMos-NG, necessitating design changes to accommodate it.

Conclusion

Using an indigenously developed ramjet for the BrahMos-NG would be a bold move aimed at consolidating the self-reliance that India has already achieved in missile technology. Relying on a yet-to-be-developed indigenous engine does entail the risk of schedule slippage. However, that risk is acceptable because import options will always remain available to bridge any temporary operational capability gaps caused by delays.

Temporary import dependence is preferable to committing an indigenously developed weapon system to permanent dependence on a foreign vendor.

What 7,496 Guided Bombs Reveal About Russia's Air War in Ukraine

Screen grab from a RuMoD released video showing a Su-34 dropping UMPK guided bombs

In May 2026, the VKS (Russian Air Force) dropped, on average, roughly 240 UMPK-guided bombs per day, for a monthly total of 7,496 bombs. Such an effort would have required approximately 60 Su-34 sorties per day, with each fighter-bomber carrying four bombs. Assuming two sorties per day per aircraft, a minimum of 30 fighters would have had to be serviceable every day. Assuming a 50 percent serviceability rate, the bombing effort suggests that the number of Su-34 fighter-bombers committed to the Special Military Operation exceeds 60.

Open-source estimates suggest that, as of early 2025, the VKS operated between 150 and 180 Su-34s.

Each Su-34 strike mission is reportedly provided top cover by a Su-35 mission.

From the above, it would be reasonable to conclude that VKS participation in the ongoing conflict is substantial and creditable, but still well short of its full potential.

Kometa-M and Improved Bomb Accuracy

Notably, the accuracy of Su-34 strikes has improved considerably over the past few months, most likely because of the use of more EW-resilient SATNAV modules.

Russia has reportedly developed a 12-channel satellite-navigation system known as Kometa-M. Each Kometa module uses real-time signal processing to automatically "null out" (cancel) electronic-warfare jammers attempting to overwhelm satellite signals. It does so while maintaining clear reception from genuine satellites in other directions. As long as the number of separate jammers targeting the module remains below approximately 12, the system continues to provide accurate navigation. Similarly, when encountering spoofing attacks, the module checks the direction of incoming signals and rejects fake transmissions originating from the ground rather than from orbit.

Scale of VKS Bombing Operations

The scale of the bombing campaign is made possible not only by the size of the Su-34 fleet but also by the aircraft's unusually strong payload-range characteristics. 

The Su-34 can reportedly carry six bombs, instead of just four. However, it cannot carry six UMPK bombs because of stability issues. Instead, the fighter-bomber can be configured to carry a combination of four UMPKs and two UMPB D-30SN bombs. (UMPB stands for Universal Interspecific Glide Ammunition. UMPB can be dropped by fighters or launched using Tornado-2 MLRS rockets.)

According to the Fighterbomber Telegram channel, the VKS is currently dropping approximately 10,000 bombs per month. If Su-34s could be routinely configured to carry six bombs, monthly bomb delivery could potentially increase to 15,000–16,000 bombs.

Screen grab from a RuMoD released video showing the cockpit of a Su-34 in flight.

Why the Su-34 Is an Effective Strike Aircraft

Another interesting point is that the Su-34 has one of the longest ferry ranges of any fighter aircraft in the world, estimated at between 4,800 and 5,000 km on internal fuel alone. Fitted with three 3,000-litre drop tanks, its ferry range increases to an estimated 8,000 km.

The Su-34 is an adaptation of the Soviet Su-27 air-superiority fighter optimized for the strike role. The fighter-bomber is approximately 50 percent heavier than the Su-27. However, the performance penalty associated with the additional weight is mitigated by an aerodynamically refined airframe, the use of the more powerful and fuel-efficient AL-31FM2 engine, and a greater use of composite materials.

The AL-31FM2 is a non-thrust-vectoring engine that delivers better overall performance than the thrust-vectoring AL-31FP fitted on the Su-30SM. It produces 14.5 tonnes-force (142 kN) in afterburner compared with the AL-31FP's 12.5 tonnes-force (122.6 kN), giving the Su-34 superior acceleration, climb rate, and payload-range performance in its strike-bomber role.

Besides its extraordinary range, the Su-34 also stands out as the only twin side-by-side seat fighter aircraft of the world. 

Despite side by side seating, there is space between the pilot seats to spread a mattress, allowing one of the crew members to rest during a flight. Space behind the pilots’ seats allows them to stand up to their full height.

There is a microwave oven, an air conditioner, an electro-massage system built into the pilots’ seats and even a bio toilet aboard the bomber.

Reconnaissance Variant

In a statement released on July 7, 2025, Rostec stated, "the Su-34 can also be used to perform aerial reconnaissance tasks."

For tactical reconnaissance missions, the Su-34 uses the Sych family of externally mounted modular pods to enable the aircraft to perform electronic, radar, and optical intelligence gathering without compromising its primary combat capabilities.

The Sych family comprises 3 pods - UKR-RT, UKR-RL and UKR-OE.

UKR-RT: This variant is dedicated to signals intelligence (SIGINT). It intercepts and analyzes enemy radio and radar emissions, identifying electronic signatures of ground-based and airborne systems. 

UKR-RL: Focused on radar reconnaissance, this pod houses a side-looking synthetic aperture radar (SAR). It can map terrain and moving targets in all weather conditions, day or night, offering detailed battlefield awareness and enabling strike planning even in GPS-denied or obscured environments.

UKR-OE: This electro-optical pod combines TV, infrared (IR), and laser rangefinder/designator systems. It is used for high-resolution imagery of ground targets, surveillance of enemy positions, and target acquisition—particularly useful in precision strike missions or battle damage assessment.

Together, these Sych pod variants transform the Su-34 into a multi-role ISR platform capable of supporting deep strike, situational awareness, and electronic warfare missions.

Ukraine's Brave 1: The Autonomous Interceptor Built to Hunt Jet-Powered Gerans

Screen grab from Militarnyi video on YouTube embedded below

Ukraine is all set to field its first autonomous interceptor drone — the Brave 1. So far, Ukraine has developed and deployed FPV interceptor drones only.

The Brave 1 has successfully undergone combat tests in the Kharkiv region with a unit of the 12th Special Forces Group.

A video posted on the Militarnyi YouTube channel allegedly shows the drone intercepting an unidentified Geran variant and several other drones.

Brave 1 Features

The tube-launched Brave 1 features an aft-mounted pusher propeller and an optronic sensor in the nose.

The drone has a conventional airframe, making it aerodynamically more efficient than the Sting. The latter, which currently serves as the workhorse interceptor drone for Ukrainian forces, is an FPV drone with a bullet-like fuselage and a quadcopter architecture. The drone was operationally fielded around mid-2025.

Quadcopter drones have limited maximum speed because of the higher drag associated with the design. This limitation makes them ineffective against high-speed, jet-powered Geran one-way attack drones.

The conventional airframe of the Brave 1 would allow it to achieve much higher speeds. It is likely that, in a dive, it would be capable of intercepting a jet-powered Geran-4 or Geran-5.

Another limitation of the Sting is that it is an FPV kinetic interceptor that must be piloted into its target by a ground-based operator using an RF communication link. Signals from this link can be detected by adversary EW sensors, and the location of the pilot can be extrapolated through triangulation.

Russian forces reportedly exploit this vulnerability by pairing Geran-2 drones. When a Sting interceptor is launched against one Geran-2, a second Geran autonomously uses onboard sensors to locate and dive onto the Sting operator.

Interception Autonomy

The next generation of interceptor drones is being designed to operate autonomously using AI-powered machine vision, both during the day and at night.

These drones can independently detect, track, and engage targets without continuous human involvement. As a result, they do not require a vulnerable control channel that can be jammed or spoofed. They can home in on targets even when SATNAV and communication signals are jammed

In effect, they are launch-and-scoot weapons that remove the operator from the battlefield and significantly reduce operational risk.

Merops AS-3

Besides the Sting, Ukrainian forces use the US-supplied Merops AS-3 drone to intercept Geran drones.

The Merops AS-3 Surveyor is a mobile, truck-portable counter-drone system comprising:

1. Radar and electro-optical sensors for detection and tracking
2. A ground control and command station
3. Pneumatic or mobile launch platforms
4. A fleet of Surveyor interceptor drones

The AS-3 features a conventional fixed-wing airframe and AI-based autonomy. The drone is cued and initially guided using the sensors of the Merops system. For terminal guidance, it uses onboard IR and RF sensors, as well as AI-based machine vision. 

With a maximum speed of 280 km/h, the drone outpaces Russian Gerans more easily than the Sting.

Although highly effective, the Merops system relies heavily on ground-based infrastructure that can be located and attacked. Also, the system is expensive. It is currently priced at around $15,000.

Russian Yolka Interceptor Drone

At the beginning of the year, Russia fielded its Yolka interceptor drone, which featured the autonomy of next-generation drones and stole a march on the capabilities of the Ukrainian Sting.

The Yolka uses a hybrid quadcopter configuration augmented by X-planform lift-generating wings.

The Yolka is remarkably simple to use. It is launched from a handheld pistol-like device. The operator points the drone toward a target and launches it as soon as the drone begins to autonomously track the target. The UAV is fitted with electro-optical (daylight camera) and infrared sensors, along with an onboard AI processor known as the "Igolka" module.

The Yolka's portability, ease of use, and very low cost (approximately $500) enable widespread and distributed deployment.

Conclusion

Nothing definitive has been published about the guidance architecture of the Brave 1. However, since the drone is launched vertically from a tube, it is likely initially cued to its target by a ground-based radar sensor, as is the case with the Merops system. Mid-course guidance likely relies on AI-powered fusion of ground-radar and onboard optical-sensor inputs.

It is likely that Ukraine has developed the Brave 1 interceptor primarily to counter the threat posed by Russian high-speed jet-powered drones such as the Geran-3, Geran-4, and Geran-5.

The Geran-3 features a Geran-2 fuselage fitted with a jet engine.

The Geran-4 is an adaptation of the Geran-2 airframe optimized for jet propulsion. It features a compact jet engine mounted beneath the aft fuselage. The design is aerodynamically more efficient, resulting in greater range and speed.

The Geran-5, however, is a clean-sheet design. Russian forces first used the drone in January. The catapult-launched drone resembles a subsonic cruise missile, with a tubular fuselage and fold-out wings.

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate believes the Russian Armed Forces are actively ramping up their inventory of jet-powered drones to an extent where 50 percent of the long range one way attack drones launched at Ukrainian targets will be jet powered. 

In an earlier post, I discussed the Molniya, a second-generation Russian autonomous interceptor drone that retains the operational simplicity of the Yolka interceptor while offering greater capability through longer range, higher speed, and a warhead. It can reach speeds of up to 330 km/h.

One possible shortcoming of the Molniya is its quadcopter configuration. However, Russia may have deliberately chosen this design because it is also simultaneously developing the Molniya-P interceptor drone with a conventional airframe.

With the Brave 1, Ukrainian forces may well have narrowed the gap in interceptor-drone capabilities between the two nations thanks to its conventional airframe and the higher speeds that configuration enables.

In Ukraine, Cornered by US Supplied Hornet Drones, Russia Bounces Back with Molniya Purpose-Built Hornet Hunter

Molniya Interceptor Drone Undergoing Factory Testing. Screen grab from RuMoD released video.

Russian forces appear to be reeling under a sustained campaign of mid-range interdiction attacks on their logistics network by Ukrainian forces using US-made Hornet AI-powered autonomous attack drones. The Hornet can navigate using machine vision and autonomously hunt, recognize, prioritize, and attack targets moving along Russian supply routes.

As a result, over the past month, the flow of fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements to the front line is drying up.

Logistics Lockdown

Ukraine has succeeded in imposing a logistics lockdown on Russian forces using Hornet drones, a lockdown that appears to have significantly slowed the Russian offensive along the Donbas frontline..

It's conceivable that supplies reaching the frontline are barely allowing Russian forces to hold territory.

Breaking Out of the Lockdown

To retain the offensive capability of its forces, the Russian military leadership has taken immediate measures such as shortening convoys and avoiding highways by using alternative routes and dirt roads.

Short-term measures being considered to ease Ukraine's "logistics lockdown" include relocating depots deeper within Russian territory and redeploying short-range mobile air-defense systems, such as Tor and Pantsir, to protect highways from drone attacks. However, when resources are limited, strengthening the rear can weaken the front.

Relocating depots deeper within Russian territory will slow the flow of supplies. Redeploying air-defense assets will weaken the integrated air-defense network and make forward-deployed artillery and command posts more vulnerable.

Long Term Measures

It is the long-term measures that the Russian leadership is likely betting on, including 

1. Improving drone detection and tracking through the use of more capable radar and optical sensors. 

2. Deploying large numbers of interceptor drones to engage attacking Hornet drones.

Yolka Interceptor Drone

Yolka is a handheld, man-portable kinetic interceptor drone launched from a pistol-like device. It's extremely simple to use. The operator points it roughly toward a target, launches, and the drone autonomously tracks and rams the enemy UAV using electro-optical (daylight camera) + infrared sensors plus an onboard AI/processor ("Igolka" module). 

Weighing approximately 1.3 kg, the Yolka can reach speeds of 200–250 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 2 km.

Russian forces began operational deployment of the autonomous Yolka interceptor drone in early 2026.

The Yolka's portability, ease of use, and very low cost (approximately $500) enable widespread and distributed deployment. 

The Yolka provides a credible counter-drone capability for mobile counter-drone ("drone hunting") teams, small infantry and special-forces units, and for protecting personnel, vehicles, and equipment in the field. 

Though the Yolka has been a success story, it was developed and operationally deployed before former Google CEO Eric Schmidt dug into his deep pockets to fund the development of the Hornet strike drone that is now causing anguish along the front line and at command centers. 

The speed and routing flexibility of the Hornet are often beyond the interception capabilities of the Yolka. The Hornet has a cruising speed of 100-120 kph but is capable of higher dash and dive speeds. However, if launched and positioned in time, Yolkas can successfully intercept Hornet drones. Drone interception video released by the RuMoD and other official sources such as the Zvesdamews often show footage of Yolka drones intercepting Hornets.   

Screen grab from RuMoD released video.

Molniya Interceptor Drone

Developed by the Scientific and Production Center for Unmanned Aviation Systems in Russia's Tomsk Region, the Molniya interceptor is somewhat similar in shape (bullet-like) to the Ukrainian Sting interceptor. Both use a quadcopter flight and control scheme.

Currently, Molniya is undergoing factory tests. 

Significantly, the Molniya is heavier (2.5 kg versus 1.3 kg) than the Yolka and offers a greater maximum engagement range (5 km versus 3 km).

Unlike the Yolka, which lacks a warhead and relies entirely on kinetic interception, the Molniya carries a 300-gram warhead. 

Both the Yolka and Molniya can be hand-launched and feature AI-powered autonomy that makes them resilient to control channel jamming. 

The Yolka starts using its optical / thermal sensors and AI interception algorithms from before launch in order to engage its target. The Molniya has optical and thermal sensors and can likely use onboard AI to fuse radar and optical sensor data for autonomous positioning and interception. 

While the Yolka needs to be visually cued onto its target before launch and cannot be effectively used under poor visibility conditions, the Molniya is cued by ground-based radar  facilitating use under all visibility conditions. Radar cueing also leverages the interceptor's longer engagement range making it more versatile than the Yolka. Early launch allows the drone to position optimally for an interception. 

Reusable Interceptor?

Perhaps its most intriguing feature is that the Molniya appears to be a reusable interceptor drone. It is equipped with landing struts that protect its propellers during landing. Footage of Molniya trials recently posted on social media shows the drone returning for a controlled landing. Indeed, the footage focuses almost entirely on the drone's return capability. 

For an interceptor drone to be reusable, it needs the ability to take down its target without destroying itself. Could the 300-gram warhead on the Molniya be ejectable, allowing it to return from a successful engagement? A close look at the drone video does not rule out the capability. However, most likely, the drone is just capable of aborting an interception. 

Screen grab from RuMoD released video.

Conclusion

Russia has a proven track record of countering sophisticated, versatile, and expensive Western weapon systems with less sophisticated, more focused, significantly lower-cost but effective alternatives.

Russia countered the Ukrainian deployment of the Sting interceptor drone with the significantly cheaper yet highly capable Yolka interceptor. 

The Molniya's longer range, radar cueing, and autonomous sensor-fusion tracking capabilities are reminiscent of the US Merops AS-3 interceptor drone used by Ukrainian forces, the development of which was also funded by Eric Schmidt. Unlike the Merops, however, the Molniya appears to be designed for mass production and widespread deployment. If it proves capable of reliably countering the Hornet, it may only be a matter of time before Russian forces are able to regain the operational momentum necessary to resume offensive operations in Donbas.