Russia's Semiconductor Lithography Breakthrough: No More Washing Machines for Chips

The Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center (ZNTC), together with the Belarusian Planar, has reportedly completed the development and manufacture of a prototype photolithography unit with a design standard of 130 nm. This is the most advanced lithograph ever created on the territory of Russia and the Union State.

Microchips based on the 130-nm standard on 200-mm wafers are widely used in industrial electronics — car controllers, converters for the power industry, chips for communication base stations, secure microcontrollers for payment systems, and interface components for aviation and space. Russia has been manufacturing 130-nm microchips using photolithography systems imported from Nikon, Canon and ASML. Following Western sanctions, access to such equipment was severely restricted.

In the past, ZNTC has successfully developed and delivered to industry photolithography systems with 350-nm resolution. It has also created two prototypes of an electron-beam lithography system with a 150-nm standard, which are undergoing testing. Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) is distinct from photolithography — EBL is a semiconductor lithography technique that can be used for research, mask fabrication and low-volume manufacturing of semiconductors.

The new Russian breakthrough follows Russian success in developing an excimer laser, a critical component of photolithography technology.

In September 2024, Moscow-based LASSARD Group of Companies announced that it had produced two experimental high-power excimer-laser samples, at 193 and 248 nm, under the Russian "Progress 130" project.

In February 2026, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, reportedly said that this year Russia would master the production of lithography equipment with a 130-nm standard.

LASSARD is attempting to develop and industrialise a Russian excimer-laser light source specifically for semiconductor photolithography. Its work began with a 248-nm prototype for a 130-nm lithography system, followed by development of a 193-nm source for 90–45-nm lithography.

LASSARD is developing just the laser. The lithography machine is vastly more complicated than the laser. Other critical components include optics, the mask, wafer stage, photoresist, and alignment and focus systems.

Based on the report, the Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center, together with the Belarusian Planar, is developing the entire lithography machine.

Photolithography Explained

Making a semiconductor chip involves printing an extraordinarily complicated microscopic drawing onto a silicon wafer.

The wafer is coated with a light-sensitive material called photoresist. A pattern — representing transistors, wires, etc. — is projected onto the wafer through a mask. When photons interact with the photoresist, it changes chemically. The exposed or unexposed portions can then be removed, allowing the underlying silicon or other material to be etched or otherwise processed.

The smaller the wavelength of the light, the smaller the features that can potentially be printed.

That's why semiconductor manufacturing progressed from visible/near-UV light to deep ultraviolet (DUV).

Excimer Laser

An excimer laser produces extremely intense pulses of very short-wavelength ultraviolet light.

For semiconductor lithography, two wavelengths are relevant:

KrF (Krypton Fluoride) — 248 nm

ArF (Argon Fluoride) — 193 nm

These are deep-ultraviolet wavelengths. Modern DUV lithography systems use these lasers as their light source. 

The highly specialised excimer-laser light sources required for DUV photolithography are supplied essentially by two major foreign companies — ASML-owned US company Cymer and Japan's Gigaphoton. Nikon and Canon manufacture complete DUV lithography systems, but do not provide the same independent excimer-laser-light-source capability.

EUV Lithography

Even after LASSARD fields a 193-nm excimer-laser system, there will continue to exist a yawning gap between Russian-manufactured microchips and those manufactured by Taiwan-based TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC is already mass-producing 7-nm-class chips, with its more advanced 7-nm variants using ASML EUV lithography.

ASML has now achieved an extraordinary technological position by developing EUV lithography in which a laser-generated tin plasma produces 13.5-nm light. Extremely short-wavelength ultraviolet light — typically 13.5 nanometres (nm) — can be used to print very tiny features on a silicon wafer. ASML is currently the only commercial supplier of EUV lithography systems.

Semiconductor Manufacturing

With 130-nm lithographic capability, Russia could push its optical lithography capability to potentially approach 65-nm-class features using multipatterning.

Multipatterning involves printing complicated patterns by photo-etching two or more simpler patterns sequentially over the same wafer surface.

Multipatterning is technologically challenging and pushes up cost, processing time, and defect rates.

Though so far Russia has only now acquired photolithography capabilities to manufacture 130-nm chips, it is already designing and manufacturing chips with finer topography.

Mikron already produces chips with a 90-nm topology, which are used in bank cards. For the 90-nm process, Mikron uses lithography equipment from STMicroelectronics.

In January 2026, it was reported that Element Microelectronic Holding was building a plant in Tatarstan for the production of semiconductor wafers with 55–40-nm technology. In the future, the enterprise should reach a more advanced level — 28 nanometers.

55–40-nm technologies cover more than half of the Russian market for electronic components. Among the main customers are Rosatom, Rostec, defence industry enterprises and critical information infrastructure facilities.

Russia has possibly acquired the capability to manufacture finer-topology chips by using imported second-hand ASML photolithography systems, optics, lasers, wafer stages and control electronics.

China's Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment reportedly has been developing 28-nm immersion lithography systems.

Ambitious Plans

Russia reportedly has around 25–40 imported 130-nm photolithography units operational at Russian enterprises. These will eventually need to be replaced, creating a potential demand for 15–25 new units by 2030–32. The market is small, but sanctions and the urgent need to reduce import dependence leave Russia with little choice.

Despite the sanctions — or perhaps because of them — Russia has drawn up ambitious plans to ramp up its semiconductor manufacturing capability. It aims to mass-produce 28-nm chips by 2027 and 14-nm chips by 2030. However, it is likely that the targets will be pushed back based on delays in establishing the capability.

The recent development of a prototype photolithography system with a 130-nm design resolution is an important step towards realising Russia's semiconductor ambitions. What Russia has created so far is a prototype that will be used for preliminary testing and for developing and refining the technological processes required to manufacture specific products.

Most importantly for Russian strategic planners, ZNTC's success with the 130-nm photolithography system has cemented its reputation as an organisation that Russia could rely on for its semiconductor ambitions in the future.

The Russian Wild Card in HAL's MTA Bid

Multiple sources have reported that the Indian Ministry of Defence on August 12, 2026 issued an RFP for the procurement of 60 new multirole transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF), with an option for additional aircraft. The programme is intended primarily to replace the ageing An-32 fleet. ANI reported that the tender has been issued to multiple Indian companies, including Tata, Mahindra and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), with Indian companies expected to play the lead role.

The programme envisages Indian companies tying up with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to establish local production. According to ANI, around 20% of the aircraft are to be delivered in fly-away condition, with the remainder manufactured in India with more than 60% indigenous content.

According to ThePrint, the MTA is intended to fill the capability gap between the An-32 and Il-76 fleets and could eventually replace both in terms of numbers and capability. The IAF's original 2022 RFI specified a payload of 18–27 tonnes, while subsequent reporting indicates that the upper limit was raised to 30 tonnes.

In an earlier Thumkar post in December 2025, I discussed the foreign OEMs likely to bid for the MTA project and compared the performance of the aircraft they were expected to offer. At that point, however, HAL was not widely known to be in the reckoning. I will therefore focus here on what HAL may have to offer.

On April 3, 2026, The Times of India posted a video concerning the MTA programme. The accompanying commentary, reportedly based on an interaction with HAL CMD D. K. Sunil, indicated that HAL had renewed discussions with Russia regarding a possible joint response to the MTA requirement. 

The original Indo-Russian MTA

The original MTA was envisaged as a twin-engine military transport aircraft capable of carrying 12,000 kg over 4,700 km or 20,000 kg over 2,000 km, with operations in all geographical and climatic conditions, including high-altitude airfields up to 3,300 m and unpaved runways.

Its pressurised cargo-compartment cross-section was to be identical to that of the Il-76MD. This would have permitted the use of existing cargo-handling, transportation and airdrop equipment and infrastructure. Russian sources also stated that the aircraft's dimensions, cargo compartment and powerplant would enable it to carry up to 80% of the weapons and military equipment then in Indian service.

India and Russia began negotiations on the aircraft in 1999. HAL records that an agreement to prepare a detailed project report for co-development of the MTA with Russian partners was signed on June 6, 2001. A joint design, development and co-production agreement involving HAL, Ilyushin and Irkut followed in June 2001.

The Indian requirements subsequently differed significantly from the Russian specifications. Ilyushin's General Director said that the Indian requirements delivered in January 2006 were “somewhat different” from the Russian specification, leading to further discussions and a redesign. A new letter of intent was signed on January 24, 2007, followed by a new intergovernmental agreement on joint development on November 12, 2007.

The Preliminary Design Phase (PDP) contract was finally signed on October 12, 2012, and PDP activities commenced on December 1, 2012. HAL's 2012–13 annual report confirms these dates.

HAL's 2013–14 annual report stated that the Joint Technical Preliminary Design Phase had been completed at UAC-TA in Moscow, while the contracts for detailed design, experimental work, prototype fabrication, testing and certification were still being negotiated.

Russia initially planned to power the MTA with the PS-90A, with the then-under-development PD-14 family subsequently envisaged as an alternative.

The engine subsequently became one of the major stumbling blocks.

A contemporary Economic Times report said that the IAF required a full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) system, while Russia had argued that the PS-90's performance did not require such a system. A 2016 interview with UAC President Yuri Slyusar was more explicit: he acknowledged that the PS-90 did not have “full-fledged FADEC” and said that the FADEC requirement had apparently been introduced during the programme.

There were also concerns about the PS-90A-76's ability to operate safely at Himalayan altitudes, including its engine relight capability. Contemporary Indian aviation reporting identified both the relight issue and the absence of full-authority digital engine control as concerns.

On January 13, 2016, Ilyushin CEO Sergey Velmozhkin confirmed to TASS that the Russian-Indian project had been frozen as a joint project.

IL-214 reborn as IL-276

Following India's withdrawal, Russia continued development of the aircraft independently, eventually redesignating it Il-276. It was essentially a further development of the Il-214/MTA concept, with a payload of around 20 tonnes.

In 2024, however, interest in the Il-276 appeared to wane following the emergence of the Il-212 project. The Il-212 is being developed as a replacement for Russia's An-26 and An-72-class transports.

A UAC source quoted in reporting in January 2024 gave the proposed Il-212 a maximum payload of 17 tonnes when powered by two PD-8 turbofans. This is worth treating as a design target rather than a firmly established production specification, since the aircraft remains under development.

Reviving the Il-276 project would nevertheless be an attractive option for HAL because it would build on the considerable design work already undertaken for the Indo-Russian MTA programme and could potentially involve considerably more technology transfer than a straightforward foreign-aircraft assembly arrangement.

However, reviving the mothballed project would inevitably introduce some development and acquisition delay.

There is also the unresolved question of the PS-90A's engine-control system.

Does the PS-90A now have FADEC?

The situation is more complicated than it was in 2015.

Current documentation concerning the PS-90A-76 identifies its control arrangement as:

“BAC (Basic Automatic Control) with EEC (RED-90M) & SAC (Stand-by Automatic Control mode with Electro-hydro-mechanical control system TD-90.”

This indicates that the engine has an electronic engine controller but also a standby electro-hydromechanical control system.

A Russian patent published subsequently describes the RED-90 electronic engine controller as the main device of a digital engine-control system “of the FADEC type” and specifically identifies RED-90 as being used with the PS-90A. The patent also states that the RED-90 samples PS-90A engine parameters at 50 Hz.

This is significant, but I would not yet equate it unequivocally with the Western understanding of a modern, redundant, full-authority FADEC on the PS-90A-76.

Russia has nevertheless continued to modernise the PS-90 family, and the RED-90 is unquestionably a digital electronic engine controller.

Thus, it is possible that a later version of the RED-90M/PS-90A-76 control system has moved closer to, or now actually provides, full-authority digital control. This needs confirmation before the engine can safely be described as having FADEC.

Alternative Russian aircraft

Assuming that the PS-90A-76 does not meet the IAF's FADEC requirement, there has been speculation that HAL could make its MTA pitch with a Russian medium airlifter other than the Il-276, with which it has been closely associated in the past.

Two obvious possibilities would be the Il-212 and Il-76MD-90A.

Neither is a perfect fit for the Indian MTA requirement.

The Il-212, with its reported maximum payload of 17 tonnes, falls just below the 18-tonne lower limit reported for the current requirement. Its major attraction, however, would be its two PD-8 engines. Russia has developed an indigenous electronic automatic-control system for the PD-8, and the engine is intended to be used on the Il-212.

The PD-8 is an all Russian, fuel efficient turbofan engine with FADEC or equivalent, which is comparable to Western military engines.However, the engine is still relatively new and its operational maturity is yet to be established.

The surprising option: IL-76MD-90A

Setting aside the initial incredulity, the Il-76MD-90A, with a maximum payload of approximately 60 tonnes, could make a surprisingly credible MTA solution if operated with payloads in the 18–30 tonne range.

The aircraft would have enormous payload margin relative to the Indian requirement. It also offers a large cargo compartment, rear loading, substantial range and the ability to carry loads far beyond the maximum payload of most of the aircraft competing for the MTA contract.

However, its compliance with the Indian requirement cannot be established from payload alone. The complete RFP would have to be examined for requirements concerning runway performance, high-altitude operation and other relevant parameters.

The principal disadvantage would obviously be operating cost and the fact that the Il-76MD-90A is a much larger aircraft than an 18–30-tonne MTA would appear to require.

On the other hand, India already possesses considerable Il-76 operational and maintenance experience. The IAF also has existing infrastructure and trained personnel associated with the type.

If the RFP does not impose a significant size or operating-cost constraint, and if the RED-90M/PS-90A-76 control system is ultimately demonstrated to satisfy the IAF's FADEC requirement, the Il-76MD-90A could be a very interesting interim solution.

It could provide HAL with a relatively mature platform while buying time to revive and further develop the Il-276, complete its testing and eventually establish indigenous serial production.

Russia’s Su-30SM2 Upgrade: The Clue to HAL’s Missing Su-30MKI Engine Plan

Su-30SM2 delivered on July 9, 2026. Photo by Rostec

On July 9, 2026, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) announced in a press release that it had delivered an unspecified number of Su-30SM2 multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), along with a batch of Su-34 fighter-bomber aircraft.

It is widely reported that the Su-30SM2 features the more powerful AL-41F-1S (Product 117S) engine and the Irbis-N035 radar, both of which are fitted on the Su-35S. While the latter (radar update) is true, the former (engine upgrade) is most likely not yet the case. That may well be the reason why HAL’s current Su-30MKI upgrade plans do not include an engine upgrade.

Su-30SM2

The Su-30SM2 is an effort to converge the Su-30 family with the Su-35 series to the maximum extent possible in order to reduce logistics and maintenance overheads.

In addition to the new radar and engine, the Su-30SM2 variant is expected to feature improved avionics and an upgraded OLS. It will also be capable of carrying new air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons developed for the Su-57 fighter.

S-70 Okhotnik Integration

Notably, the Su-30SM2 is expected to feature secure radio communication channels that will allow it to exchange tactical data with the S-70 Okhotnik low-observable attack drone. The range of this communication equipment is reportedly between 350 and 450 km, potentially reducing the need for Russian fighters to enter airspace controlled by enemy air-defense systems.

Order and Operational Induction Status

At the Army-2020 forum, the Russian Ministry of Defense and UAC signed a contract for the supply of 21 modernized Su-30SM2 fighters for the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) and the Navy.

The RuAF and Fleet Aviation are inducting the Su-30SM2 on two parallel tracks:

1. Upgrading existing Su-30SM fighters to the SM2 standard.

2, Producing new Su-30SM2 fighters.

In April 2021, Izvestia reported that the initial batch of Su-30SM2 fighters would be earmarked for the Russian Navy, with deliveries prioritized for the Northern, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets.

“Slightly more than two dozen aircraft” were reportedly scheduled to be handed over to the Russian Ministry of Defense by the end of 2022.

Flight testing of the aircraft began in September 2021.

Deliveries of the aircraft started in January 2022.

“The United Aircraft Corporation, part of Rostec, has begun deliveries of modernized Su-30SM2 fighters for naval aviation of the Navy,” Rostec said in a statement to TASS on January 20, 2022.

Batch deliveries containing an unspecified number of fighters were made in November 2022 and July 2023.

Deliveries to the RuAF likely began in late 2023.

The RuAF reportedly received two two-seat Su-30SM2 aircraft in 2023.

On August 10, 2024, RIA Novosti reported, quoting a UAC press release, that the Irkutsk Aviation Plant of the United Aircraft Corporation had manufactured and delivered new improved Su-30SM2 multirole fighters to the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The batch delivered on July 9, 2026, was the latest such delivery.

Radar Upgrade

Designed by the Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute (NIIP) in Zhukovsky, the Irbis-E radar is a direct evolution of the BARS radar, but is significantly more powerful.

The BARS radar is fitted on Indian Air Force Su-30MKI fighters and their Russian Su-30SM analogues. Both the Irbis-E and BARS are PESA hybrid radars.

The Irbis-E reportedly retains the hybrid phased-array architecture. Its noise figure is slightly worse at 3.5 dB, but the receiver has four rather than three discrete channels.

“The biggest change is in the EGSP-27 transmitter, where the single 7-kilowatt peak-power-rated Chelnok TWT is replaced with a pair of 10-kilowatt peak-power-rated Chelnok tubes, ganged to provide a total peak power rating of 20 kilowatts. The radar is cited as having an average power rating of 5 kilowatts, with a 2-kilowatt CW rating for illumination.”

The detection range has reportedly been increased by almost two times compared with the Su-30SM, for ground targets as well as air and sea targets.

AL-41F-1S (Product 117S) Engine Upgrade

As mentioned earlier, the Su-30SM2 is intended to be powered by the AL-41F-1S engine.

Compared with the Su-30SM’s AL-31FP power plant, the Product 117S offers a 16% increase in maximum thrust (14,500 kgf) and twice the service life (4,000 hours), while retaining the same weight and dimensions.

Importantly, the more powerful Product 117S facilitates increased electrical power generation, allowing more powerful radar and electronic warfare (EW) systems to be fitted on the fighter. The higher-powered Irbis radar of the Su-30SM2 consequently increases the detection range of air and ground targets.

Current Product 117S Status

The initial Su-30SM2 aircraft delivered to the RuAF and Navy were almost certainly not fitted with the Product 117S engine.

In January 2021, a source in the aviation industry told Interfax:

“Currently, special flight tests (SLI) of the Su-30SM aircraft with the AL-41F-1S engine are being carried out. It is planned that they will be completed by December 2023.”

In July 2024, a report published on the Rostec website stated that the Product 117S engine, which was then undergoing testing on the Su-30SM2, would enter mass production the following year.

The UAC press release covering the transfer of the latest batch of Su-30SM2 fighters to the RuAF stated:

“The powerful radar allows the fighter to ‘see’ much farther than the previous version and accurately strike a wide range of ground, air, and naval targets without entering the enemy’s air-defense zone.”

Notably, the press release made no mention of a new engine.

Russian forces have operationally deployed the Su-30SM2 without a more powerful engine in order to leverage the available upgrades to the radar, optical sensors, and weapon systems.

Conclusion

Russian official sources have previously stated that the Product 117S engine is undergoing tests on the Su-30SM2. However, there has been no confirmation that these tests have been successfully completed.

On November 30, 2023, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) granted Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the modernization of the Indian Air Force’s Su-30MKI fleet by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

As part of this upgrade, HAL will equip the aircraft with the indigenously developed Virupaksha AESA radar, an electronic warfare (EW) suite, and other advanced avionics. Additionally, HAL will integrate several indigenously developed long-range weapon systems into the aircraft’s weapon management system.

The modernization will also extend the service life of the Su-30MKI fleet by more than 20 years, with the IAF reportedly planning to retain the upgraded aircraft until 2055.

However, there have been no reports indicating that HAL plans to upgrade the aircraft’s engine.

It is possible that HAL is awaiting confirmation regarding the suitability of the Product 117S engine for the Su-30MKI before committing to an engine upgrade.

Pinaka LRGR: In-Flight Manoeuvring and Longer-Range Secret Revealed!

Pinaka LRGR Test on July 8, 2026. PIB Photo

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully flight-tested the Pinaka Long Range Guided Rocket (LRGR) at the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur, on July 8, 2026.

According to the official statement,

“The rocket was tested for a user-defined minimum range of 60 km. Demonstrating all in-flight manoeuvres as planned, the LRGR impacted the target with textbook precision, exactly following the predicted trajectory.”

Notably,

“The rocket was launched from the in-service Pinaka launcher, demonstrating its versatility and providing launch capability for Pinaka variants of different ranges from the same launcher.”

Earlier Test

Earlier, in its maiden test on December 29, 2025, at the Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, the LRGR was tested for its maximum range of 120 km and its in-flight manoeuvring capability. The PIB press release covering the launch stated that “the LRGR impacted the target with textbook precision.”

DAC Clearance

On the same day, December 29, 2025, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the procurement of LRGR for the Pinaka Multiple Launch Rocket System (MRLS). According to the PIB press release, the LRGR “will enhance the range and accuracy of Pinaka MRLS for effective engagement of high-value targets.”

In January 2025, the Indian Army had reportedly given DRDO an unofficial go-ahead to develop the 120 km-range LRGR for the Pinaka MRLS, as well as a 300 km-range rocket. With a 300 km-range rocket, a future Pinaka variant would transition from a classical rocket artillery system into a quasi-tactical strike system.

The Pinaka MRLS equipped with the LRGR is generally referred to as the Pinaka Mk.3.

Pinaka LRGR

The Pinaka LRGR uses a combination of Inertial Navigation System (INS) based on Ring Laser Gyro technology and multiple GNSS inputs for navigation. Its reported Circular Error Probable (CEP) is less than 10 metres, representing a substantial improvement in accuracy over earlier Pinaka variants.

Its in-flight manoeuvring capability is likely limited to trajectory shaping and the ability to follow preprogrammed flight paths. This is not comparable to the aggressive evasive manoeuvres associated with cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles. Instead, the rocket likely uses controlled aerodynamic adjustments during flight to refine its ballistic trajectory. Such manoeuvring could allow rockets in a salvo to approach the target from different angles and/or arrive almost simultaneously despite staggered launch intervals.

The LRGR’s extended range is achieved through a combination of factors. Although it can be launched from the existing Pinaka launcher, the LRGR itself is understood to use a larger-diameter rocket body, an upgraded rocket motor, a lighter composite casing, and an aerodynamically refined shape that reduces drag and improves glide efficiency during the terminal phase of flight. Together, these features enable the rocket to reach targets at ranges of up to 120 km.

Tornado-S Comparison

For comparison, the Tornado-S is one of Russia’s most capable guided MRLS systems. It uses 300 mm guided rockets and has a reported range of approximately 120 km for standard guided rockets, with some variants reportedly capable of reaching 200 km. Like the Pinaka LRGR, the Tornado-S uses NS/GNSS-based guidance and is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets. However, the Tornado-S generally carries a heavier warhead and larger-calibre rockets, while the Pinaka LRGR offers India a precision-strike capability within the 214 mm Pinaka ecosystem and from the existing in-service launcher.

Predecessor Pinaka Systems

Currently, the most advanced Pinaka MRLS variant operated by the Indian Army is the Pinaka Mk.2 Guided Pinaka Rocket System, which can engage targets from 20 km to 80 km with a reported CEP of about 30 metres.

The Pinaka Mk.2 is a 214 mm-calibre system. It can launch unguided rockets with a maximum range of either 40 km or 60 km, as well as Guided Pinaka rockets with a maximum range of 80 km.

Guided Pinaka rockets, also known as Enhanced Pinaka rockets, feature a 250 kg warhead, canard-based aerodynamic control, and guidance using a combination of Inertial Navigation System (INS) and Satellite Navigation (SATNAV).

The SATNAV system has been integrated with the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), India’s indigenous satellite navigation network.

With the help of trajectory lofting and aerodynamic glide provided by the canards, the Guided Pinaka rocket can achieve a range of 80 km. However, the Guided Pinaka rocket is focused primarily on enhanced accuracy and reduced collateral damage, rather than on significant in-flight manoeuvring.

The Pinaka LRGR has been designed by the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in association with the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), with support from the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) and Research Centre Imarat (RCI).

Humanoid Combat Robots: Weapon Systems or the World's First Artificial Soldiers?

China will produce over 100,000 humanoid robots in 2026, according to Gan Xiaobin, Deputy Director of the Department of Science and Technology under the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. He was speaking at a press conference in Shanghai. (via TASS)

"Large language models, AI agents, and AI chips are advancing at a rapid pace. We expect humanoid robot output to exceed 100,000 units this year," Gan Xiaobin noted.

In February, CNBC reported that the US has started testing two humanoid combat robots in Ukraine, marking the first known deployment of humanoid robots in a combat zone. Developed by San Francisco-based startup Foundation Future Industries, the robots, named Phantom-1, were deployed to Ukraine for frontline logistics and reconnaissance.

Foundation Future has secured approximately $24 million in Pentagon research contracts (from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force) to test the humanoids.

Phantom-1 is roughly 5'9"–5'11" tall and weighs 176–180 lb. It is designed to use human weapons and infrastructure such as doors, stairs, and vehicles. It can lift approximately 90 lb and perform physical tasks in complex or high-risk environments. The robot has five-fingered hands, camera-based vision, and an LLM-driven autonomy system that supports both independent operation and supervised teleoperation.

Foundation Future aims to send an upgraded humanoid variant—Phantom-2—to Ukraine later this year.

China is also actively experimenting with humanoids for military applications, including teleoperated demonstrations of complex battlefield tasks.

Operational Fielding Timeline

If current technological progress continues:

Over the next one to three years, platforms like Phantom are likely to be upgraded and fielded in supervised autonomous or teleoperated combat roles. They will undertake high-risk tasks such as urban clearing, resupply under fire, and acting as decoys that draw enemy fire or absorb risk.

It is plausible that, starting as early as 2028—or perhaps as late as 2035—armed humanoid robots will actively participate in direct combat.

Between 2035 and 2045, fully autonomous squad-level humanoid "soldiers" will likely begin replacing human infantry in many battlefield roles.

Why Humanoid Robots?

There is a good reason why robotic soldiers will initially take humanoid form. Battlefield equipment—including transport and combat vehicles, firearms, and drone-launching systems—is designed for human use. Humanoids will be able to operate all equipment developed for humans. Interchangeability between humans and humanoid robots will be critical during the transition period, which could last for decades.

Challenges Persist

Humanoid robots outperform humans in many aspects of soldiering. They possess greater strength, higher load-carrying capacity, superior endurance, greater environmental tolerance, and higher precision. They can also be deployed in numbers limited only by manufacturing capacity. Most importantly, robots completely trounce humans when it comes to expendability.

However, humans outperform robots in mobility over rough terrain, adaptability, judgment, and field-acquired dexterity. As long as food and water are available, humans also exhibit far greater endurance than electrically powered robots.

It is interesting to note that companies developing humanoid robots worldwide are focused on improving endurance, fall recovery, rough-terrain mobility, and dexterity.

Humanoid Vulnerabilities

The vulnerability of humanoid robots to cyberattacks and spoofing, the logistics infrastructure required to support their operation, and their limitations in leadership and command roles will likely require humans and humanoids to operate as teams in the near future—and perhaps even in the more distant future.

However, there can be little doubt that deploying humanoid soldiers will provide a nation with an overwhelming military advantage, particularly if they can be upgraded more rapidly than those of an adversary.

It is also possible that humanoids, together with quadruped robots and UGVs, will never evolve beyond being sophisticated weapon systems that reduce the number of humans required on the battlefield. They may significantly reduce the demand for human soldiers, but they are unlikely to eliminate it entirely.

To some extent, the widespread use of drones has already reduced the number of soldiers required to hold a front in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

 

Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.

Factories, Patience and Resilience: Russia's Answer to Ukraine's Drone Offensive

Interceptor Drone developed by Rostec : Photo Credit Rostec

Over the past one month or so, Russia has absorbed many painful blows delivered by Ukrainian long range strike drones. Ukraine has struck Russian energy infrastructure and logistics to an extent where Russians are now being forced to cope with fuel and energy shortages, not just the loss of energy exports. The advance of Russian forces has slowed to a crawl that suggests that it may take years for them to completely 'liberate' Donbas.

For some in Russia and abroad, the situation may appear dismal. However, Russia has some good cards to play on account of its industrial capacity, resilience, and patience. To counter the drone menace it appears to be abandoning a "border defence" philosophy in favour of distributed vital-area defence.

There is a perception that Russia has no effective counter to the threat posed by Ukraine's long-range strike drones. Deployed in sufficient numbers, such drones are likely to continue penetrating Russian airspace and striking targets deep inside the country. Unless Russia develops more effective countermeasures, the economic and military costs imposed by these attacks are likely to grow as Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to evolve.

Russia may still achieve some of the objectives of its Special Military Operation, such as the liberation of Donbas. However, even if Russian forces were to secure Donbas, there is little reason to believe Ukraine would cease hostilities. Instead, it could continue using long-range drones to impose economic costs on Russia and gradually erode its war-fighting capacity.

In that sense, drones may provide Ukraine with a viable means of waging a prolonged war of attrition, one that seeks to compel Russia to negotiate on terms more favourable to Kyiv.

Understanding Russia's Air Defence Limitations

Russia has largely relied on its integrated layered air defence network—designed primarily to detect, track, and engage high-value aerial assets such as combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—to counter the threat posed by low-cost, slow-flying long-range drones. The endeavor has been ineffective, besides its high economic cost.

Border Length

Russia's land border with Ukraine extends for approximately 1,974 km. However, drones are not restricted to crossing the land border. They can approach via the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, cross territorial waters, or exploit the airspace of neighbouring countries before entering Russia.

Russia also has approximately 800 km of coastline vulnerable to drone ingress. Ukrainian drones have, on occasion, reportedly transited the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before entering Russian airspace to strike targets around St. Petersburg. Russia's borders with the Baltic states extend for another 862 km.

In effect, Russian air defence systems must monitor potential drone approaches along more than 3,600 km of land and maritime frontiers.

Air defence coverage across such distances will inevitably contain gaps. Existing Russian systems were primarily designed to detect aircraft and missiles flying above approximately 500 ft. Ukrainian drones, equipped with Starlink terminals that provide low-latency communications, are known to fly at much lower altitudes. Using electro-optical sensors, they can also be remotely piloted along river valleys, lakes, and other terrain features that reduce the likelihood of detection.

Western ISR Support

Ukraine's Western allies also employ space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor Russian air defence deployments and operational status.

These assets may detect temporary gaps created by system relocation, maintenance, or technical failures, allowing drone routes to be planned around them. It is conceivable that some drones can even be dynamically rerouted during flight as new opportunities emerge.

Molniya Interceptor Drone: Screen grab from RuMoD video

Air defence coverage within Russia's interior is generally less dense than along its borders and tends to focus on protecting major cities and strategic facilities. Once drones penetrate the border defences, they may find it easier to avoid known air defence sites and populated areas while remaining undetected for extended periods.

Why Ukraine Has Been Successful

In many respects, the perception that drones can occasionally penetrate even heavily defended airspace reflects reality. Both Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated the ability to do so against sophisticated air defence networks fielded by Russia, the United States, and Israel.

With extensive assistance from its Western partners, Ukraine has developed tactics that exploit the inherent limitations of legacy air defence systems through the use of Starlink communications, space-based ISR, and airborne surveillance assets.

Russia Pivots Towards Dedicated Drone Defence

Recent Ukrainian successes appear to have prompted Russia to complement its legacy air defence network with systems specifically designed to counter drones.

Unlike traditional air defence systems, which are optimised to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, these new systems are intended to defeat slow-flying autonomous or remotely piloted drones.

There will inevitably be overlap between the two defensive architectures as drones themselves increasingly assume traditional combat roles.

Russia's changing priorities are reflected in the variety of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) introduced over the past few months. The emphasis appears to have shifted from preventing drone penetration to limiting the damage once drones enter defended airspace.

Vital Area and Vital Point Defence

Broadly speaking, Russia appears to be focusing on protecting vital areas and vital points.

For vital area defence, Russian forces have introduced:

1. Specialised drone-detection radar (Sokol)

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system capable of denying connectivity over an area of approximately 18 sq km

2. Medium-range interceptor drones (Rita-2 and Molniya)

3. Passive RF and electro-optical drone detection systems

4. Medium-range electronic warfare systems

5. Rapidly deployable protective net systems for roads and convoys

6. Yak-130M light combat aircraft for engaging larger drones

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink Jamming: Photo Ukrainian Defence Sources

For vital point defence:

1. Krona-E ultra-short-range missile system (450 m–1.3 km)

2. Zak-30 Citadel 30 mm automatic cannon firing programmable air-burst ammunition

3. Zubr automated gun systems

4. Yolka hand-launched interceptor drones

5. Rita-2 reusable interceptor drones

6. Redut-UR automated kinetic defence system firing unguided rockets

7. Shrapnel-dispersing small-arms ammunition

8. Duplet net-firing handgun

These lists are not exhaustive.

With the notable exception of the Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jammer, most of these systems appear relatively inexpensive. They therefore lend themselves to large-scale production and widespread deployment.

It is likely that Russia's next priority will be manufacturing these systems in sufficient numbers to protect critical infrastructure and strategic facilities across the country.

An interesting feature of nearly all these new systems is that they possess their own dedicated radar and/or electro-optical sensors. They are therefore far less dependent on the sensor network of Russia's legacy air defence system.

It is also likely that the legacy air defence network will continue to evolve and become more tightly integrated with this new layered drone defence architecture.

A day after my above post, in this interview, President Putin corroborates conclusions that I had independently reached through my own analysis. It is reassuring to see that my assessment aligns with his remarks.

Putin on Ukraine's Strikes Against Russia's Energy Infrastructure

Russian President Vladimir Putin comments on Ukraine's strikes against Russia's critical and energy infrastructure, discussing the impact on fuel supplies, air defense production, repairs, and the situation in… pic.twitter.com/PYOsyaVQVX

— Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil (@ivan_8848) June 29, 2026