Ukraine Struggles to Develop Interceptor for Russia’s Faster Jet Gerans

 

Ukraine has yet to develop a reliable, scalable interceptor drone capable of engaging Russia’s increasingly fast jet-powered Geran attack drones, according to Serhiy Beskrestnov, better known by his callsign “Flash,” a Ukrainian technology specialist and adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It was recently reported that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has field tested and accepted the first jet interceptor drone Alexa Spatium, which is designed to combat kamikaze jet drones “Geran‑3”, “Geran‑4” and “Geran‑5”. However, the key performance characteristics of the interceptor, such as maximum speed, range and operational ceiling, were not disclosed making it difficult to assess the veracity of the Ukrainian claim.

Early in August, the UV Military Cluster company told Militarnyi that the company had created a drone named "Crazy" that will start shooting down Russian drones later in August. 

The vertical takeoff and landing drone is capable of carrying a payload weighing up to 0.5 kg. Its max flight range is 45 km, tactical flight range is 25 km and maximum endurance is 30 minutes. Its operational altitude can vary from 200 m to 10,000 m. A digital or analog camera can be installed on board, as well as thermal imaging or twilight optics.

The company highlighted the drone's thoughtful design, aerodynamic profile and balanced center of mass. The battery passes through the body, which allows you to evenly distribute the weight and avoid overloading the front of the drone.

The drone is available in two variants: a high-speed variant without wings that accelerates to 365 km/h and a winged variant that achieves 310 km/h.

Performance Shortfalls

In a recent interview with Radio NV, Beskrestnov acknowledged that Ukrainian manufacturers had failed to deliver the jet-drone interceptors they had promised during the winter of 2025–26. Some manufacturers had claimed that such systems would be available within “a few weeks,” but subsequent trials reportedly demonstrated that the interceptor drones lacked both the speed and technical characteristics required to reliably engage the faster Russian drones.

The problem is significant because Russia appears to be progressively increasing the speed and sophistication of its attack drones. The Geran-3 is reported to reach around 300–330 km/h, while the Geran-4 can reach approximately 450–500 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres. The newer Geran-5 is reported to be capable of approximately 600 km/h, placing it firmly in the performance class of a small cruise missile. The Banderol, a related Russian drone-missile, is also reported to fly at around 500–600 km/h, with a range of up to 500 km and a warhead of approximately 114–150 kg.

The implications for interception are considerable. Against a target travelling at 500–600 km/h, an interceptor needs not merely to match the target's speed but to have a substantial speed advantage to close the distance and manoeuvre for an engagement. This puts the desirable performance of an interceptor at roughly 600 km/h or more—well beyond the capabilities of many of the inexpensive interceptor drones currently being deployed by Ukraine. The 360 km/h speed capability of the "Crazy" drone referred to above illustrates the growing performance gap.

This creates a difficult technological and economic problem. A cheap interceptor drone is attractive for countering inexpensive mass-produced attack drones, but as the target becomes faster, the interceptor increasingly begins to require the performance characteristics—and consequently the cost and complexity—of a conventional aircraft.

Ukraine's inability to field a sufficiently capable interceptor at scale means that it currently has to rely on more expensive conventional air-defence methods. Fighter aircraft, predominantly F-16s, can engage the faster Russian drones with air-to-air missiles, while Ukrainian ground forces use MANPADS against targets within their engagement envelope.

Neither method, however, provides an obvious low-cost solution for dealing with large numbers of high-speed attack drones.

The issue is becoming particularly important as Russia expands the use of jet-powered variants of the Geran family. Unlike the relatively slow piston-powered Gerans that can be engaged by a wider range of air-defence systems, the higher speed of the jet-powered variants sharply reduces the time available for detection, tracking and interception.

The failure of Ukraine's promised interceptor programmes to produce a working system several months after the original deadlines therefore represents more than a development delay. It highlights the technological challenge involved in creating an inexpensive countermeasure capable of keeping pace with the rapid evolution of Russia's attack-drone fleet.

Russia's Expanded Use of Jet Drones

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the production volume of Geran-4/5 jet drones now exceeds the production of Geran-2 

As of March 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Russia produced about 5500 drones per month. As of August, the Main Intelligence Directorate, estimates the Russian industry produces about 3 thousand Geran-4/5 kamikaze drones and about 2.8 thousand Geran-2 attack drones every month.

Jet drone operational usage has gradually risen since early 2026. During the whole of 2025, Russian forces used 180 jet drones. In 2026, by the beginning of June, Russian forces had launched 1400 jet drones. 

In July, Russian forces used five times more jet UAVs than in June. During some attacks, two-thirds of the drones used were jet powered. 

Russian state media has also claimed that the jet-powered drones are being employed against higher-value targets.

RIA Novosti has reported that Russian forces are using jet drones and other precision weapons against decision-making centres, command posts and enterprises allegedly being used in cooperation with NATO specialists, both in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine.

The emerging contest is therefore not simply one of producing more drones. It is becoming a race between increasingly sophisticated attack drones and increasingly capable—and ideally inexpensive—interceptors.

For Ukraine, Beskrestnov's admission suggests that the interceptor side of that race has so far failed to keep pace.

Black Sea Passivity Continues to Enfeeble and Embarrass Russia

 

Photo via Military Informant

Ukraine's Combined on Russian BSF

New Western satellite imagery provides confirmation that the Ukrainian jet drone and missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) on the night of August 12 likely caused serious damage to top-of-the-line warships — Project 11356R frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov — in Novorossiysk Bay.

The large-scale combined attack was carried out using Neptune anti-ship missiles, Palianytsia jet-powered strike drones, and unmanned surface vessels.

Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov are both key Kalibr cruise-missile carriers, equipped with eight vertical launch cells each. The imagery shows damage to the UKSK 3S14 area housing the Kalibr cruise missiles.

Admiral Essen shows signs of fire resulting from a drone strike on the UKSK cells. On Admiral Makarov, a breach in the bow section of the upper deck, to the left of the location of the Kalibr cruise missiles, is evident.

Military Informant states that "In addition, there are suspicions that the satellite communication station 'Centaur-NM1' and the detection radar 'Pozitiv-M1.2', located on the superstructure closer to the stern, were damaged."

This marked the third time in 2026 that both frigates had been damaged. Ironically, Russia relocated its Black Sea Fleet warships from Sevastopol to a "safe" harbor at Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai. Also, Admiral Makarov, which became the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet after the loss of the guided-missile cruiser Moskva in a Neptune anti-ship missile attack, has now sustained damage.

Ukrainian sources have additionally claimed damage to a Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship and the Project 22160 patrol ship Vasily Bykov, air-defence assets (including a 30N6E radar from an S-300 system), port infrastructure, and oil facilities at the Sheskharis terminal.

Though satellite imagery confirms damage to the Black Sea Fleet warships, it does not reveal the extent of the damage. It could well be largely superficial. In the worst-case scenario, the ships will require lengthy dockyard repairs.

Perplexing BSF Posture

It's difficult to see merit in the current posture of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. While it makes sense to relocate fleet warships at a greater distance from Ukrainian drone and missile launch pads, it is difficult to understand why the warships should passively remain in harbor, waiting to be struck.

It's possible that Ukraine is using containers on commercial shipping to launch missile and drone attacks, reducing time of flight and providing greater flexibility with attack vectors. If that is true, keeping warships docked makes even less sense because bunching targets facilitates combined attacks designed to overwhelm defences.

News Roundup: Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained, China Develops AI-Based Counter Stealth IR Seeker

Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained

The Ministry of Defence on Monday signed a contract with GA-ASI to lease two MQ-9B SeaGuardian High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for the Indian Navy for a period of 30 months.

The confusing lease needs to be put in the correct perspective.

Earlier, on October 15, 2024, India finalised a deal with the United States to acquire 31 MQ-9B Predator drones.

Of the 31 MQ-9B Predators contracted for, 15 were earmarked for the Indian Navy and eight each for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.

The deal includes setting up an MRO facility for the General Atomics-manufactured drones in the country and a separate follow-up technology-transfer deal.

India has not yet received any of the 31 MQ-9Bs under the October 2024 purchase contract. The first deliveries are currently scheduled for 2029.

In an interview published in early 2026, Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi was asked when the Navy could expect the first of its 15 MQ-9 SeaGuardians. His answer was:

“Delivery of first two RPAs ... are scheduled to commence wef Q1/2029.”

Possible reasons for the stretched delivery timeline likely include the need to produce the sensors and weapons systems ordered by the three Indian services, as well as the equipment required to set up the MRO facilities in India.

US MQ-9 Reaper Losses

The US has reportedly lost 45 MQ-9A Reaper RPAs in its ongoing conflict with Iran. The MQ-9A designation is used for variants operated by the US, while the MQ-9B designation is used for export variants variously configured to meet individual customer requirements.

It is conceivable that the reported attrition, if true, could further stretch the delivery timeline to India because GA-ASI would need to divert manufacturing capacity, components, engines, sensors and skilled manpower to make up for the losses.

Earlier Lease

In November 2020, The ToI reported that India had inducted two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for surveillance missions after acquiring them on a one-year lease from US firm General Atomics. The lease was later extended.

Based at Naval Air Station INS Rajali at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu, the two drones were to be used for long-range ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

In September 2024, the IN lost one of the two MQ-9s it had leased following a technical failure that resulted in a forced ditching.

The two additional MQ-9Bs contracted for lease would augment the surveillance capabilities of the IN. 

China Develops AI-Based IR Seeker That Could Strip F-22, F-35 of Their Stealth Cloak

Chinese researchers have developed a lightweight IR missile seeker that uses AI to recognize the relatively weak exhaust signature patterns of US F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, even in the presence of IR countermeasures such as flares.

Lab tests showed recognition accuracy of more than 90% for simulated targets.

Su-30MKI Upgrade: Could Virupaksha Become an Albatross Around Its Neck?

 HAL's Su-30MKI upgrade pivots almost entirely around the Virupaksha AESA radar being developed by DRDO to replace the existing N011M Bars Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) radar.

DRDO's confidence in successfully developing the Virupaksha AESA on a tight timeline rests on its experience and technological strides in developing the Uttam AESA for the LCA Mk-1A.

However, is that confidence justified, keeping in mind that delays in developing the radar and performance shortfalls could result in serious IAF capability gaps?

Uttam AESA

Development of the Uttam radar started around 2012, when DRDO showcased a prototype. The radar has yet to be operationally inducted.

As of August 2026, HAL claims that the Uttam radar has been extensively flight-tested. More than 120 sorties had been flown on Tejas LSP-2/LSP-3 by mid-2025, and the programme had reportedly completed the major flight-test phases and hardware qualification required for certification.

Back on February 20, 2015, LRDE officials told the author that rooftop trials of the radar were set to commence. (It had earlier been reported in the press that rooftop trials had already commenced.)

SK Sharma, Chairman and Managing Director of BEL, told reporters at Aero India 2015, “Our Active Array Radar is currently being developed in collaboration with DRDO, and would take 2 years to complete. The progress is going good and we hope Tejas could ultimately have homemade radars.”

During 2016–17, the AAAU (Active Antenna Array Unit) prototype was tested on the rooftop. Integration and testing of the engineered version on LSP-2 was in progress.

During Aero India 2019, ADA displayed LSP-2 fitted with the Uttam AESA radar. The radar was then being flight-tested on a Hawker-800 business jet.

In February 2021, DRDO chairman Sateesh Reddy told TOI, “We will have the Uttam radar from the 21st Tejas Mk-1A to be produced. Uttam has performed better than anticipated in the trials so far. We’ve already signed an MoU with HAL,” he added.

No Production Clearance Yet

The plan to introduce Uttam partway through the first 83-aircraft Mk-1A order has now effectively been abandoned. HAL's management stated in May 2026 that Uttam would not be included in the 83-aircraft programme because DRDO had not yet given production clearance. HAL now plans to integrate it into the 97-aircraft Mk-1A order.

In July 2026, Astra Microwave received a ₹2,205-crore HAL order for 122 AAAUs and 121 interface frames for the Uttam programme, intended for the second tranche of Tejas Mk-1As.

It has been reported that aircraft-level integration, software/interface validation, weapons integration, environmental and electromagnetic testing, certification and acceptance by the IAF are not yet complete.

There can be no doubt that DRDO is close to wrapping up the Uttam project. After over 14 years of development, Uttam is no longer merely an experimental radar, but neither is it yet a production-standard, operationally inducted IAF radar.

A realistic target for Uttam to achieve full maturity and operational induction would be 2029–30.

Su-30MKI Upgrade Programme

The Indian Air Force's Su-30MKI fighters have been undergoing spiral upgrades for over a decade, with key milestones including the successful integration of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and Astra air-to-air missiles.

In 2022, the IAF outlined plans for a more comprehensive block upgrade. In October 2022, The Times of India quoted IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal V. R. Chaudhari as saying, “We have decided this upgrade will be done indigenously with a plethora of indigenously-designed weapons, electronic warfare systems and the like.”

By October 2023, reports in The Economic Times indicated that the proposed upgrade would touch every aspect of the fighter—except its airframe and engines.

On November 30, 2023, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) formally approved the block upgrade programme. The project is expected to unfold in two phases: the first focused on installing advanced avionics and radar systems, and the second on enhancing the aircraft's flight-control systems.

The DAC did indeed approve the indigenous Su-30MKI upgrade from HAL on November 30, 2023.

Among the most significant upgrades is the integration of the indigenously developed Virupaksha AESA radar, which will substantially improve detection, tracking and engagement capabilities. Additionally, the Su-30MKIs will be fitted with a new indigenous Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, enhancing both air-to-air and air-to-ground targeting. The upgrade will also introduce a new electronic warfare suite designed to detect, jam and neutralise enemy threats, significantly boosting survivability in contested airspace.

Together, these upgrades will not only extend the operational life of the Su-30MKI fleet but also transform it into a more lethal, survivable and networked combat platform for the future battlespace.

Considering the steady depletion in IAF fighter aircraft strength and the growing stealth and drone threats from our adversaries, the Su-30MKI upgrade is a welcome short-term move to plug IAF operational capability gaps.

Virupaksha AESA

However, making the Su-30MKI upgrade totally dependent on the still-under-development Virupaksha AESA introduces risks that should not be ignored.

The Virupaksha is a next-generation Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar specifically tailored for the Su-30MKI upgrade programme. The radar reportedly features around 2,400 Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based transmit/receive modules. Importantly, it is being developed as a plug-and-play system compatible with the Su-30MKI's existing avionics architecture.

Development work is already underway.

While the Virupaksha AESA radar offers impressive capabilities, its development, integration and validation are likely to be a multi-year process.

However, integrating such a sophisticated sensor onto a legacy platform like the Su-30MKI is a daunting challenge. Despite the system's modularity, radar integration is a complex and delicate task, involving seamless interfacing with flight-control, navigation and weapons-management systems. As the primary onboard sensor, the radar must operate flawlessly under real-time combat conditions, making integration and testing both technically demanding and time-consuming.

Upgrade Timeline

DRDO has not officially committed to a Virupaksha development timeline.

In October 2022, the then IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal V. R. Chaudhari, told TOI that the design and development phase would take four to five years, following which the actual major upgrade would kick off.

In February 2024, The ET reported that the Air Force was set to commence work on integrating the new systems within the year, with approximately 90 fighters slated for upgrade in the initial phase.

In February 2025, DRDO, which displayed a model of the radar with a 950-mm antenna and about 2,400 GaN T/R modules, claimed that development of the Virupaksha radar was progressing as planned. DRDO subsequently told Janes that it had finalised the radar's design architecture.

Developmental trials using a Hawker-800 are reportedly planned for 2027, with Su-30MKI integration planned for 2028.

Su-30MKI integration would need to be coordinated with the integration of new mission/radar computers and displays, as well as the aircraft's weapons and EW systems.

India may have tied up with Russia for help in the integration of the Virupaksha radar, including the integration of the RVV-BD (R-37M) long-range missile onto existing Su-30MKIs equipped with the N011M Bars radar.

Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh met with Russian Defence Minister Mr. Andrey Belousov on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers' Meeting held in Qingdao, China, on June 26, 2025.

The official press release described the meeting as “one of the most important recent meetings between the leaders of the two nations,” citing the context of Operation Sindoor and the emerging need to bolster defence production—particularly in critical domains such as air defence, air-to-air missiles, modern capabilities and upgrades of air platforms.

Realistic Upgrade Timeline

Even ignoring imponderable delays that are part of technology development, in 2028, when integration of Virupaksha with the Su-30MKI commences, Virupaksha would be at roughly the same development stage as Uttam was in 2019.

Under the circumstances, a realistic goal for the start of serial upgrades of the Su-30MKI would be 2035.

The need for developing Virupaksha cannot be questioned. However, subordinating the Su-30MKI upgrade to the successful development of Virupaksha is clearly not a near-term solution to the widening gap in the IAF's operational capabilities and the threat perspective. Even as a long-term solution, it appears underwhelming considering the need for MUM-T (Manned, Unmanned Teaming).

Sukhoi Explains the Need for the Su-57 Dual-Seat Variant

In an interview with the Military Acceptance programme on the Zvezda TV channel, Mikhail Strelets, director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, revealed the following.

The twin-seat Su-57D is primarily intended for two main tasks:

Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.

Facilitating the use of sixth-generation technologies, such as operating as an airborne command post for controlling unmanned aerial vehicles. The primary pilot focuses on flying the mission profile, while the second pilot manages highly intelligent systems such as the S-70 Okhotnik, drone swarms and group-control systems.

The Su-57D will also facilitate the development of combat artificial intelligence, which Russia is currently working on.

Operating in Special Modes

One of the reasons stated for developing the Su-57D twin-seat variant is:

“Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.”

I am not sure what “special modes” alludes to.

If I were to guess, it would involve the networking of disparate systems that would be difficult to simulate on the ground.

One such mode could involve controlling a stealth drone operating deep in adversary territory, streaming target coordinates — possibly of a moving target — and relaying them to a precision-strike weapon system on the ground, such as the Iskander, or in the air, such as the Su-34.

The second pilot could manage the drone and other highly autonomous systems while the primary pilot concentrates on flying the mission and maintaining situational awareness.

Incidentally, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate recently reported recovering a Russian S-71M “Monokhrom”, a stealthy unmanned aircraft associated with the Su-57. The S-71 can reportedly perform both reconnaissance and strike missions, with the latter involving a kamikaze variant. The aircraft recovered by the Ukrainians was presumably the strike variant, which would explain why it was not recovered for reuse.

The Ukrainians found an NVIDIA Jetson Orin computer module in the S-71M, which they claim may indicate the use of AI. This provides an interesting indication of the increasingly sophisticated autonomous systems that could potentially be integrated into such a manned-unmanned architecture.

Perhaps this is what “special modes” refers to.

Su-57, S-71 Integration: Lethal Upgrade

On February 9, 2026, Russia's UAC delivered a large batch of Su-57s which, according to a UAC press release, were “in a new technical configuration.”

“The aircraft have received upgraded onboard systems and a new weapons complex.”

It is likely that the fresh batch of Su-57s delivered added the capability to carry the air-launched stealthy combat UAV designated S-71, a weapon first unveiled during Army 2024.

The S-71 is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking or destruction. Deploying and controlling a Su-57 carrying an S-71 variant would have required an upgrade of its onboard systems.

The S-71 began captive-carry trials in April 2024 at Russia’s Flight Research Centre in Zhukovsky, with test flights involving the Su-57 fighter.

You can read more details about the S-71 in my Thumkar blog post below:

On January 17, 2026, it was reported that an S-71K “Carpet” demonstrated its effectiveness for the first time by successfully destroying the highly mobile M142 HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system.

The cruise missile–drone hybrid has been developed by GosMKB Raduga JSC and can be used by 4++ generation multirole fighters, including the Su-35S and Su-30SM/SM2, as well as Su-34 NVO fighter-bombers.

Russia's Semiconductor Lithography Breakthrough: No More Washing Machines for Chips

The Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center (ZNTC), together with the Belarusian Planar, has reportedly completed the development and manufacture of a prototype photolithography unit with a design standard of 130 nm. This is the most advanced lithograph ever created on the territory of Russia and the Union State.

Microchips based on the 130-nm standard on 200-mm wafers are widely used in industrial electronics — car controllers, converters for the power industry, chips for communication base stations, secure microcontrollers for payment systems, and interface components for aviation and space. Russia has been manufacturing 130-nm microchips using photolithography systems imported from Nikon, Canon and ASML. Following Western sanctions, access to such equipment was severely restricted.

In the past, ZNTC has successfully developed and delivered to industry photolithography systems with 350-nm resolution. It has also created two prototypes of an electron-beam lithography system with a 150-nm standard, which are undergoing testing. Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) is distinct from photolithography — EBL is a semiconductor lithography technique that can be used for research, mask fabrication and low-volume manufacturing of semiconductors.

The new Russian breakthrough follows Russian success in developing an excimer laser, a critical component of photolithography technology.

In September 2024, Moscow-based LASSARD Group of Companies announced that it had produced two experimental high-power excimer-laser samples, at 193 and 248 nm, under the Russian "Progress 130" project.

In February 2026, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, reportedly said that this year Russia would master the production of lithography equipment with a 130-nm standard.

LASSARD is attempting to develop and industrialise a Russian excimer-laser light source specifically for semiconductor photolithography. Its work began with a 248-nm prototype for a 130-nm lithography system, followed by development of a 193-nm source for 90–45-nm lithography.

LASSARD is developing just the laser. The lithography machine is vastly more complicated than the laser. Other critical components include optics, the mask, wafer stage, photoresist, and alignment and focus systems.

Based on the report, the Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center, together with the Belarusian Planar, is developing the entire lithography machine.

Photolithography Explained

Making a semiconductor chip involves printing an extraordinarily complicated microscopic drawing onto a silicon wafer.

The wafer is coated with a light-sensitive material called photoresist. A pattern — representing transistors, wires, etc. — is projected onto the wafer through a mask. When photons interact with the photoresist, it changes chemically. The exposed or unexposed portions can then be removed, allowing the underlying silicon or other material to be etched or otherwise processed.

The smaller the wavelength of the light, the smaller the features that can potentially be printed.

That's why semiconductor manufacturing progressed from visible/near-UV light to deep ultraviolet (DUV).

Excimer Laser

An excimer laser produces extremely intense pulses of very short-wavelength ultraviolet light.

For semiconductor lithography, two wavelengths are relevant:

KrF (Krypton Fluoride) — 248 nm

ArF (Argon Fluoride) — 193 nm

These are deep-ultraviolet wavelengths. Modern DUV lithography systems use these lasers as their light source. 

The highly specialised excimer-laser light sources required for DUV photolithography are supplied essentially by two major foreign companies — ASML-owned US company Cymer and Japan's Gigaphoton. Nikon and Canon manufacture complete DUV lithography systems, but do not provide the same independent excimer-laser-light-source capability.

EUV Lithography

Even after LASSARD fields a 193-nm excimer-laser system, there will continue to exist a yawning gap between Russian-manufactured microchips and those manufactured by Taiwan-based TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC is already mass-producing 7-nm-class chips, with its more advanced 7-nm variants using ASML EUV lithography.

ASML has now achieved an extraordinary technological position by developing EUV lithography in which a laser-generated tin plasma produces 13.5-nm light. Extremely short-wavelength ultraviolet light — typically 13.5 nanometres (nm) — can be used to print very tiny features on a silicon wafer. ASML is currently the only commercial supplier of EUV lithography systems.

Semiconductor Manufacturing

With 130-nm lithographic capability, Russia could push its optical lithography capability to potentially approach 65-nm-class features using multipatterning.

Multipatterning involves printing complicated patterns by photo-etching two or more simpler patterns sequentially over the same wafer surface.

Multipatterning is technologically challenging and pushes up cost, processing time, and defect rates.

Though so far Russia has only now acquired photolithography capabilities to manufacture 130-nm chips, it is already designing and manufacturing chips with finer topography.

Mikron already produces chips with a 90-nm topology, which are used in bank cards. For the 90-nm process, Mikron uses lithography equipment from STMicroelectronics.

In January 2026, it was reported that Element Microelectronic Holding was building a plant in Tatarstan for the production of semiconductor wafers with 55–40-nm technology. In the future, the enterprise should reach a more advanced level — 28 nanometers.

55–40-nm technologies cover more than half of the Russian market for electronic components. Among the main customers are Rosatom, Rostec, defence industry enterprises and critical information infrastructure facilities.

Russia has possibly acquired the capability to manufacture finer-topology chips by using imported second-hand ASML photolithography systems, optics, lasers, wafer stages and control electronics.

China's Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment reportedly has been developing 28-nm immersion lithography systems.

Ambitious Plans

Russia reportedly has around 25–40 imported 130-nm photolithography units operational at Russian enterprises. These will eventually need to be replaced, creating a potential demand for 15–25 new units by 2030–32. The market is small, but sanctions and the urgent need to reduce import dependence leave Russia with little choice.

Despite the sanctions — or perhaps because of them — Russia has drawn up ambitious plans to ramp up its semiconductor manufacturing capability. It aims to mass-produce 28-nm chips by 2027 and 14-nm chips by 2030. However, it is likely that the targets will be pushed back based on delays in establishing the capability.

The recent development of a prototype photolithography system with a 130-nm design resolution is an important step towards realising Russia's semiconductor ambitions. What Russia has created so far is a prototype that will be used for preliminary testing and for developing and refining the technological processes required to manufacture specific products.

Most importantly for Russian strategic planners, ZNTC's success with the 130-nm photolithography system has cemented its reputation as an organisation that Russia could rely on for its semiconductor ambitions in the future.

The Russian Wild Card in HAL's MTA Bid

Multiple sources have reported that the Indian Ministry of Defence on August 12, 2026 issued an RFP for the procurement of 60 new multirole transport aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF), with an option for additional aircraft. The programme is intended primarily to replace the ageing An-32 fleet. ANI reported that the tender has been issued to multiple Indian companies, including Tata, Mahindra and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), with Indian companies expected to play the lead role.

The programme envisages Indian companies tying up with foreign Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to establish local production. According to ANI, around 20% of the aircraft are to be delivered in fly-away condition, with the remainder manufactured in India with more than 60% indigenous content.

According to ThePrint, the MTA is intended to fill the capability gap between the An-32 and Il-76 fleets and could eventually replace both in terms of numbers and capability. The IAF's original 2022 RFI specified a payload of 18–27 tonnes, while subsequent reporting indicates that the upper limit was raised to 30 tonnes.

In an earlier Thumkar post in December 2025, I discussed the foreign OEMs likely to bid for the MTA project and compared the performance of the aircraft they were expected to offer. At that point, however, HAL was not widely known to be in the reckoning. I will therefore focus here on what HAL may have to offer.

On April 3, 2026, The Times of India posted a video concerning the MTA programme. The accompanying commentary, reportedly based on an interaction with HAL CMD D. K. Sunil, indicated that HAL had renewed discussions with Russia regarding a possible joint response to the MTA requirement. 

The original Indo-Russian MTA

The original MTA was envisaged as a twin-engine military transport aircraft capable of carrying 12,000 kg over 4,700 km or 20,000 kg over 2,000 km, with operations in all geographical and climatic conditions, including high-altitude airfields up to 3,300 m and unpaved runways.

Its pressurised cargo-compartment cross-section was to be identical to that of the Il-76MD. This would have permitted the use of existing cargo-handling, transportation and airdrop equipment and infrastructure. Russian sources also stated that the aircraft's dimensions, cargo compartment and powerplant would enable it to carry up to 80% of the weapons and military equipment then in Indian service.

India and Russia began negotiations on the aircraft in 1999. HAL records that an agreement to prepare a detailed project report for co-development of the MTA with Russian partners was signed on June 6, 2001. A joint design, development and co-production agreement involving HAL, Ilyushin and Irkut followed in June 2001.

The Indian requirements subsequently differed significantly from the Russian specifications. Ilyushin's General Director said that the Indian requirements delivered in January 2006 were “somewhat different” from the Russian specification, leading to further discussions and a redesign. A new letter of intent was signed on January 24, 2007, followed by a new intergovernmental agreement on joint development on November 12, 2007.

The Preliminary Design Phase (PDP) contract was finally signed on October 12, 2012, and PDP activities commenced on December 1, 2012. HAL's 2012–13 annual report confirms these dates.

HAL's 2013–14 annual report stated that the Joint Technical Preliminary Design Phase had been completed at UAC-TA in Moscow, while the contracts for detailed design, experimental work, prototype fabrication, testing and certification were still being negotiated.

Russia initially planned to power the MTA with the PS-90A, with the then-under-development PD-14 family subsequently envisaged as an alternative.

The engine subsequently became one of the major stumbling blocks.

A contemporary Economic Times report said that the IAF required a full-authority digital engine control (FADEC) system, while Russia had argued that the PS-90's performance did not require such a system. A 2016 interview with UAC President Yuri Slyusar was more explicit: he acknowledged that the PS-90 did not have “full-fledged FADEC” and said that the FADEC requirement had apparently been introduced during the programme.

There were also concerns about the PS-90A-76's ability to operate safely at Himalayan altitudes, including its engine relight capability. Contemporary Indian aviation reporting identified both the relight issue and the absence of full-authority digital engine control as concerns.

On January 13, 2016, Ilyushin CEO Sergey Velmozhkin confirmed to TASS that the Russian-Indian project had been frozen as a joint project.

IL-214 reborn as IL-276

Following India's withdrawal, Russia continued development of the aircraft independently, eventually redesignating it Il-276. It was essentially a further development of the Il-214/MTA concept, with a payload of around 20 tonnes.

In 2024, however, interest in the Il-276 appeared to wane following the emergence of the Il-212 project. The Il-212 is being developed as a replacement for Russia's An-26 and An-72-class transports.

A UAC source quoted in reporting in January 2024 gave the proposed Il-212 a maximum payload of 17 tonnes when powered by two PD-8 turbofans. This is worth treating as a design target rather than a firmly established production specification, since the aircraft remains under development.

Reviving the Il-276 project would nevertheless be an attractive option for HAL because it would build on the considerable design work already undertaken for the Indo-Russian MTA programme and could potentially involve considerably more technology transfer than a straightforward foreign-aircraft assembly arrangement.

However, reviving the mothballed project would inevitably introduce some development and acquisition delay.

There is also the unresolved question of the PS-90A's engine-control system.

Does the PS-90A now have FADEC?

The situation is more complicated than it was in 2015.

Current documentation concerning the PS-90A-76 identifies its control arrangement as:

“BAC (Basic Automatic Control) with EEC (RED-90M) & SAC (Stand-by Automatic Control mode with Electro-hydro-mechanical control system TD-90.”

This indicates that the engine has an electronic engine controller but also a standby electro-hydromechanical control system.

A Russian patent published subsequently describes the RED-90 electronic engine controller as the main device of a digital engine-control system “of the FADEC type” and specifically identifies RED-90 as being used with the PS-90A. The patent also states that the RED-90 samples PS-90A engine parameters at 50 Hz.

This is significant, but I would not yet equate it unequivocally with the Western understanding of a modern, redundant, full-authority FADEC on the PS-90A-76.

Russia has nevertheless continued to modernise the PS-90 family, and the RED-90 is unquestionably a digital electronic engine controller.

Thus, it is possible that a later version of the RED-90M/PS-90A-76 control system has moved closer to, or now actually provides, full-authority digital control. This needs confirmation before the engine can safely be described as having FADEC.

Alternative Russian aircraft

Assuming that the PS-90A-76 does not meet the IAF's FADEC requirement, there has been speculation that HAL could make its MTA pitch with a Russian medium airlifter other than the Il-276, with which it has been closely associated in the past.

Two obvious possibilities would be the Il-212 and Il-76MD-90A.

Neither is a perfect fit for the Indian MTA requirement.

The Il-212, with its reported maximum payload of 17 tonnes, falls just below the 18-tonne lower limit reported for the current requirement. Its major attraction, however, would be its two PD-8 engines. Russia has developed an indigenous electronic automatic-control system for the PD-8, and the engine is intended to be used on the Il-212.

The PD-8 is an all Russian, fuel efficient turbofan engine with FADEC or equivalent, which is comparable to Western military engines.However, the engine is still relatively new and its operational maturity is yet to be established.

The surprising option: IL-76MD-90A

Setting aside the initial incredulity, the Il-76MD-90A, with a maximum payload of approximately 60 tonnes, could make a surprisingly credible MTA solution if operated with payloads in the 18–30 tonne range.

The aircraft would have enormous payload margin relative to the Indian requirement. It also offers a large cargo compartment, rear loading, substantial range and the ability to carry loads far beyond the maximum payload of most of the aircraft competing for the MTA contract.

However, its compliance with the Indian requirement cannot be established from payload alone. The complete RFP would have to be examined for requirements concerning runway performance, high-altitude operation and other relevant parameters.

The principal disadvantage would obviously be operating cost and the fact that the Il-76MD-90A is a much larger aircraft than an 18–30-tonne MTA would appear to require.

On the other hand, India already possesses considerable Il-76 operational and maintenance experience. The IAF also has existing infrastructure and trained personnel associated with the type.

If the RFP does not impose a significant size or operating-cost constraint, and if the RED-90M/PS-90A-76 control system is ultimately demonstrated to satisfy the IAF's FADEC requirement, the Il-76MD-90A could be a very interesting interim solution.

It could provide HAL with a relatively mature platform while buying time to revive and further develop the Il-276, complete its testing and eventually establish indigenous serial production.