Dan-T: Russia’s New Loitering Munition Raises More Questions Than Answers

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

The world premiere of the Dan-T loitering munition by Rostec at the El Alamein International Airshow 2026 has drawn considerable interest. Some would say it has cleared the air around a new Russian weapon system that has demonstrated an uncanny ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defences. Others would contend that it has only added to the confusion surrounding the weapon's actual capabilities.

In its statement, Rostec says:

The “Dan-T” munition operates on the “fire-and-forget” principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters.  

 

The product is equipped with a small-sized jet engine and can hit targets at a distance of hundreds of kilometres.  

 

The “Dan-T” has a special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems.  

 

The high effectiveness of the loitering munition has been confirmed by hundreds of successful launches against enemy targets in the special military operation zone.

Rostec's description of the weapon as “fire-and-forget” would imply that it is a cruise-missile-like weapon designed to strike a pre-programmed target based on coordinates or optical imagery. The question that arises, therefore, is: how then is it a loitering munition?

And what exactly is the “special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems”?

The weapon does not appear to feature an optical aperture for an infrared or TV seeker, making it unlikely that it is capable of machine-vision-based terminal navigation.

Under the circumstances, its ability to bypass enemy air-defence systems may derive from a combination of low-observable characteristics—including its small size and low radar cross-section—and the use of 12- or 16-channel jam-resistant satellite navigation.

Dan-T Antecedents

The Dan-T is reportedly derived from the Dan-M target drone, which was first operationally tested for combat use in May 2025.

The Dan-M's reported flight-performance capabilities include a cruise altitude of 50 to 9,000 metres, a cruise speed of 300 to 750 km/h and an endurance of approximately 70 minutes. Its take-off weight is 350 kg.

Dan-M History

The existence of the Dan-M was first publicly reported in August 2004.

The Dan-M was developed from the Dan target drone, designed for air-defence training and testing, which first flew in 1993.

The Dan-M programme aimed to provide greater endurance and range, with production reportedly expected around 2005. Later public reporting on a further-updated Dan-M, featuring a new engine and avionics, appeared around 2020.

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

Stealth Characteristics

All three Dan variants share essentially the same aerodynamic layout.

The differences appear to be internal and mission-related rather than the result of a fundamental redesign of the airframe.

While the Dan and Dan-M were target drones that likely carried a Luneberg lens to modify their radar signatures, the Dan-T does not appear to have a Luneberg lens. Another significant difference is that the Dan and Dan-M were designed for parachute recovery, whereas the Dan-T is an OWA (one-way attack) drone.

Banderol Similarity

The Banderol S8000, a jet-powered cruise-missile-like drone, looks remarkably similar to the Dan-T. Russia has been using the Banderol launched from its Orion MALE drone extensively in its ongoing systematic campaign against Ukraine's logistics, weapons-manufacturing, energy and export infrastructure.

However, while the Banderol is attributed to Kronstadt, which also developed the Orion drone, the Dan-T is believed to be an upgrade of the Dan-M target drone.

Banderols usually cruise at low altitudes, particularly when routed over the sea for strikes on targets in Odesa, avoiding radar detection right up to the moment they pop up to gain altitude and strike the target at an angle best suited for maximum damage.

The use of composites, besides stealth shaping and small size, adds to the low observability of the weapon, reducing detection range.

Launch-Platform Versatility

The use of a helicopter as a launch platform makes the weapon particularly versatile. Air launch increases the drone's effective range, while helicopter carriage allows it to be launched without the early warning that could accompany the radar detection of a fighter aircraft.

It is likely that the drone is programmed to operate mostly outside the engagement envelope of Ukraine's MANPADS and SHORAD systems.

By leveraging the Dan-T's superior flight performance, Russia could compel Ukraine to engage these drones with medium-range air-defence systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and SAMP/T. Not only are these systems available to the AFU in limited numbers, but their missile stocks are also scarce—both in Ukraine and among their original manufacturers.

Additionally, despite its improved performance, the Dan-M is likely to be a relatively affordable platform. Its unit cost is probably considerably lower than that of a medium-range air-defence missile.

By forcing Ukraine to expend its limited and expensive interceptor stocks against comparatively inexpensive drones, Russia could further erode the country's already strained air-defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The Banderol is known to be inexpensive, giving Russia the ability to ramp up production of the missile relatively easily. In mid-August 2026, HUR (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) told Militarnyi that Russia can produce up to about 80 S8000 Banderol missiles per month. Plants are described as working three shifts.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, stated in July that Russia’s planned rate for 2026 was 120 per month (roughly four a day if fully used). Later, in August, Beskrestnov said Moscow was trying to raise jet-powered munition output and that Banderol production could be pushed toward 300–400 per month.

The increased use of the Banderol bears testimony to its cost-effectiveness, if not its sophistication. Assuming that the Banderol and the Dan-T are similar weapons, if not the same weapons, Russia's El Alamein pitch for the sale of the missile could have many takers.

Russia’s Coca-Cola Strike: Retaliation, Deterrence or Coincidence?

During the past year or so, the US and its Western allies have increasingly become directly involved in Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia, including through the provision of targeting, intelligence and navigation-related information for Ukrainian long-range strike systems.

Russia now appears to be responding in kind by striking US and Western commercial interests in Ukraine. The apparent objectives are twofold: retaliation for Western involvement in attacks on Russian commercial and economic interests, and deterrence of further Western investment in Ukraine.

On September 3, Russian drones struck the Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine plant in Velyka Dymerka, in Kyiv region. The facility is Coca-Cola's only production site in Ukraine and one of Europe's larger bottling plants.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the strike as “a clear Russian signal to America,” arguing that Russia could not be unaware that it was striking an American-owned facility. 

In its account of the September 3 strikes, the Russian MoD did not specifically identify the Coca-Cola facility. Instead, it broadly claimed to have struck “enterprises of the military-industrial and fuel-energy complexes” involved in producing missiles, drones and components, supplying fuel to Ukrainian forces, and logistics facilities allegedly handling dual-use goods and UAV components.

Reports from Ukraine said a drone struck warehouses containing finished products, causing a large fire. No casualties were reported.

The Russian account therefore leaves the purpose of the Coca-Cola strike deliberately ambiguous. If the facility was intentionally selected because it belongs to an American company, the MoD's broader description provides Moscow with plausible deniability.

Coca-Cola and the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine said the company was assessing the damage with Ukrainian authorities and that employee safety remained the priority.

Not the First

The September 3 strike was not the first Russian attack on US commercial interests in Ukraine. A May New York Times investigation documented Russian strikes since mid-2025 on facilities linked to Coca-Cola, Cargill, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Flex and Bunge.

Representatives of several companies told visiting US senators that they believed the attacks were deliberate. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said the businesses believed they were being targeted intentionally. Andy Hunder of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine argued that Russia was attempting to deter further American investment.

There is, however, another plausible explanation. Some Ukrainian business figures and observers believe the attacks are part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukraine's industrial and logistical infrastructure, with the nationality of the company being incidental. In that interpretation, US companies are being hit because their facilities happen to be part of Ukraine's economic infrastructure.

Zelenskyy's “a clear Russian signal to America” characterisation could well have been a "cheeky" interpretation as it could well be possible that Ukrainian forces were using Coca Cola warehouses for military purposes thinking that Russia would not dare to strike them. 

The most plausible explanation may be that both motives are operating simultaneously: Russia is attempting to weaken Ukraine's economy while also signalling to Washington and other Western capitals that their commercial assets in Ukraine are not immune from the consequences of Western involvement in the war.

The Coca-Cola plant's highly visible American branding would have made it an especially potent symbolic target.

At the same time, the use of plausible deniability is important. There is no publicly available evidence establishing conclusively that Russia deliberately selected the Coca-Cola plant because it was American-owned. The strike can therefore be explained as an attack on Ukrainian economic infrastructure, even if its selection was in fact deliberate.

US Reaction

The US government has so far not publicly reacted to the September 3 Coca-Cola strike. Earlier in 2026, Washington's response to similar incidents was muted; a State Department spokesperson said the US had urged both sides to refrain from targeting American business interests.

Some US lawmakers and analysts have criticised this posture, arguing that Washington's restraint could establish a precedent in which American commercial assets in a war zone can be struck with little consequence.

But a more belligerent US response would carry its own problem: Washington would have to confront, rather than brush under the carpet, the extent of US involvement in enabling Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia.

Doing so could turn attacks on American commercial interests from an uncomfortable side-effect of the war into a direct US-Russia confrontation—and escalate an already dangerous conflict considerably further.

Ukraine Struggles to Develop Interceptor for Russia’s Faster Jet Gerans

 

Ukraine has yet to develop a reliable, scalable interceptor drone capable of engaging Russia’s increasingly fast jet-powered Geran attack drones, according to Serhiy Beskrestnov, better known by his callsign “Flash,” a Ukrainian technology specialist and adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It was recently reported that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has field tested and accepted the first jet interceptor drone Alexa Spatium, which is designed to combat kamikaze jet drones “Geran‑3”, “Geran‑4” and “Geran‑5”. However, the key performance characteristics of the interceptor, such as maximum speed, range and operational ceiling, were not disclosed making it difficult to assess the veracity of the Ukrainian claim.

Early in August, the UV Military Cluster company told Militarnyi that the company had created a drone named "Crazy" that will start shooting down Russian drones later in August. 

The vertical takeoff and landing drone is capable of carrying a payload weighing up to 0.5 kg. Its max flight range is 45 km, tactical flight range is 25 km and maximum endurance is 30 minutes. Its operational altitude can vary from 200 m to 10,000 m. A digital or analog camera can be installed on board, as well as thermal imaging or twilight optics.

The company highlighted the drone's thoughtful design, aerodynamic profile and balanced center of mass. The battery passes through the body, which allows you to evenly distribute the weight and avoid overloading the front of the drone.

The drone is available in two variants: a high-speed variant without wings that accelerates to 365 km/h and a winged variant that achieves 310 km/h.

Performance Shortfalls

In a recent interview with Radio NV, Beskrestnov acknowledged that Ukrainian manufacturers had failed to deliver the jet-drone interceptors they had promised during the winter of 2025–26. Some manufacturers had claimed that such systems would be available within “a few weeks,” but subsequent trials reportedly demonstrated that the interceptor drones lacked both the speed and technical characteristics required to reliably engage the faster Russian drones.

The problem is significant because Russia appears to be progressively increasing the speed and sophistication of its attack drones. The Geran-3 is reported to reach around 300–330 km/h, while the Geran-4 can reach approximately 450–500 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres. The newer Geran-5 is reported to be capable of approximately 600 km/h, placing it firmly in the performance class of a small cruise missile. The Banderol, a related Russian drone-missile, is also reported to fly at around 500–600 km/h, with a range of up to 500 km and a warhead of approximately 114–150 kg.

The implications for interception are considerable. Against a target travelling at 500–600 km/h, an interceptor needs not merely to match the target's speed but to have a substantial speed advantage to close the distance and manoeuvre for an engagement. This puts the desirable performance of an interceptor at roughly 600 km/h or more—well beyond the capabilities of many of the inexpensive interceptor drones currently being deployed by Ukraine. The 360 km/h speed capability of the "Crazy" drone referred to above illustrates the growing performance gap.

This creates a difficult technological and economic problem. A cheap interceptor drone is attractive for countering inexpensive mass-produced attack drones, but as the target becomes faster, the interceptor increasingly begins to require the performance characteristics—and consequently the cost and complexity—of a conventional aircraft.

Ukraine's inability to field a sufficiently capable interceptor at scale means that it currently has to rely on more expensive conventional air-defence methods. Fighter aircraft, predominantly F-16s, can engage the faster Russian drones with air-to-air missiles, while Ukrainian ground forces use MANPADS against targets within their engagement envelope.

Neither method, however, provides an obvious low-cost solution for dealing with large numbers of high-speed attack drones.

The issue is becoming particularly important as Russia expands the use of jet-powered variants of the Geran family. Unlike the relatively slow piston-powered Gerans that can be engaged by a wider range of air-defence systems, the higher speed of the jet-powered variants sharply reduces the time available for detection, tracking and interception.

The failure of Ukraine's promised interceptor programmes to produce a working system several months after the original deadlines therefore represents more than a development delay. It highlights the technological challenge involved in creating an inexpensive countermeasure capable of keeping pace with the rapid evolution of Russia's attack-drone fleet.

Russia's Expanded Use of Jet Drones

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the production volume of Geran-4/5 jet drones now exceeds the production of Geran-2 

As of March 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Russia produced about 5500 drones per month. As of August, the Main Intelligence Directorate, estimates the Russian industry produces about 3 thousand Geran-4/5 kamikaze drones and about 2.8 thousand Geran-2 attack drones every month.

Jet drone operational usage has gradually risen since early 2026. During the whole of 2025, Russian forces used 180 jet drones. In 2026, by the beginning of June, Russian forces had launched 1400 jet drones. 

In July, Russian forces used five times more jet UAVs than in June. During some attacks, two-thirds of the drones used were jet powered. 

Russian state media has also claimed that the jet-powered drones are being employed against higher-value targets.

RIA Novosti has reported that Russian forces are using jet drones and other precision weapons against decision-making centres, command posts and enterprises allegedly being used in cooperation with NATO specialists, both in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine.

The emerging contest is therefore not simply one of producing more drones. It is becoming a race between increasingly sophisticated attack drones and increasingly capable—and ideally inexpensive—interceptors.

For Ukraine, Beskrestnov's admission suggests that the interceptor side of that race has so far failed to keep pace.

Black Sea Passivity Continues to Enfeeble and Embarrass Russia

 

Photo via Military Informant

Ukraine's Combined on Russian BSF

New Western satellite imagery provides confirmation that the Ukrainian jet drone and missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) on the night of August 12 likely caused serious damage to top-of-the-line warships — Project 11356R frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov — in Novorossiysk Bay.

The large-scale combined attack was carried out using Neptune anti-ship missiles, Palianytsia jet-powered strike drones, and unmanned surface vessels.

Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov are both key Kalibr cruise-missile carriers, equipped with eight vertical launch cells each. The imagery shows damage to the UKSK 3S14 area housing the Kalibr cruise missiles.

Admiral Essen shows signs of fire resulting from a drone strike on the UKSK cells. On Admiral Makarov, a breach in the bow section of the upper deck, to the left of the location of the Kalibr cruise missiles, is evident.

Military Informant states that "In addition, there are suspicions that the satellite communication station 'Centaur-NM1' and the detection radar 'Pozitiv-M1.2', located on the superstructure closer to the stern, were damaged."

This marked the third time in 2026 that both frigates had been damaged. Ironically, Russia relocated its Black Sea Fleet warships from Sevastopol to a "safe" harbor at Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai. Also, Admiral Makarov, which became the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet after the loss of the guided-missile cruiser Moskva in a Neptune anti-ship missile attack, has now sustained damage.

Ukrainian sources have additionally claimed damage to a Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship and the Project 22160 patrol ship Vasily Bykov, air-defence assets (including a 30N6E radar from an S-300 system), port infrastructure, and oil facilities at the Sheskharis terminal.

Though satellite imagery confirms damage to the Black Sea Fleet warships, it does not reveal the extent of the damage. It could well be largely superficial. In the worst-case scenario, the ships will require lengthy dockyard repairs.

Perplexing BSF Posture

It's difficult to see merit in the current posture of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. While it makes sense to relocate fleet warships at a greater distance from Ukrainian drone and missile launch pads, it is difficult to understand why the warships should passively remain in harbor, waiting to be struck.

It's possible that Ukraine is using containers on commercial shipping to launch missile and drone attacks, reducing time of flight and providing greater flexibility with attack vectors. If that is true, keeping warships docked makes even less sense because bunching targets facilitates combined attacks designed to overwhelm defences.

News Roundup: Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained, China Develops AI-Based Counter Stealth IR Seeker

Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained

The Ministry of Defence on Monday signed a contract with GA-ASI to lease two MQ-9B SeaGuardian High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for the Indian Navy for a period of 30 months.

The confusing lease needs to be put in the correct perspective.

Earlier, on October 15, 2024, India finalised a deal with the United States to acquire 31 MQ-9B Predator drones.

Of the 31 MQ-9B Predators contracted for, 15 were earmarked for the Indian Navy and eight each for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.

The deal includes setting up an MRO facility for the General Atomics-manufactured drones in the country and a separate follow-up technology-transfer deal.

India has not yet received any of the 31 MQ-9Bs under the October 2024 purchase contract. The first deliveries are currently scheduled for 2029.

In an interview published in early 2026, Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi was asked when the Navy could expect the first of its 15 MQ-9 SeaGuardians. His answer was:

“Delivery of first two RPAs ... are scheduled to commence wef Q1/2029.”

Possible reasons for the stretched delivery timeline likely include the need to produce the sensors and weapons systems ordered by the three Indian services, as well as the equipment required to set up the MRO facilities in India.

US MQ-9 Reaper Losses

The US has reportedly lost 45 MQ-9A Reaper RPAs in its ongoing conflict with Iran. The MQ-9A designation is used for variants operated by the US, while the MQ-9B designation is used for export variants variously configured to meet individual customer requirements.

It is conceivable that the reported attrition, if true, could further stretch the delivery timeline to India because GA-ASI would need to divert manufacturing capacity, components, engines, sensors and skilled manpower to make up for the losses.

Earlier Lease

In November 2020, The ToI reported that India had inducted two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for surveillance missions after acquiring them on a one-year lease from US firm General Atomics. The lease was later extended.

Based at Naval Air Station INS Rajali at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu, the two drones were to be used for long-range ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

In September 2024, the IN lost one of the two MQ-9s it had leased following a technical failure that resulted in a forced ditching.

The two additional MQ-9Bs contracted for lease would augment the surveillance capabilities of the IN. 

China Develops AI-Based IR Seeker That Could Strip F-22, F-35 of Their Stealth Cloak

Chinese researchers have developed a lightweight IR missile seeker that uses AI to recognize the relatively weak exhaust signature patterns of US F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, even in the presence of IR countermeasures such as flares.

Lab tests showed recognition accuracy of more than 90% for simulated targets.

Su-30MKI Upgrade: Could Virupaksha Become an Albatross Around Its Neck?

 HAL's Su-30MKI upgrade pivots almost entirely around the Virupaksha AESA radar being developed by DRDO to replace the existing N011M Bars Passive Electronically Scanned Array (PESA) radar.

DRDO's confidence in successfully developing the Virupaksha AESA on a tight timeline rests on its experience and technological strides in developing the Uttam AESA for the LCA Mk-1A.

However, is that confidence justified, keeping in mind that delays in developing the radar and performance shortfalls could result in serious IAF capability gaps?

Uttam AESA

Development of the Uttam radar started around 2012, when DRDO showcased a prototype. The radar has yet to be operationally inducted.

As of August 2026, HAL claims that the Uttam radar has been extensively flight-tested. More than 120 sorties had been flown on Tejas LSP-2/LSP-3 by mid-2025, and the programme had reportedly completed the major flight-test phases and hardware qualification required for certification.

Back on February 20, 2015, LRDE officials told the author that rooftop trials of the radar were set to commence. (It had earlier been reported in the press that rooftop trials had already commenced.)

SK Sharma, Chairman and Managing Director of BEL, told reporters at Aero India 2015, “Our Active Array Radar is currently being developed in collaboration with DRDO, and would take 2 years to complete. The progress is going good and we hope Tejas could ultimately have homemade radars.”

During 2016–17, the AAAU (Active Antenna Array Unit) prototype was tested on the rooftop. Integration and testing of the engineered version on LSP-2 was in progress.

During Aero India 2019, ADA displayed LSP-2 fitted with the Uttam AESA radar. The radar was then being flight-tested on a Hawker-800 business jet.

In February 2021, DRDO chairman Sateesh Reddy told TOI, “We will have the Uttam radar from the 21st Tejas Mk-1A to be produced. Uttam has performed better than anticipated in the trials so far. We’ve already signed an MoU with HAL,” he added.

No Production Clearance Yet

The plan to introduce Uttam partway through the first 83-aircraft Mk-1A order has now effectively been abandoned. HAL's management stated in May 2026 that Uttam would not be included in the 83-aircraft programme because DRDO had not yet given production clearance. HAL now plans to integrate it into the 97-aircraft Mk-1A order.

In July 2026, Astra Microwave received a ₹2,205-crore HAL order for 122 AAAUs and 121 interface frames for the Uttam programme, intended for the second tranche of Tejas Mk-1As.

It has been reported that aircraft-level integration, software/interface validation, weapons integration, environmental and electromagnetic testing, certification and acceptance by the IAF are not yet complete.

There can be no doubt that DRDO is close to wrapping up the Uttam project. After over 14 years of development, Uttam is no longer merely an experimental radar, but neither is it yet a production-standard, operationally inducted IAF radar.

A realistic target for Uttam to achieve full maturity and operational induction would be 2029–30.

Su-30MKI Upgrade Programme

The Indian Air Force's Su-30MKI fighters have been undergoing spiral upgrades for over a decade, with key milestones including the successful integration of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and Astra air-to-air missiles.

In 2022, the IAF outlined plans for a more comprehensive block upgrade. In October 2022, The Times of India quoted IAF Chief Air Chief Marshal V. R. Chaudhari as saying, “We have decided this upgrade will be done indigenously with a plethora of indigenously-designed weapons, electronic warfare systems and the like.”

By October 2023, reports in The Economic Times indicated that the proposed upgrade would touch every aspect of the fighter—except its airframe and engines.

On November 30, 2023, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) formally approved the block upgrade programme. The project is expected to unfold in two phases: the first focused on installing advanced avionics and radar systems, and the second on enhancing the aircraft's flight-control systems.

The DAC did indeed approve the indigenous Su-30MKI upgrade from HAL on November 30, 2023.

Among the most significant upgrades is the integration of the indigenously developed Virupaksha AESA radar, which will substantially improve detection, tracking and engagement capabilities. Additionally, the Su-30MKIs will be fitted with a new indigenous Infrared Search and Track (IRST) system, enhancing both air-to-air and air-to-ground targeting. The upgrade will also introduce a new electronic warfare suite designed to detect, jam and neutralise enemy threats, significantly boosting survivability in contested airspace.

Together, these upgrades will not only extend the operational life of the Su-30MKI fleet but also transform it into a more lethal, survivable and networked combat platform for the future battlespace.

Considering the steady depletion in IAF fighter aircraft strength and the growing stealth and drone threats from our adversaries, the Su-30MKI upgrade is a welcome short-term move to plug IAF operational capability gaps.

Virupaksha AESA

However, making the Su-30MKI upgrade totally dependent on the still-under-development Virupaksha AESA introduces risks that should not be ignored.

The Virupaksha is a next-generation Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar specifically tailored for the Su-30MKI upgrade programme. The radar reportedly features around 2,400 Gallium Nitride (GaN)-based transmit/receive modules. Importantly, it is being developed as a plug-and-play system compatible with the Su-30MKI's existing avionics architecture.

Development work is already underway.

While the Virupaksha AESA radar offers impressive capabilities, its development, integration and validation are likely to be a multi-year process.

However, integrating such a sophisticated sensor onto a legacy platform like the Su-30MKI is a daunting challenge. Despite the system's modularity, radar integration is a complex and delicate task, involving seamless interfacing with flight-control, navigation and weapons-management systems. As the primary onboard sensor, the radar must operate flawlessly under real-time combat conditions, making integration and testing both technically demanding and time-consuming.

Upgrade Timeline

DRDO has not officially committed to a Virupaksha development timeline.

In October 2022, the then IAF chief, Air Chief Marshal V. R. Chaudhari, told TOI that the design and development phase would take four to five years, following which the actual major upgrade would kick off.

In February 2024, The ET reported that the Air Force was set to commence work on integrating the new systems within the year, with approximately 90 fighters slated for upgrade in the initial phase.

In February 2025, DRDO, which displayed a model of the radar with a 950-mm antenna and about 2,400 GaN T/R modules, claimed that development of the Virupaksha radar was progressing as planned. DRDO subsequently told Janes that it had finalised the radar's design architecture.

Developmental trials using a Hawker-800 are reportedly planned for 2027, with Su-30MKI integration planned for 2028.

Su-30MKI integration would need to be coordinated with the integration of new mission/radar computers and displays, as well as the aircraft's weapons and EW systems.

India may have tied up with Russia for help in the integration of the Virupaksha radar, including the integration of the RVV-BD (R-37M) long-range missile onto existing Su-30MKIs equipped with the N011M Bars radar.

Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh met with Russian Defence Minister Mr. Andrey Belousov on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers' Meeting held in Qingdao, China, on June 26, 2025.

The official press release described the meeting as “one of the most important recent meetings between the leaders of the two nations,” citing the context of Operation Sindoor and the emerging need to bolster defence production—particularly in critical domains such as air defence, air-to-air missiles, modern capabilities and upgrades of air platforms.

Realistic Upgrade Timeline

Even ignoring imponderable delays that are part of technology development, in 2028, when integration of Virupaksha with the Su-30MKI commences, Virupaksha would be at roughly the same development stage as Uttam was in 2019.

Under the circumstances, a realistic goal for the start of serial upgrades of the Su-30MKI would be 2035.

The need for developing Virupaksha cannot be questioned. However, subordinating the Su-30MKI upgrade to the successful development of Virupaksha is clearly not a near-term solution to the widening gap in the IAF's operational capabilities and the threat perspective. Even as a long-term solution, it appears underwhelming considering the need for MUM-T (Manned, Unmanned Teaming).

Sukhoi Explains the Need for the Su-57 Dual-Seat Variant

In an interview with the Military Acceptance programme on the Zvezda TV channel, Mikhail Strelets, director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, revealed the following.

The twin-seat Su-57D is primarily intended for two main tasks:

Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.

Facilitating the use of sixth-generation technologies, such as operating as an airborne command post for controlling unmanned aerial vehicles. The primary pilot focuses on flying the mission profile, while the second pilot manages highly intelligent systems such as the S-70 Okhotnik, drone swarms and group-control systems.

The Su-57D will also facilitate the development of combat artificial intelligence, which Russia is currently working on.

Operating in Special Modes

One of the reasons stated for developing the Su-57D twin-seat variant is:

“Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.”

I am not sure what “special modes” alludes to.

If I were to guess, it would involve the networking of disparate systems that would be difficult to simulate on the ground.

One such mode could involve controlling a stealth drone operating deep in adversary territory, streaming target coordinates — possibly of a moving target — and relaying them to a precision-strike weapon system on the ground, such as the Iskander, or in the air, such as the Su-34.

The second pilot could manage the drone and other highly autonomous systems while the primary pilot concentrates on flying the mission and maintaining situational awareness.

Incidentally, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate recently reported recovering a Russian S-71M “Monokhrom”, a stealthy unmanned aircraft associated with the Su-57. The S-71 can reportedly perform both reconnaissance and strike missions, with the latter involving a kamikaze variant. The aircraft recovered by the Ukrainians was presumably the strike variant, which would explain why it was not recovered for reuse.

The Ukrainians found an NVIDIA Jetson Orin computer module in the S-71M, which they claim may indicate the use of AI. This provides an interesting indication of the increasingly sophisticated autonomous systems that could potentially be integrated into such a manned-unmanned architecture.

Perhaps this is what “special modes” refers to.

Su-57, S-71 Integration: Lethal Upgrade

On February 9, 2026, Russia's UAC delivered a large batch of Su-57s which, according to a UAC press release, were “in a new technical configuration.”

“The aircraft have received upgraded onboard systems and a new weapons complex.”

It is likely that the fresh batch of Su-57s delivered added the capability to carry the air-launched stealthy combat UAV designated S-71, a weapon first unveiled during Army 2024.

The S-71 is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking or destruction. Deploying and controlling a Su-57 carrying an S-71 variant would have required an upgrade of its onboard systems.

The S-71 began captive-carry trials in April 2024 at Russia’s Flight Research Centre in Zhukovsky, with test flights involving the Su-57 fighter.

You can read more details about the S-71 in my Thumkar blog post below:

On January 17, 2026, it was reported that an S-71K “Carpet” demonstrated its effectiveness for the first time by successfully destroying the highly mobile M142 HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system.

The cruise missile–drone hybrid has been developed by GosMKB Raduga JSC and can be used by 4++ generation multirole fighters, including the Su-35S and Su-30SM/SM2, as well as Su-34 NVO fighter-bombers.