Russia has deployed the newly developed Volna-Kupol-Garant electronic warfare (EW) system to protect its forces from attacks by medium-range drones equipped with Starlink terminals, such as the US-supplied Hornet drone, whose development was funded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.
Jamming a communication terminal in a war zone is generally considered a legitimate military activity. However, traditional electronic warfare systems seek to disrupt the receiver. Garant appears to reverse the approach by targeting the satellite instead. In effect, the system attempts to deny access to a Starlink satellite over a defined area rather than disable individual terminals operating within it.
Starlink Communications
Conventional drones communicate with their operating crew using line-of-sight RF links which sometimes involve ground based or airborne relays. Such links are easy to disrupt using
ground-based jammers. In contrast, Starlink terminals use narrow electronically steered beams directed towards satellites overhead. The geometry significantly reduces the effectiveness of conventional jamming systems.
Starlink terminals mounted on drones are difficult to jam using ground-based EW systems because they are pointed skywards towards Starlink satellites orbiting approximately 500 km above the Earth. Any EW system attempting to jam a Starlink terminal directly would ideally need to be positioned above the drone's altitude.
Garant System
The Garant system takes advantage of the fact that while the Starlink terminal mounted on the drone is facing skywards, the Starlink satellite with which it is communicating is facing the Earth's surface.
The Garant system disrupts communication between a drone-mounted Starlink terminal and a Starlink satellite by saturating the satellite with interference signals across its entire communication band (14–14.5 GHz). Although Starlink satellites can frequency-hop across eight channels, the Garant system employs eight antennas, each covering 62.5 MHz.
The interference signals generated by Garant effectively blind the satellite passing overhead. The system can isolate an area of approximately 18 sq km from Starlink satellite signals. Its coverage extends through 360 degrees in azimuth and 110 degrees in elevation.
A Starlink terminal can communicate with multiple Starlink satellites simultaneously. At present, it is not clear whether, or how, the Garant system prevents drone-mounted terminals from communicating with satellites visible outside the area affected by the interference.
Initial reports from Ukraine suggested that the Garant system could interfere with only one satellite at a time. If that were the case, the system would be of limited effectiveness, since a terminal could simply switch to one of the 10 to 20 satellites (an approximation) typically visible overhead.
More recent Ukrainian reports suggest that the Russian capability is both comprehensive and credible, to the extent that Ukrainian forces reportedly respond by immediately launching drones to locate, attack, and disable any deployed Garant system.
A graphic published by Militarnyi suggests that the system can interfere with all satellites within its operating cone.
The Garant electronic warfare system typically consists of eight satellite dishes. It weighs approximately 120 kg and can be operated by a single individual.
Garant Vulnerabilities
Locating and attacking the system is relatively straightforward because SpaceX can instantly detect interference affecting its communication channels, while radio reconnaissance assets operated by Western countries supporting Ukraine can detect the powerful emissions generated by the system.
While the Garant system can disrupt attacks by Starlink-guided drones, it remains vulnerable to attacks by FPV drones and machine-vision-guided kamikaze drones.
Russian forces have reportedly begun using the Garant system to protect the Novorossiya Highway, which has come under repeated attack by Hornet drones equipped with Starlink terminals.
Conceptual Shift
The conceptual shift from jamming communication terminals to jamming satellites has ramifications. Interfering directly with a satellite serving other users could be viewed as an escalation. However, Russian forces have apparently concluded that such escalation, if it indeed constitutes one, is justified because the Starlink network is being used to facilitate attacks on Russian military personnel and civilians.
TASS quotes technical and information security expert Sergey Trukhachev as saying:
"Hundreds of companies from the United States and Europe are directly involved in the Ukraine conflict and complicit in the deaths of our servicemen and civilians. This cannot go on forever. Volna-Kupol-Garant systems are just the first step in a set of means for destroying any enemy infrastructure."
Perhaps the expert is alluding to a possible future escalation involving the use of more powerful directed-energy weapon systems to temporarily or permanently disable satellites.
Russia could also justify satellite jamming by arguing that the system merely incapacitates a particular satellite visible over contested territory for the duration of its passage through the area. The incapacitation is temporary.
Looking Ahead
The use of Starlink as a dual-use communication network which prompted the deployment of the Garant system heralds the inevitable extension of warfare into space.
The deployment of the Garant challenges the assumption that commercial satellite constellations can provide invulnerable communications in wartime. Garant demonstrates that even massive constellations such as Starlink may be vulnerable to localized denial techniques.
In the past, SpaceX has demonstrated a lot of agility with Starlink by quickly upgrading software to thwart attempts at disrupting the network. It remains unclear whether SpaceX could modify the Starlink network software to mitigate the effects of the Garant system. With Russian sources already alluding to potentially more potent Russian EW capability, the battle may ultimately evolve into a contest between Russian electronic warfare engineers and SpaceX software developers.
Indeed, the possibility exists of space warfare going beyond EW. If attempts at satellite jamming are repeatedly frustrated, Russia could eventually opt for the use of directed-energy systems or kinetic anti-satellite weapons against communication satellites supporting military operations.






