Decoding the Su-57D’s Tail Marking: A Glimpse Into Russia’s Future Air Combat Concept

Photo from Defence TC

The graphic above, clearly visible on a close-up photograph of the right fin of the Su-57D, published on the "Defence" TC, highlights the role that the twin-seat stealth platform may be equipped to play.

The graphic shows the Su-57D at the center, with four silhouettes positioned at the tips of white spiral markings radiating outward. Each silhouette appears to represent an aerial platform or missile.

According to the Defence TC, the silhouettes represent the S-70 Okhotnik UCAV, an unmanned Su-75, the Kh-69 air-to-surface cruise missile, and the "Izdeliye 810" air-to-air missile — a further evolution of the R-37M.

If true, the graphic illustrates the Su-57D's ability to coordinate attacks by S-70 and Su-75 combat drones while also launching attacks itself using Kh-69 and Izdeliye 810 missiles.

I believe the silhouettes could instead represent the S-70 Okhotnik UCAV, an unmanned Su-75, a MALE reconnaissance and targeting drone, and a tactical ballistic missile such as the Iskander-M.

In that case, the graphic would illustrate the Su-57D's ability to coordinate attacks by S-70 and Su-75 combat drones, as well as assign targets to an Iskander-M battery using coordinates relayed from the MALE drone.

I could be wrong, but my interpretation is based on what appear to be the Su-57D's primary roles — a drone mothership for MUM-T operations and an airborne command post.

It may be noted that, when configured for MUM-T and command-post roles, the Su-57D likely does not carry weapons in its internal bays. I explained the reasons in my earlier blogpost.

You are welcome to share your opinion with a comment below.

Su-57D: Russia’s Stealth Fighter Becomes an Airborne Command Post

Su-57D Maiden Flight

On May 19, Russia’s UAC announced that the Su-57D — a two-seat variant of the Su-57 — had undertaken its maiden flight and commenced flight testing.

During the maiden flight, the aircraft was flown by a single pilot, Sergei Bogdan, the chief test pilot of the Sukhoi Design Bureau.

The Su-57 is designed for single-seat operations. Situational awareness, AI decision assist, and automation have been extensively used to allow a single pilot to handle the cockpit workload.

Imperative for Two-Seat Variant

To begin with, Russian forces didn't feel the need for a two-seat variant. However, much has changed since the stealth fighter first flew in 2010. Based on advances in combat aviation technology and the experience of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine, Russia's Ministry of Defense has now ordered a batch of the twin-seaters.

It is widely understood that a twin-seat variant facilitates speedier pilot training and operational conversion, as well as manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) of combat aircraft operating as a drone mothership.

The Su-57D is reportedly capable of teaming up with four S-70 Okhotnik modular drones configured for roles such as SEAD, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and aerial combat. Notably, the control and coordination demands of MUM-T operations are far beyond what a single pilot can handle, even using sensor fusion and AI assistance.

Following the Su-57D's maiden flight, Bogdan, during his interaction with the Russian press, highlighted yet another important role that would require a second seat. He stated that the co-pilot of the Su-57D would be able to command an air group directly in the air, thousands of kilometers away from base. It is important to understand what Bogdan was alluding to because it highlights another emerging, path-breaking trend in combat aviation.

Important Cues from the Su-57D Patent

In November 2023, Russia's United Aircraft Corporation published a patent for a multifunctional two-seat stealth aircraft, which has now been unveiled as the Su-57D.

Based on a copy of the patent, TASS reported that the two-seat stealth tactical aircraft would be designed to detect and destroy air, surface, and ground targets.

The patent document acquired by TASS referred to the aircraft as “...a multifunctional two-seat stealth tactical aircraft... intended to detect and destroy air, surface, and ground targets at super- and subsonic flight speeds across a wide range of altitudes, as well as act as an airborne command post for network-oriented operations involving mixed groups of aircraft.”

To reiterate, the document noted that the twin-seat variant would retain its ability to destroy targets with guided and unguided weapons. In addition, it would be possible to use the new variant as an air control point with the ability to ensure coordination between aviation and military formations, as well as serve as a control point for unmanned aerial vehicles.

Air Command Role

For several years now, the RuAF has been evaluating the use of the Su-57 for cooperative operations with manned fighters such as the Su-35.

In June 2020, TASS reported that Russia had tested Su-35–Su-57 cooperative operations.

“The experiment was carried out in real combat conditions. A group of Su-35 fighters was involved in the ‘flock’; the role of the command-and-staff aircraft was performed by the Su-57,” a source told TASS.

More recently, as part of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, Su-57 fighters have teamed up with S-70 Okhotnik UCAVs to strike targets in Ukraine.

Su-57D Redesign

Pivotal to the Su-57D's role as a command post would be long endurance and range, which would necessitate a significant increase in the fuel carried internally by the aircraft.

The redesign of the Su-57 airframe to realise the Su-57D is aimed not only at creating space for a second cockpit but also at increasing internal fuel capacity. In other words, the Su-57D variant will carry more fuel internally than the Su-57 fighter. Usually, twin-seat variants carry less fuel than the single-seat fighter because the second seat is fitted while retaining the fighter version's dimensions.

It is clear that, in the case of the Su-57D, Sukhoi has departed from the norm to facilitate its MUM-T and command-post roles.

Optionally, the Su-57D can also carry additional fuel in tanks fitted into the weapon bays normally used for the internal carriage of missiles and bombs.

It is also possible that, by increasing the dimensions, Sukhoi has created additional space for the avionics required to support MUM-T and command-post roles. Perhaps the avionics could also go into the weapon bays?

As such, it is highly likely that the Su-57D can be configured either for a combat role or for a command-post role, but not both simultaneously.

Conclusion

The option to carry additional fuel in the weapons bays of the Su-57 is an interesting innovation that increases the versatility of the stealth fighter.

With the Su-57, Russia appears to be following the same approach that the Soviet Union successfully pursued after developing the Su-27 — continuously reinventing the aircraft to meet the challenges and opportunities emerging from technological advances.

The Su-27, officially inducted into the Soviet Air Force in 1985, evolved into several Su-30 variants, the Su-34, the Su-35, and the J-11, all of which remain in service to this day. The evolved variants of the Su-27 will likely remain in service for at least a couple of decades more.

It is highly likely that Su-57 variants will similarly remain in service for the next 50 years.

In Ukraine, US-Supplied Drones Strangulate Russian Supply Lines, Blunt Geran Threat

 

ChatGPT Image

Russia has steadily lost its advantage in drone warfare in Ukraine and is now reeling under the onslaught of Western-supplied drones in general and US-supplied drones in particular.

At one point, Russian innovations — such as Lancet and Kub kamikaze drones, fiber-optic cable-controlled kamikaze drones, and inexpensive long-range one-way attack drones — had given Russian forces a significant edge over Ukraine.

Now, not only has the Russian edge been blunted, Ukrainian forces have seized the initiative using interceptor and strike drones featuring advanced US technology.

The sophistication of US-supplied drones has put Russian forces on the back foot and brought the Russian offensive in Donbas to a grinding halt.

Among the several US companies that have developed potent drones for use by Ukrainian forces is Perennial Autonomy, a company owned by Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google.

Two drones developed by Perennial Autonomy are giving Russian forces a hard time — the Merops interceptor drone and the Hornet strike drone.

First time EVER - Ukrainian-American drone Merops being shown in the news, in Ukraine, and in Europe.

So this is basically one of the key drones Ukraine operates to keep it's sky safe. It has a good level of autonomy, so it's easy for the pilots.

— Dimko Zhluktenko 🇺🇦⚔️ (@dim0kq) April 9, 2026

Merops AS-3 Surveyor

The Merops AS-3 Surveyor has reportedly proven effective in intercepting Russian drones.

The fixed-wing Surveyor interceptor was first combat-tested in Ukraine around June 2024. By late 2025, it had reportedly achieved over 1,900 intercepts. In some sectors, it is claimed to have brought down roughly 40% of Russian Geran drones. Recent reports claim 4,000 successful Russian drone interceptions.

The propeller-driven drone is roughly three feet long and is capable of attaining a maximum speed of 280 km/h.

It can be launched pneumatically from the bed of a standard pickup truck alongside a ground control station. The entire system is highly portable and requires minimal training.

Its success in Ukraine reportedly prompted the US Army to order 13,000 units shortly after the US and Israel launched an unprovoked large-scale aerial attack on Iran on February 28, to counter Iranian Shahed drone barrages.

The drone is currently priced at $15,000, but its cost is projected to fall below $10,000.

The Surveyor is an effective interceptor on account of its greater autonomy, speed, and jam resistance. The drone features electro-optical, thermal, and RF sensors. More importantly, it can fuse inputs from its different sensors into highly effective machine vision. Using AI-based autonomy and machine vision, it can home in on targets even when SATNAV and communication signals are jammed. With its maximum speed of 280 km/h, the drone outpaces Russian Gerans.

Its 2 kg fragmentation warhead increases the probability of a successful interception. Combined with its $15,000 price tag, it offers an optimized cost-to-kill ratio.

Hornet Strike Drone

U.S. Army's Hornet AI-enabled strike drone now active across two NATO exercises — Lithuania and Poland. Same system hitting Russian logistics in Ukraine beyond 100 km. Swift Beat, owned by ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt, is developer.

Read more: https://defence-blog.com/u-s-army-deploys-combat-proven-hornet-strike-drone/

— Dylan Malyasov | 🧐 (@DylanMalyasov) May 5, 2026

The effectiveness of US interceptor drones has substantially relieved the financial and operational burden on Western-supplied Ukrainian air defence (AD) systems deployed to defend Ukrainian airspace, despite the adverse cost-to-kill ratio resulting from the use of high-cost interceptor missiles to destroy low-cost strike drones such as the Geran. More effective interception of Russian attack drones will reduce Russia’s ability to degrade Ukraine's warfighting potential. It would allow Ukraine to continue the fight much longer.

The introduction of the US-supplied Hornet strike drone has yielded a more immediate gain. Along with other factors, Hornets can be credited with bringing the Russian offensive in Donbas to a crawl along the line of contact, and even to a complete halt in some sectors.

The Hornet drone is estimated to cost less than €5,000. Its takeoff weight is approximately 15 kg, its wingspan 2.2 m, and its fuselage length 1.4 m. Its maximum payload reaches 5 kg.

The technological features that make the Hornet potent include stealth, long range, autonomy, navigational accuracy, and EW resilience.

Stealth & Range

The drone uses a conventional airframe that allows RF signature reduction. It also cruises at low altitudes, sometimes extremely low altitudes.

It mostly operates at altitudes of up to 200 m but has reportedly been seen flying as low as 5 m.

It is claimed to have a maximum range of 160 km.

Navigational Accuracy

The drone autonomously tracks along adversary logistics routes using its optical sensors, identifying and prioritizing targets.

It features two daylight cameras — forward-facing and downward-facing — that facilitate terrain orientation, altitude stabilization, target recognition, and target lock-on.

When it detects a target, the system seeks operator clearance to attack. Once clearance is granted, the low-audio-signature drone autonomously dives onto or approaches the target, giving the adversary little reaction time.

EW Resilience

Tracking along logistics routes enhances both navigational accuracy and resilience to EW.

The drone’s built-in autonomy minimizes communication with the operator.

The drone is controlled using the following non-traditional protocols and frequencies:

1. Radio communication in non-standard frequency bands of 1800–1900 MHz, 2000–2300 MHz, and 3300–3800 MHz

2. Starlink or MESH networking

3. LoRa (Long Range)

A large number of operationally deployed Russian EW systems cannot disrupt the non-standard frequency bands used by the Hornet.

Starlink and MESH networks are inherently resilient to jamming.

The LoRa protocol facilitates the transmission of small amounts of data over long distances using very little power. The fact that Russian forces use DMR (Digital Mobile Radio) systems for tactical communication complicates their option of jamming the LoRa spectrum.

Hornet’s SATNAV module can simultaneously receive and process signals from all major satellite constellations — GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, and Galileo. It can additionally leverage SBAS support to improve signal accuracy.

The drone’s unique communication architecture reportedly enables positioning accuracy of 1.5 m RMS in the absence of EW jamming, significantly exceeding that of previous-generation SATNAV modules.

It has been reported that Ukrainian forces leveraged the accuracy of Hornet drones to destroy the support poles and framework holding protective nets in place over a logistics supply route, collapsing the barriers and opening the routes to follow-on attacks.

Technologically, Russian forces have no effective counter to the Surveyor interceptor drone except making their Gerans fly faster. As far as attack drones are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that Russia is attempting to seize back the initiative with its Geran-5 jet-powered drone — a clean-sheet design bearing no physical resemblance to earlier Geran variants. According to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, the Russian Armed Forces plan to ramp up production of jet-powered drones and increase their share to 50% of all long-range drones launched.

Chetak, Cheetah Replacement: Still Hovering After Two Decades

 

LUH on display at DefExpo 2020

On May 20, 2026, an Indian Army (IA) Cheetah helicopter crashed in the Tangste (Tangtse) region near Leh in Ladakh during a routine high-altitude sortie.

The helicopter was carrying three IA officers — two pilots and passenger Major General Sachin Mehta, General Officer Commanding of the 3 Infantry Division.

All three survived with minor injuries. They walked away from the wreckage in high spirits, as was evident from a selfie posted by them on social media that went viral.

Ageing Chetak, Cheetah Helicopter Fleet

The crash drew attention to the IA's ageing fleet of around 350 Cheetah and Chetak helicopters. For over two decades, the IA has been seeking replacement of the 1960s-vintage French helicopters manufactured in India by HAL.

In 2010, HAL, based on its experience and learning from manufacturing the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters, as well as from developing the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter, announced that it would develop a Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) to replace the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters.

On a parallel track, Indian PM Narendra Modi, during his visit to Russia in December 2014 for the annual summit meeting, signed an agreement to jointly manufacture Kamov Ka-226T light utility helicopters in India at HAL.

As per the agreement, India and Russia were to produce at least 200 Ka-226T helicopters for the Indian Armed Forces, with additional units potentially manufactured for civilian use and export.

The LUH is a 3-tonne, single-engine light utility helicopter. Powered by the Safran HE Ardiden-1U engine, rated at 750 kW, the LUH has a maximum AUW of 3,150 kg. It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 350 km with a 400 kg payload. It can seat six — a crew of two and four passengers.

The Ka-226 is a slightly larger 3.6-tonne, twin-engine, multi-role light helicopter with coaxial contra-rotating rotors (no tail rotor). It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 600 km. It has a crew of one to two and can seat six to seven passengers.

LUH Hot & High Altitude Trials September 2020

LUH Program Status

The programs to replace IA Chetak and Cheetah helicopters with the LUH and Ka-226 helicopters are both woefully behind schedule.

The LUH program has been delayed by technical challenges, supply-chain issues, and certification problems. Technical challenges include main rotor blade refinements and noise/vibration issues. The imported Automatic Flight Control System (autopilot) from Safran faced supply disruptions during COVID and integration problems. There has also been scope creep, with the Army adding advanced autopilot requirements that were not part of the original specifications.

Nine of the 12 Limited Series Production units had been built but remained undelivered as of May 2026.

Certification, which was targeted for late 2025, will likely slip to late 2026.

Ka-226 Program Status

The Ka-226 program failed to make headway due to disagreements over local production costs, technology transfer issues, and Russia's inability to meet 70% indigenous content targets because the aircraft was powered by French engines.

In January 2022, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reviewed the Ka-226T manufacturing project as part of India's efforts to reduce dependence on foreign defence equipment. Following the review, the project stalled, likely due to two key factors:

1. Development of the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): The DPB considered HAL’s indigenous LUH program a viable alternative. The LUH, a 3-tonne-class helicopter, was being developed to meet both military and civilian requirements.

2. Restricted Access to French Engines: At the time of contract signing in 2015, the Ka-226T was powered by French Arrius 2G1 engines. However, following geopolitical tensions, France denied Russia access to the engine. Consequently, Russia could not meet its obligations to fully support Ka-226T manufacture in India as the OEM.

Russian Import Substitution Alters the Landscape

Meanwhile, Russia continued to develop the Ka-226T to fulfil Indian requirements.

Following Russia's estrangement from France, the UEC-Klimov enterprise announced in 2019 the development of a new VK-650V gas-turbine turboshaft engine with a takeoff power of 650 hp.

The VK-650V is intended to replace the French powerplant on Russian Ka-226T and Ansat helicopters. According to UEC, variants of the VK-650V could also be adapted to power drones and hybrid propulsion systems for aircraft.

In June 2024, UEC delivered the first prototype VK-650V engines for flight tests on an Ansat helicopter.

On February 7, a Rostec press release stated that UEC “has received type certification for the VK-650V turboshaft engine, designed for light helicopters. The VK-650V is now ready for serial production and operational deployment.”

On May 22, 2026, a prototype Ka-226T helicopter equipped with two new Russian VK-650V turboshaft engines completed its first full-fledged circular flight in Tomilino near Moscow.

Potential Ka-226T Revival with the VK-650V Engine

The certification of the VK-650V engine could potentially revive the stalled project to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India.

Since contract negotiations were suspended, Russia has replaced many foreign components on the Ka-226T with locally manufactured ones. At the time of contract signing, only 72% of the components were of Russian origin. As a result, Indo-Russian Helicopters can now begin production of the Ka-226T with a higher level of indigenous content than before.

HAL is significantly behind schedule in delivering an LUH conforming to the requirements of the Indian Armed Forces. Keeping in mind the large number of light helicopters due for replacement, it could be over a decade before the Chetaks and Cheetahs are finally phased out.

In any case, there is market potential for two locally manufactured helicopters targeting the Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, law-enforcement agencies, the civil sector, and exports.

Relying solely on HAL’s LUH program is a high-risk strategy, given HAL’s uncertain delivery timeline.

Both the LUH and Ka-226T programs conform to the Make-in-India paradigm. The indigenous content and level of technology transfer (ToT) absorption for both the LUH and the Ka-226T are expected to be similar.

If the Russians were to agree to limited or complete manufacturing ToT for the VK-650V engine, India would gain much more than a helicopter engine, keeping in mind the possible use of the engine as a drone powerplant.

India Walked Away from the FGFA. The Need for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter Did Not!

 The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which India and Russia once planned to co-develop, was envisioned as a two-seat variant of the Su-57.

The IAF’s requirement was never for a stealth fighter — it was, and likely continues to be, for a twin-seat stealth fighter!

It's likely that the IAF’s preference for a twin-seat fighter was based on its experience operating the Su-30MKI. Besides pilot training and operational conversion, a twin-seat fighter could also support multi-role operations benefiting from a second crew member, such as complex strike coordination, electronic warfare/attack roles, and reconnaissance.

The reported reasons for India opting out of the FGFA program — lack of supercruise and unproven operational capability — were always unconvincing, considering that India, as a co-developer of the fighter, would eventually have addressed those shortcomings.

The Rationale for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter

All 4th-generation fighter development programs foresaw the eventual need for a twin-seat variant. The initial designs provisioned for a second seat, usually by placing a fuel tank and relocatable electronics behind the cockpit. That space could later be utilized for a second cockpit by moving the electronics and dispensing with the fuel tank.

Stealth fighter development programs for the F-22 and F-35 chose to depart from the twin-seat convention for the following reasons:

1. A twin-seat configuration compromises stealth shaping to some extent.

2. It reduces internal fuel-carrying capacity, thereby compromising range. (Stealth fighters cannot carry fuel externally in drop tanks.)

3. The fighters were primarily designed to penetrate contested airspace; it was believed that sensor fusion would be adequate to enable a single pilot to fly such missions.

In brief, it was believed — with good reason — that twin-seat stealth fighters would add complexity, reduce internal fuel or payload in some cases, and increase radar cross-section.

MUM-T Operations

It has now been clear for several years that the choice of single-seat-only stealth fighters did not anticipate the emergence of the requirement for Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) operations.

The Su-57D, for example, is reportedly designed to team up with four S-70 Okhotnik modular drones configured for roles such as SEAD, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and aerial combat. The control and coordination demands of MUM-T operations far exceed what sensor fusion and AI alone can enable a pilot to manage.

South Korea's KF-21 Boramae Stealth Fighter

South Korea followed a pragmatic approach in developing its KF-21 stealth fighter — an approach that is paying rich dividends in terms of meeting performance and development timeline goals.

Specifically:

The KF-21 features significant reduction in RF observability rather than all-aspect low observability. (To achieve the latter, it would have required materials that the nation had not yet developed.)

The KF-21 features a twin-engine, semi-stealth design with external weapons carriage (no internal weapons bay in the early blocks).

Of the six prototypes built, two were twin-seat variants.

The first prototype rolled out in April 2021 and flew in July 2022. All prototypes collectively conducted roughly 1,600 sorties over 42 months of incident-free flight testing, achieving supersonic flight, aerial refueling, and weapons integration. System development concluded in early 2026.

The first serial-production KF-21 to roll out in March 2026 was, significantly, a trainer!

Initial deliveries to the ROKAF are slated for the second half of 2026, with 40 Block I aircraft targeted by 2028 and up to 120 total aircraft (including Block II) by 2032.

Block I prioritizes air superiority; Block II will add full multirole air-to-ground and anti-ship capabilities. Block III variants will address stealth shortcomings and include internal weapons bays.

The two-seat variant will play a pivotal role. It will not only accelerate pilot training and operational conversion but also facilitate the development of advanced variants and future concepts such as loyal-wingman operations.

An electronic warfare/attack variant — the KF-21EA — is planned, with a dedicated Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) station in the rear cockpit.

China's J-20S

Ahead of the KF-21, China’s J-20S — a two-seat variant of the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon — became the world’s first operational twin-seat fifth-generation stealth fighter.

The fighter was unveiled at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow.

Prototypes first flew in 2021; the aircraft entered, or approached, PLAAF operational service in 2025, with frontline markings appearing by mid-year.

The J-20S is reportedly optimized for combat (MUM-T operations), not training or operational conversion. The second crew member — a Mission Systems Officer — manages MUM-T-related sensor fusion, electronic warfare/jamming, and tactical command and control.

While the pilot focuses on flight and air superiority, the Mission Systems Officer directs loyal-wingman drones for coordinated strikes, reconnaissance, and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences).

Su-57D

Russia’s UAC announced on May 19, 2026, that the Su-57D — a two-seat, multifunctional, fifth-generation fighter — had commenced flight testing. The Su-57D is now the third stealth fighter with a twin-seat variant.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Russia provisioned for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 from the start of the aircraft’s development.

Reliable Russian social media recently reported that the Su-57D “was converted from the already existing 055 aircraft in the shortest possible time.”

“The Indians wanted such an aircraft, and we customized it for them.”

Converting an existing single-seat airframe into a twin-seater in a short time would not have been possible had Sukhoi not designed the aircraft for such a conversion.

The most likely reason Sukhoi did not develop a twin-seat variant earlier was that the Russian Aerospace Forces never projected the need for one.

However, over the past couple of years, Sukhoi has completed development and operational testing of the S-70 Okhotnik stealth combat drone. Su-57 fighters have successfully carried out operational Su-57 + S-70 MUM-T missions in Ukraine.

The need for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 has now been firmly established, and Russia’s Ministry of Defense has already ordered a batch of the twin-seaters.

HAL Likely to Offer a Customized Su-57D Variant

Russia has offered to help HAL build a customized variant of the Su-57D for the IAF. The offer reportedly involves ToT and industrial participation, including joint-venture production of components in India, licensed assembly, MRO facilities, and possible avionics customization.

If Rosoboronexport and HAL successfully negotiate the technological and financial terms of their collaboration, HAL is likely to offer the customized Su-57D variant to the IAF.

The HAL–Rosoboronexport tie-up is unlikely to be derailed by any CAATSA sanctions because U.S. leverage over HAL is limited. Any U.S. move to stop the supply of GE F404 or F414 engines to HAL is likely to hurt Boeing as much as it hurts India. From India’s perspective, such sanctions now would be preferable to sanctions imposed when the LCA Mk-2 and AMCA programs are approaching maturity and serial production.

DRDO’s ULPGM : Quixotic Counter-Drone Concept Sidesteps the Real Technological Challenge

 

The MoD on May 19 announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes.

ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.

Conceptually, ULPGM is a loitering munition designed to engage adversary drones and helicopters attempting to attack Indian Army (IA) assets. As such, it is an area-defence counter-drone weapon system, unlike interceptor drones that are designed to protect platoon-level deployments of soldiers. Interceptor drones are relatively cheaper and can be widely deployed along the battlefront.

The PIB release announcing the completion of the flight trials states:

"Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully completed the final deliverable-configuration development trials of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile (ULPGM)-V3 in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes at the DRDO test range near Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. The trials were carried out using an integrated Ground Control System (GCS) to command and control the ULPGM weapon system. The GCS features state-of-the-art technologies to automate readiness and launch operations."

ULPGM Capability

The PIB release does not reveal critical weapon-system specifications such as:

1. Range 2. Type of seeker 3. Warhead weight and type 4. Accuracy

However, past news reports have claimed that the missile features a 2-kg warhead and has a 1-metre circular error probability (CEP).

The ULPGM missile has been developed by Research Centre Imarat, Hyderabad, as the nodal lab, along with other DRDO laboratories, namely Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad; Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), Chandigarh; and High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), Pune.

The missile has been produced entirely through the Indian defence ecosystem, based on a mature domestic supply chain. As such, it is ready for "immediate serial mass production."

Launch Platform

The launch platform used for the trials — a multicopter developed by Newspace Research and Technologies, Bengaluru — is unlikely to emerge as the final platform.

Multicopters use commercially available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) microcontrollers, propellers, batteries and gyros. They are easy and relatively inexpensive to configure but lack the speed, stealth, payload capability and range of drones featuring conventional winged airframes.

As such, it is possible that the IA will eventually deploy the ULPGM on a medium-sized drone with a conventional airframe shaped for stealth. Whether such a drone is already under development is not known.

Analysis

A long-endurance, area-defence loitering drone with both air-to-air and air-to-ground capability is not known to have been deployed thus far in the Ukraine war, despite the conflict having emerged as the seminal crucible for drone warfare.

The fact that the concept of an area-defence drone has not been battle-tested should be reason for pause, not a claim of a conceptual breakthrough.

Let me elaborate. As the war in Ukraine has evolved, troop deployments along the line of contact have become increasingly thin. Reconnaissance drones now make the battlefield completely transparent. Troop concentrations and weapons deployments are immediately detected and attacked with fibre-optic-cable-guided FPV drones. Each drone is like a precisely aimed artillery shell and costs as much, possibly less.

In the absence of troop concentrations and the deployment of large weapons along the front line, an area-defence-based counter-drone weapon system lacks relevance in emerging warfare.

Unwieldy, Vulnerable Architecture

The ULPGM relies heavily on the GCS for successful interception. This makes the weapon system unwieldy and vulnerable.

An interceptor drone with 2–3 hours of loitering capability would have to be a medium-sized drone. A medium-sized multicopter drone would be easily detectable in flight and would be immediately engaged by ground-launched air-defence missile systems. A launch platform with a conventional airframe would be even more detectable, as it would require a launch catapult.

An adversary, using drone-based and ground-based electronic eavesdropping, could easily locate and attack a GCS. Indeed, counter-drone warfare is increasingly gravitating towards attacking and destroying drone control centres rather than the attacking drones themselves.

For a successful ULPGM engagement, the adversary target, the ULPGM launch platform and the GCS would all have to be in close proximity — roughly within 10–15 km. As such, adversary attack drones could easily skirt the GCS deployment to strike deep into the interior.

Let us not forget an important lesson from the war in Ukraine: drone strikes are all about finding gaps in the adversary’s air-defence system.

There is another possibility. The adversary could also easily saturate the ULPGM deployment. It is important to understand that the low cost of drones means that a peer adversary will always have a large number of drones at its disposal.

Electronic Warfare

Under the ULPGM architecture, the GCS would control the launch platform, detect the target and launch the missile. The architecture is heavily reliant on communication channels. How likely is it that these communication channels would not be jammed or interfered with through electronic warfare?

Also, the combined cost of the ULPGM, its launch platform and the GCS would far exceed the cost of the target.

Manpower Intensive

The architecture would require the deployment of several trained personnel to launch and operate the ULPGM platform and detection sensors (RF, optical, IR). The deployed personnel would have to be positioned in close proximity to the line of contact. GCS personnel and their equipment would be easily targeted by the adversary.

Conclusion

Drone warfare is gravitating towards the use of relatively inexpensive drones and their deployment in large numbers across the entire battlefield, both for attack and defence.

Counter-drone capability based on low-cost interceptor drones makes sense. Counter-drone capability based on high-cost, high-technology, manpower-intensive drones makes less sense.

The DRDO concept is a total departure from battlefield realities.

Drone warfare is trending towards AI-based autonomous operations, both for attack and interceptor drones. DRDO would better serve the nation by focusing on developing autonomous drone technology based on indigenously manufactured chipsets and sensors, rather than attempting to field unproven and technologically laggard capabilities based on COTS electronic components on drones manufactured by private-sector players like Adani Defence Systems & Technologies Limited, Hyderabad, whose credentials in defence technology are dubious.

It appears that the ULPGM architecture is designed to protect VAs and VPs in the interior, not on the battlefront. The system could well be intended to protect against attacks on political rallies, a role in which it would indeed be effective.

However, the thought leaves one depressed.

MBDA and IAF Sign MRO Agreement for MICA Missiles

Image by @Grok

MBDA and the IAF have signed an agreement to set up MRO facilities for the MICA missile in India.

Currently, MICA missiles need to be shipped to MBDA for refurbishment. An indigenous capability will save time and reduce costs.

The IAF will operate the MICA MRO facility, undertaking inspection, repair, component replacement, and mid-life upgrades throughout the missiles’ service life, with MBDA providing tools, data packages, training, and support.

Mid-life work on an air-to-air missile typically involves software upgrades, seeker enhancements, renewal of pyrotechnic elements (especially solid rocket propellant), batteries, electronics, and other aging components.

At the 2025 Paris Air Show, MBDA and the Indian company AXISCADES formalized the creation of an industrial unit in Bengaluru dedicated to the manufacture and integration of missile launch systems. The MICA MRO agreement is a progression of that tie-up.

AXISCADES Technologies is a Bengaluru-based Indian multinational company specializing in high-end engineering solutions and technology services. It focuses primarily on Aerospace, Defence, and ESAI (Electronics, Semiconductor, and Artificial Intelligence), delivering end-to-end product lifecycle support — from design and development to manufacturing, assembly, testing, and R&D.

Its current order book includes over ₹600 crore worth of advanced sub-systems for indigenous platforms.

IAF and MBDA MICA

The IAF has operated MICA missiles since 2016, initially with the Mirage 2000 and later with Rafale fighters as well.

The IAF Rafale fleet, which currently comprises two squadrons (36 aircraft), is set to expand with the induction of an additional 114 Rafale fighters under the MRFA program. The MICA MRO agreement will help ensure cost-effective sustainment of the fleet’s combat capability.

MBDA weapon systems currently in use by the IAF include the MICA, Meteor, ASRAAM, and Mistral.