Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.

Factories, Patience and Resilience: Russia's Answer to Ukraine's Drone Offensive

Interceptor Drone developed by Rostec : Photo Credit Rostec

Over the past one month or so, Russia has absorbed many painful blows delivered by Ukrainian long range strike drones. Ukraine has struck Russian energy infrastructure and logistics to an extent where Russians are now being forced to cope with fuel and energy shortages, not just the loss of energy exports. The advance of Russian forces has slowed to a crawl that suggests that it may take years for them to completely 'liberate' Donbas.

For some in Russia and abroad, the situation may appear dismal. However, Russia has some good cards to play on account of its industrial capacity, resilience, and patience. To counter the drone menace it appears to be abandoning a "border defence" philosophy in favour of distributed vital-area defence.

There is a perception that Russia has no effective counter to the threat posed by Ukraine's long-range strike drones. Deployed in sufficient numbers, such drones are likely to continue penetrating Russian airspace and striking targets deep inside the country. Unless Russia develops more effective countermeasures, the economic and military costs imposed by these attacks are likely to grow as Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to evolve.

Russia may still achieve some of the objectives of its Special Military Operation, such as the liberation of Donbas. However, even if Russian forces were to secure Donbas, there is little reason to believe Ukraine would cease hostilities. Instead, it could continue using long-range drones to impose economic costs on Russia and gradually erode its war-fighting capacity.

In that sense, drones may provide Ukraine with a viable means of waging a prolonged war of attrition, one that seeks to compel Russia to negotiate on terms more favourable to Kyiv.

Understanding Russia's Air Defence Limitations

Russia has largely relied on its integrated layered air defence network—designed primarily to detect, track, and engage high-value aerial assets such as combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—to counter the threat posed by low-cost, slow-flying long-range drones. The endeavor has been ineffective, besides its high economic cost.

Border Length

Russia's land border with Ukraine extends for approximately 1,974 km. However, drones are not restricted to crossing the land border. They can approach via the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, cross territorial waters, or exploit the airspace of neighbouring countries before entering Russia.

Russia also has approximately 800 km of coastline vulnerable to drone ingress. Ukrainian drones have, on occasion, reportedly transited the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before entering Russian airspace to strike targets around St. Petersburg. Russia's borders with the Baltic states extend for another 862 km.

In effect, Russian air defence systems must monitor potential drone approaches along more than 3,600 km of land and maritime frontiers.

Air defence coverage across such distances will inevitably contain gaps. Existing Russian systems were primarily designed to detect aircraft and missiles flying above approximately 500 ft. Ukrainian drones, equipped with Starlink terminals that provide low-latency communications, are known to fly at much lower altitudes. Using electro-optical sensors, they can also be remotely piloted along river valleys, lakes, and other terrain features that reduce the likelihood of detection.

Western ISR Support

Ukraine's Western allies also employ space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor Russian air defence deployments and operational status.

These assets may detect temporary gaps created by system relocation, maintenance, or technical failures, allowing drone routes to be planned around them. It is conceivable that some drones can even be dynamically rerouted during flight as new opportunities emerge.

Molniya Interceptor Drone: Screen grab from RuMoD video

Air defence coverage within Russia's interior is generally less dense than along its borders and tends to focus on protecting major cities and strategic facilities. Once drones penetrate the border defences, they may find it easier to avoid known air defence sites and populated areas while remaining undetected for extended periods.

Why Ukraine Has Been Successful

In many respects, the perception that drones can occasionally penetrate even heavily defended airspace reflects reality. Both Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated the ability to do so against sophisticated air defence networks fielded by Russia, the United States, and Israel.

With extensive assistance from its Western partners, Ukraine has developed tactics that exploit the inherent limitations of legacy air defence systems through the use of Starlink communications, space-based ISR, and airborne surveillance assets.

Russia Pivots Towards Dedicated Drone Defence

Recent Ukrainian successes appear to have prompted Russia to complement its legacy air defence network with systems specifically designed to counter drones.

Unlike traditional air defence systems, which are optimised to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, these new systems are intended to defeat slow-flying autonomous or remotely piloted drones.

There will inevitably be overlap between the two defensive architectures as drones themselves increasingly assume traditional combat roles.

Russia's changing priorities are reflected in the variety of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) introduced over the past few months. The emphasis appears to have shifted from preventing drone penetration to limiting the damage once drones enter defended airspace.

Vital Area and Vital Point Defence

Broadly speaking, Russia appears to be focusing on protecting vital areas and vital points.

For vital area defence, Russian forces have introduced:

1. Specialised drone-detection radar (Sokol)

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system capable of denying connectivity over an area of approximately 18 sq km

2. Medium-range interceptor drones (Rita-2 and Molniya)

3. Passive RF and electro-optical drone detection systems

4. Medium-range electronic warfare systems

5. Rapidly deployable protective net systems for roads and convoys

6. Yak-130M light combat aircraft for engaging larger drones

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink Jamming: Photo Ukrainian Defence Sources

For vital point defence:

1. Krona-E ultra-short-range missile system (450 m–1.3 km)

2. Zak-30 Citadel 30 mm automatic cannon firing programmable air-burst ammunition

3. Zubr automated gun systems

4. Yolka hand-launched interceptor drones

5. Rita-2 reusable interceptor drones

6. Redut-UR automated kinetic defence system firing unguided rockets

7. Shrapnel-dispersing small-arms ammunition

8. Duplet net-firing handgun

These lists are not exhaustive.

With the notable exception of the Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jammer, most of these systems appear relatively inexpensive. They therefore lend themselves to large-scale production and widespread deployment.

It is likely that Russia's next priority will be manufacturing these systems in sufficient numbers to protect critical infrastructure and strategic facilities across the country.

An interesting feature of nearly all these new systems is that they possess their own dedicated radar and/or electro-optical sensors. They are therefore far less dependent on the sensor network of Russia's legacy air defence system.

It is also likely that the legacy air defence network will continue to evolve and become more tightly integrated with this new layered drone defence architecture.

A day after my above post, in this interview, President Putin corroborates conclusions that I had independently reached through my own analysis. It is reassuring to see that my assessment aligns with his remarks.

Putin on Ukraine's Strikes Against Russia's Energy Infrastructure

Russian President Vladimir Putin comments on Ukraine's strikes against Russia's critical and energy infrastructure, discussing the impact on fuel supplies, air defense production, repairs, and the situation in… pic.twitter.com/PYOsyaVQVX

— Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil (@ivan_8848) June 29, 2026

America Wants an Extreme-Range Air-to-Air Missile. India Already Has the Foundation.

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) reportedly plans to acquire a new air-to-air missile with a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles (nm). It also wants the weapon to be capable of engaging ground-based targets and has consequently dubbed it the Air Force Long Range Weapon (AFLRW).

India Already Has It!

Most of us would consider the AFLRW concept bold and technologically ambitious. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the technological challenges that must be overcome to develop such a weapon. Before doing so, however, let me offer an intriguing observation: India already appears to have the basis for an AFLRW-like weapon in its inventory, albeit with roughly half the range sought by the USAF. Yes, Brahmos Aerospace has been working on an air-to-air variant of the missile for over seven years now! 

Current Air-to-Air Capability

Currently, the longest-range air-to-air missile in widespread USAF service is the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM, which reportedly has a maximum range of 87 nm.

Lockheed Martin is developing the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), a next-generation beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

The JATM reportedly offers a significantly greater range (more than 108 nb) and a higher speed (around Mach 5), giving it an advantage over China's PL-15.

The missile retains the same general dimensions and form factor as the AMRAAM, enabling seamless integration with existing rail launchers and the internal weapon bays of stealth fighters such as the F-22 and F-35.

Production of the missile commenced in 2024. The missile is still undergoing flight testing and is expected to enter service later this decade.

Also, the U.S. Navy has already begun fielding an air-launched version of the multi-role Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), designated the AIM-174B. The missile, intended to arm the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has a maximum range of 130 nm. It also retains secondary capabilities for anti-ship, land-attack, and counter-hypersonic roles.

Technological Challenges

Extremely long-range air-to-air missiles are primarily intended to neutralize high-value force multipliers such as aerial refuelling tankers and AWACS aircraft.

Developing such missiles presents four major technological challenges:

1. Weight and size

2. High-speed propulsion

3. Warhead effectiveness

4. Targeting and guidance

Weight and Size

Achieving a range of 1,000 nm would require a very large propellant load, increasing both the missile's weight and dimensions to the point where most fighter aircraft would be unable to carry it. The AFLRW, for example, is expected to be launched from a bomber such as the B-52.

High-Speed Requirement

Against a target 1,000 nm away, even a hypothetical high-supersonic missile would require approximately 13–26 minutes to reach its target, depending on its average speed and the target's speed and flight path.

By comparison, current BVR engagements at ranges of 100–200 km typically involve missile flight times of just 1–3 minutes.

A weapon capable of reaching 1,000 nm would therefore require revolutionary advances in propulsion—likely involving hypersonic ramjets, scramjets, multi-stage rockets, or boost-glide technology—effectively creating an entirely new class of stand-off weapon.

Reduced Accuracy and Larger Warhead

The missile's large size and sustained high cruise speed would inevitably reduce its manoeuvrability. Long flight time poses tracking and guidance challenges. Tracking and guidance inaccuracies and lower terminal agility, combined with the large size of its intended targets, would necessitate a heavier warhead to achieve a sufficiently large lethal radius. The heavier warhead would, in turn, further increase the missile's dimensions and weight.

Targeting and Guidance

The greatest challenge in developing an AFLRW lies in target detection, tracking, and mid-course guidance over a 1,000 nm engagement.

Unlike shorter-range missiles such as the AIM-260, whose launch aircraft can often provide continuous radar updates, an AFLRW would remain in flight for 15–25 minutes. During this period, the launch platform would be unable to maintain radar contact with distant or manoeuvring targets such as AWACS aircraft or tankers.

Instead, the missile would depend on a networked "kill web" of off-board sensors—including satellites, drones, other aircraft, and ground-based systems—for initial cueing and continuous mid-course updates via robust datalinks. These links would have to withstand jamming, latency, and line-of-sight limitations while providing highly accurate updates to compensate for inertial navigation drift over such vast distances.

Achieving reliable, real-time coordination across multiple platforms in a contested electromagnetic environment represents one of the programme's greatest technical challenges.

BrahMos Air-to-Air Variant

In March 2019, speaking to Financial Express Online, Dr Sudhir Mishra, then CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, spoke of an air-to-air variant of the BrahMos-NG. He stated that the missile, when launched from the Tejas or Su-30MKI, would target the enemy's "radar in the air" capability by engaging AWACS, aerial refuelling, and transport aircraft.

The BrahMos-NG is a clean-sheet design rather than a derivative of the current BrahMos. It is being developed to enable carriage by medium-weight fighter aircraft.

Dr Mishra's remarks suggest that an air-to-air capability for the BrahMos-NG is a qualitative requirement projected by the IAF.

There is no obvious technological reason why an air-to-air version of the existing BrahMos-A, the air-launched version of the in-service BrahMos missile, could not also be developed.

Such a missile would already possess sustained high-supersonic speed, carry a large warhead, and could eventually achieve a range of around 800 km. And we have the best possible platform to launch such as missile - the Su-30MKI!

The shorter range of the Brahmos-A would significantly reduce the complexity of establishing the required kill web.

India could further bridge gaps in its space-based surveillance capability by accelerating the development of relatively affordable High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) and Airship-based High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (AS-HAPS) systems.

HAPS is a solar-powered unmanned aircraft designed to remain airborne for more than 90 days while operating at an altitude of approximately 65,000 ft. It is being developed by NewSpace in collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which serves as the prototype development partner.

AS-HAPS is being developed for the Indian Air Force to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, telecommunications, and remote sensing.

As an airship platform, AS-HAPS could potentially accommodate a radar capable of providing all-weather surveillance and target tracking.

In addition to long-range target detection, AS-HAPS could also provide a low-latency communications relay for long-range missile engagements.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Should India Pause the AMCA Programme?

 

Copyright Vijainder K Thakur

In 2019, DRDO and ADA projected that the AMCA would be ready for operational induction by 2035.

It is now mid-2026. DRDO and ADA have yet to achieve a major programme milestone on the path from the design board to operational induction. Nevertheless, both organisations continue to adhere to the original timeline. 

The projected timeline was viewed with considerable scepticism within sections of the IAF when it was first presented. Whether that scepticism has diminished, with only nine years remaining to the planned induction date, is difficult to judge.  

Rather than speculate, I will confine myself to the available facts. 

According to the current timeline, AMCA's maiden flight is projected to take place in the middle of 2029. That gives ADA and its private sector development partner just 6 years of test flying to qualify the aircraft for initial operational clearance. 

By comparison, the F-22 required approximately eight years from first flight to operational service, the F-35 around nine years, and the Su-57 roughly ten years. China, however, fielded the J-20 in about six years.

One important distinction is that China was not attempting to field the aircraft with an interim foreign engine while simultaneously planning an indigenous replacement. 

We will talk about the "interim" engine later. Let's first remind ourselves that the J-20 was developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), part of AVIC. 

Before developing the J-20, CAC had designed and produced the J-7 (a MiG-21 derivative) and, crucially, the J-10 — China’s first indigenous fourth-generation multirole fighter (first flight 1998, entered service around 2005). 

ADA and its private sector partner will not have the experience of CAC when they start building the AMCA. 

The GE F414 Engine Issue

The AMCA has been designed around the General Electric F414 engine. The F414 is a 98 kN thrust class engine. The IAF wants the AMCA to be powered by a 110-kN class engine. Consequently, F414 has been publicly described as an interim AMCA powerplant. The long-term intention is to replace it with a more powerful indigenous engine that is yet to be developed. The follow-up variant with the more powerful indigenous engine is to be called AMCA Mk.2

India, which currently does not have the technology to build a 110-kN class turbofan engine, intends to develop the engine in partnership with Safran or Rolls-Royce. 

India intends to procure GE F414 engines not just as an interim powerplant for the AMCA but also as the powerplant for the under development LCA Mk.2 and the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) which is still at an early stage of development. 

Negotiations for the F414 have reportedly slowed amid disagreements over pricing. Some reports place the cost at over ₹200 crore per engine—nearly three times earlier estimates of ₹70–80 crore—with additional discussions concerning the approximately ₹6,000 crore cost of establishing a dedicated manufacturing line.

The Risks of an Interim Engine Strategy

Designing an airframe around an engine that is acknowledged to be below the aircraft's intended long-term thrust requirement introduces significant technical and programme risk. HAL did this in the past with the Marut HF-24 and the outcome was very disappointing for the IAF. HAL could neither develop nor acquire an aeroengine powerful enough to achieve the airframe's Mach 2 capability that the IAF so desperately coveted. Three squadrons of the Marut were operationally inducted and then prematurely phased out. The author has the dubious distinction of having flown his last sortie on the Marut ferrying an aircraft, with just 60 airframe hours, into retirement storage. 

The AMCA programme appears to risk repeating a development approach that produced disappointing results with the HF-24 Marut some six decades ago.

The central concern discussed here is not whether India should develop the AMCA—there is broad agreement that it should—but whether the present development strategy is technically sound and likely to achieve its objectives within a realistic timeframe.

Traditionally, combat aircraft are designed around their engines. The engine is not merely a source of thrust; it is the heart of the aircraft, determining numerous aspects of the overall design. It influences weight distribution, intake and exhaust geometry, cooling requirements, hydraulic capacity, electrical power generation, fuel consumption, centre of gravity, and maintenance philosophy. The engine also determines how much electrical power is available for sophisticated systems such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare equipment, sensors, and future directed-energy or high-power electronic systems.

With the AMCA program India proposes to design and certify an aircraft around one engine and subsequently redesign significant portions of the aircraft to accommodate another. Such an approach introduces substantial technical and programme risks.

Engine Replacement Challenges

ADA has stated that the AMCA airframe incorporates provisions for a future 110-kN-class engine. (The Marut airframe similarly provisioned for a higher thrust reheated engine.) 

The question is whether designing and certifying an aircraft around one engine before integrating another introduces unnecessary technical and programme risk.

Replacing an engine is not simply a matter of installing a more powerful unit. Changes in airflow requirements, mounting arrangements, cooling systems, hydraulic pumps, electrical generators, fuel systems, engine controls, software integration, and flight characteristics may all require redesign. Even relatively small differences in engine dimensions, mass flow, or power extraction can affect the aircraft’s overall performance and certification.

From an engineering perspective, developing a new engine to suit an already frozen airframe can also be highly restrictive. Engine designers may find themselves forced to meet constraints imposed by an existing aircraft rather than optimising the engine for performance, reliability, maintainability, and future growth. This creates risks for both the engine programme and the aircraft programme simultaneously.

Alternative Strategy

Rather than committing to an interim airframe, an alternative strategy may reduce technical risk while preserving India’s significant technological gains.

ADA and DRDO have invested heavily in developing many of the enabling technologies that define a fifth-generation fighter. These include radar-absorbent materials, stealth shaping techniques, sensor fusion, avionics architecture, flight-control software, advanced mission computers, and low-observable manufacturing processes. These achievements represent valuable national capabilities irrespective of the final aircraft configuration.

Instead of finalizing an aircraft design around an interim engine, these technologies could continue to mature through incremental integration into existing and developmental platforms.

For example, stealth technologies, autonomous mission systems, and sensor fusion could be demonstrated aboard unmanned combat aircraft such as the Ghatak UCAV currently under development. Other technologies could be progressively integrated into operational platforms such as the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, or the LCA Tejas, allowing engineers to validate hardware, software, reliability, and operational concepts under real flying conditions.

Such an incremental approach would continue to advance India’s technological competence while reducing programme risk. Each successful demonstration would increase confidence in individual technologies before integrating them into a completely new aircraft.

Meanwhile, efforts could focus on developing the indigenous engine to the maturity required for operational service. Once that engine is available and its characteristics are fully understood, engineers could design the AMCA airframe around its actual capabilities rather than estimated future specifications.

By that stage, most of the enabling technologies would already have been demonstrated and refined, allowing designers to concentrate on optimising the airframe itself. This could produce a more coherent, better-integrated fighter while avoiding extensive redesign after the aircraft enters development.

Conclusion

This proposal does not advocate slowing India’s fifth-generation ambitions. Rather, it recommends sequencing development in a manner that aligns more closely with established aerospace engineering practice. The objective would be to reduce technical risk, improve system integration, and ultimately produce a more capable aircraft with fewer compromises.

India has already made substantial investments in the technologies required for a fifth-generation fighter. Allowing these technologies to mature independently while bringing the indigenous engine to operational readiness before finalising the aircraft design may provide a more robust path to achieving the AMCA's long-term objectives.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Back to the Wall, Russia Turns to Satellite Jamming. Has Space Warfare Begun?

Google translated graphic published by Militarnyi

Russia has deployed the newly developed Volna-Kupol-Garant electronic warfare (EW) system to protect its forces from attacks by medium-range drones equipped with Starlink terminals, such as the US-supplied Hornet drone, whose development was funded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.

Jamming a communication terminal in a war zone is generally considered a legitimate military activity. However, traditional electronic warfare systems seek to disrupt the receiver. Garant appears to reverse the approach by targeting the satellite instead. In effect, the system attempts to deny access to a Starlink satellite over a defined area rather than disable individual terminals operating within it.

Starlink Communications

Conventional drones communicate with their operating crew using line-of-sight RF links which sometimes involve ground based or airborne relays. Such links are easy to disrupt using

ground-based jammers. In contrast, Starlink terminals use narrow electronically steered beams directed towards satellites overhead. The geometry significantly reduces the effectiveness of conventional jamming systems.

Starlink terminals mounted on drones are difficult to jam using ground-based EW systems because they are pointed skywards towards Starlink satellites orbiting approximately 500 km above the Earth. Any EW system attempting to jam a Starlink terminal directly would ideally need to be positioned above the drone's altitude.

Garant System

The Garant system takes advantage of the fact that while the Starlink terminal mounted on the drone is facing skywards, the Starlink satellite with which it is communicating is facing the Earth's surface.

The Garant system disrupts communication between a drone-mounted Starlink terminal and a Starlink satellite by saturating the satellite with interference signals across its entire communication band (14–14.5 GHz). Although Starlink satellites can frequency-hop across eight channels, the Garant system employs eight antennas, each covering 62.5 MHz.

The interference signals generated by Garant effectively blind the satellite passing overhead. The system can isolate an area of approximately 18 sq km from Starlink satellite signals. Its coverage extends through 360 degrees in azimuth and 110 degrees in elevation.

A Starlink terminal can communicate with multiple Starlink satellites simultaneously. At present, it is not clear whether, or how, the Garant system prevents drone-mounted terminals from communicating with satellites visible outside the area affected by the interference.

Initial reports from Ukraine suggested that the Garant system could interfere with only one satellite at a time. If that were the case, the system would be of limited effectiveness, since a terminal could simply switch to one of the 10 to 20 satellites (an approximation) typically visible overhead.

More recent Ukrainian reports suggest that the Russian capability is both comprehensive and credible, to the extent that Ukrainian forces reportedly respond by immediately launching drones to locate, attack, and disable any deployed Garant system.

A graphic published by Militarnyi suggests that the system can interfere with all satellites within its operating cone.

The Garant electronic warfare system typically consists of eight satellite dishes. It weighs approximately 120 kg and can be operated by a single individual.

Garant Vulnerabilities

Locating and attacking the system is relatively straightforward because SpaceX can instantly detect interference affecting its communication channels, while radio reconnaissance assets operated by Western countries supporting Ukraine can detect the powerful emissions generated by the system.

While the Garant system can disrupt attacks by Starlink-guided drones, it remains vulnerable to attacks by FPV drones and machine-vision-guided kamikaze drones.

Russian forces have reportedly begun using the Garant system to protect the Novorossiya Highway, which has come under repeated attack by Hornet drones equipped with Starlink terminals.

Conceptual Shift

The conceptual shift from jamming communication terminals to jamming satellites has ramifications. Interfering directly with a satellite serving other users could be viewed as an escalation. However, Russian forces have apparently concluded that such escalation, if it indeed constitutes one, is justified because the Starlink network is being used to facilitate attacks on Russian military personnel and civilians.

TASS quotes technical and information security expert Sergey Trukhachev as saying:

"Hundreds of companies from the United States and Europe are directly involved in the Ukraine conflict and complicit in the deaths of our servicemen and civilians. This cannot go on forever. Volna-Kupol-Garant systems are just the first step in a set of means for destroying any enemy infrastructure."

Perhaps the expert is alluding to a possible future escalation involving the use of more powerful directed-energy weapon systems to temporarily or permanently disable satellites.

Russia could also justify satellite jamming by arguing that the system merely incapacitates a particular satellite visible over contested territory for the duration of its passage through the area. The incapacitation is temporary.

Looking Ahead

The use of Starlink as a dual-use communication network which prompted the deployment of the Garant system heralds the inevitable extension of warfare into space. 

The deployment of the Garant challenges the assumption that commercial satellite constellations can provide invulnerable communications in wartime. Garant demonstrates that even massive constellations such as Starlink may be vulnerable to localized denial techniques.

In the past, SpaceX has demonstrated a lot of agility with Starlink by quickly upgrading software to thwart attempts at disrupting the network. It remains unclear whether SpaceX could modify the Starlink network software to mitigate the effects of the Garant system. With Russian sources already alluding to potentially more potent Russian EW capability, the battle may ultimately evolve into a contest between Russian electronic warfare engineers and SpaceX software developers.

Indeed, the possibility exists of space warfare going beyond EW. If attempts at satellite jamming are repeatedly frustrated, Russia could eventually opt for the use of directed-energy systems or kinetic anti-satellite weapons against communication satellites supporting military operations.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

DRDO's LR-LACM Test Deserves More Attention Than It Is Getting

LR-LACM Test on June 15, 2026: Photo PIB

 The DRDO successfully flight-tested the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM) from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, off the coast of Odisha, on June 15, 2026, using a mobile articulated launcher.

The missile was last tested on November 12, 2024, during its maiden flight. That test was also conducted from a mobile articulated launcher.

During its maiden test, the missile followed the desired flight path using waypoint navigation and demonstrated its ability to perform various manoeuvres while flying at different altitudes and speeds.

The LR-LACM flies a terrain-hugging or sea-skimming profile to avoid radar detection. It can navigate using waypoints and modify its flight profile to avoid adversary air-defence zones, terrain features, and other obstacles.

The missile can execute precision strikes against static targets using an RF seeker for terminal homing, similar to the one developed for the BrahMos missile.

The DAC accorded approval for the acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force on July 2, 2020.

The LR-LACM is a derivative of the ITCM (Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile).

ITCM

The ITCM was a technology-demonstrator project, while the LR-LACM is intended for operational deployment.

The ITCM itself was derived from the Nirbhay missile. During DefExpo 2020, DRDO announced that it had completed and closed the Nirbhay capability-development project.

The ITCM featured a small turbofan engine named Manik, developed by GTRE, and an indigenously developed RF seeker for terminal guidance. The Nirbhay lacked a terminal seeker and was powered by a Russian turbofan engine.

The ITCM was last flight-tested successfully on April 17, 2024, with the Manik turbofan engine and all other subsystems, including the RF seeker. According to DRDO, the ITCM has a range of 1,000 km and carries a 300 kg warhead. It weighs 1,500 kg and is 6 metres long.

LR-LACM Test on November 12, 2024 Photo PIB

LR-LACM Features

The LR-LACM is dimensionally similar to the ITCM. However, it is believed to be significantly lighter, at around one tonne, and to have a longer range of up to 1,500 km. It is also likely capable of executing more complex flight profiles.

With a range of up to 1,500 km, the LR-LACM would allow India to hold high-value targets at risk deep inside adversary territory. Its nap-of-the-Earth profile and waypoint navigation capability would allow it to easily exploit gaps in the low level coverage of adversary radars. 

The LR-LACM is configured for launch from the ground using mobile articulated launchers and from frontline warships using the UVLM (Universal Vertical Launcher Module). Developed and patented by BrahMos Aerospace, the UVLM is already deployed on 30 Indian Navy warships for launching BrahMos missiles.

Since the DAC has also approved acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Air Force, it is likely that an air-launched variant of the missile is under development and could be tested in the near future.

Besides the LR-LACM, DRDO is developing another derivative of the ITCM—the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), which will be capable of launching from a standard 533 mm submarine torpedo tube.

SLCM

The SLCM (Submarine Launched Cruise Missile) will need to be shorter and lighter to make it compatible with torpedo-tube launch. Consequently, it is expected to feature a smaller 250 kg penetration-cum-blast or airburst warhead.

DRDO plans to initially flight-test the SLCM from a Russian-origin Sindhughosh-class (Kilo-class) submarine.

According to media reports, DRDO successfully validated submarine-launch capability in February 2023 during a developmental missile launch from an underwater platform. The missile tested covered a range of 402 km.

The test was reportedly aimed at validating critical underwater-launch processes, including wing deployment after surfacing and engine start during flight.

Looking Ahead

The operational deployment of the LR-LACM, which now appears to be only a matter of time, will represent a significant milestone in India's quest for missile self-reliance, signalling the maturation of DRDO's ability to develop and deploy indigenous cruise missiles capable of operating from multiple platforms.

In the near future, DRDO could further enhance the missile's penetration capability and lethality by equipping it with self-protection modules featuring radar jammers to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispensers for decoy submunitions—such as dipole reflectors and heat traps—to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight. The addition of optical sensors for navigation and target recognition could also make the missile more resilient against electronic warfare measures aimed at spoofing or jamming GNSS signals.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.