Decoding the Lethal Upgrade in Russia’s Latest Su-57 Deliveries

A Su-57 from the batch delivered on February 9, 2026

On February 9, 2026, Russia's UAC delivered a large batch of Su-57s which, according to a UAC press release, were “in a new technical configuration.”

“The aircraft have received upgraded onboard systems and a new weapons complex.”

According to a TASS report that quoted experts, one of the main changes in the modernized Su-57 aircraft is the upgraded 101KS onboard optical-electronic self-defense system.

The new 101KS has an infrared channel, believed to operate in the medium and long-wave ranges, in contrast to the system of the previous batches. 

101KS Atoll Electro-Optical (EO) System

The 101KS Atoll Electro-Optical (EO) system is designed primarily for complete situational awareness. The system additionally assists the pilot in operation of the aircraft at all stages. It is used for air-to-air and air-to-surface target engagement, piloting & landing, and as a defensive suite.

The 101KS is a passive sensor suite that emits no radiation - IR or RF - thus providing the Su-57 with increased stealth and survivability. 

The suite includes the 

1. 4 x 101KS-U Omnidirectional UV based MAWS (U/01 - Dorsal aft & Ventral aft; U/02 Either side behind cockpit)

2. 2 x 101KS-O: DIRCM Laser-based counter-measures against infrared missiles (Dorsal fore, Ventral behind cockpit)

3. 101KS-P: Opto-electronic sensor

4. 101KS-V: Omnidirectional IRST for airborne targets

5. 101KS-N: Targeting pod

IRST 101KS-V

IRST is installed atop the aircraft's nose, near its windscreen. Photo: UAC Russia

The Su-57 sports an advanced infrared search and track sensor in the traditional position on Russian fighters—installed atop the aircraft's nose, near its windscreen. The positioning adversely impacts front aspect stealth of the aircraft but the ability of IRST to passively engage stealth aircraft from increasingly greater distances makes up for the LO erosion.

101KS-V forward looking IRST

The fore sensor suite on the Su-57 with elements of the N036 AESA and Atoll EO System

101KS-O, 101KS-U

Like the F-22, the Su-57 has a number of missile launch detector apertures scattered around the aircraft but the Su-57 also has turrets that fire modulated laser beams at an incoming missile's seeker to blind it and throw it off course. The IRST, and DIRCM turrets are mounted dorsally behind the cockpit and ventrally under the cockpit. 

Upper and lower 101KS-O bubbles are visible in the photo at the top.

The 101KS-O turrets on the Su-57 duplicate the functionality of the 101KS-V Opto-electronic (IRST) unit placed ahead of the cockpit but additionally feature IR homing suppression laser to blind an attacking missile providing DIRCM.

The 101KS-O system consists of two laser-emitting turrets, with one placed behind the cockpit on the dorsal side, and the other beneath the cockpit on the ventral side.

The Su-57 is the first fighter in the world to feature a DIRCM. Hitherto, the system has only been used on transports and helicopters only, invariably placed on the ventral side in the past as defense against MANPADS. The use of DIRCM to blind an air-to-air missile is unprecedented.

101KS-O turret on display at MAKS 2019

101KS-O turret on display at MAKS 2019

The 101KS-U MAWS UV sensors (below) of the Su-57 Atoll detect approaching IR missiles and the 101KS-O DIRCM blinds their IR homing sensors with laser.

101KS-U MAWS sensors on the Su-57

101KS-P Thermal Imager

The 101KS-P high resolution thermal imager of the Su-57 Atoll is installed on the wing leading edge & provides low altitude piloting and landing at night

101KS-P Thermal Imager

101KS-N Targeting Pod

101KS-N Optical Pod

The 101KS-N is a multi-channel optical sighting system designed to detect, identify and engage ground targe. The pod features its own thermal stabilization system. 

Situational Awareness

According to First Deputy Igor KRET Nasenkov, the Su-57 features a smart skin that provides the pilot 360-deg situational awareness.

The term "smart skin" refers to the fact that many of the surface of the aircraft are versatile antenna systems that facilitate integrated use of all resources of the aircraft. 

S-71 Integration

Since the UAC press release talks of a new weapons complex, it is possible that the fresh batch of Su-57s delivered is capable of carrying the newly developed air-launched stealthy combat UAV designated S-71, a weapon first unveiled during Army 2024.

The S-71 is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction. Deploying and controlling the Su-57 would require an upgrade of onboard systems. 

The S-71 began captive-carry trials in April 2024 at Russia’s Flight Research Centre in Zhukovsky, with test flights involving the Su-57 fighter.

You can read more details about the S-71 at my Thumkar blog post here.

On January 17, 2026, it was reported that an S-71K “Carpet” for the first time demonstrated its effectiveness by successfully destroying the highly mobile M142 HIMARS multiple launch rocket system.

The cruise missile–drone hybrid has been developed by GosMKB Raduga JSC and can be used by 4++ generation multirole fighters, including the Su-35S, Su-30SM/SM2, as well as Su-34 NVO fighter-bombers.

Positive Indigenisation Lists, Negative Political Will - Is India Buying Western Weapons Unnecessarily?

V-BAT Drone. Image via Shield AI

ANI has recently reported that India and France are moving closer to a deal worth around €300 million for the procurement of additional SCALP long-range cruise missiles.

Doesn’t the import of SCALP missiles adversely impact the development and induction of the ITCM—Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile (Nirbhay)?

Under the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020 and subsequent Positive Indigenisation Lists (formerly called Negative Import Lists), the Ministry of Defence barred the import of long-range cruise missiles to support the Nirbhay programme.

We appear to be breaking our own Make-in-India rules to acquire weapons from Western nations, increasing our dependency on foreign vendors instead of reducing it.

If Atmanirbharta is a genuine quest, why isn’t the development of the ITCM being prioritised?

The ITCM Mystery

The ITCM has been under development since 2010. It is ironic that in 15 years we have not been able to develop a subsonic cruise missile, and yet we are confident of developing the AMCA, which is not even at the prototype stage, within 10 years.

However, ITCM was last successfully tested on April 18, 2024. During the test, all subsystems performed as per expectations.

The successful flight test also established the reliable performance of the indigenous propulsion system (Manik turbojet) developed by the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), Bengaluru.

Would it not make more sense to use the €300 million earmarked for the SCALP purchase to operationalise the ITCM as soon as possible, at least on the Su-30MKI? One cannot help but wonder if the additional purchase of SCALPs is a quid pro quo for the recent trade deal with the EU.

India, it appears, is bending over backwards to please Western nations despite being shabbily treated by the U.S.

Ignoring Russian Weapons

It appears that the Atmanirbharta paradigm applies only to Russian weapons. The IAF has projected a requirement for 2–3 interim stealth fighters. Russia has offered the Su-57 fighters, but India cannot acquire them because it could negatively impact the AMCA programme. (More likely, it is because we fear U.S. sanctions.)

Logically speaking, if AMCA is delivered as per the projected timeline and turns out to be better than the Su-57, then that would be the end of the Su-57—not just in India, but also in other possible Russian export markets.

With Russian weapons, which tend to be more cost-effective, we look a gift horse in the mouth. Western weapons, however, are treated like thoroughbreds even when they are actually overpriced mules.

Our desire to please the West now goes well beyond acquiring weapon systems that we cannot develop.

Take the case of drones, for example. By any logic, all types of drones should be on the Positive Indigenisation List. Where is the need to import drones? Surely, we have the time, talent, and technical know-how to develop our own.

So how does one explain India’s increasing dependence on U.S. and European companies for drones?

V-BAT Acquisition & Local Production

The recent tie-up between India’s JSW Defence and U.S. defence contractor Shield AI to locally manufacture the V-BAT Unmanned Aerial System in India for use by the Indian Army (IA) deserves scrutiny.

V-BAT is a very capable reconnaissance drone with around 12 hours of endurance. It can operate at altitudes of up to 20,000 feet and has a range of up to 180 km with a line-of-sight data link, which can be extended using SATCOM.

Besides its ability to navigate through GPS-denied environments, the drone stands out for its ability to take off and land vertically. Despite its large size, its VTOL capability allows it to operate from only a 12×12-foot clearing, making it deployable from jungle clearings or narrow Himalayan ridges.

V-BAT uses ducted-fan technology, which facilitates an improved maximum take-off weight to payload weight ratio.

V-BAT’s duct increases thrust by 80%+ at equivalent engine power, enabling take-off and landing with a single powerplant. It can fly for half a day or stop and hover for hours on end.

On the downside, the drone costs approximately $1 million per unit.

The IA has acquired V-BAT drones worth roughly $35 million (approximately ₹295 crore) under the emergency purchase provision. Now, JSW Defence is investing $90 million to set up production in Hyderabad.

To be useful to the IA, the drone would need to operate near the LoC or LAC. However, considering its large size, slow speed (167 km/h), and operating height of 20,000 ft, when operating close to the border the drone would always be vulnerable to adversary AD systems.

Notably, the drone is powered by Shield AI’s licensed Hivemind autonomy software. Hivemind AI allows the V-BAT to operate autonomously using machine vision in GPS-denied environments and during heavy electronic warfare (EW) jamming.

One should not expect Shield AI to part with the software’s source code.

The question here is: is the requirement for V-BAT capability compelling enough for the private-sector JSW to invest $90 million without firm orders? Or is there proverbially more to it than meets the eye?

Drone Racket

Many small Indian private-sector companies are now selling drones to the Indian Armed Forces. You might think the drones they are selling are indigenously developed. Think again!

Most of the drones with fancy Sanskrit names being sold to the Armed Forces (AFs) are not Indian-designed, developed, or manufactured, despite Atmanirbharta claims.

Chennai-based private company TUNGA Aerospace Industries was in the news recently for having tied up with Czech firm U&C UAS to supply drones to India’s armed forces. Disconcertingly, the drones proposed to be sold to the AFs are based on Ukrainian technology.

U&C UAS is marketing modified Ukrainian drones, including platforms derived from the Leleka and Bulava drone families.

Any ToT clause notwithstanding, Indian private-sector joint ventures with foreign OEMs will not lead to Indian-designed, developed, and manufactured products in the future. The JSW–Shield AI joint venture will continue peddling V-BAT upgrades and follow-on variants under Sanskrit names, just as TUNGA Aerospace will continue peddling Ukrainian drones.

HAL Details Roadmap for SJ-100 and Il-114-300 Regional Aircraft Production

The Chairman of Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), Devasri Kutti Sunil, revealed that HAL will initially lease several SJ-100 regional airliners from Russia to get acquainted with the maintenance, reliability, and ecosystem of the aircraft. Simultaneously, it will build infrastructure for construction.

Assembly in India will start in three years.

HAL estimates a total requirement of 200 SJ-100 aircraft and a larger number of Il-114-300 turboprop regional airliners.

HAL plans to set up engine assembly and a repair facility for the TV7-117ST-01 turboprop engine that powers the Il-114-300. It may also consider local manufacture of engine parts and the engine itself.

Russia is open to HAL’s aspirations, says Ekaterina Rukhlova, Head of the Civil Aviation Engine Sales Department at UEC.

The Il-114-300 has completed flight certification tests with TV7-117ST-01 engines. Engine prototypes have flown almost 3,000 hours during more than 400 flights.

The TV7-117ST-01 belongs to a family of engines built with the TV7-117SM as the base.

The TV7-117ST-01 has a takeoff power of up to 3,100 hp and, in comparison with the base engine (TV7-117SM), differs in design features and higher power in takeoff and cruise modes. The power plant includes a new high-thrust AV-112-114 propeller and a new ACS using a combined modernized engine control unit and a BARK-65SM propeller, providing a thrust of up to 4 tons.

Russia Moves to End Reliance on Chinese Chips for Su-57 and S-400 Systems

Gemini Generated Image

Microwave microchips for the Su-57 fighter and S-500 Prometheus air-defence systems are expected to be manufactured within Russia by the end of 2027.

The governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Denis Pasler, recently announced that an enterprise has begun designing and constructing the country’s first factory capable of serial production of microwave microchips across the full technological cycle.

According to Pasler, the planned production capacity of the facility will be up to 2,000 silicon wafers per year.

Microwave microchips are integrated circuits (ICs) designed to operate at microwave frequencies, ranging from roughly 300 MHz to 300 GHz. They are used in applications such as radar, satellite communications, unmanned systems, wireless networks, and high-speed data processing.

A common example is the Monolithic Microwave Integrated Circuit (MMIC), which integrates components such as transistors, resistors, and capacitors onto a single semiconductor substrate—typically gallium arsenide (GaAs) or silicon—to process microwave signals efficiently.

These chips handle ultrafast data and wireless signals in real time for tasks including signal decoding, radar tracking, and pattern recognition.

The Su-57’s N036 Byelka airborne radar is likely to rely on such microwave chips, as do the 96L6-CP radar of the S-350A Vityaz air-defence system and the 98L6 Yenisei radar used with the S-500 and S-400 systems.

Su-57 Byelka Radar

The N036 Byelka (“Squirrel”) is an advanced X-band Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar system developed by the Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design (NIIP) for the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57 fighter.

It serves as the aircraft’s primary fire-control radar, featuring a nose-mounted N036-1-01 array with approximately 1,514–1,526 gallium arsenide (GaAs) transmit/receive (T/R) modules. This is supplemented by two side-looking N036B-1-01 X-band arrays, each with around 358–404 T/R modules, providing an expanded azimuth coverage of up to ±135°. In addition, L-band arrays embedded in the wing leading edges support IFF and electronic-warfare functions.

The GaAs substrate offers high electron mobility, low noise, and efficient operation in dense electronic environments, although it lags behind gallium nitride (GaN) in power density and heat dissipation.

Key capabilities reportedly include detection ranges of up to 400 km against targets with a 1 m² radar cross-section, simultaneous tracking of 60 airborne and 30 ground targets, and engagement of up to 16 air and four surface targets. Air-to-air and air-to-ground modes can operate concurrently.

The system incorporates sensor fusion and additional rear-facing elements to provide near-360° coverage, enhancing situational awareness, resistance to jamming, and survivability in contested airspace.

S-400 / S-500 Yenisei Radar

The Yenisei radar is an advanced S-band AESA system developed primarily for the S-500 Prometey air-defence system.

It features a large AESA array—approximately 3 × 4 metres—based on gallium arsenide technology. The radar offers long detection ranges of up to 600 km, high resolution, precise tracking of both ballistic and aerodynamic targets, and strong resistance to electronic countermeasures.

Designed for continuous, long-duration operation, it also incorporates low-probability-of-intercept characteristics.

Although developed for the S-500, the Yenisei can be integrated with S-400 batteries as a multifunctional fire-control radar, improving missile guidance accuracy and overall system effectiveness in dense electronic-warfare environments.

Russia's Dependence on China

There is speculation that Russia is dependent on China for microchips and MMICs fitted on its high end systems. While there is likelihood that the speculation reflects reality, it is important to note that Russia produces MMICs domestically through firms like Mikropribor and Istok. However, the MMIC production has relied on imported components and machinery. It's possible that MMIC production was disrupted after the imposition of Western sanctions in 2022 limiting Russia's access to advanced semiconductors. 

It is likely that now at least some MMICs in the Su-57's N036 Byelka radar and S-400's associated radars (such as the 92N6E Grave Stone or integrable Yenisei) are sourced from or via China.

The evidence for this is circumstantial. For example, in 2023-2024, China supplied ~90% of Russia's microelectronics, including specialized chips for guidance, radar, and military applications.

However, since production at Mikropribor pivots around components sourced from the West, it is likely that China is being used primarily as a conduit for importing Western components that go into MMICs. 

For example, the S-400 system depends on foreign radar substrates (e.g., US-made RO4003C laminates) obtained via China/Hong Kong. 

Because of China's limited holding of S-400 system, it is unlikely that they are locally manufacturing major electronic components that go into the system. As such, China likely supplies to Russia other electronic material such as PCB laminates. 

It's important to note that the governor of Sverdlovsk Oblast, Denis Pasler announced that the new plant would be the "country’s first factory capable of serial production of microwave microchips across the full technological cycle."

Impact on India

India, which currently operates three S-400 systems, is likely to acquire at least ten eventually. Local manufacture of S-400 systems is also being considered.

Meanwhile, HAL is in advanced technical negotiations with Russia’s UAC for the local manufacture of the Su-57 stealth fighter.

Based on the analysis above, it is highly unlikely that IAF S-400 or Su-57 systems would be negatively impacted by Russia’s likely limited and transient dependence on Chinese electronic components.

Russia’s investment in full-cycle design and development of MMICs will ensure that India does not become dependent on China.

In addition, India already has design capabilities and ambitious plans to manufacture MMICs as part of its broader semiconductor push under the India Semiconductor Mission (ISM). Indian design plans reportedly include advanced 3 nm nodes.

MMIC manufacturing capability is also emerging through plans that include a US–India joint fab for GaN and SiC semiconductors by 2029.

Within a reasonable timeframe, India would be in a position to manufacture the electronic components required for the S-400 and Su-57 systems.

Why HAL’s Tie-Up with Russia’s Yakovlev Makes Sense

Yak-42 Photo Credit: Konstantin Nikiforov 

 

According to The Economic Times, Russian aerospace company and aircraft manufacturer Yakovlev has signed a preliminary agreement with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

Commenting on the development, Alexander Dolotovsky, Deputy General Director of Yakovlev, declined to share specific details but noted that the agreement marks the beginning of a significant collaboration.

HAL’s tie-up with Yakovlev may appear perplexing to many. The following background helps put it into perspective.

Historically, Yakovlev has developed both military and commercial aircraft. Military aircraft developed since its founding in 1930 include:

Yak-38 “Forger”: A VTOL, carrier-based fighter inducted in 1975, and the Soviet Navy’s first operational VTOL jet.

Yak-38 Forger Photo Credit: Wikipedia

Yak-130: A modern advanced jet trainer/light attack aircraft introduced in 2002. Developed jointly with Italy’s Aermacchi, the Yak-130 is a lead-in fighter trainer and has been widely exported.

On the commercial side, Yakovlev developed the Yak-40, the world’s first regional turbojet airliner, which entered service in 1966. This three-engine short-haul aircraft could carry 32 passengers and was certified to Western standards. Over 1,000 units were built, and the aircraft was widely exported.

The Yak-40 was followed by the Yak-42, a short-haul trijet airliner introduced in 1976 with seating for up to 120 passengers.

In recent months, Russian media and aviation outlets have reported that some Russian airlines are considering resuming operations of “mothballed” Soviet-era Yak-42 aircraft to cope with a severe shortage of airliners, following the grounding of Western-made aircraft due to sanctions.

Today, Yakovlev is actively involved in the development of both the MS-21 medium-haul airliner and the SJ-100 regional airliner.

As widely reported, on January 28, 2026, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and India’s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) signed a joint agreement governing cooperation in the production of the Superjet 100 (SJ-100) in India. Under this agreement, UAC will grant HAL a license to manufacture and sell the SJ-100, including components, parts, and spare parts required for maintenance and repair.

The Superjet Design Bureau that developed the SJ-100 was integrated into Yakovlev in 2020.

Yakovlev is also likely overseeing the substitution of imported components with domestic analogues for both the MS-21 and SJ-100. Consequently, Yakovlev’s technical and programmatic inputs will be critical to the success of HAL’s local production efforts.

IAF Signals Hypersonic Ambitions With IISc-Led Propulsion Challenge

A Gemini rendition of the launch of a S-200 with a DMRJ powered curise missile

The Indian Air Force on January 29, 2026 signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA)  with the Foundation for Science Innovation and Development (FSID), IISc Bengaluru to indigenously develop an advanced high-speed air-breathing propulsion system.

Announcing the MoA, the IAF's official X handle stated that the MoA "underscores IAF’s commitment towards Atmanirbharta by development of high-speed flight systems with dual-use capabilities."

Copies of documents and diagrams posted on social media and associated with the MoA indicate that the proposed “advanced high-speed air-breathing propulsion system” is a dual-mode ramjet/scramjet engine (DMRJ), intended for use in propelling missiles or combat aircraft.

DRDO has already developed ramjet and scramjet engines for missiles. The former operate efficiently at high supersonic speeds and the latter operate efficiently through hypersonic speeds. 

DMRJ Engines Explained

In a ramjet engine the air entering the engine is slowed to subsonic speed and consequently compressed before combustion. In a scramjet engine, the air is similarly slowed down and compressed but remains supersonic throughout the combustor. 

Ramjet engines operate efficiently roughly from Mach 3 to Mach 6. Scramjet engines are needed for speeds beyond Mach 6–7

DMRJ, which combines ramjet and scramjet propulsion, can operate efficiently across a very wide supersonic to hypersonic speed envelope by switching how combustion occurs inside the engine.

DMRJ Development Status

The DMRJ concept has been tested but never operationalised.

Russia reportedly tested a hydrogen-fueled dual-mode scramjet  developed by the Central Institute of Aviation Motors (CIAM) in the 1990s under (Kholod Project). 

It modified a 5V28 missile from the S-200 long-range air defence system, replacing the warhead and guidance system with a DMRJ and its liquid hydrogen fuel tank.

To test a DMRJ, it first has to be accelerated to high supersonic speeds that can facilitate ramjet light-up. The S-200 is a heavy missile with a launch weight exceeding 7,000 kg and substantial payload capacity. The S-200’s solid boosters and liquid-fueled sustainer were well suited to accelerating the payload to hypersonic velocities. This modified S-200 served as a cost-effective, readily available booster, leveraging existing infrastructure.

Boosted to high speeds by the missile’s liquid rocket motor, the DMRJ successfully transitioned from ramjet propulsion to scramjet propulsion, achieving speeds over Mach 6.4, with scramjet mode sustained for 77 seconds across seven flight tests (1991–1998).

Russia used the data gathered from these tests to develop the 3M22 Zircon, which can achieve speeds near Mach 8. However, the Zircon uses a scramjet engine not a DMRJ. It is boosted to hypersonic speed directly by its solid-propellant rocket booster. 

Similarly, DRDO’s Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) and its follow-up system under development, the Extended Trajectory–Long Distance Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM), both use scramjet propulsion, not DMRJ.

DMRJ Limitation

A notable limitation of a DMRJ is its inability to operate from zero airspeed. It needs to be accelerated to a high airspeed that can generate air compression due to airflow path constriction. To overcome this limitation, a dual-mode ramjet (DMRJ) can be paired with a rocket booster when used in a hypersonic cruise missile. 

For use in a combat aircraft, the DMRJ is paired with a turbine engine in what is called a Turbine-Based Combined Cycle (TBCC) architecture.

In a TBCC-powered combat aircraft, at speeds below ~Mach 2.5 to 5, a turbofan or turbojet provides thrust. The turbine is then shut down and bypassed, and the DMRJ takes over propulsion.

Combining a turbine with a DMRJ allows a combat aircraft to take off conventionally using a turbine engine and then accelerate all the way to hypersonic speeds.

Using TBCC propulsion, a combat aircraft can take off and loiter at subsonic cruise. When desired, it can accelerate to supersonic speeds using its turbine engine and then switch to DMRJ propulsion for sustained hypersonic cruise. Such a flight profile is impossible with a pure DMRJ + rocket booster combination.

TBCC Challenges

Ramjets, scramjets, and DMRJs are conceptually and mechanically relatively simple to build, as they involve no moving parts. However, the materials and techniques required to sustain supersonic and hypersonic combustion do pose significant challenges.

While a DMRJ can be combined with a turbine engine in a TBCC configuration, the engineering challenges are extremely complex, and the concept remains experimental.

The air flowing into a turbine engine has to be subsonic and at relatively low temperatures, whereas the airflow in a DMRJ has to be supersonic and at very high temperatures.

As such, the two engines share the inlet and nozzle, but not the combustor.

Smoothly switching from turbine to ramjet and then to scramjet operation is a particularly major challenge. Any pressure mismatch can cause the engine to fail to start or experience flameout.

Conclusion

As already noted, the engineering challenges of building a reliable ramjet that can transition to scramjet mode within the form factor of a compact missile fare immense.

While standalone scramjet and ramjet missiles exist or are being developed, true DMRJ designs remain in research and flight test demonstration programs rather than fielded systems

As already noted, there are no operational missiles powered by DMRJ propulsion, let alone the even more complex TBCC architecture.

Viewed in this light, the IAF’s MoA with IISc is clearly aimed at funding long-term research. This investment is unlikely to yield operational benefits for the IAF for at least a decade.

IISc has actively participated in the HSTDV programme, which successfully met its stated objectives. It therefore possesses the experience and technical depth required to undertake the development of DMRJ propulsion, and eventually progress to TBCC systems.

Supporting long-term technology development is, without doubt, a sound approach for the IAF.

However, there also appears to be a subtle but important message in the IAF’s tie-up with IISc:

While the IAF is willing to invest in future technologies, its immediate operational requirements cannot wait. These must be met through fast-paced procurement, preferably from domestic OEMs, but where necessary through foreign partnerships that guarantee continuity of support and supply.