The IAF's Healthy Mix - Is it Healthy Enough?

Missing from the healthy force mix projected by the CAS

 During his interaction with the press ahead of Air Force Day on October 8, 2026, the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) stated that, in the near future, the Indian Air Force would have a “healthy mix” of LCA Tejas Mk 1A, LCA Mk 2, the French Rafale and the indigenous fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).

On the face of it, there is little to quarrel with what the CAS stated. These aircraft will undoubtedly constitute important elements of the IAF's future fighter fleet. However, there are some infirmities in the projection that are difficult to overlook.

How near is the “near future”?

The first question is what the CAS meant by the “near future”.

If the statement is intended to describe the fighter fleet that the IAF will field over the next decade or so, the mix is understandable. But if it is a projection of the force structure extending into the 2040s—and beyond—it raises a more fundamental question.

How far into the future was the CAS extrapolating current procurement plans to arrive at the projected “healthy mix”?

Based on past record of Indian fighter aircraft development projects, I would think at least 15 years from now, well into the 2040s.

By then, Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2, Rafale and AMCA could indeed form the backbone of the IAF's manned combat-aircraft fleet. But describing that combination alone as a “healthy mix” would ignore a major transformation that is already underway in air warfare.

The manned fighter is no longer the whole equation

There is little doubt that the IAF will continue to depend predominantly on the 4th-generation fighters named by the CAS, quite possibly for the next 20 to 30 years. Fighter aircraft have long service lives, and India's continuing dependence on legacy and contemporary 4th-generation platforms is therefore likely to persist well into the 2040s and perhaps beyond.

But the fighter force of the 2040s cannot be assessed merely by counting manned fighters across different generations.

The changing character of air warfare will demand a mix of manned and unmanned platforms, with different levels of survivability, autonomy and weapons heft.

This is particularly important because the most dangerous missions in a future conflict are likely to involve penetrating increasingly dense and sophisticated air-defence networks. A manned 4th-generation fighter, however capable, is not necessarily the most appropriate platform for every such mission.

The unmanned component

The IAF's future force structure will therefore need an increasing proportion of unmanned combat aircraft.

At one end of the spectrum would be relatively inexpensive unmanned systems able to perform reconnaissance, electronic warfare, decoy and weapons-truck functions. At another would be sophisticated unmanned combat aircraft capable of operating alongside manned fighters as loyal wingmen.

The latter could substantially increase the effectiveness of a manned fighter formation. An unmanned aircraft could carry additional weapons, extend the formation's sensor coverage, perform electronic attack or act as a decoy, while exposing no pilot to the risk of a mission in heavily defended airspace.

There is also an important economic dimension. An unmanned platform does not necessarily have to replicate the capabilities, complexity or cost of a manned fighter. A future air force could therefore field a much larger number of expendable or attritable unmanned combat aircraft than it could afford to field manned fighters.

This would fundamentally alter the arithmetic of air combat.

Why describe only the present procurement mix?

The “healthy mix” referred to by the CAS was therefore, in my view, probably intended primarily for mainstream media consumption.

That is not necessarily a criticism of the CAS. Mainstream reporting tends to operate at shallow depths and gravitates towards readily understood narratives. In India's case, the narrative of Atmanirbharta is particularly attractive.

Tejas Mk 1A, Tejas Mk 2 and AMCA fit neatly into that narrative, while Rafale provides the foreign component of the mix.

But the full spectrum of capabilities that the IAF will require in the 2040s is considerably more complicated.

It would include manned 4th-generation fighters, 4.5-generation fighters, 5th-generation VLO aircraft and an expanding family of unmanned combat aircraft ranging from relatively inexpensive attritable systems to sophisticated loyal wingmen.

The uncomfortable technological reality

I suspect that the IAF leadership understands this reality.

India's indigenous technological capability in unmanned combat aircraft is still well short of what would be required to develop and field the full range of systems that a future air force will need. The problem is not simply the airframe. Autonomous operation, artificial intelligence, manned-unmanned teaming, secure communications, distributed sensing, electronic warfare and the ability to operate in a heavily contested electromagnetic environment all present formidable challenges.

MoD bureaucrats are unlikely to be unaware of these limitations either.

Under the circumstances, articulating the full range of what a truly “healthy mix” would entail would perhaps serve little purpose in a public interaction with the media.

But that does not make the issue any less important.

The real challenge

The real challenge is not recognising that India needs a mix of manned and unmanned combat aircraft. It is developing the technologies and industrial ecosystem needed to field them in meaningful numbers.

The IAF of the 2040s will almost certainly still contain large numbers of 4th-generation fighters. There is nothing inherently wrong with that. The question is what surrounds them.

If the future force consists predominantly of today's manned fighter concepts, supplemented by a relatively small number of AMCA aircraft, it may represent a healthy mix of India's current procurement programmes.

It may not, however, be a healthy mix for the wars India could have to fight in the 2040s and beyond.

The distinction is important.

A force structure should not be called “healthy” merely because it contains a balanced selection of the aircraft that India is capable of building or procuring today. It should be judged against the operational environment in which that force will actually have to fight.

Rostec Reveals a Significant New Su-57 Capability Focused on MUM-T

 Rostec, in a statement on September 16, 2026, revealed that for its ferry flight to the recent El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt, the Russian Su-57E carried drop tanks in its internal weapons bay.

This appears to be the first time Rostec has publicly confirmed that the Su-57 can carry auxiliary fuel tanks inside its weapons bays. Until now, extra range was associated with external drop tanks. The El Alamein ferry is therefore the first official example of internal tank carriage on the type.

The stealth fighter completed the ferry with just one intermediate landing and, after that, still had enough fuel for another 1,000 km. That was enough to carry out a demonstration flight the next day.

Su-57 Internal Weapons Bays

The Su-57 has four internal weapons bays: two large tandem main bays in the fuselage between the engines (one forward, one aft). These typically carry four medium- or long-range missiles such as the R-77M, or larger weapons such as the R-37M or Kh-69. It also has two smaller side bays at the wing roots. Each side bay is designed for one short-range infrared missile (R-74M2).

It is highly likely that the Su-57 can carry drop tanks in one or both tandem main bays. In other words, the aircraft could carry a mix of weapons and drop tanks.

Standout MUM-T Capability

Internal carriage of fuel would not only extend its ferry range but also its combat radius. Most of all, it would greatly enhance its MUM-T endurance. Operating as a drone mothership, it could remain well clear of adversary air defenses while carrying a smaller air-to-air missile load.

Neither the F-35 Lightning II nor the F-22 Raptor can carry drop tanks in their internal weapons bays.

The F-35’s combat radius is similar to the Su-57’s, but its combat load is smaller. With similar combat loads, a Su-57 carrying some fuel internally would have a significantly longer combat range.

The F-22’s combat radius is significantly shorter than the F-35’s.

F-22,F-35 Weapons Bays

The Raptor’s three internal bays are for weapons only—typically six AIM-120s in the main ventral bay (or two 1,000 lb JDAMs plus missiles), plus two AIM-9s in the side bays.

The Lightning II has two internal bays sized and configured specifically for weapons—typically two 2,000 lb-class bombs plus AIM-120s (or more missiles with the Sidekick adapter), for a total internal payload of about 5,700 lb while remaining in a low-observable configuration.

Dan-T: Russia’s New Loitering Munition Raises More Questions Than Answers

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

The world premiere of the Dan-T loitering munition by Rostec at the El Alamein International Airshow 2026 has drawn considerable interest. Some would say it has cleared the air around a new Russian weapon system that has demonstrated an uncanny ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defences. Others would contend that it has only added to the confusion surrounding the weapon's actual capabilities.

In its statement, Rostec says:

The “Dan-T” munition operates on the “fire-and-forget” principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters.  

 

The product is equipped with a small-sized jet engine and can hit targets at a distance of hundreds of kilometres.  

 

The “Dan-T” has a special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems.  

 

The high effectiveness of the loitering munition has been confirmed by hundreds of successful launches against enemy targets in the special military operation zone.

Rostec's description of the weapon as “fire-and-forget” would imply that it is a cruise-missile-like weapon designed to strike a pre-programmed target based on coordinates or optical imagery. The question that arises, therefore, is: how then is it a loitering munition?

And what exactly is the “special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems”?

The weapon does not appear to feature an optical aperture for an infrared or TV seeker, making it unlikely that it is capable of machine-vision-based terminal navigation.

Under the circumstances, its ability to bypass enemy air-defence systems may derive from a combination of low-observable characteristics—including its small size and low radar cross-section—and the use of 12- or 16-channel jam-resistant satellite navigation.

Dan-T Antecedents

The Dan-T is reportedly derived from the Dan-M target drone, which was first operationally tested for combat use in May 2025.

The Dan-M's reported flight-performance capabilities include a cruise altitude of 50 to 9,000 metres, a cruise speed of 300 to 750 km/h and an endurance of approximately 70 minutes. Its take-off weight is 350 kg.

Dan-M History

The existence of the Dan-M was first publicly reported in August 2004.

The Dan-M was developed from the Dan target drone, designed for air-defence training and testing, which first flew in 1993.

The Dan-M programme aimed to provide greater endurance and range, with production reportedly expected around 2005. Later public reporting on a further-updated Dan-M, featuring a new engine and avionics, appeared around 2020.

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

Stealth Characteristics

All three Dan variants share essentially the same aerodynamic layout.

The differences appear to be internal and mission-related rather than the result of a fundamental redesign of the airframe.

While the Dan and Dan-M were target drones that likely carried a Luneberg lens to modify their radar signatures, the Dan-T does not appear to have a Luneberg lens. Another significant difference is that the Dan and Dan-M were designed for parachute recovery, whereas the Dan-T is an OWA (one-way attack) drone.

Banderol Similarity

The Banderol S8000, a jet-powered cruise-missile-like drone, looks remarkably similar to the Dan-T. Russia has been using the Banderol launched from its Orion MALE drone extensively in its ongoing systematic campaign against Ukraine's logistics, weapons-manufacturing, energy and export infrastructure.

However, while the Banderol is attributed to Kronstadt, which also developed the Orion drone, the Dan-T is believed to be an upgrade of the Dan-M target drone.

Banderols usually cruise at low altitudes, particularly when routed over the sea for strikes on targets in Odesa, avoiding radar detection right up to the moment they pop up to gain altitude and strike the target at an angle best suited for maximum damage.

The use of composites, besides stealth shaping and small size, adds to the low observability of the weapon, reducing detection range.

Launch-Platform Versatility

The use of a helicopter as a launch platform makes the weapon particularly versatile. Air launch increases the drone's effective range, while helicopter carriage allows it to be launched without the early warning that could accompany the radar detection of a fighter aircraft.

It is likely that the drone is programmed to operate mostly outside the engagement envelope of Ukraine's MANPADS and SHORAD systems.

By leveraging the Dan-T's superior flight performance, Russia could compel Ukraine to engage these drones with medium-range air-defence systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and SAMP/T. Not only are these systems available to the AFU in limited numbers, but their missile stocks are also scarce—both in Ukraine and among their original manufacturers.

Additionally, despite its improved performance, the Dan-M is likely to be a relatively affordable platform. Its unit cost is probably considerably lower than that of a medium-range air-defence missile.

By forcing Ukraine to expend its limited and expensive interceptor stocks against comparatively inexpensive drones, Russia could further erode the country's already strained air-defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The Banderol is known to be inexpensive, giving Russia the ability to ramp up production of the missile relatively easily. In mid-August 2026, HUR (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) told Militarnyi that Russia can produce up to about 80 S8000 Banderol missiles per month. Plants are described as working three shifts.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, stated in July that Russia’s planned rate for 2026 was 120 per month (roughly four a day if fully used). Later, in August, Beskrestnov said Moscow was trying to raise jet-powered munition output and that Banderol production could be pushed toward 300–400 per month.

The increased use of the Banderol bears testimony to its cost-effectiveness, if not its sophistication. Assuming that the Banderol and the Dan-T are similar weapons, if not the same weapons, Russia's El Alamein pitch for the sale of the missile could have many takers.

Russia’s Coca-Cola Strike: Retaliation, Deterrence or Coincidence?

During the past year or so, the US and its Western allies have increasingly become directly involved in Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia, including through the provision of targeting, intelligence and navigation-related information for Ukrainian long-range strike systems.

Russia now appears to be responding in kind by striking US and Western commercial interests in Ukraine. The apparent objectives are twofold: retaliation for Western involvement in attacks on Russian commercial and economic interests, and deterrence of further Western investment in Ukraine.

On September 3, Russian drones struck the Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine plant in Velyka Dymerka, in Kyiv region. The facility is Coca-Cola's only production site in Ukraine and one of Europe's larger bottling plants.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the strike as “a clear Russian signal to America,” arguing that Russia could not be unaware that it was striking an American-owned facility. 

In its account of the September 3 strikes, the Russian MoD did not specifically identify the Coca-Cola facility. Instead, it broadly claimed to have struck “enterprises of the military-industrial and fuel-energy complexes” involved in producing missiles, drones and components, supplying fuel to Ukrainian forces, and logistics facilities allegedly handling dual-use goods and UAV components.

Reports from Ukraine said a drone struck warehouses containing finished products, causing a large fire. No casualties were reported.

The Russian account therefore leaves the purpose of the Coca-Cola strike deliberately ambiguous. If the facility was intentionally selected because it belongs to an American company, the MoD's broader description provides Moscow with plausible deniability.

Coca-Cola and the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine said the company was assessing the damage with Ukrainian authorities and that employee safety remained the priority.

Not the First

The September 3 strike was not the first Russian attack on US commercial interests in Ukraine. A May New York Times investigation documented Russian strikes since mid-2025 on facilities linked to Coca-Cola, Cargill, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Flex and Bunge.

Representatives of several companies told visiting US senators that they believed the attacks were deliberate. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said the businesses believed they were being targeted intentionally. Andy Hunder of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine argued that Russia was attempting to deter further American investment.

There is, however, another plausible explanation. Some Ukrainian business figures and observers believe the attacks are part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukraine's industrial and logistical infrastructure, with the nationality of the company being incidental. In that interpretation, US companies are being hit because their facilities happen to be part of Ukraine's economic infrastructure.

Zelenskyy's “a clear Russian signal to America” characterisation could well have been a "cheeky" interpretation as it could well be possible that Ukrainian forces were using Coca Cola warehouses for military purposes thinking that Russia would not dare to strike them. 

The most plausible explanation may be that both motives are operating simultaneously: Russia is attempting to weaken Ukraine's economy while also signalling to Washington and other Western capitals that their commercial assets in Ukraine are not immune from the consequences of Western involvement in the war.

The Coca-Cola plant's highly visible American branding would have made it an especially potent symbolic target.

At the same time, the use of plausible deniability is important. There is no publicly available evidence establishing conclusively that Russia deliberately selected the Coca-Cola plant because it was American-owned. The strike can therefore be explained as an attack on Ukrainian economic infrastructure, even if its selection was in fact deliberate.

US Reaction

The US government has so far not publicly reacted to the September 3 Coca-Cola strike. Earlier in 2026, Washington's response to similar incidents was muted; a State Department spokesperson said the US had urged both sides to refrain from targeting American business interests.

Some US lawmakers and analysts have criticised this posture, arguing that Washington's restraint could establish a precedent in which American commercial assets in a war zone can be struck with little consequence.

But a more belligerent US response would carry its own problem: Washington would have to confront, rather than brush under the carpet, the extent of US involvement in enabling Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia.

Doing so could turn attacks on American commercial interests from an uncomfortable side-effect of the war into a direct US-Russia confrontation—and escalate an already dangerous conflict considerably further.

Ukraine Struggles to Develop Interceptor for Russia’s Faster Jet Gerans

 

Ukraine has yet to develop a reliable, scalable interceptor drone capable of engaging Russia’s increasingly fast jet-powered Geran attack drones, according to Serhiy Beskrestnov, better known by his callsign “Flash,” a Ukrainian technology specialist and adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It was recently reported that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has field tested and accepted the first jet interceptor drone Alexa Spatium, which is designed to combat kamikaze jet drones “Geran‑3”, “Geran‑4” and “Geran‑5”. However, the key performance characteristics of the interceptor, such as maximum speed, range and operational ceiling, were not disclosed making it difficult to assess the veracity of the Ukrainian claim.

Early in August, the UV Military Cluster company told Militarnyi that the company had created a drone named "Crazy" that will start shooting down Russian drones later in August. 

The vertical takeoff and landing drone is capable of carrying a payload weighing up to 0.5 kg. Its max flight range is 45 km, tactical flight range is 25 km and maximum endurance is 30 minutes. Its operational altitude can vary from 200 m to 10,000 m. A digital or analog camera can be installed on board, as well as thermal imaging or twilight optics.

The company highlighted the drone's thoughtful design, aerodynamic profile and balanced center of mass. The battery passes through the body, which allows you to evenly distribute the weight and avoid overloading the front of the drone.

The drone is available in two variants: a high-speed variant without wings that accelerates to 365 km/h and a winged variant that achieves 310 km/h.

Performance Shortfalls

In a recent interview with Radio NV, Beskrestnov acknowledged that Ukrainian manufacturers had failed to deliver the jet-drone interceptors they had promised during the winter of 2025–26. Some manufacturers had claimed that such systems would be available within “a few weeks,” but subsequent trials reportedly demonstrated that the interceptor drones lacked both the speed and technical characteristics required to reliably engage the faster Russian drones.

The problem is significant because Russia appears to be progressively increasing the speed and sophistication of its attack drones. The Geran-3 is reported to reach around 300–330 km/h, while the Geran-4 can reach approximately 450–500 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres. The newer Geran-5 is reported to be capable of approximately 600 km/h, placing it firmly in the performance class of a small cruise missile. The Banderol, a related Russian drone-missile, is also reported to fly at around 500–600 km/h, with a range of up to 500 km and a warhead of approximately 114–150 kg.

The implications for interception are considerable. Against a target travelling at 500–600 km/h, an interceptor needs not merely to match the target's speed but to have a substantial speed advantage to close the distance and manoeuvre for an engagement. This puts the desirable performance of an interceptor at roughly 600 km/h or more—well beyond the capabilities of many of the inexpensive interceptor drones currently being deployed by Ukraine. The 360 km/h speed capability of the "Crazy" drone referred to above illustrates the growing performance gap.

This creates a difficult technological and economic problem. A cheap interceptor drone is attractive for countering inexpensive mass-produced attack drones, but as the target becomes faster, the interceptor increasingly begins to require the performance characteristics—and consequently the cost and complexity—of a conventional aircraft.

Ukraine's inability to field a sufficiently capable interceptor at scale means that it currently has to rely on more expensive conventional air-defence methods. Fighter aircraft, predominantly F-16s, can engage the faster Russian drones with air-to-air missiles, while Ukrainian ground forces use MANPADS against targets within their engagement envelope.

Neither method, however, provides an obvious low-cost solution for dealing with large numbers of high-speed attack drones.

The issue is becoming particularly important as Russia expands the use of jet-powered variants of the Geran family. Unlike the relatively slow piston-powered Gerans that can be engaged by a wider range of air-defence systems, the higher speed of the jet-powered variants sharply reduces the time available for detection, tracking and interception.

The failure of Ukraine's promised interceptor programmes to produce a working system several months after the original deadlines therefore represents more than a development delay. It highlights the technological challenge involved in creating an inexpensive countermeasure capable of keeping pace with the rapid evolution of Russia's attack-drone fleet.

Russia's Expanded Use of Jet Drones

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the production volume of Geran-4/5 jet drones now exceeds the production of Geran-2 

As of March 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Russia produced about 5500 drones per month. As of August, the Main Intelligence Directorate, estimates the Russian industry produces about 3 thousand Geran-4/5 kamikaze drones and about 2.8 thousand Geran-2 attack drones every month.

Jet drone operational usage has gradually risen since early 2026. During the whole of 2025, Russian forces used 180 jet drones. In 2026, by the beginning of June, Russian forces had launched 1400 jet drones. 

In July, Russian forces used five times more jet UAVs than in June. During some attacks, two-thirds of the drones used were jet powered. 

Russian state media has also claimed that the jet-powered drones are being employed against higher-value targets.

RIA Novosti has reported that Russian forces are using jet drones and other precision weapons against decision-making centres, command posts and enterprises allegedly being used in cooperation with NATO specialists, both in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine.

The emerging contest is therefore not simply one of producing more drones. It is becoming a race between increasingly sophisticated attack drones and increasingly capable—and ideally inexpensive—interceptors.

For Ukraine, Beskrestnov's admission suggests that the interceptor side of that race has so far failed to keep pace.

Black Sea Passivity Continues to Enfeeble and Embarrass Russia

 

Photo via Military Informant

Ukraine's Combined on Russian BSF

New Western satellite imagery provides confirmation that the Ukrainian jet drone and missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) on the night of August 12 likely caused serious damage to top-of-the-line warships — Project 11356R frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov — in Novorossiysk Bay.

The large-scale combined attack was carried out using Neptune anti-ship missiles, Palianytsia jet-powered strike drones, and unmanned surface vessels.

Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov are both key Kalibr cruise-missile carriers, equipped with eight vertical launch cells each. The imagery shows damage to the UKSK 3S14 area housing the Kalibr cruise missiles.

Admiral Essen shows signs of fire resulting from a drone strike on the UKSK cells. On Admiral Makarov, a breach in the bow section of the upper deck, to the left of the location of the Kalibr cruise missiles, is evident.

Military Informant states that "In addition, there are suspicions that the satellite communication station 'Centaur-NM1' and the detection radar 'Pozitiv-M1.2', located on the superstructure closer to the stern, were damaged."

This marked the third time in 2026 that both frigates had been damaged. Ironically, Russia relocated its Black Sea Fleet warships from Sevastopol to a "safe" harbor at Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai. Also, Admiral Makarov, which became the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet after the loss of the guided-missile cruiser Moskva in a Neptune anti-ship missile attack, has now sustained damage.

Ukrainian sources have additionally claimed damage to a Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship and the Project 22160 patrol ship Vasily Bykov, air-defence assets (including a 30N6E radar from an S-300 system), port infrastructure, and oil facilities at the Sheskharis terminal.

Though satellite imagery confirms damage to the Black Sea Fleet warships, it does not reveal the extent of the damage. It could well be largely superficial. In the worst-case scenario, the ships will require lengthy dockyard repairs.

Perplexing BSF Posture

It's difficult to see merit in the current posture of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. While it makes sense to relocate fleet warships at a greater distance from Ukrainian drone and missile launch pads, it is difficult to understand why the warships should passively remain in harbor, waiting to be struck.

It's possible that Ukraine is using containers on commercial shipping to launch missile and drone attacks, reducing time of flight and providing greater flexibility with attack vectors. If that is true, keeping warships docked makes even less sense because bunching targets facilitates combined attacks designed to overwhelm defences.

News Roundup: Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained, China Develops AI-Based Counter Stealth IR Seeker

Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained

The Ministry of Defence on Monday signed a contract with GA-ASI to lease two MQ-9B SeaGuardian High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for the Indian Navy for a period of 30 months.

The confusing lease needs to be put in the correct perspective.

Earlier, on October 15, 2024, India finalised a deal with the United States to acquire 31 MQ-9B Predator drones.

Of the 31 MQ-9B Predators contracted for, 15 were earmarked for the Indian Navy and eight each for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.

The deal includes setting up an MRO facility for the General Atomics-manufactured drones in the country and a separate follow-up technology-transfer deal.

India has not yet received any of the 31 MQ-9Bs under the October 2024 purchase contract. The first deliveries are currently scheduled for 2029.

In an interview published in early 2026, Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi was asked when the Navy could expect the first of its 15 MQ-9 SeaGuardians. His answer was:

“Delivery of first two RPAs ... are scheduled to commence wef Q1/2029.”

Possible reasons for the stretched delivery timeline likely include the need to produce the sensors and weapons systems ordered by the three Indian services, as well as the equipment required to set up the MRO facilities in India.

US MQ-9 Reaper Losses

The US has reportedly lost 45 MQ-9A Reaper RPAs in its ongoing conflict with Iran. The MQ-9A designation is used for variants operated by the US, while the MQ-9B designation is used for export variants variously configured to meet individual customer requirements.

It is conceivable that the reported attrition, if true, could further stretch the delivery timeline to India because GA-ASI would need to divert manufacturing capacity, components, engines, sensors and skilled manpower to make up for the losses.

Earlier Lease

In November 2020, The ToI reported that India had inducted two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for surveillance missions after acquiring them on a one-year lease from US firm General Atomics. The lease was later extended.

Based at Naval Air Station INS Rajali at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu, the two drones were to be used for long-range ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

In September 2024, the IN lost one of the two MQ-9s it had leased following a technical failure that resulted in a forced ditching.

The two additional MQ-9Bs contracted for lease would augment the surveillance capabilities of the IN. 

China Develops AI-Based IR Seeker That Could Strip F-22, F-35 of Their Stealth Cloak

Chinese researchers have developed a lightweight IR missile seeker that uses AI to recognize the relatively weak exhaust signature patterns of US F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, even in the presence of IR countermeasures such as flares.

Lab tests showed recognition accuracy of more than 90% for simulated targets.