Pinaka LRGR: In-Flight Manoeuvring and Longer-Range Secret Revealed!

Pinaka LRGR Test on July 8, 2026. PIB Photo

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) successfully flight-tested the Pinaka Long Range Guided Rocket (LRGR) at the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur, on July 8, 2026.

According to the official statement,

“The rocket was tested for a user-defined minimum range of 60 km. Demonstrating all in-flight manoeuvres as planned, the LRGR impacted the target with textbook precision, exactly following the predicted trajectory.”

Notably,

“The rocket was launched from the in-service Pinaka launcher, demonstrating its versatility and providing launch capability for Pinaka variants of different ranges from the same launcher.”

Earlier Test

Earlier, in its maiden test on December 29, 2025, at the Integrated Test Range, Chandipur, the LRGR was tested for its maximum range of 120 km and its in-flight manoeuvring capability. The PIB press release covering the launch stated that “the LRGR impacted the target with textbook precision.”

DAC Clearance

On the same day, December 29, 2025, the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), chaired by Raksha Mantri Rajnath Singh, accorded Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) for the procurement of LRGR for the Pinaka Multiple Launch Rocket System (MRLS). According to the PIB press release, the LRGR “will enhance the range and accuracy of Pinaka MRLS for effective engagement of high-value targets.”

In January 2025, the Indian Army had reportedly given DRDO an unofficial go-ahead to develop the 120 km-range LRGR for the Pinaka MRLS, as well as a 300 km-range rocket. With a 300 km-range rocket, a future Pinaka variant would transition from a classical rocket artillery system into a quasi-tactical strike system.

The Pinaka MRLS equipped with the LRGR is generally referred to as the Pinaka Mk.3.

Pinaka LRGR

The Pinaka LRGR uses a combination of Inertial Navigation System (INS) based on Ring Laser Gyro technology and multiple GNSS inputs for navigation. Its reported Circular Error Probable (CEP) is less than 10 metres, representing a substantial improvement in accuracy over earlier Pinaka variants.

Its in-flight manoeuvring capability is likely limited to trajectory shaping and the ability to follow preprogrammed flight paths. This is not comparable to the aggressive evasive manoeuvres associated with cruise missiles or hypersonic glide vehicles. Instead, the rocket likely uses controlled aerodynamic adjustments during flight to refine its ballistic trajectory. Such manoeuvring could allow rockets in a salvo to approach the target from different angles and/or arrive almost simultaneously despite staggered launch intervals.

The LRGR’s extended range is achieved through a combination of factors. Although it can be launched from the existing Pinaka launcher, the LRGR itself is understood to use a larger-diameter rocket body, an upgraded rocket motor, a lighter composite casing, and an aerodynamically refined shape that reduces drag and improves glide efficiency during the terminal phase of flight. Together, these features enable the rocket to reach targets at ranges of up to 120 km.

Tornado-S Comparison

For comparison, the Tornado-S is one of Russia’s most capable guided MRLS systems. It uses 300 mm guided rockets and has a reported range of approximately 120 km for standard guided rockets, with some variants reportedly capable of reaching 200 km. Like the Pinaka LRGR, the Tornado-S uses NS/GNSS-based guidance and is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets. However, the Tornado-S generally carries a heavier warhead and larger-calibre rockets, while the Pinaka LRGR offers India a precision-strike capability within the 214 mm Pinaka ecosystem and from the existing in-service launcher.

Predecessor Pinaka Systems

Currently, the most advanced Pinaka MRLS variant operated by the Indian Army is the Pinaka Mk.2 Guided Pinaka Rocket System, which can engage targets from 20 km to 80 km with a reported CEP of about 30 metres.

The Pinaka Mk.2 is a 214 mm-calibre system. It can launch unguided rockets with a maximum range of either 40 km or 60 km, as well as Guided Pinaka rockets with a maximum range of 80 km.

Guided Pinaka rockets, also known as Enhanced Pinaka rockets, feature a 250 kg warhead, canard-based aerodynamic control, and guidance using a combination of Inertial Navigation System (INS) and Satellite Navigation (SATNAV).

The SATNAV system has been integrated with the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS), India’s indigenous satellite navigation network.

With the help of trajectory lofting and aerodynamic glide provided by the canards, the Guided Pinaka rocket can achieve a range of 80 km. However, the Guided Pinaka rocket is focused primarily on enhanced accuracy and reduced collateral damage, rather than on significant in-flight manoeuvring.

The Pinaka LRGR has been designed by the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in association with the High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), with support from the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) and Research Centre Imarat (RCI).

Humanoid Combat Robots: Weapon Systems or the World's First Artificial Soldiers?

China will produce over 100,000 humanoid robots in 2026, according to Gan Xiaobin, Deputy Director of the Department of Science and Technology under the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. He was speaking at a press conference in Shanghai. (via TASS)

"Large language models, AI agents, and AI chips are advancing at a rapid pace. We expect humanoid robot output to exceed 100,000 units this year," Gan Xiaobin noted.

In February, CNBC reported that the US has started testing two humanoid combat robots in Ukraine, marking the first known deployment of humanoid robots in a combat zone. Developed by San Francisco-based startup Foundation Future Industries, the robots, named Phantom-1, were deployed to Ukraine for frontline logistics and reconnaissance.

Foundation Future has secured approximately $24 million in Pentagon research contracts (from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force) to test the humanoids.

Phantom-1 is roughly 5'9"–5'11" tall and weighs 176–180 lb. It is designed to use human weapons and infrastructure such as doors, stairs, and vehicles. It can lift approximately 90 lb and perform physical tasks in complex or high-risk environments. The robot has five-fingered hands, camera-based vision, and an LLM-driven autonomy system that supports both independent operation and supervised teleoperation.

Foundation Future aims to send an upgraded humanoid variant—Phantom-2—to Ukraine later this year.

China is also actively experimenting with humanoids for military applications, including teleoperated demonstrations of complex battlefield tasks.

Operational Fielding Timeline

If current technological progress continues:

Over the next one to three years, platforms like Phantom are likely to be upgraded and fielded in supervised autonomous or teleoperated combat roles. They will undertake high-risk tasks such as urban clearing, resupply under fire, and acting as decoys that draw enemy fire or absorb risk.

It is plausible that, starting as early as 2028—or perhaps as late as 2035—armed humanoid robots will actively participate in direct combat.

Between 2035 and 2045, fully autonomous squad-level humanoid "soldiers" will likely begin replacing human infantry in many battlefield roles.

Why Humanoid Robots?

There is a good reason why robotic soldiers will initially take humanoid form. Battlefield equipment—including transport and combat vehicles, firearms, and drone-launching systems—is designed for human use. Humanoids will be able to operate all equipment developed for humans. Interchangeability between humans and humanoid robots will be critical during the transition period, which could last for decades.

Challenges Persist

Humanoid robots outperform humans in many aspects of soldiering. They possess greater strength, higher load-carrying capacity, superior endurance, greater environmental tolerance, and higher precision. They can also be deployed in numbers limited only by manufacturing capacity. Most importantly, robots completely trounce humans when it comes to expendability.

However, humans outperform robots in mobility over rough terrain, adaptability, judgment, and field-acquired dexterity. As long as food and water are available, humans also exhibit far greater endurance than electrically powered robots.

It is interesting to note that companies developing humanoid robots worldwide are focused on improving endurance, fall recovery, rough-terrain mobility, and dexterity.

Humanoid Vulnerabilities

The vulnerability of humanoid robots to cyberattacks and spoofing, the logistics infrastructure required to support their operation, and their limitations in leadership and command roles will likely require humans and humanoids to operate as teams in the near future—and perhaps even in the more distant future.

However, there can be little doubt that deploying humanoid soldiers will provide a nation with an overwhelming military advantage, particularly if they can be upgraded more rapidly than those of an adversary.

It is also possible that humanoids, together with quadruped robots and UGVs, will never evolve beyond being sophisticated weapon systems that reduce the number of humans required on the battlefield. They may significantly reduce the demand for human soldiers, but they are unlikely to eliminate it entirely.

To some extent, the widespread use of drones has already reduced the number of soldiers required to hold a front in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

 

Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.

Factories, Patience and Resilience: Russia's Answer to Ukraine's Drone Offensive

Interceptor Drone developed by Rostec : Photo Credit Rostec

Over the past one month or so, Russia has absorbed many painful blows delivered by Ukrainian long range strike drones. Ukraine has struck Russian energy infrastructure and logistics to an extent where Russians are now being forced to cope with fuel and energy shortages, not just the loss of energy exports. The advance of Russian forces has slowed to a crawl that suggests that it may take years for them to completely 'liberate' Donbas.

For some in Russia and abroad, the situation may appear dismal. However, Russia has some good cards to play on account of its industrial capacity, resilience, and patience. To counter the drone menace it appears to be abandoning a "border defence" philosophy in favour of distributed vital-area defence.

There is a perception that Russia has no effective counter to the threat posed by Ukraine's long-range strike drones. Deployed in sufficient numbers, such drones are likely to continue penetrating Russian airspace and striking targets deep inside the country. Unless Russia develops more effective countermeasures, the economic and military costs imposed by these attacks are likely to grow as Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to evolve.

Russia may still achieve some of the objectives of its Special Military Operation, such as the liberation of Donbas. However, even if Russian forces were to secure Donbas, there is little reason to believe Ukraine would cease hostilities. Instead, it could continue using long-range drones to impose economic costs on Russia and gradually erode its war-fighting capacity.

In that sense, drones may provide Ukraine with a viable means of waging a prolonged war of attrition, one that seeks to compel Russia to negotiate on terms more favourable to Kyiv.

Understanding Russia's Air Defence Limitations

Russia has largely relied on its integrated layered air defence network—designed primarily to detect, track, and engage high-value aerial assets such as combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—to counter the threat posed by low-cost, slow-flying long-range drones. The endeavor has been ineffective, besides its high economic cost.

Border Length

Russia's land border with Ukraine extends for approximately 1,974 km. However, drones are not restricted to crossing the land border. They can approach via the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, cross territorial waters, or exploit the airspace of neighbouring countries before entering Russia.

Russia also has approximately 800 km of coastline vulnerable to drone ingress. Ukrainian drones have, on occasion, reportedly transited the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before entering Russian airspace to strike targets around St. Petersburg. Russia's borders with the Baltic states extend for another 862 km.

In effect, Russian air defence systems must monitor potential drone approaches along more than 3,600 km of land and maritime frontiers.

Air defence coverage across such distances will inevitably contain gaps. Existing Russian systems were primarily designed to detect aircraft and missiles flying above approximately 500 ft. Ukrainian drones, equipped with Starlink terminals that provide low-latency communications, are known to fly at much lower altitudes. Using electro-optical sensors, they can also be remotely piloted along river valleys, lakes, and other terrain features that reduce the likelihood of detection.

Western ISR Support

Ukraine's Western allies also employ space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor Russian air defence deployments and operational status.

These assets may detect temporary gaps created by system relocation, maintenance, or technical failures, allowing drone routes to be planned around them. It is conceivable that some drones can even be dynamically rerouted during flight as new opportunities emerge.

Molniya Interceptor Drone: Screen grab from RuMoD video

Air defence coverage within Russia's interior is generally less dense than along its borders and tends to focus on protecting major cities and strategic facilities. Once drones penetrate the border defences, they may find it easier to avoid known air defence sites and populated areas while remaining undetected for extended periods.

Why Ukraine Has Been Successful

In many respects, the perception that drones can occasionally penetrate even heavily defended airspace reflects reality. Both Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated the ability to do so against sophisticated air defence networks fielded by Russia, the United States, and Israel.

With extensive assistance from its Western partners, Ukraine has developed tactics that exploit the inherent limitations of legacy air defence systems through the use of Starlink communications, space-based ISR, and airborne surveillance assets.

Russia Pivots Towards Dedicated Drone Defence

Recent Ukrainian successes appear to have prompted Russia to complement its legacy air defence network with systems specifically designed to counter drones.

Unlike traditional air defence systems, which are optimised to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, these new systems are intended to defeat slow-flying autonomous or remotely piloted drones.

There will inevitably be overlap between the two defensive architectures as drones themselves increasingly assume traditional combat roles.

Russia's changing priorities are reflected in the variety of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) introduced over the past few months. The emphasis appears to have shifted from preventing drone penetration to limiting the damage once drones enter defended airspace.

Vital Area and Vital Point Defence

Broadly speaking, Russia appears to be focusing on protecting vital areas and vital points.

For vital area defence, Russian forces have introduced:

1. Specialised drone-detection radar (Sokol)

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system capable of denying connectivity over an area of approximately 18 sq km

2. Medium-range interceptor drones (Rita-2 and Molniya)

3. Passive RF and electro-optical drone detection systems

4. Medium-range electronic warfare systems

5. Rapidly deployable protective net systems for roads and convoys

6. Yak-130M light combat aircraft for engaging larger drones

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink Jamming: Photo Ukrainian Defence Sources

For vital point defence:

1. Krona-E ultra-short-range missile system (450 m–1.3 km)

2. Zak-30 Citadel 30 mm automatic cannon firing programmable air-burst ammunition

3. Zubr automated gun systems

4. Yolka hand-launched interceptor drones

5. Rita-2 reusable interceptor drones

6. Redut-UR automated kinetic defence system firing unguided rockets

7. Shrapnel-dispersing small-arms ammunition

8. Duplet net-firing handgun

These lists are not exhaustive.

With the notable exception of the Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jammer, most of these systems appear relatively inexpensive. They therefore lend themselves to large-scale production and widespread deployment.

It is likely that Russia's next priority will be manufacturing these systems in sufficient numbers to protect critical infrastructure and strategic facilities across the country.

An interesting feature of nearly all these new systems is that they possess their own dedicated radar and/or electro-optical sensors. They are therefore far less dependent on the sensor network of Russia's legacy air defence system.

It is also likely that the legacy air defence network will continue to evolve and become more tightly integrated with this new layered drone defence architecture.

A day after my above post, in this interview, President Putin corroborates conclusions that I had independently reached through my own analysis. It is reassuring to see that my assessment aligns with his remarks.

Putin on Ukraine's Strikes Against Russia's Energy Infrastructure

Russian President Vladimir Putin comments on Ukraine's strikes against Russia's critical and energy infrastructure, discussing the impact on fuel supplies, air defense production, repairs, and the situation in… pic.twitter.com/PYOsyaVQVX

— Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil (@ivan_8848) June 29, 2026

America Wants an Extreme-Range Air-to-Air Missile. India Already Has the Foundation.

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) reportedly plans to acquire a new air-to-air missile with a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles (nm). It also wants the weapon to be capable of engaging ground-based targets and has consequently dubbed it the Air Force Long Range Weapon (AFLRW).

India Already Has It!

Most of us would consider the AFLRW concept bold and technologically ambitious. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the technological challenges that must be overcome to develop such a weapon. Before doing so, however, let me offer an intriguing observation: India already appears to have the basis for an AFLRW-like weapon in its inventory, albeit with roughly half the range sought by the USAF. Yes, Brahmos Aerospace has been working on an air-to-air variant of the missile for over seven years now! 

Current Air-to-Air Capability

Currently, the longest-range air-to-air missile in widespread USAF service is the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM, which reportedly has a maximum range of 87 nm.

Lockheed Martin is developing the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), a next-generation beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

The JATM reportedly offers a significantly greater range (more than 108 nb) and a higher speed (around Mach 5), giving it an advantage over China's PL-15.

The missile retains the same general dimensions and form factor as the AMRAAM, enabling seamless integration with existing rail launchers and the internal weapon bays of stealth fighters such as the F-22 and F-35.

Production of the missile commenced in 2024. The missile is still undergoing flight testing and is expected to enter service later this decade.

Also, the U.S. Navy has already begun fielding an air-launched version of the multi-role Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), designated the AIM-174B. The missile, intended to arm the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has a maximum range of 130 nm. It also retains secondary capabilities for anti-ship, land-attack, and counter-hypersonic roles.

Technological Challenges

Extremely long-range air-to-air missiles are primarily intended to neutralize high-value force multipliers such as aerial refuelling tankers and AWACS aircraft.

Developing such missiles presents four major technological challenges:

1. Weight and size

2. High-speed propulsion

3. Warhead effectiveness

4. Targeting and guidance

Weight and Size

Achieving a range of 1,000 nm would require a very large propellant load, increasing both the missile's weight and dimensions to the point where most fighter aircraft would be unable to carry it. The AFLRW, for example, is expected to be launched from a bomber such as the B-52.

High-Speed Requirement

Against a target 1,000 nm away, even a hypothetical high-supersonic missile would require approximately 13–26 minutes to reach its target, depending on its average speed and the target's speed and flight path.

By comparison, current BVR engagements at ranges of 100–200 km typically involve missile flight times of just 1–3 minutes.

A weapon capable of reaching 1,000 nm would therefore require revolutionary advances in propulsion—likely involving hypersonic ramjets, scramjets, multi-stage rockets, or boost-glide technology—effectively creating an entirely new class of stand-off weapon.

Reduced Accuracy and Larger Warhead

The missile's large size and sustained high cruise speed would inevitably reduce its manoeuvrability. Long flight time poses tracking and guidance challenges. Tracking and guidance inaccuracies and lower terminal agility, combined with the large size of its intended targets, would necessitate a heavier warhead to achieve a sufficiently large lethal radius. The heavier warhead would, in turn, further increase the missile's dimensions and weight.

Targeting and Guidance

The greatest challenge in developing an AFLRW lies in target detection, tracking, and mid-course guidance over a 1,000 nm engagement.

Unlike shorter-range missiles such as the AIM-260, whose launch aircraft can often provide continuous radar updates, an AFLRW would remain in flight for 15–25 minutes. During this period, the launch platform would be unable to maintain radar contact with distant or manoeuvring targets such as AWACS aircraft or tankers.

Instead, the missile would depend on a networked "kill web" of off-board sensors—including satellites, drones, other aircraft, and ground-based systems—for initial cueing and continuous mid-course updates via robust datalinks. These links would have to withstand jamming, latency, and line-of-sight limitations while providing highly accurate updates to compensate for inertial navigation drift over such vast distances.

Achieving reliable, real-time coordination across multiple platforms in a contested electromagnetic environment represents one of the programme's greatest technical challenges.

BrahMos Air-to-Air Variant

In March 2019, speaking to Financial Express Online, Dr Sudhir Mishra, then CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, spoke of an air-to-air variant of the BrahMos-NG. He stated that the missile, when launched from the Tejas or Su-30MKI, would target the enemy's "radar in the air" capability by engaging AWACS, aerial refuelling, and transport aircraft.

The BrahMos-NG is a clean-sheet design rather than a derivative of the current BrahMos. It is being developed to enable carriage by medium-weight fighter aircraft.

Dr Mishra's remarks suggest that an air-to-air capability for the BrahMos-NG is a qualitative requirement projected by the IAF.

There is no obvious technological reason why an air-to-air version of the existing BrahMos-A, the air-launched version of the in-service BrahMos missile, could not also be developed.

Such a missile would already possess sustained high-supersonic speed, carry a large warhead, and could eventually achieve a range of around 800 km. And we have the best possible platform to launch such as missile - the Su-30MKI!

The shorter range of the Brahmos-A would significantly reduce the complexity of establishing the required kill web.

India could further bridge gaps in its space-based surveillance capability by accelerating the development of relatively affordable High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) and Airship-based High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (AS-HAPS) systems.

HAPS is a solar-powered unmanned aircraft designed to remain airborne for more than 90 days while operating at an altitude of approximately 65,000 ft. It is being developed by NewSpace in collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which serves as the prototype development partner.

AS-HAPS is being developed for the Indian Air Force to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, telecommunications, and remote sensing.

As an airship platform, AS-HAPS could potentially accommodate a radar capable of providing all-weather surveillance and target tracking.

In addition to long-range target detection, AS-HAPS could also provide a low-latency communications relay for long-range missile engagements.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Should India Pause the AMCA Programme?

 

Copyright Vijainder K Thakur

In 2019, DRDO and ADA projected that the AMCA would be ready for operational induction by 2035.

It is now mid-2026. DRDO and ADA have yet to achieve a major programme milestone on the path from the design board to operational induction. Nevertheless, both organisations continue to adhere to the original timeline. 

The projected timeline was viewed with considerable scepticism within sections of the IAF when it was first presented. Whether that scepticism has diminished, with only nine years remaining to the planned induction date, is difficult to judge.  

Rather than speculate, I will confine myself to the available facts. 

According to the current timeline, AMCA's maiden flight is projected to take place in the middle of 2029. That gives ADA and its private sector development partner just 6 years of test flying to qualify the aircraft for initial operational clearance. 

By comparison, the F-22 required approximately eight years from first flight to operational service, the F-35 around nine years, and the Su-57 roughly ten years. China, however, fielded the J-20 in about six years.

One important distinction is that China was not attempting to field the aircraft with an interim foreign engine while simultaneously planning an indigenous replacement. 

We will talk about the "interim" engine later. Let's first remind ourselves that the J-20 was developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), part of AVIC. 

Before developing the J-20, CAC had designed and produced the J-7 (a MiG-21 derivative) and, crucially, the J-10 — China’s first indigenous fourth-generation multirole fighter (first flight 1998, entered service around 2005). 

ADA and its private sector partner will not have the experience of CAC when they start building the AMCA. 

The GE F414 Engine Issue

The AMCA has been designed around the General Electric F414 engine. The F414 is a 98 kN thrust class engine. The IAF wants the AMCA to be powered by a 110-kN class engine. Consequently, F414 has been publicly described as an interim AMCA powerplant. The long-term intention is to replace it with a more powerful indigenous engine that is yet to be developed. The follow-up variant with the more powerful indigenous engine is to be called AMCA Mk.2

India, which currently does not have the technology to build a 110-kN class turbofan engine, intends to develop the engine in partnership with Safran or Rolls-Royce. 

India intends to procure GE F414 engines not just as an interim powerplant for the AMCA but also as the powerplant for the under development LCA Mk.2 and the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) which is still at an early stage of development. 

Negotiations for the F414 have reportedly slowed amid disagreements over pricing. Some reports place the cost at over ₹200 crore per engine—nearly three times earlier estimates of ₹70–80 crore—with additional discussions concerning the approximately ₹6,000 crore cost of establishing a dedicated manufacturing line.

The Risks of an Interim Engine Strategy

Designing an airframe around an engine that is acknowledged to be below the aircraft's intended long-term thrust requirement introduces significant technical and programme risk. HAL did this in the past with the Marut HF-24 and the outcome was very disappointing for the IAF. HAL could neither develop nor acquire an aeroengine powerful enough to achieve the airframe's Mach 2 capability that the IAF so desperately coveted. Three squadrons of the Marut were operationally inducted and then prematurely phased out. The author has the dubious distinction of having flown his last sortie on the Marut ferrying an aircraft, with just 60 airframe hours, into retirement storage. 

The AMCA programme appears to risk repeating a development approach that produced disappointing results with the HF-24 Marut some six decades ago.

The central concern discussed here is not whether India should develop the AMCA—there is broad agreement that it should—but whether the present development strategy is technically sound and likely to achieve its objectives within a realistic timeframe.

Traditionally, combat aircraft are designed around their engines. The engine is not merely a source of thrust; it is the heart of the aircraft, determining numerous aspects of the overall design. It influences weight distribution, intake and exhaust geometry, cooling requirements, hydraulic capacity, electrical power generation, fuel consumption, centre of gravity, and maintenance philosophy. The engine also determines how much electrical power is available for sophisticated systems such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare equipment, sensors, and future directed-energy or high-power electronic systems.

With the AMCA program India proposes to design and certify an aircraft around one engine and subsequently redesign significant portions of the aircraft to accommodate another. Such an approach introduces substantial technical and programme risks.

Engine Replacement Challenges

ADA has stated that the AMCA airframe incorporates provisions for a future 110-kN-class engine. (The Marut airframe similarly provisioned for a higher thrust reheated engine.) 

The question is whether designing and certifying an aircraft around one engine before integrating another introduces unnecessary technical and programme risk.

Replacing an engine is not simply a matter of installing a more powerful unit. Changes in airflow requirements, mounting arrangements, cooling systems, hydraulic pumps, electrical generators, fuel systems, engine controls, software integration, and flight characteristics may all require redesign. Even relatively small differences in engine dimensions, mass flow, or power extraction can affect the aircraft’s overall performance and certification.

From an engineering perspective, developing a new engine to suit an already frozen airframe can also be highly restrictive. Engine designers may find themselves forced to meet constraints imposed by an existing aircraft rather than optimising the engine for performance, reliability, maintainability, and future growth. This creates risks for both the engine programme and the aircraft programme simultaneously.

Alternative Strategy

Rather than committing to an interim airframe, an alternative strategy may reduce technical risk while preserving India’s significant technological gains.

ADA and DRDO have invested heavily in developing many of the enabling technologies that define a fifth-generation fighter. These include radar-absorbent materials, stealth shaping techniques, sensor fusion, avionics architecture, flight-control software, advanced mission computers, and low-observable manufacturing processes. These achievements represent valuable national capabilities irrespective of the final aircraft configuration.

Instead of finalizing an aircraft design around an interim engine, these technologies could continue to mature through incremental integration into existing and developmental platforms.

For example, stealth technologies, autonomous mission systems, and sensor fusion could be demonstrated aboard unmanned combat aircraft such as the Ghatak UCAV currently under development. Other technologies could be progressively integrated into operational platforms such as the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, or the LCA Tejas, allowing engineers to validate hardware, software, reliability, and operational concepts under real flying conditions.

Such an incremental approach would continue to advance India’s technological competence while reducing programme risk. Each successful demonstration would increase confidence in individual technologies before integrating them into a completely new aircraft.

Meanwhile, efforts could focus on developing the indigenous engine to the maturity required for operational service. Once that engine is available and its characteristics are fully understood, engineers could design the AMCA airframe around its actual capabilities rather than estimated future specifications.

By that stage, most of the enabling technologies would already have been demonstrated and refined, allowing designers to concentrate on optimising the airframe itself. This could produce a more coherent, better-integrated fighter while avoiding extensive redesign after the aircraft enters development.

Conclusion

This proposal does not advocate slowing India’s fifth-generation ambitions. Rather, it recommends sequencing development in a manner that aligns more closely with established aerospace engineering practice. The objective would be to reduce technical risk, improve system integration, and ultimately produce a more capable aircraft with fewer compromises.

India has already made substantial investments in the technologies required for a fifth-generation fighter. Allowing these technologies to mature independently while bringing the indigenous engine to operational readiness before finalising the aircraft design may provide a more robust path to achieving the AMCA's long-term objectives.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.