Should India Pause the AMCA Programme?

 

Copyright Vijainder K Thakur

In 2019, DRDO and ADA projected that the AMCA would be ready for operational induction by 2035.

It is now mid-2026. DRDO and ADA have yet to achieve a major programme milestone on the path from the design board to operational induction. Nevertheless, both organisations continue to adhere to the original timeline. 

The projected timeline was viewed with considerable scepticism within sections of the IAF when it was first presented. Whether that scepticism has diminished, with only nine years remaining to the planned induction date, is difficult to judge.  

Rather than speculate, I will confine myself to the available facts. 

According to the current timeline, AMCA's maiden flight is projected to take place in the middle of 2029. That gives ADA and its private sector development partner just 6 years of test flying to qualify the aircraft for initial operational clearance. 

By comparison, the F-22 required approximately eight years from first flight to operational service, the F-35 around nine years, and the Su-57 roughly ten years. China, however, fielded the J-20 in about six years.

One important distinction is that China was not attempting to field the aircraft with an interim foreign engine while simultaneously planning an indigenous replacement. 

We will talk about the "interim" engine later. Let's first remind ourselves that the J-20 was developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), part of AVIC. 

Before developing the J-20, CAC had designed and produced the J-7 (a MiG-21 derivative) and, crucially, the J-10 — China’s first indigenous fourth-generation multirole fighter (first flight 1998, entered service around 2005). 

ADA and its private sector partner will not have the experience of CAC when they start building the AMCA. 

The GE F414 Engine Issue

The AMCA has been designed around the General Electric F414 engine. The F414 is a 98 kN thrust class engine. The IAF wants the AMCA to be powered by a 110-kN class engine. Consequently, F414 has been publicly described as an interim AMCA powerplant. The long-term intention is to replace it with a more powerful indigenous engine that is yet to be developed. The follow-up variant with the more powerful indigenous engine is to be called AMCA Mk.2

India, which currently does not have the technology to build a 110-kN class turbofan engine, intends to develop the engine in partnership with Safran or Rolls-Royce. 

India intends to procure GE F414 engines not just as an interim powerplant for the AMCA but also as the powerplant for the under development LCA Mk.2 and the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) which is still at an early stage of development. 

Negotiations for the F414 have reportedly slowed amid disagreements over pricing. Some reports place the cost at over ₹200 crore per engine—nearly three times earlier estimates of ₹70–80 crore—with additional discussions concerning the approximately ₹6,000 crore cost of establishing a dedicated manufacturing line.

The Risks of an Interim Engine Strategy

Designing an airframe around an engine that is acknowledged to be below the aircraft's intended long-term thrust requirement introduces significant technical and programme risk. HAL did this in the past with the Marut HF-24 and the outcome was very disappointing for the IAF. HAL could neither develop nor acquire an aeroengine powerful enough to achieve the airframe's Mach 2 capability that the IAF so desperately coveted. Three squadrons of the Marut were operationally inducted and then prematurely phased out. The author has the dubious distinction of having flown his last sortie on the Marut ferrying an aircraft, with just 60 airframe hours, into retirement storage. 

The AMCA programme appears to risk repeating a development approach that produced disappointing results with the HF-24 Marut some six decades ago.

The central concern discussed here is not whether India should develop the AMCA—there is broad agreement that it should—but whether the present development strategy is technically sound and likely to achieve its objectives within a realistic timeframe.

Traditionally, combat aircraft are designed around their engines. The engine is not merely a source of thrust; it is the heart of the aircraft, determining numerous aspects of the overall design. It influences weight distribution, intake and exhaust geometry, cooling requirements, hydraulic capacity, electrical power generation, fuel consumption, centre of gravity, and maintenance philosophy. The engine also determines how much electrical power is available for sophisticated systems such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare equipment, sensors, and future directed-energy or high-power electronic systems.

With the AMCA program India proposes to design and certify an aircraft around one engine and subsequently redesign significant portions of the aircraft to accommodate another. Such an approach introduces substantial technical and programme risks.

Engine Replacement Challenges

ADA has stated that the AMCA airframe incorporates provisions for a future 110-kN-class engine. (The Marut airframe similarly provisioned for a higher thrust reheated engine.) 

The question is whether designing and certifying an aircraft around one engine before integrating another introduces unnecessary technical and programme risk.

Replacing an engine is not simply a matter of installing a more powerful unit. Changes in airflow requirements, mounting arrangements, cooling systems, hydraulic pumps, electrical generators, fuel systems, engine controls, software integration, and flight characteristics may all require redesign. Even relatively small differences in engine dimensions, mass flow, or power extraction can affect the aircraft’s overall performance and certification.

From an engineering perspective, developing a new engine to suit an already frozen airframe can also be highly restrictive. Engine designers may find themselves forced to meet constraints imposed by an existing aircraft rather than optimising the engine for performance, reliability, maintainability, and future growth. This creates risks for both the engine programme and the aircraft programme simultaneously.

Alternative Strategy

Rather than committing to an interim airframe, an alternative strategy may reduce technical risk while preserving India’s significant technological gains.

ADA and DRDO have invested heavily in developing many of the enabling technologies that define a fifth-generation fighter. These include radar-absorbent materials, stealth shaping techniques, sensor fusion, avionics architecture, flight-control software, advanced mission computers, and low-observable manufacturing processes. These achievements represent valuable national capabilities irrespective of the final aircraft configuration.

Instead of finalizing an aircraft design around an interim engine, these technologies could continue to mature through incremental integration into existing and developmental platforms.

For example, stealth technologies, autonomous mission systems, and sensor fusion could be demonstrated aboard unmanned combat aircraft such as the Ghatak UCAV currently under development. Other technologies could be progressively integrated into operational platforms such as the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, or the LCA Tejas, allowing engineers to validate hardware, software, reliability, and operational concepts under real flying conditions.

Such an incremental approach would continue to advance India’s technological competence while reducing programme risk. Each successful demonstration would increase confidence in individual technologies before integrating them into a completely new aircraft.

Meanwhile, efforts could focus on developing the indigenous engine to the maturity required for operational service. Once that engine is available and its characteristics are fully understood, engineers could design the AMCA airframe around its actual capabilities rather than estimated future specifications.

By that stage, most of the enabling technologies would already have been demonstrated and refined, allowing designers to concentrate on optimising the airframe itself. This could produce a more coherent, better-integrated fighter while avoiding extensive redesign after the aircraft enters development.

Conclusion

This proposal does not advocate slowing India’s fifth-generation ambitions. Rather, it recommends sequencing development in a manner that aligns more closely with established aerospace engineering practice. The objective would be to reduce technical risk, improve system integration, and ultimately produce a more capable aircraft with fewer compromises.

India has already made substantial investments in the technologies required for a fifth-generation fighter. Allowing these technologies to mature independently while bringing the indigenous engine to operational readiness before finalising the aircraft design may provide a more robust path to achieving the AMCA's long-term objectives.

Back to the Wall, Russia Turns to Satellite Jamming. Has Space Warfare Begun?

Google translated graphic published by Militarnyi

Russia has deployed the newly developed Volna-Kupol-Garant electronic warfare (EW) system to protect its forces from attacks by medium-range drones equipped with Starlink terminals, such as the US-supplied Hornet drone, whose development was funded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.

Jamming a communication terminal in a war zone is generally considered a legitimate military activity. However, traditional electronic warfare systems seek to disrupt the receiver. Garant appears to reverse the approach by targeting the satellite instead. In effect, the system attempts to deny access to a Starlink satellite over a defined area rather than disable individual terminals operating within it.

Starlink Communications

Conventional drones communicate with their operating crew using line-of-sight RF links which sometimes involve ground based or airborne relays. Such links are easy to disrupt using

ground-based jammers. In contrast, Starlink terminals use narrow electronically steered beams directed towards satellites overhead. The geometry significantly reduces the effectiveness of conventional jamming systems.

Starlink terminals mounted on drones are difficult to jam using ground-based EW systems because they are pointed skywards towards Starlink satellites orbiting approximately 500 km above the Earth. Any EW system attempting to jam a Starlink terminal directly would ideally need to be positioned above the drone's altitude.

Garant System

The Garant system takes advantage of the fact that while the Starlink terminal mounted on the drone is facing skywards, the Starlink satellite with which it is communicating is facing the Earth's surface.

The Garant system disrupts communication between a drone-mounted Starlink terminal and a Starlink satellite by saturating the satellite with interference signals across its entire communication band (14–14.5 GHz). Although Starlink satellites can frequency-hop across eight channels, the Garant system employs eight antennas, each covering 62.5 MHz.

The interference signals generated by Garant effectively blind the satellite passing overhead. The system can isolate an area of approximately 18 sq km from Starlink satellite signals. Its coverage extends through 360 degrees in azimuth and 110 degrees in elevation.

A Starlink terminal can communicate with multiple Starlink satellites simultaneously. At present, it is not clear whether, or how, the Garant system prevents drone-mounted terminals from communicating with satellites visible outside the area affected by the interference.

Initial reports from Ukraine suggested that the Garant system could interfere with only one satellite at a time. If that were the case, the system would be of limited effectiveness, since a terminal could simply switch to one of the 10 to 20 satellites (an approximation) typically visible overhead.

More recent Ukrainian reports suggest that the Russian capability is both comprehensive and credible, to the extent that Ukrainian forces reportedly respond by immediately launching drones to locate, attack, and disable any deployed Garant system.

A graphic published by Militarnyi suggests that the system can interfere with all satellites within its operating cone.

The Garant electronic warfare system typically consists of eight satellite dishes. It weighs approximately 120 kg and can be operated by a single individual.

Garant Vulnerabilities

Locating and attacking the system is relatively straightforward because SpaceX can instantly detect interference affecting its communication channels, while radio reconnaissance assets operated by Western countries supporting Ukraine can detect the powerful emissions generated by the system.

While the Garant system can disrupt attacks by Starlink-guided drones, it remains vulnerable to attacks by FPV drones and machine-vision-guided kamikaze drones.

Russian forces have reportedly begun using the Garant system to protect the Novorossiya Highway, which has come under repeated attack by Hornet drones equipped with Starlink terminals.

Conceptual Shift

The conceptual shift from jamming communication terminals to jamming satellites has ramifications. Interfering directly with a satellite serving other users could be viewed as an escalation. However, Russian forces have apparently concluded that such escalation, if it indeed constitutes one, is justified because the Starlink network is being used to facilitate attacks on Russian military personnel and civilians.

TASS quotes technical and information security expert Sergey Trukhachev as saying:

"Hundreds of companies from the United States and Europe are directly involved in the Ukraine conflict and complicit in the deaths of our servicemen and civilians. This cannot go on forever. Volna-Kupol-Garant systems are just the first step in a set of means for destroying any enemy infrastructure."

Perhaps the expert is alluding to a possible future escalation involving the use of more powerful directed-energy weapon systems to temporarily or permanently disable satellites.

Russia could also justify satellite jamming by arguing that the system merely incapacitates a particular satellite visible over contested territory for the duration of its passage through the area. The incapacitation is temporary.

Looking Ahead

The use of Starlink as a dual-use communication network which prompted the deployment of the Garant system heralds the inevitable extension of warfare into space. 

The deployment of the Garant challenges the assumption that commercial satellite constellations can provide invulnerable communications in wartime. Garant demonstrates that even massive constellations such as Starlink may be vulnerable to localized denial techniques.

In the past, SpaceX has demonstrated a lot of agility with Starlink by quickly upgrading software to thwart attempts at disrupting the network. It remains unclear whether SpaceX could modify the Starlink network software to mitigate the effects of the Garant system. With Russian sources already alluding to potentially more potent Russian EW capability, the battle may ultimately evolve into a contest between Russian electronic warfare engineers and SpaceX software developers.

Indeed, the possibility exists of space warfare going beyond EW. If attempts at satellite jamming are repeatedly frustrated, Russia could eventually opt for the use of directed-energy systems or kinetic anti-satellite weapons against communication satellites supporting military operations.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

DRDO's LR-LACM Test Deserves More Attention Than It Is Getting

LR-LACM Test on June 15, 2026: Photo PIB

 The DRDO successfully flight-tested the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM) from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, off the coast of Odisha, on June 15, 2026, using a mobile articulated launcher.

The missile was last tested on November 12, 2024, during its maiden flight. That test was also conducted from a mobile articulated launcher.

During its maiden test, the missile followed the desired flight path using waypoint navigation and demonstrated its ability to perform various manoeuvres while flying at different altitudes and speeds.

The LR-LACM flies a terrain-hugging or sea-skimming profile to avoid radar detection. It can navigate using waypoints and modify its flight profile to avoid adversary air-defence zones, terrain features, and other obstacles.

The missile can execute precision strikes against static targets using an RF seeker for terminal homing, similar to the one developed for the BrahMos missile.

The DAC accorded approval for the acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force on July 2, 2020.

The LR-LACM is a derivative of the ITCM (Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile).

ITCM

The ITCM was a technology-demonstrator project, while the LR-LACM is intended for operational deployment.

The ITCM itself was derived from the Nirbhay missile. During DefExpo 2020, DRDO announced that it had completed and closed the Nirbhay capability-development project.

The ITCM featured a small turbofan engine named Manik, developed by GTRE, and an indigenously developed RF seeker for terminal guidance. The Nirbhay lacked a terminal seeker and was powered by a Russian turbofan engine.

The ITCM was last flight-tested successfully on April 17, 2024, with the Manik turbofan engine and all other subsystems, including the RF seeker. According to DRDO, the ITCM has a range of 1,000 km and carries a 300 kg warhead. It weighs 1,500 kg and is 6 metres long.

LR-LACM Test on November 12, 2024 Photo PIB

LR-LACM Features

The LR-LACM is dimensionally similar to the ITCM. However, it is believed to be significantly lighter, at around one tonne, and to have a longer range of up to 1,500 km. It is also likely capable of executing more complex flight profiles.

With a range of up to 1,500 km, the LR-LACM would allow India to hold high-value targets at risk deep inside adversary territory. Its nap-of-the-Earth profile and waypoint navigation capability would allow it to easily exploit gaps in the low level coverage of adversary radars. 

The LR-LACM is configured for launch from the ground using mobile articulated launchers and from frontline warships using the UVLM (Universal Vertical Launcher Module). Developed and patented by BrahMos Aerospace, the UVLM is already deployed on 30 Indian Navy warships for launching BrahMos missiles.

Since the DAC has also approved acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Air Force, it is likely that an air-launched variant of the missile is under development and could be tested in the near future.

Besides the LR-LACM, DRDO is developing another derivative of the ITCM—the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), which will be capable of launching from a standard 533 mm submarine torpedo tube.

SLCM

The SLCM (Submarine Launched Cruise Missile) will need to be shorter and lighter to make it compatible with torpedo-tube launch. Consequently, it is expected to feature a smaller 250 kg penetration-cum-blast or airburst warhead.

DRDO plans to initially flight-test the SLCM from a Russian-origin Sindhughosh-class (Kilo-class) submarine.

According to media reports, DRDO successfully validated submarine-launch capability in February 2023 during a developmental missile launch from an underwater platform. The missile tested covered a range of 402 km.

The test was reportedly aimed at validating critical underwater-launch processes, including wing deployment after surfacing and engine start during flight.

Looking Ahead

The operational deployment of the LR-LACM, which now appears to be only a matter of time, will represent a significant milestone in India's quest for missile self-reliance, signalling the maturation of DRDO's ability to develop and deploy indigenous cruise missiles capable of operating from multiple platforms.

In the near future, DRDO could further enhance the missile's penetration capability and lethality by equipping it with self-protection modules featuring radar jammers to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispensers for decoy submunitions—such as dipole reflectors and heat traps—to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight. The addition of optical sensors for navigation and target recognition could also make the missile more resilient against electronic warfare measures aimed at spoofing or jamming GNSS signals.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Successful Ukrainian Iskander-M, Kinzhal Interceptions Plummet Due Missile Upgrades

AI visualisation of a Patriot vs Iskander-M engagement

 The interception rates of Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles have dramatically dropped because of Russian missile upgrades. 

Interception Statistics

According to aggregated data compiled from Ukrainian official claims, Russia launched 939 Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine between September 2022 and October 2025. Of these, 227 were reportedly intercepted, representing an interception rate of 24 percent.

It is likely that the interception rate increased steadily over the period as the number of deployed Patriot systems grew. Not just the number of Patriots deployed, the missile's interception tactics and algorithms were also refined to counter the speed and manoeuvring advantages of the Russian missiles.

As a result, by the summer of 2025, the interception rate had increased to 37 percent.

However, in September–October 2025, the interception rate dropped sharply to as low as 6–17 percent.

The decline could be attributed to the limited availability of Patriot interceptors, improved survivability of the Russian missiles, or a combination of both factors.

However, there can be little doubt that technological upgrades and possibly improved tactics have enhanced the survivability of Russian missiles. Russia has improved both the lethality and penetration capability of its Iskander-M missile through greater emphasis on electronic warfare and the use of decoys.

The painstaking effort to improve missile penetration suggests that Russia expects future conflicts to involve dense and sophisticated missile-defence networks.

Iskander-M Upgrades

In the following paragraphs, we take a closer look at recent upgrades to the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile aimed at improving its lethality and penetration capability.

The Iskander-M now incorporates an updated 9B899 submunition as a self-protection and penetration aid. The 9B899 module features a radar jammer to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispenses decoy submunitions—dipole reflectors and heat traps—to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight, confusing RF- and IR-homing interceptor missiles. The Iskander-M can release six or more dart-shaped modules fitted with fins.

The missile uses active scanning, likely through its radar seeker, to identify gaps in adversary radar coverage and then manoeuvres to exploit those gaps. The algorithms used to detect blind spots or weak signals can be continuously updated.

New versions of the missile feature a more powerful microprocessor for faster processing of target-area images captured by the optical seeker, improving accuracy.

Almost 90 percent of the electronic components in the missile are now of Russian origin.

The missile can now be fitted with seven different types of warheads. A concrete-piercing warhead is specifically intended for targeting F-16s in hardened shelters.

Russia has ramped up production of the missile to 60 units per month.

A longer-range (1,000 km) version of the missile—unofficially referred to as the Iskander-1000—is still under development, despite limited orders having already been placed.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

AD-1, AD-2 and India's THAAD: What the Latest DRDO Tests Reveal

AD-2 Interceptor Test. Note the minimal use of aerodynamic surfaces on the exoatmospheric interceptor : PIB Photo

 The DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

BMD Phase 2 InterceptorsThe DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

AD-1 Interceptor test from November 2022 : PIB Photo

BMD Phase 2 Interceptors

BMD Phase 2 employs two interceptor missiles: AD-1 and AD-2.

The AD-1 is designed for both endo-atmospheric and low exo-atmospheric interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as aircraft. It is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor and achieves hypersonic speeds of Mach 6–7. Guided by an indigenous Ka-band RF seeker, the missile features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-2 is designed exclusively for exo-atmospheric interception. Like the AD-1, it is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor to hypersonic speeds. The type of seeker employed is not known to the author. It too features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-1, with its limited exo-atmospheric capability, is expected to engage medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000–3,000 km range) and aircraft. Higher-flying intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be handled by the AD-2.

Together, the AD-1 and AD-2 are intended to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 5,000 km.

Past AD-1 Test

DRDO successfully tested the AD-1 interceptor on November 2, 2022.

The PIB release announcing the test stated:

"During the flight test, all the sub-systems performed as per expectations and were validated by data captured by a number of range sensors, including radar, telemetry and electro-optical tracking stations deployed to capture the flight data."

Past AD-2 Test

The AD-2 interceptor was first successfully flight-tested on July 24, 2024. Subsequent tests have focused on validating its exo-atmospheric interception capability against longer-range ballistic missile threats.

Notably, the trial validated the complete network-centric warfare system consisting of long-range sensors, a low-latency communication network, and Advanced Interceptor missiles. 

A low latency communication system is absolutely essential for long range missile interception. 

BMD Phase 2 Explained

DRDO is developing India's BMD system in two phases under a capability based deployment plan. In the first phase, which has been completed, the DRDO developed a system for defence against missiles with less than 2,000 km range, like Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen missiles and China's solid-fuel Dongfeng-21 (NATO designation: CSS-5). 

BMD Phase 2 is intended to defend against ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 km, including missiles equipped with decoys and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. 

Longer range missiles not only climb higher following a ballistic trajectory but also hurtle down on the target at much greater speeds than shorter range missiles. During their terminal phase, ICBM warheads can reach speeds twice those of intermediate range missiles. 

The Phase 2 system will feature longer range radars (with a detection range of 1,500 km, compared to 600 km for Phase 1 radars), and hypersonic interceptor missiles flying at Mach 6-7 (as opposed to Mach 4-5 for Phase 1 missiles) with agility and the capability to discriminate against ballistic missile defence countermeasures. 

The Phase 2 system is expected to offer capabilities broadly comparable to those of the US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system. THAAD missiles can intercept ballistic missiles over 200 km away and track targets at ranges in excess of 1,000 km.

In addition to new interceptors, Phase 2 also required a new radar and test ranges. 

Phase 2 Radar

DRDO is developing an Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar for Phase 2, based on the Swordfish radar acquired from Israel. Israel will provide some equipment and consultancy for the new radar, which would feature 80% indigenous components.

Test Range

India initially had two missile test ranges at Chandipur and Wheeler Island. These are suited for testing missiles with ranges up to 300 km. Missile launches require evacuation of nearby areas, and testing different trajectories/altitudes was difficult.

Phase 2 testing of the BMD system requires two ranges placed well apart along the missile trajectory. DRDO is developing two new missile ranges at Machilipatnam in Seemandhra and Rutland Island in the Andamans. 

In October 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the establishment of a new missile testing range in Nagayalanka in Krishna district, Andhra Pradesh. 

A total of 154.42 hectares has been proposed for the project, covering the test facility in above six hectares and technical facility, a few launch pads, control centre and state-of-the-art communication infrastructure in 130 hectares.

Floating Test Range

In support of BMD Phase 2 development, India has now also deployed a floating test range (FTR), a ship that features a launch pad, launch control centre, and mission control centre, along with advanced telemetry and tracking systems.

The FTR facilitates live tests (instead of simulations) for varying trajectories, different altitudes, and longer ranges (up to 1,000–1,500 km). 

The vessel was specifically intended to support the development and testing of the BMD Phase 2 system. 

The FTR (INS Anvesh) has a displacement of approximately 10,000–11,300 tonnes, is about 200 metres long, and was built by Cochin Shipyard Limited with DRDO design input. It was commissioned into the Indian Navy in March 2022.

INS Anvesh features 4 × Ship Launch Systems (SLS) — Vertical launch systems installed in the aft section. These rest flat when not in use and raise to a vertical (90°) position for firing.

AD-1 Test in June 2026 : PIB Photo

On April 21, 2023, DRDO carried out the maiden flight trial of a sea-based endo-atmospheric interceptor missile (AAD Ashwin interceptor of BMD Phase 1). The MoD described the test, carried out off the coast of Odisha in the Bay of Bengal, as  the first sea-based BMD interceptor test by India.

INS Dhruv MRIS

In addition to INS Anvesh, India also has a missile-range instrumentation ship (MRIS), equipped to monitor trajectories of longer-range ballistic missiles. The 15,000 tonnes displacement ship built by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) Visakhapatnam was handed over to the Indian Navy in September 2021.

The MRIS features an X-Band primary AESA radar and an S-Band secondary AESA radar.

The tracking radars can track the inbound flight trajectories of surface and submarine-launched ballistic missiles,  including any manoeuvrable warheads released by the missiles.

In addition to long-range missile tracking, the ship can track satellites and conduct electronic intelligence (ELINT) missions. 

Conclusion

DRDO first tested the AD-1 interceptor in November 2022. At that time, the AD-2 interceptor was still under development.  The AD-2 was eventually tested in July 2024. 

Both interceptors were tested in quick succession during the June 10–11 trials, suggesting that the system is maturing rapidly.

The commencement of user trials in the near future would be a significant milestone and a welcome development for Indian defence planners, particularly given the growing importance of ballistic missile defence demonstrated by recent conflicts in the Middle East.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

China's Railgun Breakthrough Is a Wake-Up Call for DRDO

ChatGPT visualisation of a PLAN warship firing a railgun

China has achieved a significant breakthrough in electromagnetic railgun (EMRG) technology. It has successfully demonstrated the ability to integrate guidance and control systems into a railgun projectile.

The breakthrough paves the way for precision-guided railgun projectiles capable of self-steering to distant targets. The achievement highlights China's ongoing progress in electromagnetic launch systems for potential naval and long-range strike applications.

The breakthrough could give PLAN ships a formidable anti-shipping and surface-attack capability.

Hypervelocity projectile (HVP) railguns can also be employed very effectively for air defence. Their extremely high projectile velocity can facilitate the interception of not only aerodynamic targets but also fast-moving threats such as hypersonic missiles, relying on kinetic impact rather than explosive warheads.

Railguns Explained

Conceptually, railguns are straightforward weapon systems that use electromagnetic force, instead of explosive detonation, to accelerate a conductive projectile along two parallel conductive rails to extremely high velocities, often Mach 5–7 or higher.

The use of electromagnetic force facilitates sustained acceleration of a projectile to much higher speeds than those achievable using explosives. For example, bullets fired from conventional military guns typically reach muzzle velocities of around 1–2 km/s. Railguns, in contrast, can potentially accelerate projectiles to speeds potentially exceeding 10 km/s.

The high speed of railgun projectiles considerably reduces flight time, improving accuracy. In addition, their higher kinetic energy provides greater destructive potential, obviating the need for an explosive warhead.

Railgun Development Challenges

Conceptually, the science behind railguns is straightforward. However, implementing the concept poses formidable technological challenges.

Railguns do not involve explosions, but the enormous electrical currents involved result in resistive heating, friction, arcing, and plasma formation at the projectile-rail interface, causing severe wear and tear.

The weapon requires massive electrical currents, measured in mega-amperes, to generate the intense magnetic fields needed to propel the projectile. Consequently, railguns require compact yet powerful electrical generation and storage systems.

Perhaps the most formidable challenge in developing railguns arises from the forces experienced by the projectile as it accelerates from rest to Mach 7 within the length of the barrel. Depending on barrel length, the projectile can experience accelerations ranging from 15,000 g to 65,000 g. In contrast, conventional artillery shells typically experience accelerations ranging from hundreds to a few thousand g.

Projectile Control and Guidance

The extremely high g-forces experienced by a railgun projectile would be of merely academic interest if there were no need to fit guidance equipment and electronics within the projectile. However, that is not the case.

The relatively higher accuracy of a railgun projectile, arising from its greater speed, becomes less significant as engagement range increases. The longer the desired engagement range, the greater the need for seekers and guidance systems to correct trajectory errors.

The real challenge is developing electronic and mechanical guidance components capable of surviving accelerations exceeding 20,000 g as well as the intense magnetic pulse generated during launch.

The US Navy almost shelved its naval railgun programme after failing to solve the guidance-survivability challenge. Japan has largely sidestepped the issue by focusing on a smaller-calibre railgun intended for short-range defensive applications.

US and Japanese Efforts

The US Navy began developing a railgun around 2005. The concept was first tested in October 2006 at the Dahlgren facility. In July 2017, the Navy conducted a public demonstration involving multi-shot salvos. The demonstration marked a significant step towards proving a practical rate of fire capable of delivering several rounds per minute.

The railgun tested demonstrated a range capability exceeding 100 nautical miles.

In July 2021, the programme was paused due to technical challenges involving barrel life, power generation, and rate of fire. Prototype testing resumed in 2025 at White Sands. The weapon has yet to be operationally fielded.

The United States is also developing technology that could provide guided projectiles under the Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) programme. HVPs have been successfully tested from existing 5-inch naval guns, including aboard USS Dewey in 2018. Guidance-system development and at-sea testing remain active.

Following initial development, the US Navy explicitly expanded the railgun's role to include air and missile defence, highlighting the potential of HVPs.

In 2022, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced its intention to develop electromagnetic guns capable of countering hypersonic missiles.

Chinese Breakthrough

It was recently reported that a Chinese prototype projectile survived a 20,000 g overload lasting eight milliseconds and exposure to a 7-tesla magnetic pulse during an actual railgun firing test. A magnetic flux density of 7 tesla is roughly 140,000 times stronger than Earth's magnetic field.

The projectile carried a delicate guidance chip housed within a protective silicon shell featuring a multilayer shielding system that included copper, iron, polyurethane dampers, and μ-metal.

The Chinese breakthrough is a landmark achievement. So far, there has been no publicly available evidence of an HVP surviving actual railgun launch stresses while retaining guidance functionality.

Notwithstanding the breakthrough, broader challenges such as rail erosion remain unresolved.

India's Quest for EMRG

In 2017, it was reported that DRDO had successfully developed an electromagnetic railgun capable of accelerating projectiles to Mach 6, or approximately 4,600 miles per hour.

DRDO stated that a 12 mm square-bore EMRG had been successfully tested and that work was underway on a 30 mm version. The objective is to accelerate a one-kilogram projectile to a velocity exceeding 2,000 m/s using a 10-megajoule capacitor bank.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Why the BrahMos-NG Delay Could Be Good News for Indian Self-Reliance

Development trials of the BrahMos-NG missile have been pushed back by at least a year, TASS reported on June 10.

BrahMos Aerospace Joint Venture (JV) Managing Co-Director Alexander Maksichev told TASS on the sidelines of the International Maritime Defense Show Fleet 2026:

"Flight tests of the new-generation BrahMos-NG missile have not yet begun due to the fact that the customer has slightly changed its requirements. Therefore, we still have to make some improvements."

"In other words, the requirements for the missile have become stricter and more demanding, so we will need some time to upgrade this missile and meet the new requirements. So we are still acting according to plan," Maksichev said.

The redesign of the BrahMos-NG is expected to take about a year, Maksichev noted.

BrahMos-NG Project Genesis

BrahMos Aerospace first announced the BrahMos-NG missile concept in March 2011.

The BrahMos-NG is not a BrahMos variant; it is a clean-sheet, high-supersonic missile that will be smaller and lighter than the current BrahMos.

Initially, the missile's qualitative requirements included:

Weight and dimensional compatibility for carriage by lighter fighter aircraft such as the Tejas Mk.1A and MiG-29UPG.

Internal carriage by the FGFA, which was to be jointly developed by India and Russia.

The missile was initially projected to be 6 m long and 0.5 m in diameter, with a top speed of Mach 3.5, a 200–300 kg warhead, and a maximum range of 290 km.

However, in July 2019, a BrahMos official reportedly told India Today that the missile would be 5 m long—possibly to enable torpedo-tube launch.

More recent press reports have claimed that the new missile will be capable of launch from standard submarine torpedo tubes, similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpène submarines.

Clues to the Likely Cause of Delay

In September 2025, Maksichev told TASS:

"We are currently at the working design stage, which we will complete next year, and then we will move on to autonomous tests."

He added that it was too early to discuss timelines for actual flight testing.

In April 2026, Navbharat Times reported that the BrahMos-NG project had not yet received government clearance.

It now appears that the clearance may have been withheld to accommodate an additional qualitative requirement.

Considering that torpedo-tube launch capability was first publicly discussed in 2019, it is clearly not a new requirement. So what additional requirement has emerged?

One possibility is the use of an indigenously developed ramjet engine instead of a Russian-designed ramjet.

A New Ramjet Engine

Because the BrahMos-NG must be significantly smaller and lighter, it requires a new scaled-down ramjet engine.

During Aero India 2019, a BrahMos official stated that Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia was developing this new engine.

This engine, like the missile itself, is a clean-sheet design. Feasibility studies and engineering analysis were reportedly completed around 2020.

It is possible that India's Ministry of Defence, currently the only customer for the BrahMos-NG, now wants the missile to be developed around an Indian-designed and Indian-developed ramjet engine.

Initially, BrahMos Aerospace assembled BrahMos missiles in India using ramjet engines produced at a plant in Russia's Orenburg region. Later, BrahMos Aerospace signed a technology-transfer agreement with its Russian partner to facilitate indigenous manufacture of the engine.

India has since begun using locally manufactured liquid-fuelled ramjet engines in BrahMos missiles.

Major airframe assemblies that form an integral part of the ramjet engine are now indigenously produced by Indian industry. These include metallic and non-metallic airframe sections comprising the ramjet fuel tank and pneumatic fuel-supply system.

Indigenous Ramjet for the NG

Building on the ramjet technology acquired through the BrahMos JV, India launched its own liquid-fuelled ramjet (LFRJ) design and development programme.

DRDL, a DRDO laboratory, is developing a technology-demonstrator LFRJ engine with a diameter of 350 mm for potential application in missiles and aerial targets.

The technology demonstrator powers DRDO's Supersonic TARget (STAR) project. Primarily intended for training surface-to-air and air-to-air weapon systems, STAR features a booster-ramjet combination and can achieve speeds of Mach 1.8–2.5, ranges of 55–175 km, and operating altitudes between 0.1 and 10 km.

STAR is also evolving into a combat-capable platform, with potential anti-AWACS, anti-radiation, and low-cost anti-ship variants.

An LFRJ derivative is also reportedly being developed to power the BrahMos-NG.

In November 2025, DRDO reportedly issued a Request for Information (RFI) to select a Development-cum-Production Partner (DcPP) for an LFRJ engine. The RFI may be aimed at developing a suitable LFRJ for the BrahMos-NG. If so, DRDL has likely firmed up the engine's design specifications.

The design changes now being requested for the BrahMos-NG may well be intended to accommodate a DRDL-developed ramjet engine rather than a Russian engine.

Ramjet engines are mechanically simple, but their development involves demanding challenges in materials, inlet optimization, combustor design, and fuel-flow management. As a result, the propulsion system is often among the most difficult subsystems of a missile to indigenize. Under the circumstances, it is conceivable that the DRDO-developed ramjet does not match the dimensional specifications of the Russian engine originally envisaged for the BrahMos-NG, necessitating design changes to accommodate it.

Conclusion

Using an indigenously developed ramjet for the BrahMos-NG would be a bold move aimed at consolidating the self-reliance that India has already achieved in missile technology. Relying on a yet-to-be-developed indigenous engine does entail the risk of schedule slippage. However, that risk is acceptable because import options will always remain available to bridge any temporary operational capability gaps caused by delays.

Temporary import dependence is preferable to committing an indigenously developed weapon system to permanent dependence on a foreign vendor.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.