Chetak, Cheetah Replacement: Still Hovering After Two Decades

 

LUH on display at DefExpo 2020

On May 20, 2026, an Indian Army (IA) Cheetah helicopter crashed in the Tangste (Tangtse) region near Leh in Ladakh during a routine high-altitude sortie.

The helicopter was carrying three IA officers — two pilots and passenger Major General Sachin Mehta, General Officer Commanding of the 3 Infantry Division.

All three survived with minor injuries. They walked away from the wreckage in high spirits, as was evident from a selfie posted by them on social media that went viral.

Ageing Chetak, Cheetah Helicopter Fleet

The crash drew attention to the IA's ageing fleet of around 350 Cheetah and Chetak helicopters. For over two decades, the IA has been seeking replacement of the 1960s-vintage French helicopters manufactured in India by HAL.

In 2010, HAL, based on its experience and learning from manufacturing the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters, as well as from developing the Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter, announced that it would develop a Light Utility Helicopter (LUH) to replace the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters.

On a parallel track, Indian PM Narendra Modi, during his visit to Russia in December 2014 for the annual summit meeting, signed an agreement to jointly manufacture Kamov Ka-226T light utility helicopters in India at HAL.

As per the agreement, India and Russia were to produce at least 200 Ka-226T helicopters for the Indian Armed Forces, with additional units potentially manufactured for civilian use and export.

The LUH is a 3-tonne, single-engine light utility helicopter. Powered by the Safran HE Ardiden-1U engine, rated at 750 kW, the LUH has a maximum AUW of 3,150 kg. It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 350 km with a 400 kg payload. It can seat six — a crew of two and four passengers.

The Ka-226 is a slightly larger 3.6-tonne, twin-engine, multi-role light helicopter with coaxial contra-rotating rotors (no tail rotor). It is capable of flying at 220 kph, with a service ceiling of 6.5 km and a range of 600 km. It has a crew of one to two and can seat six to seven passengers.

LUH Hot & High Altitude Trials September 2020

LUH Program Status

The programs to replace IA Chetak and Cheetah helicopters with the LUH and Ka-226 helicopters are both woefully behind schedule.

The LUH program has been delayed by technical challenges, supply-chain issues, and certification problems. Technical challenges include main rotor blade refinements and noise/vibration issues. The imported Automatic Flight Control System (autopilot) from Safran faced supply disruptions during COVID and integration problems. There has also been scope creep, with the Army adding advanced autopilot requirements that were not part of the original specifications.

Nine of the 12 Limited Series Production units had been built but remained undelivered as of May 2026.

Certification, which was targeted for late 2025, will likely slip to late 2026.

Ka-226 Program Status

The Ka-226 program failed to make headway due to disagreements over local production costs, technology transfer issues, and Russia's inability to meet 70% indigenous content targets because the aircraft was powered by French engines.

In January 2022, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reviewed the Ka-226T manufacturing project as part of India's efforts to reduce dependence on foreign defence equipment. Following the review, the project stalled, likely due to two key factors:

1. Development of the Light Utility Helicopter (LUH): The DPB considered HAL’s indigenous LUH program a viable alternative. The LUH, a 3-tonne-class helicopter, was being developed to meet both military and civilian requirements.

2. Restricted Access to French Engines: At the time of contract signing in 2015, the Ka-226T was powered by French Arrius 2G1 engines. However, following geopolitical tensions, France denied Russia access to the engine. Consequently, Russia could not meet its obligations to fully support Ka-226T manufacture in India as the OEM.

Russian Import Substitution Alters the Landscape

Meanwhile, Russia continued to develop the Ka-226T to fulfil Indian requirements.

Following Russia's estrangement from France, the UEC-Klimov enterprise announced in 2019 the development of a new VK-650V gas-turbine turboshaft engine with a takeoff power of 650 hp.

The VK-650V is intended to replace the French powerplant on Russian Ka-226T and Ansat helicopters. According to UEC, variants of the VK-650V could also be adapted to power drones and hybrid propulsion systems for aircraft.

In June 2024, UEC delivered the first prototype VK-650V engines for flight tests on an Ansat helicopter.

On February 7, a Rostec press release stated that UEC “has received type certification for the VK-650V turboshaft engine, designed for light helicopters. The VK-650V is now ready for serial production and operational deployment.”

On May 22, 2026, a prototype Ka-226T helicopter equipped with two new Russian VK-650V turboshaft engines completed its first full-fledged circular flight in Tomilino near Moscow.

Potential Ka-226T Revival with the VK-650V Engine

The certification of the VK-650V engine could potentially revive the stalled project to manufacture Ka-226T helicopters in India.

Since contract negotiations were suspended, Russia has replaced many foreign components on the Ka-226T with locally manufactured ones. At the time of contract signing, only 72% of the components were of Russian origin. As a result, Indo-Russian Helicopters can now begin production of the Ka-226T with a higher level of indigenous content than before.

HAL is significantly behind schedule in delivering an LUH conforming to the requirements of the Indian Armed Forces. Keeping in mind the large number of light helicopters due for replacement, it could be over a decade before the Chetaks and Cheetahs are finally phased out.

In any case, there is market potential for two locally manufactured helicopters targeting the Armed Forces, paramilitary forces, law-enforcement agencies, the civil sector, and exports.

Relying solely on HAL’s LUH program is a high-risk strategy, given HAL’s uncertain delivery timeline.

Both the LUH and Ka-226T programs conform to the Make-in-India paradigm. The indigenous content and level of technology transfer (ToT) absorption for both the LUH and the Ka-226T are expected to be similar.

If the Russians were to agree to limited or complete manufacturing ToT for the VK-650V engine, India would gain much more than a helicopter engine, keeping in mind the possible use of the engine as a drone powerplant.

India Walked Away from the FGFA. The Need for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter Did Not!

 The Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), which India and Russia once planned to co-develop, was envisioned as a two-seat variant of the Su-57.

The IAF’s requirement was never for a stealth fighter — it was, and likely continues to be, for a twin-seat stealth fighter!

It's likely that the IAF’s preference for a twin-seat fighter was based on its experience operating the Su-30MKI. Besides pilot training and operational conversion, a twin-seat fighter could also support multi-role operations benefiting from a second crew member, such as complex strike coordination, electronic warfare/attack roles, and reconnaissance.

The reported reasons for India opting out of the FGFA program — lack of supercruise and unproven operational capability — were always unconvincing, considering that India, as a co-developer of the fighter, would eventually have addressed those shortcomings.

The Rationale for a Twin-Seat Stealth Fighter

All 4th-generation fighter development programs foresaw the eventual need for a twin-seat variant. The initial designs provisioned for a second seat, usually by placing a fuel tank and relocatable electronics behind the cockpit. That space could later be utilized for a second cockpit by moving the electronics and dispensing with the fuel tank.

Stealth fighter development programs for the F-22 and F-35 chose to depart from the twin-seat convention for the following reasons:

1. A twin-seat configuration compromises stealth shaping to some extent.

2. It reduces internal fuel-carrying capacity, thereby compromising range. (Stealth fighters cannot carry fuel externally in drop tanks.)

3. The fighters were primarily designed to penetrate contested airspace; it was believed that sensor fusion would be adequate to enable a single pilot to fly such missions.

In brief, it was believed — with good reason — that twin-seat stealth fighters would add complexity, reduce internal fuel or payload in some cases, and increase radar cross-section.

MUM-T Operations

It has now been clear for several years that the choice of single-seat-only stealth fighters did not anticipate the emergence of the requirement for Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T) operations.

The Su-57D, for example, is reportedly designed to team up with four S-70 Okhotnik modular drones configured for roles such as SEAD, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, and aerial combat. The control and coordination demands of MUM-T operations far exceed what sensor fusion and AI alone can enable a pilot to manage.

South Korea's KF-21 Boramae Stealth Fighter

South Korea followed a pragmatic approach in developing its KF-21 stealth fighter — an approach that is paying rich dividends in terms of meeting performance and development timeline goals.

Specifically:

The KF-21 features significant reduction in RF observability rather than all-aspect low observability. (To achieve the latter, it would have required materials that the nation had not yet developed.)

The KF-21 features a twin-engine, semi-stealth design with external weapons carriage (no internal weapons bay in the early blocks).

Of the six prototypes built, two were twin-seat variants.

The first prototype rolled out in April 2021 and flew in July 2022. All prototypes collectively conducted roughly 1,600 sorties over 42 months of incident-free flight testing, achieving supersonic flight, aerial refueling, and weapons integration. System development concluded in early 2026.

The first serial-production KF-21 to roll out in March 2026 was, significantly, a trainer!

Initial deliveries to the ROKAF are slated for the second half of 2026, with 40 Block I aircraft targeted by 2028 and up to 120 total aircraft (including Block II) by 2032.

Block I prioritizes air superiority; Block II will add full multirole air-to-ground and anti-ship capabilities. Block III variants will address stealth shortcomings and include internal weapons bays.

The two-seat variant will play a pivotal role. It will not only accelerate pilot training and operational conversion but also facilitate the development of advanced variants and future concepts such as loyal-wingman operations.

An electronic warfare/attack variant — the KF-21EA — is planned, with a dedicated Electronic Warfare Officer (EWO) station in the rear cockpit.

China's J-20S

Ahead of the KF-21, China’s J-20S — a two-seat variant of the Chengdu J-20 Mighty Dragon — became the world’s first operational twin-seat fifth-generation stealth fighter.

The fighter was unveiled at the 2024 Zhuhai Airshow.

Prototypes first flew in 2021; the aircraft entered, or approached, PLAAF operational service in 2025, with frontline markings appearing by mid-year.

The J-20S is reportedly optimized for combat (MUM-T operations), not training or operational conversion. The second crew member — a Mission Systems Officer — manages MUM-T-related sensor fusion, electronic warfare/jamming, and tactical command and control.

While the pilot focuses on flight and air superiority, the Mission Systems Officer directs loyal-wingman drones for coordinated strikes, reconnaissance, and SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences).

Su-57D

Russia’s UAC announced on May 19, 2026, that the Su-57D — a two-seat, multifunctional, fifth-generation fighter — had commenced flight testing. The Su-57D is now the third stealth fighter with a twin-seat variant.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that Russia provisioned for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 from the start of the aircraft’s development.

Reliable Russian social media recently reported that the Su-57D “was converted from the already existing 055 aircraft in the shortest possible time.”

“The Indians wanted such an aircraft, and we customized it for them.”

Converting an existing single-seat airframe into a twin-seater in a short time would not have been possible had Sukhoi not designed the aircraft for such a conversion.

The most likely reason Sukhoi did not develop a twin-seat variant earlier was that the Russian Aerospace Forces never projected the need for one.

However, over the past couple of years, Sukhoi has completed development and operational testing of the S-70 Okhotnik stealth combat drone. Su-57 fighters have successfully carried out operational Su-57 + S-70 MUM-T missions in Ukraine.

The need for a twin-seat variant of the Su-57 has now been firmly established, and Russia’s Ministry of Defense has already ordered a batch of the twin-seaters.

HAL Likely to Offer a Customized Su-57D Variant

Russia has offered to help HAL build a customized variant of the Su-57D for the IAF. The offer reportedly involves ToT and industrial participation, including joint-venture production of components in India, licensed assembly, MRO facilities, and possible avionics customization.

If Rosoboronexport and HAL successfully negotiate the technological and financial terms of their collaboration, HAL is likely to offer the customized Su-57D variant to the IAF.

The HAL–Rosoboronexport tie-up is unlikely to be derailed by any CAATSA sanctions because U.S. leverage over HAL is limited. Any U.S. move to stop the supply of GE F404 or F414 engines to HAL is likely to hurt Boeing as much as it hurts India. From India’s perspective, such sanctions now would be preferable to sanctions imposed when the LCA Mk-2 and AMCA programs are approaching maturity and serial production.

DRDO’s ULPGM : Quixotic Counter-Drone Concept Sidesteps the Real Technological Challenge

 

The MoD on May 19 announced the completion of development trials of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile-V3 (ULPGM-V3) in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes.

ULPGM is designed for UAV integration to destroy soft and hard targets, on the ground and in the air.

Conceptually, ULPGM is a loitering munition designed to engage adversary drones and helicopters attempting to attack Indian Army (IA) assets. As such, it is an area-defence counter-drone weapon system, unlike interceptor drones that are designed to protect platoon-level deployments of soldiers. Interceptor drones are relatively cheaper and can be widely deployed along the battlefront.

The PIB release announcing the completion of the flight trials states:

"Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) has successfully completed the final deliverable-configuration development trials of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Launched Precision Guided Missile (ULPGM)-V3 in air-to-ground and air-to-air modes at the DRDO test range near Kurnool, Andhra Pradesh. The trials were carried out using an integrated Ground Control System (GCS) to command and control the ULPGM weapon system. The GCS features state-of-the-art technologies to automate readiness and launch operations."

ULPGM Capability

The PIB release does not reveal critical weapon-system specifications such as:

1. Range 2. Type of seeker 3. Warhead weight and type 4. Accuracy

However, past news reports have claimed that the missile features a 2-kg warhead and has a 1-metre circular error probability (CEP).

The ULPGM missile has been developed by Research Centre Imarat, Hyderabad, as the nodal lab, along with other DRDO laboratories, namely Defence Research & Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad; Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory (TBRL), Chandigarh; and High Energy Materials Research Laboratory (HEMRL), Pune.

The missile has been produced entirely through the Indian defence ecosystem, based on a mature domestic supply chain. As such, it is ready for "immediate serial mass production."

Launch Platform

The launch platform used for the trials — a multicopter developed by Newspace Research and Technologies, Bengaluru — is unlikely to emerge as the final platform.

Multicopters use commercially available Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) microcontrollers, propellers, batteries and gyros. They are easy and relatively inexpensive to configure but lack the speed, stealth, payload capability and range of drones featuring conventional winged airframes.

As such, it is possible that the IA will eventually deploy the ULPGM on a medium-sized drone with a conventional airframe shaped for stealth. Whether such a drone is already under development is not known.

Analysis

A long-endurance, area-defence loitering drone with both air-to-air and air-to-ground capability is not known to have been deployed thus far in the Ukraine war, despite the conflict having emerged as the seminal crucible for drone warfare.

The fact that the concept of an area-defence drone has not been battle-tested should be reason for pause, not a claim of a conceptual breakthrough.

Let me elaborate. As the war in Ukraine has evolved, troop deployments along the line of contact have become increasingly thin. Reconnaissance drones now make the battlefield completely transparent. Troop concentrations and weapons deployments are immediately detected and attacked with fibre-optic-cable-guided FPV drones. Each drone is like a precisely aimed artillery shell and costs as much, possibly less.

In the absence of troop concentrations and the deployment of large weapons along the front line, an area-defence-based counter-drone weapon system lacks relevance in emerging warfare.

Unwieldy, Vulnerable Architecture

The ULPGM relies heavily on the GCS for successful interception. This makes the weapon system unwieldy and vulnerable.

An interceptor drone with 2–3 hours of loitering capability would have to be a medium-sized drone. A medium-sized multicopter drone would be easily detectable in flight and would be immediately engaged by ground-launched air-defence missile systems. A launch platform with a conventional airframe would be even more detectable, as it would require a launch catapult.

An adversary, using drone-based and ground-based electronic eavesdropping, could easily locate and attack a GCS. Indeed, counter-drone warfare is increasingly gravitating towards attacking and destroying drone control centres rather than the attacking drones themselves.

For a successful ULPGM engagement, the adversary target, the ULPGM launch platform and the GCS would all have to be in close proximity — roughly within 10–15 km. As such, adversary attack drones could easily skirt the GCS deployment to strike deep into the interior.

Let us not forget an important lesson from the war in Ukraine: drone strikes are all about finding gaps in the adversary’s air-defence system.

There is another possibility. The adversary could also easily saturate the ULPGM deployment. It is important to understand that the low cost of drones means that a peer adversary will always have a large number of drones at its disposal.

Electronic Warfare

Under the ULPGM architecture, the GCS would control the launch platform, detect the target and launch the missile. The architecture is heavily reliant on communication channels. How likely is it that these communication channels would not be jammed or interfered with through electronic warfare?

Also, the combined cost of the ULPGM, its launch platform and the GCS would far exceed the cost of the target.

Manpower Intensive

The architecture would require the deployment of several trained personnel to launch and operate the ULPGM platform and detection sensors (RF, optical, IR). The deployed personnel would have to be positioned in close proximity to the line of contact. GCS personnel and their equipment would be easily targeted by the adversary.

Conclusion

Drone warfare is gravitating towards the use of relatively inexpensive drones and their deployment in large numbers across the entire battlefield, both for attack and defence.

Counter-drone capability based on low-cost interceptor drones makes sense. Counter-drone capability based on high-cost, high-technology, manpower-intensive drones makes less sense.

The DRDO concept is a total departure from battlefield realities.

Drone warfare is trending towards AI-based autonomous operations, both for attack and interceptor drones. DRDO would better serve the nation by focusing on developing autonomous drone technology based on indigenously manufactured chipsets and sensors, rather than attempting to field unproven and technologically laggard capabilities based on COTS electronic components on drones manufactured by private-sector players like Adani Defence Systems & Technologies Limited, Hyderabad, whose credentials in defence technology are dubious.

It appears that the ULPGM architecture is designed to protect VAs and VPs in the interior, not on the battlefront. The system could well be intended to protect against attacks on political rallies, a role in which it would indeed be effective.

However, the thought leaves one depressed.

MBDA and IAF Sign MRO Agreement for MICA Missiles

Image by @Grok

MBDA and the IAF have signed an agreement to set up MRO facilities for the MICA missile in India.

Currently, MICA missiles need to be shipped to MBDA for refurbishment. An indigenous capability will save time and reduce costs.

The IAF will operate the MICA MRO facility, undertaking inspection, repair, component replacement, and mid-life upgrades throughout the missiles’ service life, with MBDA providing tools, data packages, training, and support.

Mid-life work on an air-to-air missile typically involves software upgrades, seeker enhancements, renewal of pyrotechnic elements (especially solid rocket propellant), batteries, electronics, and other aging components.

At the 2025 Paris Air Show, MBDA and the Indian company AXISCADES formalized the creation of an industrial unit in Bengaluru dedicated to the manufacture and integration of missile launch systems. The MICA MRO agreement is a progression of that tie-up.

AXISCADES Technologies is a Bengaluru-based Indian multinational company specializing in high-end engineering solutions and technology services. It focuses primarily on Aerospace, Defence, and ESAI (Electronics, Semiconductor, and Artificial Intelligence), delivering end-to-end product lifecycle support — from design and development to manufacturing, assembly, testing, and R&D.

Its current order book includes over ₹600 crore worth of advanced sub-systems for indigenous platforms.

IAF and MBDA MICA

The IAF has operated MICA missiles since 2016, initially with the Mirage 2000 and later with Rafale fighters as well.

The IAF Rafale fleet, which currently comprises two squadrons (36 aircraft), is set to expand with the induction of an additional 114 Rafale fighters under the MRFA program. The MICA MRO agreement will help ensure cost-effective sustainment of the fleet’s combat capability.

MBDA weapon systems currently in use by the IAF include the MICA, Meteor, ASRAAM, and Mistral.

Harsh Realities Force Pause on India’s BrahMos-2 Hypersonic Dream

India's quest for the BrahMos-2 hypersonic cruise missile has come face to face with some grim reality checks, and BrahMos Aerospace, which was to develop the missile in partnership with Russia, has reportedly paused development of the missile.

Three factors appear to have weighed in the decision to push back BrahMos-2 development:

1. The high cost of the BrahMos-2 missile

2. The high precision and air defence (AD) penetration capability of the BrahMos missile

3. Russia's reluctance to transfer hypersonic flight scramjet engine technology

The BrahMos-2 is projected to cost approximately $12.5 million. In contrast, BrahMos-1 variant costs range from $3 million to $4.5 million.

The BrahMos-1 established a good accuracy and penetration track record during Op Sindoor. Similarly, Russia's Onyx missile, a BrahMos-1 analogue, has established a good track record in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The penetration capability of the hypersonic BrahMos-2 will be marginally higher than the BrahMos, but not enough to justify its much higher cost. Under the circumstances, it would make more sense for India to increase its inventory of BrahMos missiles through a production ramp-up that will additionally cut down unit cost.

Russia’s reluctance to provide full transfer-of-technology access for scramjet propulsion systems derived from its 3M22 Zircon hypersonic missile isn't surprising. Russia is a world leader in scramjet propulsion, and its need to preserve that lead is existential in nature.

Indigenous Hypersonic Development

Deprioritising BrahMos-2 development could energise several DRDO R&D programs aimed at mastering hypersonic flight and scramjet propulsion.

DRDO has already developed ramjet and scramjet engines for missiles. The former operate efficiently at high supersonic speeds, and the latter operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds.

DRDO developed a ramjet engine for its Akash air defence missile and locally manufactures the ramjet engine that powers the BrahMos missile. A project to develop an indigenous alternative ramjet engine for the BrahMos missile is reportedly underway.

DRDO’s Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) successfully demonstrated short-duration scramjet engine operation.

Under the follow-up Extended Trajectory–Long Distance Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM) program, the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) successfully demonstrated long-duration scramjet propulsion. On January 9, 2026, DRDL operated its actively cooled, full-scale scramjet combustor, achieving a run time of over 12 minutes at its state-of-the-art Scramjet Connect Pipe Test (SCPT) facility.

Earlier, on April 25, 2025, DRDL had successfully ground-tested a subscale actively cooled scramjet combustor for more than 1,000 seconds at the same facility.

The maiden ground test of the full-scale combustor, lasting 120 seconds, took place on January 21, 2025.

With these successful tests, the scramjet combustor is now poised for full-scale, flight-worthy testing.

Dual Mode Ramjet (DMRJ)

In a ramjet engine, the air entering the engine is slowed to subsonic speed and consequently compressed before combustion. In a scramjet engine, the air is similarly slowed down and compressed but remains supersonic throughout the combustor.

Ramjet engines operate efficiently roughly from Mach 3 to Mach 6. Scramjet engines are needed for speeds beyond Mach 6–7.

A DMRJ, which combines ramjet and scramjet propulsion, can operate efficiently across a very wide supersonic to hypersonic speed envelope by switching how combustion occurs inside the engine.

The Indian Air Force, on January 29, 2026, signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) with the Foundation for Science Innovation and Development (FSID), IISc Bengaluru, to indigenously develop a dual-mode ramjet/scramjet engine (DMRJ), intended for use in propelling missiles or combat aircraft.

BrahMos-2 Hypersonic Cruise Missile Program

India's quest for a hypersonic cruise missile started as far back as 2008 when, during a visit to India by Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, the two countries signed an agreement to develop a hypersonic follow-up to the BrahMos missile.

In September 2009, the two countries finalised the technical QRs for the missile and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

However, the project has failed to make any headway since then. Meanwhile, Russia has gone on to complete development of a BrahMos-2 analogue, the Zircon. Russia operationally deployed the missile as part of its Special Military Operation in Ukraine. Launched from coastal batteries, the Zircon has proven more destructive and difficult to intercept than even the Russian Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missile.

During an interview in June 2024, BrahMos Aerospace's CEO Atul Dinkar Rane and Deputy CEO Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Joshi told Sputnik India that while BrahMos-2 remained in the pipeline, project development would be initiated only after completing development of the BrahMos-NG missile, a lighter, scaled-down version of the BrahMos that would facilitate launch by Tejas and MiG-29UPG.

"Hypersonic BrahMos is in our pipeline. However, a definite timeline for its development cannot be provided at this stage. Presently, we are working on the BrahMos-NG programme. Once we realise it successfully, we would consider working on the more advanced hypersonic BrahMos variant."

In July 2025, RT India reported that Russia and India could reach an agreement to rekindle the BrahMos-2 hypersonic cruise missile project during Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to India.

Prioritising BrahMos-NG Development

Much like the BrahMos-2, the BrahMos-NG missile development project has remained in limbo since it was first announced in 2011.

However, recent reports suggest that development of the missile may have started, though the project is yet to receive an official nod.

On September 9, 2025, TASS reported that BrahMos Aerospace is designing the missile and intends to begin autonomous testing next year.

TASS quoted Alexander Maksichev, Russian Managing Director of the JV, as saying:

“We are currently at the working design stage… and then we will move on to autonomous tests.”

He added that it was too early to discuss the timeline for actual flight testing.

"Autonomous testing" is likely ground-based testing. Flight testing could require an additional year or two, considering the need to upgrade a test aircraft—likely an IAF MiG-29—with supporting hardware and software.

More recently, it has been reported that the new missile would be capable of launching from standard submarine torpedo tubes—similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpene submarines.

Clearly, BrahMos Aerospace has its hands full with the development of the BrahMos-NG and does not have the resources to develop the BrahMos-2 at this point in time.

Conclusion

The lethality, penetration, and accuracy of the high-supersonic-speed BrahMos-1 missile can adequately meet the operational needs of the Indian Armed Forces for the time being.

Embarking on the development of the hypersonic BrahMos-2 through a collaborative project would dramatically raise costs, make the missile unaffordable in large numbers, and result in very little technological gain. Indeed, a hypersonic capability could well prove destabilising, considering that we share land borders with our nuclear-armed adversaries. The shorter flight time of hypersonic missiles would lower the nuclear threshold.

BrahMos at Risk: Is India Losing Its Missile Edge?

The Navbharat Times (NBT) Online has reported, based on inputs from “reliable sources,” that the production of BrahMos missiles has plunged to below 50% of the level achieved a year ago.

The disconcerting report partly attributes the drop in production to the transfer of around 56 employees from Hyderabad to Lucknow and Pilani over the last few months, leading to employee disgruntlement and resignations.

At Lucknow, BrahMos Aerospace is in the process of setting up an integration and testing facility for existing BrahMos variants and future BrahMos-NG production.

At Peepli, in the Pilani area of Rajasthan, BrahMos Aerospace has a production unit where subsystems fabricated at various Indian and Russian work centres are delivered for final missile integration, checking, mechanical and electrical assembly, fuel filling, storage, and related activities.

BrahMos has additional integration centres in Hyderabad and Nagpur.

Reliable sources have told NBT Online that BrahMos Aerospace has alerted the Indian Navy to the possible delay of a few years in the supply of BrahMos missiles.

On March 1, 2024, the Indian Navy placed an order for 220 BrahMos-ER supersonic cruise missiles, along with associated shipborne launch systems, primarily for deployment on Indian Navy warships (including Visakhapatnam- and Kolkata-class destroyers).

Large-scale transfers of employees between geographically dispersed integration units can understandably disrupt the family lives of affected personnel. If unavoidable, such transfers require deft management to preclude employee disgruntlement.

No Go-Ahead for BrahMos-NG

Besides the over 50% drop in BrahMos production levels, the NBT report also states, based on its sources, that the BrahMos-NG project has not yet been approved by the MoD.

It is ironic that the Government of India formally approved and initiated construction of the BrahMos-NG development and testing facility in Lucknow on December 26, 2021—when Defence Minister Rajnath Singh laid the foundation stone—yet has not approved development of the missile itself.

BrahMos-NG: Historical Perspective

BrahMos Aerospace first announced the BrahMos-NG missile concept in March 2021. The missile was expected to:

Be carried by lighter fighter jets such as the Tejas Mk.1A and MiG-29UPG.

Fit inside the internal weapons bay of the FGFA, the stealth fighter India and Russia were co-developing at the time.

The NG is not a BrahMos variant; it is a clean-sheet, high-supersonic missile design that will be smaller and lighter than the current BrahMos.

The missile was initially projected to be 6 m long and 0.5 m in diameter, with a top speed of Mach 3.5 and a 200–300 kg warhead, and a maximum range of 290 km.

In July 2019, a BrahMos official reportedly told India Today that the missile would be 5 m long—possibly to enable torpedo-tube launch.

More recently, it has been reported that the new missile would be capable of launching from standard submarine torpedo tubes—similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpene submarines.

BrahMos-NG – Misleading Development Timelines

Over the years, BrahMos officials have made overly optimistic statements about the development timeline of BrahMos-NG.

A senior defence official reportedly told Times Now in November 2017 that the air-launched BrahMos-NG was “currently in the design stage,” adding that the missile would be ready by 2019.

In February 2024, BrahMos Aerospace’s Export Director, Pravin Pathak, stated that flight tests of BrahMos-NG would begin before the end of 2025.

He said:

“In parallel with construction of the (Lucknow) plant… the first flight samples of the new BrahMos-NG rocket will be assembled for flight testing… before the end of 2025.”

Finaly, Development Start

There is good reason to believe that development actually started in September 2025.

On September 9, 2025, TASS reported that BrahMos Aerospace is designing the missile and intends to begin autonomous testing in 2026.

TASS quoted Alexander Maksichev, Russian Managing Director of the JV, as saying:

“We are currently at the working design stage… and then we will move on to autonomous tests.”

He added that it was too early to discuss timelines for actual flight testing.

After 14 years of announcements, it finally appeared that the project was making progress.

A New Ramjet Engine

Because BrahMos-NG must be significantly smaller and lighter, it requires a new, scaled-down ramjet engine.

During Aero India 2019, a BrahMos official stated that Russia’s NPO Mashinostroeyenia is developing this new engine.

This engine, like the missile itself, is a clean-sheet design. Feasibility studies and engineering analysis were reportedly completed around 2020.

Link with the Su-57

Russia has made a compelling offer to India to procure its Su-57 stealth fighters for the IAF.

In July, the IAF projected a requirement for 2–3 squadrons of stealth fighters to the Indian government, given the depletion of its fighter inventory, delays in AMCA development, and the evolving threat environment.

If the government accepts the Russian offer—which appears attractive due to the inclusion of transfer of technology—the IAF would want BrahMos-NG to be compatible with the Su-57 variant it acquires. The missile would need to fit within the aircraft’s internal weapons bays and conform to their load-carrying limits.

During the Dubai Airshow 2025, the Su-57 displayed a pair of Kh-58UShK anti-radiation missiles in its forward internal weapons bay during flight demonstrations.

The Kh-58UShK has a launch weight of 650 kg. By extrapolation, the forward internal bay’s maximum payload capacity appears to be around 1,300 kg.

In March 2019, BrahMos CEO Sudhir Misra stated that the Tejas underwing hardpoint can support a maximum load of 1,250 kg, including the launcher. This implies that BrahMos-NG would weigh less than 1,250 kg.

For comparison:

Standard BrahMos weighs ~3,000 kg

BrahMos-A weighs ~2,500 kg

Thus, miniaturisation is critical.

In addition to physical fitment, radar and mission-computer integration would require close Russian-Indian collaboration.

If Not Su-57—AMCA Compatibility

If India does not pursue the Su-57, the missile will need to be compatible with AMCA’s internal bay—an uncertain proposition at this stage of AMCA development.

Conclusion

Any significant drop in the production of BrahMos missile variants at this stage would be a serious setback, potentially weakening the deterrence capability of the Indian Armed Forces.

Any delay in approving the development of BrahMos-NG could necessitate the import of a comparable system to keep the IAF’s MiG-29 and LCA fleets operationally viable.

Russia has already begun work on the engine and a new high-supersonic air-launched missile. India must now decide whether to participate meaningfully—before timelines slip again, as they did in the case of the FGFA.

IAF’s 5th Gen Need Meets a US 4th Gen Pitch!

Indian Air Force Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh engaged with U.S. Air Force leaders during a visit to Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, April 9, 2026. The visit focused on joint exercise opportunities and aligning modernization efforts to build a foundation for interoperability.

During his recent weeklong visit to the US starting April 6, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief of Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Amar Preet Singh, flew a familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada.

Routine Visit?

Officially, the CAS was on a routine exchange visit to foster deeper relations between the IAF and the U.S. Air Force (USAF). High-ranking air force officials from both nations routinely visit counterpart nations to discuss interoperability, joint training, shared strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and modernisation.

In the past 15 years, four IAF Chiefs have made official visits to the US, as follows:

1. July 2013: Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III.

2. May 2015: Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha at the invitation of USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation.

3. September 26–28, 2017: Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa to attend the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium in Hawaii.

4. April 6–13, 2026: Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh to strengthen the India–US defence partnership and deepen cooperation between the two air forces.

The USAF Chief of Staff/Secretary of the Air Force has visited India three times in the same period, as follows:

1. August 2016: Secretary of the Air Force Deborah Lee James to discuss defence and trade cooperation.

2. February 1–7, 2018: Chief of Staff Gen. David L. Goldfein to discuss Indo-Pacific cooperation.

3. March 21, 2023: Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall to advance the U.S.–India Major Defense Partnership and bilateral security cooperation.

From the above, it is clear that exchange visits don't take place at predetermined intervals. Instead, they are based on invitations. As such, despite being labelled as routine visits, they are neither routine nor mere optics. There is always a strong undercurrent aimed at adding depth to the partnership. From the US point of view, CAS visits are either aimed at selling US weapons to India, aligning India more sharply with US unipolar global ambitions, or both.

Recent CAS Visit

Based on media reports, the invitation to ACM AP Singh to visit the US was likely aimed at laying down the modalities for surveillance by US MQ-9B SkyGuardian drones being sold to the IAF and the possible sharing of data.

The ACM's familiarisation sortie in a Boeing F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet was likely aimed at softening any IAF resistance to the purchase of the Boeing F-15EX fighter and its weapon systems.

During the MMRCA procurement process, the US had pitched its F-16 and F-18 fighters to the IAF, which ultimately chose the French Rafale fighter. However, due to irreconcilable differences over ToT, France and India could not finalise a contract. In 2018, the MoD placed an interim order for 36 Rafales and terminated further procurement under the MMRCA program.

Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) Program

The MoD then initiated the balance procurement of 110 fighters under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) program. On April 6, 2018, it released a fresh RFI stipulating that a maximum of 15 per cent of aircraft were to be procured in flyaway condition and 85 per cent would be manufactured in India based on transfer of technology (ToT) under “Make in India.” The RFI mandated the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times.

The F-15EX was a late entrant in the MRFA program, which was initially confined to former MMRCA contestants.

New Delhi first showed interest in the F-15EX in October 2020, shortly after the U.S. Air Force awarded Boeing a nearly $1.2 billion contract to build the first lot of eight F-15EX advanced fighter jets to help the service meet its capacity requirements and add capability to its fighter fleet.

“There is a possibility that the F-15EX could be sold on a government-to-government basis,” a top government official familiar with the discussions told Hindustan Times at that time.

However, at that point, Boeing had not yet been licensed to sell the F-15EX abroad.

On January 28, 2021, the US government granted Boeing a marketing licence to offer the F-15EX Eagle II fighter jet directly to the Indian Air Force (IAF) under its MRFA procurement program.

It is not clear if Boeing’s pitch of the F-15EX conformed to the Indian MoD RFI of April 6, 2018, particularly regarding its willingness for ToT and local manufacture in India under “Make in India.”

Notably, the Boeing fighter was never offered for evaluation to the IAF, which raises doubts about the sincerity of the Boeing pitch.

Meanwhile, the IAF, having invested heavily in creating the maintenance and logistics infrastructure for Rafale, continued to display enthusiasm for additional procurement of the French fighter, which had performed creditably in Op Sindoor.

The CAS, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:

“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”

However, he acknowledged that a decision in favour of Rafale would depend on French willingness to share manufacturing technology with India.

Alluding to the 2018 RFI that mandates ToT with the guarantee of 75 per cent availability of aircraft at all times, he said, “So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he added.

Rafale Procurement Go-Ahead

In January 2026, the Defence Procurement Board (DPB) reportedly gave its go-ahead to an Indian Air Force proposal to buy 114 French-origin Rafale jets.

Contract negotiations between India and France are underway. The DPB go-ahead has to be cleared by the DAC, headed by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh. Finally, before the contract is signed, it would need to be approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security.

Source Code Issues

Some unverified media reports suggest that the French government has refused to provide India with the source code for the Rafale’s Thales RBE2 AESA radar, the Modular Data Processing Unit (MDPU), and the SPECTRA electronic warfare suite.

These reports may sound alarming to many defence enthusiasts, but they need not be.

The IAF does not need the full source code of the Rafale. What it needs is programming access to the full source code. In an earlier analysis for the Eurasian Times, I explained in detail the difference.

A programming interface provides access to the underlying code through a layer of abstraction.

There is no reason for France to withhold full programming access to the Rafale source code, just as there is no reason for the IAF to ask for the transfer of the full source code.

It is the author’s belief that good negotiations can adequately seal the deal while safeguarding the interests of both France and India.

MRFA – A Near Done Deal

The IAF has made its choice clear in favour of Rafale. The renewed US pitch for the F-15EX aims to leverage the controversy wittingly or unwittingly created by the media over the source code. The IAF is unlikely to pursue a red-herring offer; notably, however, the US has made one—exposing its insincerity.

Need for Stealth Fighters

The IAF has officially projected to the MoD a need for 2–3 squadrons of a stealth fighter to address an emerging stopgap requirement. Ironically, what the US is ready to offer is not the F-35, but a Su-30MKI substitute that will drain billions from the IAF's capital expenditure over the next few years in acquiring the aircraft, creating a logistics and maintenance infrastructure, and procuring a whole new line of weapon systems.

The loss of four F-15EX fighters during the recent Iran war would be difficult for the IAF leadership to ignore were it inclined to change its mind at this late stage.

According to ANI, during ACM AP Singh’s visit, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Ken Wilsbach welcomed India’s procurement of the MQ-9B SkyGuardian drone. I wonder if the CAS found the endorsement reassuring, considering how easily Iran has been able to shoot down these very expensive drones.

In summary, what the IAF urgently needs is not the F-15EX, but an upgrade to the highly potent BrahMos-wielding Su-30MKI, which can also be adapted for launching Indian-developed hypersonic aeroballistic missiles in the future.