America Wants an Extreme-Range Air-to-Air Missile. India Already Has the Foundation.

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) reportedly plans to acquire a new air-to-air missile with a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles (nm). It also wants the weapon to be capable of engaging ground-based targets and has consequently dubbed it the Air Force Long Range Weapon (AFLRW).

India Already Has It!

Most of us would consider the AFLRW concept bold and technologically ambitious. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the technological challenges that must be overcome to develop such a weapon. Before doing so, however, let me offer an intriguing observation: India already appears to have the basis for an AFLRW-like weapon in its inventory, albeit with roughly half the range sought by the USAF. Yes, Brahmos Aerospace has been working on an air-to-air variant of the missile for over seven years now! 

Current Air-to-Air Capability

Currently, the longest-range air-to-air missile in widespread USAF service is the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM, which reportedly has a maximum range of 87 nm.

Lockheed Martin is developing the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), a next-generation beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

The JATM reportedly offers a significantly greater range (more than 108 nb) and a higher speed (around Mach 5), giving it an advantage over China's PL-15.

The missile retains the same general dimensions and form factor as the AMRAAM, enabling seamless integration with existing rail launchers and the internal weapon bays of stealth fighters such as the F-22 and F-35.

Production of the missile commenced in 2024. The missile is still undergoing flight testing and is expected to enter service later this decade.

Also, the U.S. Navy has already begun fielding an air-launched version of the multi-role Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), designated the AIM-174B. The missile, intended to arm the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has a maximum range of 130 nm. It also retains secondary capabilities for anti-ship, land-attack, and counter-hypersonic roles.

Technological Challenges

Extremely long-range air-to-air missiles are primarily intended to neutralize high-value force multipliers such as aerial refuelling tankers and AWACS aircraft.

Developing such missiles presents four major technological challenges:

1. Weight and size

2. High-speed propulsion

3. Warhead effectiveness

4. Targeting and guidance

Weight and Size

Achieving a range of 1,000 nm would require a very large propellant load, increasing both the missile's weight and dimensions to the point where most fighter aircraft would be unable to carry it. The AFLRW, for example, is expected to be launched from a bomber such as the B-52.

High-Speed Requirement

Against a target 1,000 nm away, even a hypothetical high-supersonic missile would require approximately 13–26 minutes to reach its target, depending on its average speed and the target's speed and flight path.

By comparison, current BVR engagements at ranges of 100–200 km typically involve missile flight times of just 1–3 minutes.

A weapon capable of reaching 1,000 nm would therefore require revolutionary advances in propulsion—likely involving hypersonic ramjets, scramjets, multi-stage rockets, or boost-glide technology—effectively creating an entirely new class of stand-off weapon.

Reduced Accuracy and Larger Warhead

The missile's large size and sustained high cruise speed would inevitably reduce its manoeuvrability. Long flight time poses tracking and guidance challenges. Tracking and guidance inaccuracies and lower terminal agility, combined with the large size of its intended targets, would necessitate a heavier warhead to achieve a sufficiently large lethal radius. The heavier warhead would, in turn, further increase the missile's dimensions and weight.

Targeting and Guidance

The greatest challenge in developing an AFLRW lies in target detection, tracking, and mid-course guidance over a 1,000 nm engagement.

Unlike shorter-range missiles such as the AIM-260, whose launch aircraft can often provide continuous radar updates, an AFLRW would remain in flight for 15–25 minutes. During this period, the launch platform would be unable to maintain radar contact with distant or manoeuvring targets such as AWACS aircraft or tankers.

Instead, the missile would depend on a networked "kill web" of off-board sensors—including satellites, drones, other aircraft, and ground-based systems—for initial cueing and continuous mid-course updates via robust datalinks. These links would have to withstand jamming, latency, and line-of-sight limitations while providing highly accurate updates to compensate for inertial navigation drift over such vast distances.

Achieving reliable, real-time coordination across multiple platforms in a contested electromagnetic environment represents one of the programme's greatest technical challenges.

BrahMos Air-to-Air Variant

In March 2019, speaking to Financial Express Online, Dr Sudhir Mishra, then CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, spoke of an air-to-air variant of the BrahMos-NG. He stated that the missile, when launched from the Tejas or Su-30MKI, would target the enemy's "radar in the air" capability by engaging AWACS, aerial refuelling, and transport aircraft.

The BrahMos-NG is a clean-sheet design rather than a derivative of the current BrahMos. It is being developed to enable carriage by medium-weight fighter aircraft.

Dr Mishra's remarks suggest that an air-to-air capability for the BrahMos-NG is a qualitative requirement projected by the IAF.

There is no obvious technological reason why an air-to-air version of the existing BrahMos-A, the air-launched version of the in-service BrahMos missile, could not also be developed.

Such a missile would already possess sustained high-supersonic speed, carry a large warhead, and could eventually achieve a range of around 800 km. And we have the best possible platform to launch such as missile - the Su-30MKI!

The shorter range of the Brahmos-A would significantly reduce the complexity of establishing the required kill web.

India could further bridge gaps in its space-based surveillance capability by accelerating the development of relatively affordable High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) and Airship-based High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (AS-HAPS) systems.

HAPS is a solar-powered unmanned aircraft designed to remain airborne for more than 90 days while operating at an altitude of approximately 65,000 ft. It is being developed by NewSpace in collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which serves as the prototype development partner.

AS-HAPS is being developed for the Indian Air Force to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, telecommunications, and remote sensing.

As an airship platform, AS-HAPS could potentially accommodate a radar capable of providing all-weather surveillance and target tracking.

In addition to long-range target detection, AS-HAPS could also provide a low-latency communications relay for long-range missile engagements.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Should India Pause the AMCA Programme?

 

Copyright Vijainder K Thakur

In 2019, DRDO and ADA projected that the AMCA would be ready for operational induction by 2035.

It is now mid-2026. DRDO and ADA have yet to achieve a major programme milestone on the path from the design board to operational induction. Nevertheless, both organisations continue to adhere to the original timeline. 

The projected timeline was viewed with considerable scepticism within sections of the IAF when it was first presented. Whether that scepticism has diminished, with only nine years remaining to the planned induction date, is difficult to judge.  

Rather than speculate, I will confine myself to the available facts. 

According to the current timeline, AMCA's maiden flight is projected to take place in the middle of 2029. That gives ADA and its private sector development partner just 6 years of test flying to qualify the aircraft for initial operational clearance. 

By comparison, the F-22 required approximately eight years from first flight to operational service, the F-35 around nine years, and the Su-57 roughly ten years. China, however, fielded the J-20 in about six years.

One important distinction is that China was not attempting to field the aircraft with an interim foreign engine while simultaneously planning an indigenous replacement. 

We will talk about the "interim" engine later. Let's first remind ourselves that the J-20 was developed by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC), part of AVIC. 

Before developing the J-20, CAC had designed and produced the J-7 (a MiG-21 derivative) and, crucially, the J-10 — China’s first indigenous fourth-generation multirole fighter (first flight 1998, entered service around 2005). 

ADA and its private sector partner will not have the experience of CAC when they start building the AMCA. 

The GE F414 Engine Issue

The AMCA has been designed around the General Electric F414 engine. The F414 is a 98 kN thrust class engine. The IAF wants the AMCA to be powered by a 110-kN class engine. Consequently, F414 has been publicly described as an interim AMCA powerplant. The long-term intention is to replace it with a more powerful indigenous engine that is yet to be developed. The follow-up variant with the more powerful indigenous engine is to be called AMCA Mk.2

India, which currently does not have the technology to build a 110-kN class turbofan engine, intends to develop the engine in partnership with Safran or Rolls-Royce. 

India intends to procure GE F414 engines not just as an interim powerplant for the AMCA but also as the powerplant for the under development LCA Mk.2 and the Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter (TEDBF) which is still at an early stage of development. 

Negotiations for the F414 have reportedly slowed amid disagreements over pricing. Some reports place the cost at over ₹200 crore per engine—nearly three times earlier estimates of ₹70–80 crore—with additional discussions concerning the approximately ₹6,000 crore cost of establishing a dedicated manufacturing line.

The Risks of an Interim Engine Strategy

Designing an airframe around an engine that is acknowledged to be below the aircraft's intended long-term thrust requirement introduces significant technical and programme risk. HAL did this in the past with the Marut HF-24 and the outcome was very disappointing for the IAF. HAL could neither develop nor acquire an aeroengine powerful enough to achieve the airframe's Mach 2 capability that the IAF so desperately coveted. Three squadrons of the Marut were operationally inducted and then prematurely phased out. The author has the dubious distinction of having flown his last sortie on the Marut ferrying an aircraft, with just 60 airframe hours, into retirement storage. 

The AMCA programme appears to risk repeating a development approach that produced disappointing results with the HF-24 Marut some six decades ago.

The central concern discussed here is not whether India should develop the AMCA—there is broad agreement that it should—but whether the present development strategy is technically sound and likely to achieve its objectives within a realistic timeframe.

Traditionally, combat aircraft are designed around their engines. The engine is not merely a source of thrust; it is the heart of the aircraft, determining numerous aspects of the overall design. It influences weight distribution, intake and exhaust geometry, cooling requirements, hydraulic capacity, electrical power generation, fuel consumption, centre of gravity, and maintenance philosophy. The engine also determines how much electrical power is available for sophisticated systems such as active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, electronic warfare equipment, sensors, and future directed-energy or high-power electronic systems.

With the AMCA program India proposes to design and certify an aircraft around one engine and subsequently redesign significant portions of the aircraft to accommodate another. Such an approach introduces substantial technical and programme risks.

Engine Replacement Challenges

ADA has stated that the AMCA airframe incorporates provisions for a future 110-kN-class engine. (The Marut airframe similarly provisioned for a higher thrust reheated engine.) 

The question is whether designing and certifying an aircraft around one engine before integrating another introduces unnecessary technical and programme risk.

Replacing an engine is not simply a matter of installing a more powerful unit. Changes in airflow requirements, mounting arrangements, cooling systems, hydraulic pumps, electrical generators, fuel systems, engine controls, software integration, and flight characteristics may all require redesign. Even relatively small differences in engine dimensions, mass flow, or power extraction can affect the aircraft’s overall performance and certification.

From an engineering perspective, developing a new engine to suit an already frozen airframe can also be highly restrictive. Engine designers may find themselves forced to meet constraints imposed by an existing aircraft rather than optimising the engine for performance, reliability, maintainability, and future growth. This creates risks for both the engine programme and the aircraft programme simultaneously.

Alternative Strategy

Rather than committing to an interim airframe, an alternative strategy may reduce technical risk while preserving India’s significant technological gains.

ADA and DRDO have invested heavily in developing many of the enabling technologies that define a fifth-generation fighter. These include radar-absorbent materials, stealth shaping techniques, sensor fusion, avionics architecture, flight-control software, advanced mission computers, and low-observable manufacturing processes. These achievements represent valuable national capabilities irrespective of the final aircraft configuration.

Instead of finalizing an aircraft design around an interim engine, these technologies could continue to mature through incremental integration into existing and developmental platforms.

For example, stealth technologies, autonomous mission systems, and sensor fusion could be demonstrated aboard unmanned combat aircraft such as the Ghatak UCAV currently under development. Other technologies could be progressively integrated into operational platforms such as the Su-30MKI, Mirage 2000, or the LCA Tejas, allowing engineers to validate hardware, software, reliability, and operational concepts under real flying conditions.

Such an incremental approach would continue to advance India’s technological competence while reducing programme risk. Each successful demonstration would increase confidence in individual technologies before integrating them into a completely new aircraft.

Meanwhile, efforts could focus on developing the indigenous engine to the maturity required for operational service. Once that engine is available and its characteristics are fully understood, engineers could design the AMCA airframe around its actual capabilities rather than estimated future specifications.

By that stage, most of the enabling technologies would already have been demonstrated and refined, allowing designers to concentrate on optimising the airframe itself. This could produce a more coherent, better-integrated fighter while avoiding extensive redesign after the aircraft enters development.

Conclusion

This proposal does not advocate slowing India’s fifth-generation ambitions. Rather, it recommends sequencing development in a manner that aligns more closely with established aerospace engineering practice. The objective would be to reduce technical risk, improve system integration, and ultimately produce a more capable aircraft with fewer compromises.

India has already made substantial investments in the technologies required for a fifth-generation fighter. Allowing these technologies to mature independently while bringing the indigenous engine to operational readiness before finalising the aircraft design may provide a more robust path to achieving the AMCA's long-term objectives.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

DRDO's LR-LACM Test Deserves More Attention Than It Is Getting

LR-LACM Test on June 15, 2026: Photo PIB

 The DRDO successfully flight-tested the Long-Range Land Attack Cruise Missile (LR-LACM) from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, off the coast of Odisha, on June 15, 2026, using a mobile articulated launcher.

The missile was last tested on November 12, 2024, during its maiden flight. That test was also conducted from a mobile articulated launcher.

During its maiden test, the missile followed the desired flight path using waypoint navigation and demonstrated its ability to perform various manoeuvres while flying at different altitudes and speeds.

The LR-LACM flies a terrain-hugging or sea-skimming profile to avoid radar detection. It can navigate using waypoints and modify its flight profile to avoid adversary air-defence zones, terrain features, and other obstacles.

The missile can execute precision strikes against static targets using an RF seeker for terminal homing, similar to the one developed for the BrahMos missile.

The DAC accorded approval for the acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force on July 2, 2020.

The LR-LACM is a derivative of the ITCM (Indigenous Technology Cruise Missile).

ITCM

The ITCM was a technology-demonstrator project, while the LR-LACM is intended for operational deployment.

The ITCM itself was derived from the Nirbhay missile. During DefExpo 2020, DRDO announced that it had completed and closed the Nirbhay capability-development project.

The ITCM featured a small turbofan engine named Manik, developed by GTRE, and an indigenously developed RF seeker for terminal guidance. The Nirbhay lacked a terminal seeker and was powered by a Russian turbofan engine.

The ITCM was last flight-tested successfully on April 17, 2024, with the Manik turbofan engine and all other subsystems, including the RF seeker. According to DRDO, the ITCM has a range of 1,000 km and carries a 300 kg warhead. It weighs 1,500 kg and is 6 metres long.

LR-LACM Test on November 12, 2024 Photo PIB

LR-LACM Features

The LR-LACM is dimensionally similar to the ITCM. However, it is believed to be significantly lighter, at around one tonne, and to have a longer range of up to 1,500 km. It is also likely capable of executing more complex flight profiles.

With a range of up to 1,500 km, the LR-LACM would allow India to hold high-value targets at risk deep inside adversary territory. Its nap-of-the-Earth profile and waypoint navigation capability would allow it to easily exploit gaps in the low level coverage of adversary radars. 

The LR-LACM is configured for launch from the ground using mobile articulated launchers and from frontline warships using the UVLM (Universal Vertical Launcher Module). Developed and patented by BrahMos Aerospace, the UVLM is already deployed on 30 Indian Navy warships for launching BrahMos missiles.

Since the DAC has also approved acquisition of the LR-LACM for the Indian Air Force, it is likely that an air-launched variant of the missile is under development and could be tested in the near future.

Besides the LR-LACM, DRDO is developing another derivative of the ITCM—the Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), which will be capable of launching from a standard 533 mm submarine torpedo tube.

SLCM

The SLCM (Submarine Launched Cruise Missile) will need to be shorter and lighter to make it compatible with torpedo-tube launch. Consequently, it is expected to feature a smaller 250 kg penetration-cum-blast or airburst warhead.

DRDO plans to initially flight-test the SLCM from a Russian-origin Sindhughosh-class (Kilo-class) submarine.

According to media reports, DRDO successfully validated submarine-launch capability in February 2023 during a developmental missile launch from an underwater platform. The missile tested covered a range of 402 km.

The test was reportedly aimed at validating critical underwater-launch processes, including wing deployment after surfacing and engine start during flight.

Looking Ahead

The operational deployment of the LR-LACM, which now appears to be only a matter of time, will represent a significant milestone in India's quest for missile self-reliance, signalling the maturation of DRDO's ability to develop and deploy indigenous cruise missiles capable of operating from multiple platforms.

In the near future, DRDO could further enhance the missile's penetration capability and lethality by equipping it with self-protection modules featuring radar jammers to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispensers for decoy submunitions—such as dipole reflectors and heat traps—to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight. The addition of optical sensors for navigation and target recognition could also make the missile more resilient against electronic warfare measures aimed at spoofing or jamming GNSS signals.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

AD-1, AD-2 and India's THAAD: What the Latest DRDO Tests Reveal

AD-2 Interceptor Test. Note the minimal use of aerodynamic surfaces on the exoatmospheric interceptor : PIB Photo

 The DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

BMD Phase 2 InterceptorsThe DRDO conducted three consecutive flight tests of its BMD Phase 2 interceptors on June 10 and 11, 2026.

The PIB release announcing the tests stated that all three were successful.

Photographs released by the Ministry of Defence indicate that both the AD-1 and AD-2 BMD Phase 2 interceptors were tested.

AD-1 Interceptor test from November 2022 : PIB Photo

BMD Phase 2 Interceptors

BMD Phase 2 employs two interceptor missiles: AD-1 and AD-2.

The AD-1 is designed for both endo-atmospheric and low exo-atmospheric interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles, as well as aircraft. It is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor and achieves hypersonic speeds of Mach 6–7. Guided by an indigenous Ka-band RF seeker, the missile features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-2 is designed exclusively for exo-atmospheric interception. Like the AD-1, it is propelled by a two-stage solid-fuel motor to hypersonic speeds. The type of seeker employed is not known to the author. It too features hit-to-kill capability.

The AD-1, with its limited exo-atmospheric capability, is expected to engage medium-range ballistic missiles (1,000–3,000 km range) and aircraft. Higher-flying intermediate-range ballistic missiles would be handled by the AD-2.

Together, the AD-1 and AD-2 are intended to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 5,000 km.

Past AD-1 Test

DRDO successfully tested the AD-1 interceptor on November 2, 2022.

The PIB release announcing the test stated:

"During the flight test, all the sub-systems performed as per expectations and were validated by data captured by a number of range sensors, including radar, telemetry and electro-optical tracking stations deployed to capture the flight data."

Past AD-2 Test

The AD-2 interceptor was first successfully flight-tested on July 24, 2024. Subsequent tests have focused on validating its exo-atmospheric interception capability against longer-range ballistic missile threats.

Notably, the trial validated the complete network-centric warfare system consisting of long-range sensors, a low-latency communication network, and Advanced Interceptor missiles. 

A low latency communication system is absolutely essential for long range missile interception. 

BMD Phase 2 Explained

DRDO is developing India's BMD system in two phases under a capability based deployment plan. In the first phase, which has been completed, the DRDO developed a system for defence against missiles with less than 2,000 km range, like Pakistan's Ghauri and Shaheen missiles and China's solid-fuel Dongfeng-21 (NATO designation: CSS-5). 

BMD Phase 2 is intended to defend against ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 2,000 km, including missiles equipped with decoys and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles. 

Longer range missiles not only climb higher following a ballistic trajectory but also hurtle down on the target at much greater speeds than shorter range missiles. During their terminal phase, ICBM warheads can reach speeds twice those of intermediate range missiles. 

The Phase 2 system will feature longer range radars (with a detection range of 1,500 km, compared to 600 km for Phase 1 radars), and hypersonic interceptor missiles flying at Mach 6-7 (as opposed to Mach 4-5 for Phase 1 missiles) with agility and the capability to discriminate against ballistic missile defence countermeasures. 

The Phase 2 system is expected to offer capabilities broadly comparable to those of the US THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) system. THAAD missiles can intercept ballistic missiles over 200 km away and track targets at ranges in excess of 1,000 km.

In addition to new interceptors, Phase 2 also required a new radar and test ranges. 

Phase 2 Radar

DRDO is developing an Over-the-horizon (OTH) radar for Phase 2, based on the Swordfish radar acquired from Israel. Israel will provide some equipment and consultancy for the new radar, which would feature 80% indigenous components.

Test Range

India initially had two missile test ranges at Chandipur and Wheeler Island. These are suited for testing missiles with ranges up to 300 km. Missile launches require evacuation of nearby areas, and testing different trajectories/altitudes was difficult.

Phase 2 testing of the BMD system requires two ranges placed well apart along the missile trajectory. DRDO is developing two new missile ranges at Machilipatnam in Seemandhra and Rutland Island in the Andamans. 

In October 2024, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approved the establishment of a new missile testing range in Nagayalanka in Krishna district, Andhra Pradesh. 

A total of 154.42 hectares has been proposed for the project, covering the test facility in above six hectares and technical facility, a few launch pads, control centre and state-of-the-art communication infrastructure in 130 hectares.

Floating Test Range

In support of BMD Phase 2 development, India has now also deployed a floating test range (FTR), a ship that features a launch pad, launch control centre, and mission control centre, along with advanced telemetry and tracking systems.

The FTR facilitates live tests (instead of simulations) for varying trajectories, different altitudes, and longer ranges (up to 1,000–1,500 km). 

The vessel was specifically intended to support the development and testing of the BMD Phase 2 system. 

The FTR (INS Anvesh) has a displacement of approximately 10,000–11,300 tonnes, is about 200 metres long, and was built by Cochin Shipyard Limited with DRDO design input. It was commissioned into the Indian Navy in March 2022.

INS Anvesh features 4 × Ship Launch Systems (SLS) — Vertical launch systems installed in the aft section. These rest flat when not in use and raise to a vertical (90°) position for firing.

AD-1 Test in June 2026 : PIB Photo

On April 21, 2023, DRDO carried out the maiden flight trial of a sea-based endo-atmospheric interceptor missile (AAD Ashwin interceptor of BMD Phase 1). The MoD described the test, carried out off the coast of Odisha in the Bay of Bengal, as  the first sea-based BMD interceptor test by India.

INS Dhruv MRIS

In addition to INS Anvesh, India also has a missile-range instrumentation ship (MRIS), equipped to monitor trajectories of longer-range ballistic missiles. The 15,000 tonnes displacement ship built by Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL) Visakhapatnam was handed over to the Indian Navy in September 2021.

The MRIS features an X-Band primary AESA radar and an S-Band secondary AESA radar.

The tracking radars can track the inbound flight trajectories of surface and submarine-launched ballistic missiles,  including any manoeuvrable warheads released by the missiles.

In addition to long-range missile tracking, the ship can track satellites and conduct electronic intelligence (ELINT) missions. 

Conclusion

DRDO first tested the AD-1 interceptor in November 2022. At that time, the AD-2 interceptor was still under development.  The AD-2 was eventually tested in July 2024. 

Both interceptors were tested in quick succession during the June 10–11 trials, suggesting that the system is maturing rapidly.

The commencement of user trials in the near future would be a significant milestone and a welcome development for Indian defence planners, particularly given the growing importance of ballistic missile defence demonstrated by recent conflicts in the Middle East.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Why the BrahMos-NG Delay Could Be Good News for Indian Self-Reliance

Development trials of the BrahMos-NG missile have been pushed back by at least a year, TASS reported on June 10.

BrahMos Aerospace Joint Venture (JV) Managing Co-Director Alexander Maksichev told TASS on the sidelines of the International Maritime Defense Show Fleet 2026:

"Flight tests of the new-generation BrahMos-NG missile have not yet begun due to the fact that the customer has slightly changed its requirements. Therefore, we still have to make some improvements."

"In other words, the requirements for the missile have become stricter and more demanding, so we will need some time to upgrade this missile and meet the new requirements. So we are still acting according to plan," Maksichev said.

The redesign of the BrahMos-NG is expected to take about a year, Maksichev noted.

BrahMos-NG Project Genesis

BrahMos Aerospace first announced the BrahMos-NG missile concept in March 2011.

The BrahMos-NG is not a BrahMos variant; it is a clean-sheet, high-supersonic missile that will be smaller and lighter than the current BrahMos.

Initially, the missile's qualitative requirements included:

Weight and dimensional compatibility for carriage by lighter fighter aircraft such as the Tejas Mk.1A and MiG-29UPG.

Internal carriage by the FGFA, which was to be jointly developed by India and Russia.

The missile was initially projected to be 6 m long and 0.5 m in diameter, with a top speed of Mach 3.5, a 200–300 kg warhead, and a maximum range of 290 km.

However, in July 2019, a BrahMos official reportedly told India Today that the missile would be 5 m long—possibly to enable torpedo-tube launch.

More recent press reports have claimed that the new missile will be capable of launch from standard submarine torpedo tubes, similar to the submarine-launched Exocet used on Scorpène submarines.

Clues to the Likely Cause of Delay

In September 2025, Maksichev told TASS:

"We are currently at the working design stage, which we will complete next year, and then we will move on to autonomous tests."

He added that it was too early to discuss timelines for actual flight testing.

In April 2026, Navbharat Times reported that the BrahMos-NG project had not yet received government clearance.

It now appears that the clearance may have been withheld to accommodate an additional qualitative requirement.

Considering that torpedo-tube launch capability was first publicly discussed in 2019, it is clearly not a new requirement. So what additional requirement has emerged?

One possibility is the use of an indigenously developed ramjet engine instead of a Russian-designed ramjet.

A New Ramjet Engine

Because the BrahMos-NG must be significantly smaller and lighter, it requires a new scaled-down ramjet engine.

During Aero India 2019, a BrahMos official stated that Russia's NPO Mashinostroyenia was developing this new engine.

This engine, like the missile itself, is a clean-sheet design. Feasibility studies and engineering analysis were reportedly completed around 2020.

It is possible that India's Ministry of Defence, currently the only customer for the BrahMos-NG, now wants the missile to be developed around an Indian-designed and Indian-developed ramjet engine.

Initially, BrahMos Aerospace assembled BrahMos missiles in India using ramjet engines produced at a plant in Russia's Orenburg region. Later, BrahMos Aerospace signed a technology-transfer agreement with its Russian partner to facilitate indigenous manufacture of the engine.

India has since begun using locally manufactured liquid-fuelled ramjet engines in BrahMos missiles.

Major airframe assemblies that form an integral part of the ramjet engine are now indigenously produced by Indian industry. These include metallic and non-metallic airframe sections comprising the ramjet fuel tank and pneumatic fuel-supply system.

Indigenous Ramjet for the NG

Building on the ramjet technology acquired through the BrahMos JV, India launched its own liquid-fuelled ramjet (LFRJ) design and development programme.

DRDL, a DRDO laboratory, is developing a technology-demonstrator LFRJ engine with a diameter of 350 mm for potential application in missiles and aerial targets.

The technology demonstrator powers DRDO's Supersonic TARget (STAR) project. Primarily intended for training surface-to-air and air-to-air weapon systems, STAR features a booster-ramjet combination and can achieve speeds of Mach 1.8–2.5, ranges of 55–175 km, and operating altitudes between 0.1 and 10 km.

STAR is also evolving into a combat-capable platform, with potential anti-AWACS, anti-radiation, and low-cost anti-ship variants.

An LFRJ derivative is also reportedly being developed to power the BrahMos-NG.

In November 2025, DRDO reportedly issued a Request for Information (RFI) to select a Development-cum-Production Partner (DcPP) for an LFRJ engine. The RFI may be aimed at developing a suitable LFRJ for the BrahMos-NG. If so, DRDL has likely firmed up the engine's design specifications.

The design changes now being requested for the BrahMos-NG may well be intended to accommodate a DRDL-developed ramjet engine rather than a Russian engine.

Ramjet engines are mechanically simple, but their development involves demanding challenges in materials, inlet optimization, combustor design, and fuel-flow management. As a result, the propulsion system is often among the most difficult subsystems of a missile to indigenize. Under the circumstances, it is conceivable that the DRDO-developed ramjet does not match the dimensional specifications of the Russian engine originally envisaged for the BrahMos-NG, necessitating design changes to accommodate it.

Conclusion

Using an indigenously developed ramjet for the BrahMos-NG would be a bold move aimed at consolidating the self-reliance that India has already achieved in missile technology. Relying on a yet-to-be-developed indigenous engine does entail the risk of schedule slippage. However, that risk is acceptable because import options will always remain available to bridge any temporary operational capability gaps caused by delays.

Temporary import dependence is preferable to committing an indigenously developed weapon system to permanent dependence on a foreign vendor.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

The Next India-Pakistan Conflict Will Be Won by Drone Killers

 

The ability to defeat drones is increasingly proving to be more important than the ability to field them. That is perhaps the most important lesson emerging from the wars in Ukraine and Iran—a lesson Indian military planners need to factor into preparations for the inevitable next conflict across our western border.

According to General Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, most Russian Shahed drones and other aerial attack systems neutralized by Ukrainian forces are now being brought down by interceptor drones.

Not helicopter gunships, armed light trainers, directed-energy weapons (DEWs), low-cost air-defence missiles, or specialised anti-aircraft guns firing programmable airburst ammunition. No—just interceptor drones.

Operationally effective interceptor drones have been around for more than a year. It is time DRDO took note of them.

Interceptor drones are optimised for low cost and typically destroy their targets by ramming them. Some variants employ a small warhead to increase the probability of a successful interception.

Currently, the three most prominent interceptor drones operating in Ukraine are:

* Sting (Ukraine) * Merops AS-3 Surveyor (United States) * Yolka (Russia)

In the following sections, we examine their features, capabilities, and key differentiators.

FPV Interceptor Drones

Interceptor drones were initially FPV (First-Person View) drones that relied on real-time radio control and live video feeds.

Using RF sensors, it is possible to detect the communication link between a drone and its operator, allowing triangulation and pinpointing of the operator's location. The control link can also be jammed or spoofed using electronic warfare (EW) systems.

FPV drone operators face significant danger because they must remain relatively close to the front line to maintain a strong signal. This exposes them to artillery fire, snipers, counter-drone attacks, and detection through radio-frequency triangulation.

Russian forces exploit this vulnerability by pairing Geran-2 drones. If an FPV interceptor is launched against one Geran-2, the second drone can use onboard sensors to locate the operator and attack immediately.

Ukraine's Sting Interceptor Drone

The most successful Ukrainian-developed interceptor drone currently in service is the Sting. The low-cost drone (approximately $2,000–2,100) uses a quadcopter architecture and features a 3D-printed aerodynamic airframe shaped like a bullet.

The Sting is capable of speeds of approximately 280–343 km/h. It is designed primarily as a kinetic interceptor, with the operator steering it directly into the target. Guidance is provided through day and thermal cameras, with possible sensor fusion from radar systems.

Ukraine began employing the Sting in combat during the spring of 2025, with widespread deployment by June 2025. The first publicly documented success occurred in April 2025 when footage of a Sting downing a Shahed-type drone went viral.

Sting Interceptor Drone Photo: The Telegraph

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Sting is its ability to be operated remotely from hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away.

Like other FPV drones, the Sting maintains a line-of-sight link to a forward control station. However, this forward station functions primarily as a relay node, connecting the drone to its pilot via Starlink's low-latency internet network. As a result, the pilot can be located virtually anywhere in the world.

Ukrainian operators typically control the drone from hardened shelters. The architecture also allows Sting drones to be launched from unmanned surface vessels (USVs).

Autonomous Interceptor Drones

The next generation of interceptor drones is being designed to operate autonomously using AI-powered machine vision, both during the day and at night.

These drones can independently detect, track, and engage targets without continuous human involvement. As a result, they do not require a vulnerable control channel that can be jammed or spoofed.

In effect, they are launch-and-scoot weapons that remove the operator from the battlefield and significantly reduce operational risk.

Russian Yolka Drone

Russian forces began operational deployment of the autonomous Yolka interceptor drone in early 2026.

The Yolka can be hand-launched, enabling widespread and highly distributed deployment. Once launched in the direction of a target, it operates autonomously.

Weighing approximately 1.3 kg, the Yolka is also based on a quadcopter architecture similar to the Sting. It can reach speeds of 200–250 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 2 km.

Yolka vs Sting

The Yolka is significantly lighter and cheaper than the Sting, with an estimated cost of roughly $500 compared to the Sting's $2,000-plus price tag.

However, these savings come with trade-offs. The Yolka's range is limited to approximately 2.5–4 km, compared with the Sting's estimated 25–37 km range. It is also slower than its Ukrainian counterpart.

Merops AS-3 Surveyor

In addition to the Sting, Ukrainian forces are employing the American-made Merops AS-3 Surveyor, a sophisticated but significantly more expensive interceptor system.

Unlike the Sting and Yolka, the AS-3 requires catapult launch, reducing deployment flexibility. However, its conventional fixed-wing airframe enables much higher aerodynamic efficiency and speed.

The truck-portable counter-drone system consists of:

* Radar and electro-optical sensors for target detection and tracking * A command-and-control station * Pneumatic or mobile launch platforms * A fleet of Surveyor interceptor drones

The AS-3 derives its effectiveness from a combination of AI-enabled autonomy, high speed, and resistance to jamming.

After launch, the drone is initially guided using the sensors of the Merops system. During the terminal phase, it relies on onboard infrared and RF sensors combined with AI-powered machine vision.

The drone can continue homing in on its target even when satellite navigation and communication signals are jammed.

AI-powered machine vision, combined with the fusion of infrared and RF sensor inputs, is central to the Surveyor's effectiveness.

With a maximum speed of approximately 280 km/h, the AS-3 is capable of overtaking Russian Geran drones.

The current unit cost is estimated at around $15,000, although this is expected to fall below $10,000 as production scales.

Quadcopter vs Fixed-Wing Interceptors

The Sting and Yolka are quadcopter drones. They are simpler and cheaper to manufacture but are aerodynamically less efficient because they lack wings to generate lift and glide efficiently through the air.

Consequently, quadcopters are not optimised for sustained high-speed flight.

To intercept faster fixed-wing drones, quadcopter interceptors often position themselves above the incoming target. At the appropriate moment, they dive, converting altitude into speed and enabling a successful interception.

Future Developments

Interceptor-drone development is currently focused on increasing speed through the adoption of fixed-wing designs such as the AS-3 Surveyor.

Reusability is another area receiving considerable attention.

Fixed-wing drones can achieve higher speeds in level flight and generally manoeuvre more efficiently during the terminal interception phase.

Russian forces have already begun mass deployment of fixed-wing interceptor drones, including a dedicated air-defence variant of the Molniya family known as the Molniya-PVO. The drone is reported to be capable of speeds between 220 and 330 km/h.

Like the Yolka, the Molniya can be hand-launched. Alternatively, it can be launched using a lightweight catapult.

Conclusion

Ukraine seized an early lead in interceptor-drone technology with the Sting. Russia has largely closed the gap with the rapidly evolving Yolka and is now introducing fixed-wing interceptors such as the Molniya-PVO.

One important point stands out. Starlink has given Ukrainian forces a low-latency communications advantage that Russia is unlikely to match for several years.

There is another lesson for Indian defence planners. Rapid advances in drone autonomy are being driven by access to high-performance AI semiconductors and resilient communications networks.

India remains a long way from sovereign access to either low-latency broadband networks comparable to Starlink or the cutting-edge AI chips needed to support the next generation of autonomous combat systems.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.