IAF vs PLAAF: Assessing the J-20 Threat

 

Dual seat variant of the J-20 via Twitter

Introduction

The J-20 is a large and heavy all aspect stealth fighter, sometimes referred to as a light bomber. Based on the geometry of its shape, it likely has a very low front aspect RCS and reasonably low side aspect RCS. However, rear aspect RCS reduction is minimal. 

The J-20 was developed to penetrate undetected airspace in the vicinity of a US Navy Carrier Battle Group to a depth required to track the warships for guiding ballistic missiles such as the DF-26 or to directly attack the ships using anti-shipping cruise missiles in its internal bomb bay.

Suppression of Enemy Air Defense Systems

The size of the J-20 and the lack of rear aspect stealth compromise its overall RCS to a value that is likely significantly more than 0.0015 dBsm RCS of the F-35. However, there can be little doubt that the J-20 would be able to penetrate Indian airspace completely undetected for suppressing our air defense systems including command and control centres, radars and missile sites.

A statement by the former IAF CAS Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa (Retd.) that IAF Su-30MKI have been able to detect the J-20 must be taken in the right context. The J-20's lower side aspect stealth would allow such detection at ranges or around 40-50 kms using the Su-30MKI's powerful BARS radar, but the radar would not be able to obtain a weapon grade track. Also, it is likely that PLAAF J-20 fighters flying in close proximity to the LAC would use RF reflectors or lenses to spoof RCS assessment.

Operating undetected in Indian airspace, the J-20 would be able to strike radar and missile sites with its internally carried precision guided LACMs to degrade IAF air defenses. The stealth fighter would also be able to act as a forward penetrating sensor of massive cruise missile attacks launched by PLAAF H-6 bombers. (The PLAAF's cruise missile threat would be covered in a subsequent post.)

Air Dominance

The stealth advantage of the J-20 would give it a first see, first shoot advantage in BVR combat over all IAF fighters except the Rafale and the Su-30MKI. The Rafale would stand a fighting chance against the J-20 with its low RCS, Spectra self protection suite with RF cloaking and Meteor 150-km BVR missile, My earlier Thumkar post J-20 vs Rafale delves into the relative strengths of the two fighters in greater detail.

The Su-30MKI would stand a survival chance against the J-20 with its powerful BARS that could alert it's pilot  to the presence of a J-20, if not provide a weapon grade track. Also, the Su-30MKI with its super maneuverability could outmaneuver a J-20 launched JL-15 air-to-air missile during its end game maneuvering.

Exploiting the J-20's Sensor Fusion Weakness

Recent reports of a dual seat J-20 variant sighting, in the context of China's earlier claim that a dual seat variant is under development, confirms that the J-20's sensor fusion is subpar - otherwise there's no operational reason to put a second seat on a stealth fighter! (Ironically, the dual-seat variant of the J-20 corroborates the assessment that the J-20 stealth shaping is good. Adding a second seat will increase the RCS and the fact that China is doing so suggests that the RCS is low enough to absorb a compromise.) 

Without excellent sensor fusion and cockpit displays interpreting readouts from multiple sensors can easily overwhelm the sharpest of pilots leading to paralysis by analysis of incorrect decisions. The IAF could exploit this weakness of the J-20 to its advantage. For example, by putting multiple threats in the J-20 's vicinity to bait it into WVR combat. 

Basing

The PLAAF has a limited number of operationally deployed J-20 stealth fighters. They are based in Wuhu,  Anhui Province, near the eastern coast. The J-20 is a highly specialized aircraft which likely depends on a lot of support facilities at its home base. It's RAM coating for example would need to be frequently tended. 

It's unlikely that the J-20 can be deployed for extended periods at bases in Tibet.

Also, operating from high altitude air bases on the Tibetan plateau, J-20 fighters would not be able to carry their full weapon / fuel payload. As a result, their combat range or potential would be constrained. Also,The physical displacement of PLAAF air bases from the LAC would result in longer time to target, and restricted fuel load would mean shorter time on target.

It's unlikely that the J-20 could operate from Hotan (4,672 ft) or Kashghar (4, 529 ft) for operationally significant time. (Ngari (14,022 ft) is likely unsuitable for J-20 operations. Of course, the J-20 could operate from Wuhu and tank up in the air en-route to Ladakh. But then its role would hardly be operationally significant. 

Via Twitter

IAF Options

For the IAF, one way of mitigating the J-20 threat would be to acquire a reliable detection capability. We have the time and we have the sources to acquire radars that can obtain non weapon grade tracks on the J-20. 

Deployment of such radars would allow the IAF to detect the presence of J-20s in proximity to the LAC and send a package to exploit the sensor fusion weakness of the aircraft. If not that, detection would allow IAF fighters operating in the vicinity to evade the J-20s

Also, the IAF would be able to use gaps between J-20 patrols for its interdiction and close support missions along the LAC.

Conclusion

In the context of an IAF vs PLAAF faceoff in Ladakh, the J-20s could play a limited but operationally significant role.

Because of their limited number and operational deployment challenges, it's unlikely that the PLAAF would use the aircraft extensively. However, sensational deep penetration of Indian airspace followed by painful strikes would be good publicity for Chinese technology. It's likely that the PLAAF would carry out such strikes with their best trained pilots using the best of their weapons.

The J-20 threat is real and cannot be wished away by loud shouting on television debates. The IAF must move quickly to augment its stealth fighter detection capability to mitigate the threat.

IAF vs PLAAF - The PLA's UAV Threat

J-20 vs Rafale

IAF vs PLAAF - The PLA's UAV Threat

 

Wing Loong 1 at MAKS 2019

Introduction

This is the second article of series that I am writing analyzing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the IAF and the PLAAF in the context of the face-off between the IA and the PLA along the LAC in Ladakh. The first article of the series was Rafale vs J-20.

The threat posed by PLA reconnaissance and armed UAVs to Indian Army (IA) operations along the LAC is mostly ignored by our main stream media and, going by the total absence of attack drones in the IA and Indian Air Force (IAF) inventory, by our military, civilian and political leadership. 

The inexplicable and shocking absence of armed drones in the Indian inventory is likely attributable to the very flawed IAF doctrine that relies exclusively on multi-role aircraft and PGMs to provide close air support (CAS), and a mindset that believes armed drones are useful only for anti-terrorists operations. 

In the following paragraphs I will provide an overview of the PLA's UAV capability. Having understood the PLA drones capability, we will dwell on how the PLA would likely leverage the capability to maul the IA in the valleys along the LAC and on the flat high ground of Depsang, BMP-2 ICVs and T-90 MBTs et al! Finally, we will discuss some options available to the IA to mitigate the PLA drone threat, through emergency procurement or relatively inexpensive material. Do note, I say 'mitigate the drone threat' not 'eliminate the drone threat!'

PLA UAVs

The PLA has numerous types of   

• Slow speed piston/turboprop powered reconnaissance and attack UAV's ranging from portable, small and MALE. 
• High speed, turbojet/turbofan powered reconnaissance and attack MALE and HALE UAVs with varying degrees of stealth, ranging from front aspect stealth to flying wing all aspect stealth. 
• Specialized UAVs equipped including 
• A high altitude UAV featuring a AESA radar that can detect and track LO fighters 
• An air launched low hypersonic speed drone to obtain targeting information for missiles

Most PLA MALE and HALE drones can operate beyond line of sight (LOS) and in the past, the PLAAF has demonstrated the ability of its armed MALE UAVs to carry out precision strikes at long ranges using satellite data links.

The number of Chinese institutions working on design and development of UAVs is impressive, their repertoire of UAVs even more impressive, and most impressive of all is the spectrum of precision strike weapons and supporting E/O targeting systems that China has developed for its armed UAVs. As we will see later in the text, the small size and weight of the air-to-ground missiles and bombs carried on the UAVs vouches for their precision strike capability. Most importantly perhaps, China has developed the PGMs keeping costs in mind. Chinese PGMs are much more affordable than their western counterparts they will be used extensively

In the past, the PLAAF has demonstrated the ability of its armed MALE UAVs to carry out precision strikes at long ranges using satellite data links.

Many of the UAVs developed by China represent work in progress. Some, like the air launched low hypersonic speed WZ-8 drone and the AESA equipped Divine Eagle HALE drone developed for tracking stealth fighters, are not relevant to the PLAAF vs IAF scenario. In the following paragraphs we will look at PLA UAVs that are most likely to confront Indian forces and the weapons that they are known to carry.

A comprehensive write up on PLA UAVs can be perused at this link on my paid access website IDP Sentinel  

PLA UAVs

BZK-005

The BZK-005 is a MALE reconnaissance drone which is believed to be in service with units of the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) as well as with a special group subordinate to the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission. The drone is similar in appearance and capability to the Israeli Searcher drone in service with the IAF. 

The BZK-005 features a satellite based data link allowing it to operate well beyond LoS. 

The UAV reportedly has a speed of 150-180 kph, a service ceiling of 8,000 m and an endurance of 40-hr. It can carry a 50-kg payload.

A variant of the BZK-005 features a system mounted under the UAV's nose that could be electronic support measures (ESM), a radar, or a communication relay.

CH - 4 / Wing Loong - 1

(Photograph on top)

The CH-4 is a MALE drone that appears uncannily similar to the General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, with one visual difference being that the ventral fin below the V-tail on MQ-9 is absent on CH-4.

There are two variants. The CH-4A, a reconnaissance drone with 3500–5000 km range and 30- to 40-hour endurance, and the CH-4B, which bundles attack and reconnaissance capabilities with provisions for 6 weapons and a payload of up to 250 to 345 kg.

Specs

• Length: 9.05 m (29 ft 8 in)
• Wingspan: 14 m (45 ft 11 in)
• Height: 2.77 m (9 ft 1 in)
• Gross weight: 1,100 kg (2,425 lb)
• Powerplant: 1 × Rotax 914 turboprop, 75 kW (100 shp)
• Propellers: 3-bladed

Performance

• Maximum speed: 280 km/h (170 mph, 150 kn)
• Range: 4,000 km (2,500 mi, 2,200 nmi)
• Endurance: 20 hours
• Service ceiling: 5,000 m (16,000 ft)

The PLAAF designation for the armed variant CH-4B is GJ-1 (Gongji 1 or Attack 1). It features a chin mounted reconnaissance/targeting pod as well as hardpoints to carry weapons such as.

• BA-7 air-to-ground missile
• YZ-212 laser-guided bomb
• YZ-102A anti-personnel bomb
• LS-6 50-kG miniature guided bomb.

In May 2016, China demonstrated the CH-4s ability to strike targets with high precision using SATCOM data link and E/O target acquisition and targeting system. 

The CH-4B UCAV has been exported to Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iraq

CH - 5 / Wing Loong - 2

The CH-5 is similar in design but larger than the Chengdu CH-4. The PLAAF designation for the armed variant of the CH-5 is GJ-2.

China claims Wing Loong - 2 is better than the American MQ-9 Reaper "because it surpasses the latter's flight duration and operational efficiency". 

UAV has a wingspan: 21 m, max take-off weight: 3.3 ton, max suspension weight: 1 ton, Endurance: 40 hours, Max range: 6,500-km.

The CH-5 can carry between 16 and 24 air-to-surface missiles. An upgrade would extend its range to 10,000 km.

Standard payloads include an electro-optical turret that has infrared, laser rangefinder and designator capabilities as well as a separate synthetic aperture radar. Electronic intelligence, communications intelligence and electronic warfare payloads are also available

The CH-5 has been exported to Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, UAE, Uzbekistan

FL-1 MALE USAV

via Twitter

The FL-1 bears a strong physical resemblance to the 3,300 kg-class CH-5.

Both UAVs feature ventral EO/IR turret. The FL-1 appears visually distinct from the CH-5 because of its pronounced wing root fairings.

The UAV is powered by a rear-mounted heavy fuel engine of an undisclosed type with a dorsal intake. This engine drives a three-bladed pusher propeller, which enables the vehicle to cruise at speeds of up to 240 km/h at altitudes of 16,404–19,685 ft and attain an operating ceiling of 26,246 ft.

It's likely that the operational capability and endurance of the FL-1 exceed those of the CH-5.

GJ-11 Sharp Sword Stealth UCAV

The GJ-11 long-range stealth attack drone is designed to penetrate deep into contested airspace without being detected to strike strategic targets or ferret out targets and relay targeting information for air or ground launched missiles. The drone is likely armed with internally carried missiles and laser-guided bombs.

TB001 Armed Reconnaissance UAV

via Twitter

The operational status of the TB001 is not known.

The MALE class drone performed its maiden flight in March 20, 2020. 

Known locally as the "Twin-tailed Scorpion," the TB001 reportedly has a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 2,800 kg, an overall wingspan of 20 m, a length of 10 m, and a height of 3.3 m. 

TYW-1 Armed Reconnaissance UAV

Source: Via YOUUAV.com

The operational status of the UAV is not known. It is similar but slightly heavier than the BZK-005

The 9.85 m-long and 2.5 m-high TYW-1 reportedly has a maximum take-off weight of 1,500 kg compared with the 1,250 kg of the BZK-005.

According to Chinese media reports, the TYW-1 can carry a 370 kg payload, features four underwing pylons, has a ceiling of 7.5 km, an endurance of 40 hours, and can reach a top speed of 200 km/h.

The UAV is equipped with an electro-optical system that can reportedly read a license plate 50 km away from an altitude of 5,000 m. It also features both line-of-sight and satellite navigation and control systems.

Wing Loong - 10 / Wind Shadow / Cloud Shadow UAV

The Wing Loong 10 (Wind Shadow) is a single turbofan powered RF LO MALE/HALE UAV. An armed, export oriented variant of the Wind Shadow, referred to as Cloud Shadow, is powered by the WP-11C turbojet engine, instead of a turbofan.

Cloud Shadow is the first high-altitude, high-speed fixed-wing UAV available for export by China . 

Wind Shadow is designed for long-range reconnaissance and strike missions. It's export variant was unveiled at  the 11th Zhuhai Air Show on October 31, 2016.

The UAV has a line-of-sight link radius of 290-km, cruising altitude of 14,000m and a maximum speed of 620-kph.

A variety of air-to-ground missiles and glide bombs were exhibited at the static display, including armaments such as the Blue Arrow-7 and -21, YJ-9E and AG-300M. 

The aircraft has a maximum payload of 400kg, a normal take-off weight of 3,000kg and endurance of six hours.

CH-92A

via Twitter

The CH-92A is a medium range tactical reconnaissance/attack drone with a command link effective up to 155 miles and an endurance exceeding eight hours. It can fly up to 16,400 feet (higher than certain short-range air defense systems can reach), and up to a maximum speed of 124 miles per hour.

A CH-92 battery can be deployed in the field in around an hour, and the drone’s tricycle landing gears allows it to take off from an unprepared field or highway. It can also be recovered by parachute if necessary.

The drone’s reported maximum payload of 165 pounds can encompass up to two FT-8 missiles as well as sensors carried in a turret under the nose including day/night thermal cameras (viewing range of 8-12 miles depending on time of day), laser rangefinder and targeting pod with a range of around 8 miles, and a Moving Target Indicator for tracking vehicle targets.

The CH-92 is reported to be capable of attacking moving targets using FT-8C and FT-18D air to surface laser guided missiles

The operational status of the UAV in the PLA is not known. The UAV was exported to Serbia.

Divine Eagle LO Radar Drone

via Twitter

Photographs of China's Divine Eagle drone first emerged in May 2015. The UAV reportedly first flew in February 2015.

The twin fuselage, 15-t Divine Eagle is believed to be the largest UAV ever built; it's estimated to be 15-m long, 6-m tall and between 35-m to 45-m from one wingtip to the other.  The drone features a five wheel landing gear layout. 

The Divine Eagle is powered by a single, 1-m diameter intake engine positioned between its tailfins. The engine is conjectured to a medium non-afterburning turbofan with 3 to 5 tons of thrust, sufficient to power a 12-18 tons max AUW drone. The US RQ-4 Global Hawk, uses a F-137-RR-100 turbofan engine with 3.4 tons of thrust. 

The twin fuselage configuration of the UAV facilitates installation of a large surface area L or S band radar, with minimum internal volume and weight.

The Divine Eagle is planned to carry multiple Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars with SAR and GMTI capability. Airborne Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) radar types are used to track airborne targets, like enemy fighters and cruise missiles. Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) provides high resolution imagery of slow moving ground vehicles and enemy bases. Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) radars are ideal for identifying and tracking ships, such as aircraft carriers. 

Chinese media suggests that the UAV would be used for a variety of missions such as early warning, targeting, EW, and satellite communications.

I didn't include the Divine Eagle in the post to begin with because its operational status was unknown. This October 12, 2020 India Today article suggests that the PLAAF has operationally deployed the Divine Eagle along the Indo-Tibet border. The article shows a Divine Eagle parked at the PLAAF airbase at Uxxaktal. 

UAV Weapons

Multiple Chinese companies have developed families of UCAV weapons including precision-guided land attack missiles, bombs, and air launched ATGMs.

The Wing Loong series are equipped with the LE380 sensor turret that can include a laser designator, enabling the aircraft to fire laser-guided munitions.

The Wing Loong - 2 can carry ASCMs such as the  YJ-9E. 

In the following text, we will focus on land attack weapon systems only. These can be classified as follows.

• LS series PGMs which are modular bomb upgrade kits for gravity bombs. The kit comprises a SALH guidance module and a gliding module.
• FT series PGMS which are modular bomb kits for gravity bombs comprising a INS/GPS guidance module and gliding module.
• YZ series anti personnel cluster bombs
• AKD, AR series ATGMs

The following is an incomplete list of weapons that can be carried by PLA armed drones.

AKD-10

The AKD-10 is an air launched version of the AFT-10 ground launched surface-to-surface anti-tank missile. The 50 kg (110 lb) missile uses MMW plus IIR seeker.

AR-1

The AR-1 is a 45 kg-class short range SAL anti-armour missile. A CH-5 can carry up to 8 AR-1 missiles mounted on its centreboard and outboard pylons

AR-2

The AR-2 is a short-range semi-active laser (SAL) air-to-surface missile for use in anti-terrorism operations and low-intensity conflicts.

The AR-2 missile is reportedly a lighter and less capable variant of the AR-1, but it's more cost effective and can, therefore, be expended more readily, saving the heavier missile for higher value targets.

The missile is compatible with the CH-4 and CH-5 drones.

The AR-2 can also be carried by other unmanned combat aircraft and Chinese attack helicopters after minor technical modifications..

Weighing about 20 kg and carrying a 5 kg warhead, the AR-2 has a maximum range of 8 km and a top speed of 735 km/h, the missile's designers told China Daily.

The AR-2 is reportedly effective against personnel, armored cars, houses, and bunkers.

YZ-212 

Laser-guided anti-personnel cluster bomb

YZ-102

A anti-personnel cluster bomb

CM-502

CM-502 missile (right extreme) at MAKS-2019

The CM-50X missile family is being developed and produced by China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) of China.

The precision strike missile has a 10km-40km range and is compatible with multiple launch platforms. The missile features a modular architecture facilitating use of different guidance systems and warheads. Typically, the missile features a TV/IR seeker and HE fuze-warhead. 

LS-6

The LS-6 is a 50-kg Laser guided precision bombs

TL-2

Tianlei-2 (TL-2) is an air-to-surface missile.

Blue Arrow-7 (BA-7, LJ-7)

Is a 47 kg (104 lb)  air-to-surface missile with a tandem HEAT warhead that can penetrate 1,400 mm (55 in). It has semi-active laser guidance, and an effective range of 2 kilometres (1.2 miles) to 8 km (5.0 mi). 

FT-8C

The FT-8C is a 44-lb laser-guided missile with a range of up to 5.5 miles. 

FT-9

50-kg INS/GPS guided bomb

FT-10

25-kg INS/GPS guided bomb

FT-18D

17.6-lb bomb with a range of 3 miles.

Conclusion

PLA reconnaissance drones have already made their presence felt along the LAC. They were reportedly used in the bloody Point 14 Galwan clash on June 15, 2020. Equipped with thermal imagers and operating from heights well beyond small arm fire range, PLA reconnaissance drones can track individual IA soldiers in day and night. 

Drones have unique advantages when operating in high mountain valleys. Because of their slow speeds (around 150 to 200 kph) they can comfortably fly in the valleys along the LAC. Engaging them with MANPADs featuring heat seeking missiles is a challenge because of their low thermal signature. Engaging then with QR or SR SAM systems with active seeker missiles is also a challenge because of the clutter from the surrounding high ground. 

PLA's MALE drones feature satellite data links. They would be operated from numerous airports (operational & under construction), heliports and dedicated UAV bases close to the LAC as shown in the annotated satellite imagery below posted on Twitter by @detrefsa_

All armed PLA drones would be equipped with PGMs - Anti personnel cluster bombs, semi-active laser homing glide bombs, INS/GPS guided glide bombs, air-to-surface missiles including ATGMs.

Almost the entire range of drone weapons have stand off capability with good range. 

PLA drone operations would likely be relentless - 24x7 in all weather. They would not be constrained by costs - of drone, drone operations or PGMs. 

The PLA would loose a lot of drones due to technical failures, piloting errors including CFIT (controlled flight into terrain) and IA ground fire. Considering that the drones and PGMs are manufactured by multiple agencies in China, the losses would be easy for the PLA to absorb.

Indian CAS Opertions

The Indian Army has capable MALE reconnaissance drones (Searcher, Heron) and smaller spotting and targeting drones. Our smaller drones are not known to be equipped with thermal imaging. 

IA and IAF armed helicopters (mostly armed with unguided rockets except the AH-64Es) would be tasked with CAS in the valleys. IAF fighters armed with very expensive imported stand off PGMs would have a limited role to play in valleys but a more substantial role on the Depsang plateau. 

Our helicopters would be engaged by adversary ground fire including surface to air missiles. There would be losses. Since armed helicopters are expensive assets, their losses would be difficult to sustain. Besides, they would involve aircrew losses or capture. 

IAF fighters providing CAS from medium altitudes would be engaged by adversary fighters and ground based missile defenses. CAS mission would have to be carried out by multiple variously armed (air-to-air missiles, PGMs, EW pods) fighter aircraft in a package. The missions would involve losses of fighters and losses/capture of aircrew. Considering how valuable these assets are, it would be difficult to sustain operations.

GPS/GSM Jamming

Many PLA reconnaissance drones are known to be capable of jamming GPS and GSM signal over a wide area. Such jamming would affect the accuracy of IAF PGMs using INS/GPS guidance.  

Options for Countering PLA UAV Threat

The Indian Army does have some last minute EW options to mitigate the PLA drone threat. These include

• Deployment of GPS/GSM jammers on Searcher and Heron drones
• Deployment of RF signal jammers with field units to disrupt the use of cluster bombs 
• Deployment of ground based and airborne jammers to disrupt data links

The systems mentioned above are not known to be in the IAF, IA inventory, but are available with countries friendly to India.

The problem with EW is that there is always a counter to the warfare technique being employed.