Nearly eight years after initiating procurement under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is finally poised to sign a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Roughly speaking, India currently operates around 600 fighter aircraft and is now poised to acquire 114 more.
In contrast, in 2025 alone, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is estimated to have inducted an additional 120 J-20A/J-20S heavy stealth fighters. (The J-20A is the dual-seat variant of the J-20.)
Also in 2025, the PLAAF inducted between 100 and 170 additional fighters, including the J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT, and J-10A/B/C.
In other words, the PLAAF may have added up to 300 heavy stealth and non-stealth fighters to its inventory in a single year.
A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projection suggests that by 2030, around 1,000 J-20A/S fighters and 900 J-16s will be in service with the PLAAF.
The number of J-20s manufactured increased from around 150 in August 2022 to 208 in November 2023. Production rates likely reached 100 aircraft per year in 2023 and have since stabilised at approximately 120 aircraft annually.
In addition to the projected 1,000 J-20A/S stealth fighters, the PLAAF may also induct several hundred land-based J-35 variants. The J-35 is believed to be in low-rate initial production, but output is expected to ramp up in the coming years. Based on the rapid ramp-up of J-20 production, between 200 and 300 J-35s could be operational by 2030. Notably, the J-35 will field highly capable sensors and weapons derived from systems painstakingly perfected for the J-20.
India's Foolhardy Nonchalance
Oblivious to this burgeoning threat, Indians are hotly debating the need for additional Rafale fighters. Worse still, the Indian government appears to be ignoring the Russian offer, despite the fact that the IAF has projected the need for two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter to plug a widening operational gap.
Frankly, the only plausible explanation for India sitting on the Russian offer appears to be deep Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States military–industrial complex (MIC) penetration of Indian corporates, the bureaucracy, and the political leadership. If so, Indian sovereignty is largely illusory. I hope this assessment is wrong—but the issue warrants serious reflection.
Urgent Need to Delink ToT from Weapon Acquisition
The primary reason for the approximately 30 per cent decline in the IAF’s squadron strength—from 42 to 29 squadrons—has been persistent delays in the delivery of the Tejas fighter and its follow-on variants, including the Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-2.
Shockingly, the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership never moved beyond superficial tinkering with procurement procedures to address these crippling delays. The outcome was predictable: the process stalled and eventually ran aground. Was this paralysis by analysis? Possibly. More likely, despite the optics, defence has never been more than a desultory priority for the political leadership.
Let us focus on the optics. No one disputes the need—or urgency—of Make in India for defence-related equipment. But where is the logic in allowing defence procurement to collapse because Make in India timelines cannot be met?
The problems with Make in India cannot be addressed through procurement policy changes alone; they are endemic to the current state of India’s industrial base.
For many technologically advanced components used in modern weapon systems—such as aero and marine engines, sensors, and advanced materials—India possesses neither the industrial base nor the technical know-how required for local manufacture. Indeed, the absence of know-how is itself a consequence of the absence of a mature industrial base.
The industrial base of any country evolves in response to market dynamics. When substantial demand emerges, the private sector—driven by profit incentives—moves rapidly to meet it. Firms upgrade industrial capacity, enter technology transfer arrangements, raise capital, hire skilled personnel, and undertake a range of other, often complex, adjustments necessary to compete.
India’s inability to develop several critical weapon-system components is not a failure of intelligence or talent. It stems from the absence of a mature industrial base, which in turn limits engineering excellence, advanced semiconductor fabrication capability, materials science depth, and related competencies. The gap is so fundamental that India is not even positioned to reverse-engineer, let alone replicate, cutting-edge technologies.
Defence Procurement and Make in India Are Parallel Processes
For reasons that remain unexplained, the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India (GoI) have tethered India’s defence preparedness to the Make in India programme. This flawed linkage has allowed national security to be held hostage to industrial policy.
It is a dangerous and indefensible conflation.
A familiar refrain follows: India should not buy Rafales because France has not agreed to transfer technology. This framing is faulty. It is not France but Dassault Aviation that has declined extensive transfer of technology—and understandably so. How can a private design house be expected to part with its core intellectual property when India lacks the industrial base and the pool of trained, experienced personnel required to absorb it? Moreover, Dassault’s very survival depends on intellectual property accumulated painstakingly over decades.
This raises a more fundamental question: why is India insisting on transfer of technology as part of every fighter aircraft procurement deal?
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) already know how to design and manufacture fighter aircraft. They have done so twice—first with the HF-24 Marut, and later with the Tejas.
What they may need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps—high-temperature engine technology, for instance. Such transfers should be negotiated independently, rather than being tied to acquisitions meant to address urgent operational shortfalls.
Indeed, Safran and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) are reportedly poised to sign a contract to co-develop an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter. The deal—reportedly cleared by the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and the Finance Ministry—is awaiting final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
The proposed agreement, valued at over ₹30,000 crore, reportedly involves full transfer of technology for a 120–140 kilonewton thrust-class engine, with joint intellectual property ownership and manufacturing in India.
So why does India need Rafale engine technology at all? After all, HAL has been assembling and partially manufacturing the AL-31F engine for the Su-30MKI locally for decades.
The core issue is this: if every fighter aircraft acquisition is made contingent on comprehensive transfer of technology, will India ever acquire fighters from abroad at all? Revisit the opening paragraphs and ask whether India can realistically counter the Chinese threat through local production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, LCA Mk-2, and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), supplemented by roughly 150 Rafales and about 270 Su-30MKIs—many of which have not undergone a major upgrade in nearly 25 years.
Conclusion
China’s military build-up has already reached overwhelming proportions.
Indian Air Force light fighters such as the Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-1A lack the range and payload required to effectively defend Indian airspace against the PLAAF—particularly against its stealth fighters (J-20A/S, J-35) and heavy multirole aircraft (J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT).
The IAF must urgently rebuild its combat strength to the authorised level of 42 fighter squadrons—and not with just any aircraft, but with platforms capable of credibly countering the PLAAF’s current and emerging threat.
Make in India remains an important long-term objective. It cannot, however, be India’s immediate operational strategy.
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