Rostec Reveals a Significant New Su-57 Capability Focused on MUM-T

 Rostec, in a statement on September 16, 2026, revealed that for its ferry flight to the recent El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt, the Russian Su-57E carried drop tanks in its internal weapons bay.

This appears to be the first time Rostec has publicly confirmed that the Su-57 can carry auxiliary fuel tanks inside its weapons bays. Until now, extra range was associated with external drop tanks. The El Alamein ferry is therefore the first official example of internal tank carriage on the type.

The stealth fighter completed the ferry with just one intermediate landing and, after that, still had enough fuel for another 1,000 km. That was enough to carry out a demonstration flight the next day.

Su-57 Internal Weapons Bays

The Su-57 has four internal weapons bays: two large tandem main bays in the fuselage between the engines (one forward, one aft). These typically carry four medium- or long-range missiles such as the R-77M, or larger weapons such as the R-37M or Kh-69. It also has two smaller side bays at the wing roots. Each side bay is designed for one short-range infrared missile (R-74M2).

It is highly likely that the Su-57 can carry drop tanks in one or both tandem main bays. In other words, the aircraft could carry a mix of weapons and drop tanks.

Standout MUM-T Capability

Internal carriage of fuel would not only extend its ferry range but also its combat radius. Most of all, it would greatly enhance its MUM-T endurance. Operating as a drone mothership, it could remain well clear of adversary air defenses while carrying a smaller air-to-air missile load.

Neither the F-35 Lightning II nor the F-22 Raptor can carry drop tanks in their internal weapons bays.

The F-35’s combat radius is similar to the Su-57’s, but its combat load is smaller. With similar combat loads, a Su-57 carrying some fuel internally would have a significantly longer combat range.

The F-22’s combat radius is significantly shorter than the F-35’s.

F-22,F-35 Weapons Bays

The Raptor’s three internal bays are for weapons only—typically six AIM-120s in the main ventral bay (or two 1,000 lb JDAMs plus missiles), plus two AIM-9s in the side bays.

The Lightning II has two internal bays sized and configured specifically for weapons—typically two 2,000 lb-class bombs plus AIM-120s (or more missiles with the Sidekick adapter), for a total internal payload of about 5,700 lb while remaining in a low-observable configuration.

Dan-T: Russia’s New Loitering Munition Raises More Questions Than Answers

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

The world premiere of the Dan-T loitering munition by Rostec at the El Alamein International Airshow 2026 has drawn considerable interest. Some would say it has cleared the air around a new Russian weapon system that has demonstrated an uncanny ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defences. Others would contend that it has only added to the confusion surrounding the weapon's actual capabilities.

In its statement, Rostec says:

The “Dan-T” munition operates on the “fire-and-forget” principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters.  

 

The product is equipped with a small-sized jet engine and can hit targets at a distance of hundreds of kilometres.  

 

The “Dan-T” has a special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems.  

 

The high effectiveness of the loitering munition has been confirmed by hundreds of successful launches against enemy targets in the special military operation zone.

Rostec's description of the weapon as “fire-and-forget” would imply that it is a cruise-missile-like weapon designed to strike a pre-programmed target based on coordinates or optical imagery. The question that arises, therefore, is: how then is it a loitering munition?

And what exactly is the “special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems”?

The weapon does not appear to feature an optical aperture for an infrared or TV seeker, making it unlikely that it is capable of machine-vision-based terminal navigation.

Under the circumstances, its ability to bypass enemy air-defence systems may derive from a combination of low-observable characteristics—including its small size and low radar cross-section—and the use of 12- or 16-channel jam-resistant satellite navigation.

Dan-T Antecedents

The Dan-T is reportedly derived from the Dan-M target drone, which was first operationally tested for combat use in May 2025.

The Dan-M's reported flight-performance capabilities include a cruise altitude of 50 to 9,000 metres, a cruise speed of 300 to 750 km/h and an endurance of approximately 70 minutes. Its take-off weight is 350 kg.

Dan-M History

The existence of the Dan-M was first publicly reported in August 2004.

The Dan-M was developed from the Dan target drone, designed for air-defence training and testing, which first flew in 1993.

The Dan-M programme aimed to provide greater endurance and range, with production reportedly expected around 2005. Later public reporting on a further-updated Dan-M, featuring a new engine and avionics, appeared around 2020.

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

Stealth Characteristics

All three Dan variants share essentially the same aerodynamic layout.

The differences appear to be internal and mission-related rather than the result of a fundamental redesign of the airframe.

While the Dan and Dan-M were target drones that likely carried a Luneberg lens to modify their radar signatures, the Dan-T does not appear to have a Luneberg lens. Another significant difference is that the Dan and Dan-M were designed for parachute recovery, whereas the Dan-T is an OWA (one-way attack) drone.

Banderol Similarity

The Banderol S8000, a jet-powered cruise-missile-like drone, looks remarkably similar to the Dan-T. Russia has been using the Banderol launched from its Orion MALE drone extensively in its ongoing systematic campaign against Ukraine's logistics, weapons-manufacturing, energy and export infrastructure.

However, while the Banderol is attributed to Kronstadt, which also developed the Orion drone, the Dan-T is believed to be an upgrade of the Dan-M target drone.

Banderols usually cruise at low altitudes, particularly when routed over the sea for strikes on targets in Odesa, avoiding radar detection right up to the moment they pop up to gain altitude and strike the target at an angle best suited for maximum damage.

The use of composites, besides stealth shaping and small size, adds to the low observability of the weapon, reducing detection range.

Launch-Platform Versatility

The use of a helicopter as a launch platform makes the weapon particularly versatile. Air launch increases the drone's effective range, while helicopter carriage allows it to be launched without the early warning that could accompany the radar detection of a fighter aircraft.

It is likely that the drone is programmed to operate mostly outside the engagement envelope of Ukraine's MANPADS and SHORAD systems.

By leveraging the Dan-T's superior flight performance, Russia could compel Ukraine to engage these drones with medium-range air-defence systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and SAMP/T. Not only are these systems available to the AFU in limited numbers, but their missile stocks are also scarce—both in Ukraine and among their original manufacturers.

Additionally, despite its improved performance, the Dan-M is likely to be a relatively affordable platform. Its unit cost is probably considerably lower than that of a medium-range air-defence missile.

By forcing Ukraine to expend its limited and expensive interceptor stocks against comparatively inexpensive drones, Russia could further erode the country's already strained air-defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The Banderol is known to be inexpensive, giving Russia the ability to ramp up production of the missile relatively easily. In mid-August 2026, HUR (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) told Militarnyi that Russia can produce up to about 80 S8000 Banderol missiles per month. Plants are described as working three shifts.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, stated in July that Russia’s planned rate for 2026 was 120 per month (roughly four a day if fully used). Later, in August, Beskrestnov said Moscow was trying to raise jet-powered munition output and that Banderol production could be pushed toward 300–400 per month.

The increased use of the Banderol bears testimony to its cost-effectiveness, if not its sophistication. Assuming that the Banderol and the Dan-T are similar weapons, if not the same weapons, Russia's El Alamein pitch for the sale of the missile could have many takers.

Russia’s Coca-Cola Strike: Retaliation, Deterrence or Coincidence?

During the past year or so, the US and its Western allies have increasingly become directly involved in Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia, including through the provision of targeting, intelligence and navigation-related information for Ukrainian long-range strike systems.

Russia now appears to be responding in kind by striking US and Western commercial interests in Ukraine. The apparent objectives are twofold: retaliation for Western involvement in attacks on Russian commercial and economic interests, and deterrence of further Western investment in Ukraine.

On September 3, Russian drones struck the Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine plant in Velyka Dymerka, in Kyiv region. The facility is Coca-Cola's only production site in Ukraine and one of Europe's larger bottling plants.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the strike as “a clear Russian signal to America,” arguing that Russia could not be unaware that it was striking an American-owned facility. 

In its account of the September 3 strikes, the Russian MoD did not specifically identify the Coca-Cola facility. Instead, it broadly claimed to have struck “enterprises of the military-industrial and fuel-energy complexes” involved in producing missiles, drones and components, supplying fuel to Ukrainian forces, and logistics facilities allegedly handling dual-use goods and UAV components.

Reports from Ukraine said a drone struck warehouses containing finished products, causing a large fire. No casualties were reported.

The Russian account therefore leaves the purpose of the Coca-Cola strike deliberately ambiguous. If the facility was intentionally selected because it belongs to an American company, the MoD's broader description provides Moscow with plausible deniability.

Coca-Cola and the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine said the company was assessing the damage with Ukrainian authorities and that employee safety remained the priority.

Not the First

The September 3 strike was not the first Russian attack on US commercial interests in Ukraine. A May New York Times investigation documented Russian strikes since mid-2025 on facilities linked to Coca-Cola, Cargill, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Flex and Bunge.

Representatives of several companies told visiting US senators that they believed the attacks were deliberate. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said the businesses believed they were being targeted intentionally. Andy Hunder of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine argued that Russia was attempting to deter further American investment.

There is, however, another plausible explanation. Some Ukrainian business figures and observers believe the attacks are part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukraine's industrial and logistical infrastructure, with the nationality of the company being incidental. In that interpretation, US companies are being hit because their facilities happen to be part of Ukraine's economic infrastructure.

Zelenskyy's “a clear Russian signal to America” characterisation could well have been a "cheeky" interpretation as it could well be possible that Ukrainian forces were using Coca Cola warehouses for military purposes thinking that Russia would not dare to strike them. 

The most plausible explanation may be that both motives are operating simultaneously: Russia is attempting to weaken Ukraine's economy while also signalling to Washington and other Western capitals that their commercial assets in Ukraine are not immune from the consequences of Western involvement in the war.

The Coca-Cola plant's highly visible American branding would have made it an especially potent symbolic target.

At the same time, the use of plausible deniability is important. There is no publicly available evidence establishing conclusively that Russia deliberately selected the Coca-Cola plant because it was American-owned. The strike can therefore be explained as an attack on Ukrainian economic infrastructure, even if its selection was in fact deliberate.

US Reaction

The US government has so far not publicly reacted to the September 3 Coca-Cola strike. Earlier in 2026, Washington's response to similar incidents was muted; a State Department spokesperson said the US had urged both sides to refrain from targeting American business interests.

Some US lawmakers and analysts have criticised this posture, arguing that Washington's restraint could establish a precedent in which American commercial assets in a war zone can be struck with little consequence.

But a more belligerent US response would carry its own problem: Washington would have to confront, rather than brush under the carpet, the extent of US involvement in enabling Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia.

Doing so could turn attacks on American commercial interests from an uncomfortable side-effect of the war into a direct US-Russia confrontation—and escalate an already dangerous conflict considerably further.

Ukraine Struggles to Develop Interceptor for Russia’s Faster Jet Gerans

 

Ukraine has yet to develop a reliable, scalable interceptor drone capable of engaging Russia’s increasingly fast jet-powered Geran attack drones, according to Serhiy Beskrestnov, better known by his callsign “Flash,” a Ukrainian technology specialist and adviser to President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

It was recently reported that the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has field tested and accepted the first jet interceptor drone Alexa Spatium, which is designed to combat kamikaze jet drones “Geran‑3”, “Geran‑4” and “Geran‑5”. However, the key performance characteristics of the interceptor, such as maximum speed, range and operational ceiling, were not disclosed making it difficult to assess the veracity of the Ukrainian claim.

Early in August, the UV Military Cluster company told Militarnyi that the company had created a drone named "Crazy" that will start shooting down Russian drones later in August. 

The vertical takeoff and landing drone is capable of carrying a payload weighing up to 0.5 kg. Its max flight range is 45 km, tactical flight range is 25 km and maximum endurance is 30 minutes. Its operational altitude can vary from 200 m to 10,000 m. A digital or analog camera can be installed on board, as well as thermal imaging or twilight optics.

The company highlighted the drone's thoughtful design, aerodynamic profile and balanced center of mass. The battery passes through the body, which allows you to evenly distribute the weight and avoid overloading the front of the drone.

The drone is available in two variants: a high-speed variant without wings that accelerates to 365 km/h and a winged variant that achieves 310 km/h.

Performance Shortfalls

In a recent interview with Radio NV, Beskrestnov acknowledged that Ukrainian manufacturers had failed to deliver the jet-drone interceptors they had promised during the winter of 2025–26. Some manufacturers had claimed that such systems would be available within “a few weeks,” but subsequent trials reportedly demonstrated that the interceptor drones lacked both the speed and technical characteristics required to reliably engage the faster Russian drones.

The problem is significant because Russia appears to be progressively increasing the speed and sophistication of its attack drones. The Geran-3 is reported to reach around 300–330 km/h, while the Geran-4 can reach approximately 450–500 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 5,000 metres. The newer Geran-5 is reported to be capable of approximately 600 km/h, placing it firmly in the performance class of a small cruise missile. The Banderol, a related Russian drone-missile, is also reported to fly at around 500–600 km/h, with a range of up to 500 km and a warhead of approximately 114–150 kg.

The implications for interception are considerable. Against a target travelling at 500–600 km/h, an interceptor needs not merely to match the target's speed but to have a substantial speed advantage to close the distance and manoeuvre for an engagement. This puts the desirable performance of an interceptor at roughly 600 km/h or more—well beyond the capabilities of many of the inexpensive interceptor drones currently being deployed by Ukraine. The 360 km/h speed capability of the "Crazy" drone referred to above illustrates the growing performance gap.

This creates a difficult technological and economic problem. A cheap interceptor drone is attractive for countering inexpensive mass-produced attack drones, but as the target becomes faster, the interceptor increasingly begins to require the performance characteristics—and consequently the cost and complexity—of a conventional aircraft.

Ukraine's inability to field a sufficiently capable interceptor at scale means that it currently has to rely on more expensive conventional air-defence methods. Fighter aircraft, predominantly F-16s, can engage the faster Russian drones with air-to-air missiles, while Ukrainian ground forces use MANPADS against targets within their engagement envelope.

Neither method, however, provides an obvious low-cost solution for dealing with large numbers of high-speed attack drones.

The issue is becoming particularly important as Russia expands the use of jet-powered variants of the Geran family. Unlike the relatively slow piston-powered Gerans that can be engaged by a wider range of air-defence systems, the higher speed of the jet-powered variants sharply reduces the time available for detection, tracking and interception.

The failure of Ukraine's promised interceptor programmes to produce a working system several months after the original deadlines therefore represents more than a development delay. It highlights the technological challenge involved in creating an inexpensive countermeasure capable of keeping pace with the rapid evolution of Russia's attack-drone fleet.

Russia's Expanded Use of Jet Drones

According to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the production volume of Geran-4/5 jet drones now exceeds the production of Geran-2 

As of March 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates that Russia produced about 5500 drones per month. As of August, the Main Intelligence Directorate, estimates the Russian industry produces about 3 thousand Geran-4/5 kamikaze drones and about 2.8 thousand Geran-2 attack drones every month.

Jet drone operational usage has gradually risen since early 2026. During the whole of 2025, Russian forces used 180 jet drones. In 2026, by the beginning of June, Russian forces had launched 1400 jet drones. 

In July, Russian forces used five times more jet UAVs than in June. During some attacks, two-thirds of the drones used were jet powered. 

Russian state media has also claimed that the jet-powered drones are being employed against higher-value targets.

RIA Novosti has reported that Russian forces are using jet drones and other precision weapons against decision-making centres, command posts and enterprises allegedly being used in cooperation with NATO specialists, both in Kyiv and elsewhere in Ukraine.

The emerging contest is therefore not simply one of producing more drones. It is becoming a race between increasingly sophisticated attack drones and increasingly capable—and ideally inexpensive—interceptors.

For Ukraine, Beskrestnov's admission suggests that the interceptor side of that race has so far failed to keep pace.

Black Sea Passivity Continues to Enfeeble and Embarrass Russia

 

Photo via Military Informant

Ukraine's Combined on Russian BSF

New Western satellite imagery provides confirmation that the Ukrainian jet drone and missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) on the night of August 12 likely caused serious damage to top-of-the-line warships — Project 11356R frigates Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov — in Novorossiysk Bay.

The large-scale combined attack was carried out using Neptune anti-ship missiles, Palianytsia jet-powered strike drones, and unmanned surface vessels.

Admiral Essen and Admiral Makarov are both key Kalibr cruise-missile carriers, equipped with eight vertical launch cells each. The imagery shows damage to the UKSK 3S14 area housing the Kalibr cruise missiles.

Admiral Essen shows signs of fire resulting from a drone strike on the UKSK cells. On Admiral Makarov, a breach in the bow section of the upper deck, to the left of the location of the Kalibr cruise missiles, is evident.

Military Informant states that "In addition, there are suspicions that the satellite communication station 'Centaur-NM1' and the detection radar 'Pozitiv-M1.2', located on the superstructure closer to the stern, were damaged."

This marked the third time in 2026 that both frigates had been damaged. Ironically, Russia relocated its Black Sea Fleet warships from Sevastopol to a "safe" harbor at Novorossiysk in Krasnodar Krai. Also, Admiral Makarov, which became the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet after the loss of the guided-missile cruiser Moskva in a Neptune anti-ship missile attack, has now sustained damage.

Ukrainian sources have additionally claimed damage to a Project 21631 Buyan-M small missile ship and the Project 22160 patrol ship Vasily Bykov, air-defence assets (including a 30N6E radar from an S-300 system), port infrastructure, and oil facilities at the Sheskharis terminal.

Though satellite imagery confirms damage to the Black Sea Fleet warships, it does not reveal the extent of the damage. It could well be largely superficial. In the worst-case scenario, the ships will require lengthy dockyard repairs.

Perplexing BSF Posture

It's difficult to see merit in the current posture of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. While it makes sense to relocate fleet warships at a greater distance from Ukrainian drone and missile launch pads, it is difficult to understand why the warships should passively remain in harbor, waiting to be struck.

It's possible that Ukraine is using containers on commercial shipping to launch missile and drone attacks, reducing time of flight and providing greater flexibility with attack vectors. If that is true, keeping warships docked makes even less sense because bunching targets facilitates combined attacks designed to overwhelm defences.

News Roundup: Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained, China Develops AI-Based Counter Stealth IR Seeker

Additional IN MQ-9B Lease Explained

The Ministry of Defence on Monday signed a contract with GA-ASI to lease two MQ-9B SeaGuardian High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) for the Indian Navy for a period of 30 months.

The confusing lease needs to be put in the correct perspective.

Earlier, on October 15, 2024, India finalised a deal with the United States to acquire 31 MQ-9B Predator drones.

Of the 31 MQ-9B Predators contracted for, 15 were earmarked for the Indian Navy and eight each for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force.

The deal includes setting up an MRO facility for the General Atomics-manufactured drones in the country and a separate follow-up technology-transfer deal.

India has not yet received any of the 31 MQ-9Bs under the October 2024 purchase contract. The first deliveries are currently scheduled for 2029.

In an interview published in early 2026, Admiral Dinesh K. Tripathi was asked when the Navy could expect the first of its 15 MQ-9 SeaGuardians. His answer was:

“Delivery of first two RPAs ... are scheduled to commence wef Q1/2029.”

Possible reasons for the stretched delivery timeline likely include the need to produce the sensors and weapons systems ordered by the three Indian services, as well as the equipment required to set up the MRO facilities in India.

US MQ-9 Reaper Losses

The US has reportedly lost 45 MQ-9A Reaper RPAs in its ongoing conflict with Iran. The MQ-9A designation is used for variants operated by the US, while the MQ-9B designation is used for export variants variously configured to meet individual customer requirements.

It is conceivable that the reported attrition, if true, could further stretch the delivery timeline to India because GA-ASI would need to divert manufacturing capacity, components, engines, sensors and skilled manpower to make up for the losses.

Earlier Lease

In November 2020, The ToI reported that India had inducted two MQ-9B SeaGuardians for surveillance missions after acquiring them on a one-year lease from US firm General Atomics. The lease was later extended.

Based at Naval Air Station INS Rajali at Arakkonam in Tamil Nadu, the two drones were to be used for long-range ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) missions over the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

In September 2024, the IN lost one of the two MQ-9s it had leased following a technical failure that resulted in a forced ditching.

The two additional MQ-9Bs contracted for lease would augment the surveillance capabilities of the IN. 

China Develops AI-Based IR Seeker That Could Strip F-22, F-35 of Their Stealth Cloak

Chinese researchers have developed a lightweight IR missile seeker that uses AI to recognize the relatively weak exhaust signature patterns of US F-22 and F-35 stealth fighters, even in the presence of IR countermeasures such as flares.

Lab tests showed recognition accuracy of more than 90% for simulated targets.

Sukhoi Explains the Need for the Su-57 Dual-Seat Variant

In an interview with the Military Acceptance programme on the Zvezda TV channel, Mikhail Strelets, director of the Sukhoi Design Bureau, revealed the following.

The twin-seat Su-57D is primarily intended for two main tasks:

Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.

Facilitating the use of sixth-generation technologies, such as operating as an airborne command post for controlling unmanned aerial vehicles. The primary pilot focuses on flying the mission profile, while the second pilot manages highly intelligent systems such as the S-70 Okhotnik, drone swarms and group-control systems.

The Su-57D will also facilitate the development of combat artificial intelligence, which Russia is currently working on.

Operating in Special Modes

One of the reasons stated for developing the Su-57D twin-seat variant is:

“Training pilots to operate the stealth fighter in special modes, something that is not possible using ground-based simulators.”

I am not sure what “special modes” alludes to.

If I were to guess, it would involve the networking of disparate systems that would be difficult to simulate on the ground.

One such mode could involve controlling a stealth drone operating deep in adversary territory, streaming target coordinates — possibly of a moving target — and relaying them to a precision-strike weapon system on the ground, such as the Iskander, or in the air, such as the Su-34.

The second pilot could manage the drone and other highly autonomous systems while the primary pilot concentrates on flying the mission and maintaining situational awareness.

Incidentally, Ukraine's Defence Intelligence Directorate recently reported recovering a Russian S-71M “Monokhrom”, a stealthy unmanned aircraft associated with the Su-57. The S-71 can reportedly perform both reconnaissance and strike missions, with the latter involving a kamikaze variant. The aircraft recovered by the Ukrainians was presumably the strike variant, which would explain why it was not recovered for reuse.

The Ukrainians found an NVIDIA Jetson Orin computer module in the S-71M, which they claim may indicate the use of AI. This provides an interesting indication of the increasingly sophisticated autonomous systems that could potentially be integrated into such a manned-unmanned architecture.

Perhaps this is what “special modes” refers to.

Su-57, S-71 Integration: Lethal Upgrade

On February 9, 2026, Russia's UAC delivered a large batch of Su-57s which, according to a UAC press release, were “in a new technical configuration.”

“The aircraft have received upgraded onboard systems and a new weapons complex.”

It is likely that the fresh batch of Su-57s delivered added the capability to carry the air-launched stealthy combat UAV designated S-71, a weapon first unveiled during Army 2024.

The S-71 is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking or destruction. Deploying and controlling a Su-57 carrying an S-71 variant would have required an upgrade of its onboard systems.

The S-71 began captive-carry trials in April 2024 at Russia’s Flight Research Centre in Zhukovsky, with test flights involving the Su-57 fighter.

You can read more details about the S-71 in my Thumkar blog post below:

On January 17, 2026, it was reported that an S-71K “Carpet” demonstrated its effectiveness for the first time by successfully destroying the highly mobile M142 HIMARS multiple-launch rocket system.

The cruise missile–drone hybrid has been developed by GosMKB Raduga JSC and can be used by 4++ generation multirole fighters, including the Su-35S and Su-30SM/SM2, as well as Su-34 NVO fighter-bombers.

Russia's Semiconductor Lithography Breakthrough: No More Washing Machines for Chips

The Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center (ZNTC), together with the Belarusian Planar, has reportedly completed the development and manufacture of a prototype photolithography unit with a design standard of 130 nm. This is the most advanced lithograph ever created on the territory of Russia and the Union State.

Microchips based on the 130-nm standard on 200-mm wafers are widely used in industrial electronics — car controllers, converters for the power industry, chips for communication base stations, secure microcontrollers for payment systems, and interface components for aviation and space. Russia has been manufacturing 130-nm microchips using photolithography systems imported from Nikon, Canon and ASML. Following Western sanctions, access to such equipment was severely restricted.

In the past, ZNTC has successfully developed and delivered to industry photolithography systems with 350-nm resolution. It has also created two prototypes of an electron-beam lithography system with a 150-nm standard, which are undergoing testing. Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) is distinct from photolithography — EBL is a semiconductor lithography technique that can be used for research, mask fabrication and low-volume manufacturing of semiconductors.

The new Russian breakthrough follows Russian success in developing an excimer laser, a critical component of photolithography technology.

In September 2024, Moscow-based LASSARD Group of Companies announced that it had produced two experimental high-power excimer-laser samples, at 193 and 248 nm, under the Russian "Progress 130" project.

In February 2026, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, reportedly said that this year Russia would master the production of lithography equipment with a 130-nm standard.

LASSARD is attempting to develop and industrialise a Russian excimer-laser light source specifically for semiconductor photolithography. Its work began with a 248-nm prototype for a 130-nm lithography system, followed by development of a 193-nm source for 90–45-nm lithography.

LASSARD is developing just the laser. The lithography machine is vastly more complicated than the laser. Other critical components include optics, the mask, wafer stage, photoresist, and alignment and focus systems.

Based on the report, the Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center, together with the Belarusian Planar, is developing the entire lithography machine.

Photolithography Explained

Making a semiconductor chip involves printing an extraordinarily complicated microscopic drawing onto a silicon wafer.

The wafer is coated with a light-sensitive material called photoresist. A pattern — representing transistors, wires, etc. — is projected onto the wafer through a mask. When photons interact with the photoresist, it changes chemically. The exposed or unexposed portions can then be removed, allowing the underlying silicon or other material to be etched or otherwise processed.

The smaller the wavelength of the light, the smaller the features that can potentially be printed.

That's why semiconductor manufacturing progressed from visible/near-UV light to deep ultraviolet (DUV).

Excimer Laser

An excimer laser produces extremely intense pulses of very short-wavelength ultraviolet light.

For semiconductor lithography, two wavelengths are relevant:

KrF (Krypton Fluoride) — 248 nm

ArF (Argon Fluoride) — 193 nm

These are deep-ultraviolet wavelengths. Modern DUV lithography systems use these lasers as their light source. 

The highly specialised excimer-laser light sources required for DUV photolithography are supplied essentially by two major foreign companies — ASML-owned US company Cymer and Japan's Gigaphoton. Nikon and Canon manufacture complete DUV lithography systems, but do not provide the same independent excimer-laser-light-source capability.

EUV Lithography

Even after LASSARD fields a 193-nm excimer-laser system, there will continue to exist a yawning gap between Russian-manufactured microchips and those manufactured by Taiwan-based TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC is already mass-producing 7-nm-class chips, with its more advanced 7-nm variants using ASML EUV lithography.

ASML has now achieved an extraordinary technological position by developing EUV lithography in which a laser-generated tin plasma produces 13.5-nm light. Extremely short-wavelength ultraviolet light — typically 13.5 nanometres (nm) — can be used to print very tiny features on a silicon wafer. ASML is currently the only commercial supplier of EUV lithography systems.

Semiconductor Manufacturing

With 130-nm lithographic capability, Russia could push its optical lithography capability to potentially approach 65-nm-class features using multipatterning.

Multipatterning involves printing complicated patterns by photo-etching two or more simpler patterns sequentially over the same wafer surface.

Multipatterning is technologically challenging and pushes up cost, processing time, and defect rates.

Though so far Russia has only now acquired photolithography capabilities to manufacture 130-nm chips, it is already designing and manufacturing chips with finer topography.

Mikron already produces chips with a 90-nm topology, which are used in bank cards. For the 90-nm process, Mikron uses lithography equipment from STMicroelectronics.

In January 2026, it was reported that Element Microelectronic Holding was building a plant in Tatarstan for the production of semiconductor wafers with 55–40-nm technology. In the future, the enterprise should reach a more advanced level — 28 nanometers.

55–40-nm technologies cover more than half of the Russian market for electronic components. Among the main customers are Rosatom, Rostec, defence industry enterprises and critical information infrastructure facilities.

Russia has possibly acquired the capability to manufacture finer-topology chips by using imported second-hand ASML photolithography systems, optics, lasers, wafer stages and control electronics.

China's Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment reportedly has been developing 28-nm immersion lithography systems.

Ambitious Plans

Russia reportedly has around 25–40 imported 130-nm photolithography units operational at Russian enterprises. These will eventually need to be replaced, creating a potential demand for 15–25 new units by 2030–32. The market is small, but sanctions and the urgent need to reduce import dependence leave Russia with little choice.

Despite the sanctions — or perhaps because of them — Russia has drawn up ambitious plans to ramp up its semiconductor manufacturing capability. It aims to mass-produce 28-nm chips by 2027 and 14-nm chips by 2030. However, it is likely that the targets will be pushed back based on delays in establishing the capability.

The recent development of a prototype photolithography system with a 130-nm design resolution is an important step towards realising Russia's semiconductor ambitions. What Russia has created so far is a prototype that will be used for preliminary testing and for developing and refining the technological processes required to manufacture specific products.

Most importantly for Russian strategic planners, ZNTC's success with the 130-nm photolithography system has cemented its reputation as an organisation that Russia could rely on for its semiconductor ambitions in the future.

Humanoid Combat Robots: Weapon Systems or the World's First Artificial Soldiers?

China will produce over 100,000 humanoid robots in 2026, according to Gan Xiaobin, Deputy Director of the Department of Science and Technology under the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. He was speaking at a press conference in Shanghai. (via TASS)

"Large language models, AI agents, and AI chips are advancing at a rapid pace. We expect humanoid robot output to exceed 100,000 units this year," Gan Xiaobin noted.

In February, CNBC reported that the US has started testing two humanoid combat robots in Ukraine, marking the first known deployment of humanoid robots in a combat zone. Developed by San Francisco-based startup Foundation Future Industries, the robots, named Phantom-1, were deployed to Ukraine for frontline logistics and reconnaissance.

Foundation Future has secured approximately $24 million in Pentagon research contracts (from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force) to test the humanoids.

Phantom-1 is roughly 5'9"–5'11" tall and weighs 176–180 lb. It is designed to use human weapons and infrastructure such as doors, stairs, and vehicles. It can lift approximately 90 lb and perform physical tasks in complex or high-risk environments. The robot has five-fingered hands, camera-based vision, and an LLM-driven autonomy system that supports both independent operation and supervised teleoperation.

Foundation Future aims to send an upgraded humanoid variant—Phantom-2—to Ukraine later this year.

China is also actively experimenting with humanoids for military applications, including teleoperated demonstrations of complex battlefield tasks.

Operational Fielding Timeline

If current technological progress continues:

Over the next one to three years, platforms like Phantom are likely to be upgraded and fielded in supervised autonomous or teleoperated combat roles. They will undertake high-risk tasks such as urban clearing, resupply under fire, and acting as decoys that draw enemy fire or absorb risk.

It is plausible that, starting as early as 2028—or perhaps as late as 2035—armed humanoid robots will actively participate in direct combat.

Between 2035 and 2045, fully autonomous squad-level humanoid "soldiers" will likely begin replacing human infantry in many battlefield roles.

Why Humanoid Robots?

There is a good reason why robotic soldiers will initially take humanoid form. Battlefield equipment—including transport and combat vehicles, firearms, and drone-launching systems—is designed for human use. Humanoids will be able to operate all equipment developed for humans. Interchangeability between humans and humanoid robots will be critical during the transition period, which could last for decades.

Challenges Persist

Humanoid robots outperform humans in many aspects of soldiering. They possess greater strength, higher load-carrying capacity, superior endurance, greater environmental tolerance, and higher precision. They can also be deployed in numbers limited only by manufacturing capacity. Most importantly, robots completely trounce humans when it comes to expendability.

However, humans outperform robots in mobility over rough terrain, adaptability, judgment, and field-acquired dexterity. As long as food and water are available, humans also exhibit far greater endurance than electrically powered robots.

It is interesting to note that companies developing humanoid robots worldwide are focused on improving endurance, fall recovery, rough-terrain mobility, and dexterity.

Humanoid Vulnerabilities

The vulnerability of humanoid robots to cyberattacks and spoofing, the logistics infrastructure required to support their operation, and their limitations in leadership and command roles will likely require humans and humanoids to operate as teams in the near future—and perhaps even in the more distant future.

However, there can be little doubt that deploying humanoid soldiers will provide a nation with an overwhelming military advantage, particularly if they can be upgraded more rapidly than those of an adversary.

It is also possible that humanoids, together with quadruped robots and UGVs, will never evolve beyond being sophisticated weapon systems that reduce the number of humans required on the battlefield. They may significantly reduce the demand for human soldiers, but they are unlikely to eliminate it entirely.

To some extent, the widespread use of drones has already reduced the number of soldiers required to hold a front in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

 

Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.