Rostec Reveals a Significant New Su-57 Capability Focused on MUM-T

 Rostec, in a statement on September 16, 2026, revealed that for its ferry flight to the recent El Alamein International Airshow in Egypt, the Russian Su-57E carried drop tanks in its internal weapons bay.

This appears to be the first time Rostec has publicly confirmed that the Su-57 can carry auxiliary fuel tanks inside its weapons bays. Until now, extra range was associated with external drop tanks. The El Alamein ferry is therefore the first official example of internal tank carriage on the type.

The stealth fighter completed the ferry with just one intermediate landing and, after that, still had enough fuel for another 1,000 km. That was enough to carry out a demonstration flight the next day.

Su-57 Internal Weapons Bays

The Su-57 has four internal weapons bays: two large tandem main bays in the fuselage between the engines (one forward, one aft). These typically carry four medium- or long-range missiles such as the R-77M, or larger weapons such as the R-37M or Kh-69. It also has two smaller side bays at the wing roots. Each side bay is designed for one short-range infrared missile (R-74M2).

It is highly likely that the Su-57 can carry drop tanks in one or both tandem main bays. In other words, the aircraft could carry a mix of weapons and drop tanks.

Standout MUM-T Capability

Internal carriage of fuel would not only extend its ferry range but also its combat radius. Most of all, it would greatly enhance its MUM-T endurance. Operating as a drone mothership, it could remain well clear of adversary air defenses while carrying a smaller air-to-air missile load.

Neither the F-35 Lightning II nor the F-22 Raptor can carry drop tanks in their internal weapons bays.

The F-35’s combat radius is similar to the Su-57’s, but its combat load is smaller. With similar combat loads, a Su-57 carrying some fuel internally would have a significantly longer combat range.

The F-22’s combat radius is significantly shorter than the F-35’s.

F-22,F-35 Weapons Bays

The Raptor’s three internal bays are for weapons only—typically six AIM-120s in the main ventral bay (or two 1,000 lb JDAMs plus missiles), plus two AIM-9s in the side bays.

The Lightning II has two internal bays sized and configured specifically for weapons—typically two 2,000 lb-class bombs plus AIM-120s (or more missiles with the Sidekick adapter), for a total internal payload of about 5,700 lb while remaining in a low-observable configuration.

Dan-T: Russia’s New Loitering Munition Raises More Questions Than Answers

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

The world premiere of the Dan-T loitering munition by Rostec at the El Alamein International Airshow 2026 has drawn considerable interest. Some would say it has cleared the air around a new Russian weapon system that has demonstrated an uncanny ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defences. Others would contend that it has only added to the confusion surrounding the weapon's actual capabilities.

In its statement, Rostec says:

The “Dan-T” munition operates on the “fire-and-forget” principle and is adapted for launch from Russian and foreign aircraft and helicopters.  

 

The product is equipped with a small-sized jet engine and can hit targets at a distance of hundreds of kilometres.  

 

The “Dan-T” has a special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems.  

 

The high effectiveness of the loitering munition has been confirmed by hundreds of successful launches against enemy targets in the special military operation zone.

Rostec's description of the weapon as “fire-and-forget” would imply that it is a cruise-missile-like weapon designed to strike a pre-programmed target based on coordinates or optical imagery. The question that arises, therefore, is: how then is it a loitering munition?

And what exactly is the “special flight mode designed to bypass enemy air-defence systems”?

The weapon does not appear to feature an optical aperture for an infrared or TV seeker, making it unlikely that it is capable of machine-vision-based terminal navigation.

Under the circumstances, its ability to bypass enemy air-defence systems may derive from a combination of low-observable characteristics—including its small size and low radar cross-section—and the use of 12- or 16-channel jam-resistant satellite navigation.

Dan-T Antecedents

The Dan-T is reportedly derived from the Dan-M target drone, which was first operationally tested for combat use in May 2025.

The Dan-M's reported flight-performance capabilities include a cruise altitude of 50 to 9,000 metres, a cruise speed of 300 to 750 km/h and an endurance of approximately 70 minutes. Its take-off weight is 350 kg.

Dan-M History

The existence of the Dan-M was first publicly reported in August 2004.

The Dan-M was developed from the Dan target drone, designed for air-defence training and testing, which first flew in 1993.

The Dan-M programme aimed to provide greater endurance and range, with production reportedly expected around 2005. Later public reporting on a further-updated Dan-M, featuring a new engine and avionics, appeared around 2020.

Dan-T Loitering Munition at El Alamein 2026. Photo courtesy Rostec

Stealth Characteristics

All three Dan variants share essentially the same aerodynamic layout.

The differences appear to be internal and mission-related rather than the result of a fundamental redesign of the airframe.

While the Dan and Dan-M were target drones that likely carried a Luneberg lens to modify their radar signatures, the Dan-T does not appear to have a Luneberg lens. Another significant difference is that the Dan and Dan-M were designed for parachute recovery, whereas the Dan-T is an OWA (one-way attack) drone.

Banderol Similarity

The Banderol S8000, a jet-powered cruise-missile-like drone, looks remarkably similar to the Dan-T. Russia has been using the Banderol launched from its Orion MALE drone extensively in its ongoing systematic campaign against Ukraine's logistics, weapons-manufacturing, energy and export infrastructure.

However, while the Banderol is attributed to Kronstadt, which also developed the Orion drone, the Dan-T is believed to be an upgrade of the Dan-M target drone.

Banderols usually cruise at low altitudes, particularly when routed over the sea for strikes on targets in Odesa, avoiding radar detection right up to the moment they pop up to gain altitude and strike the target at an angle best suited for maximum damage.

The use of composites, besides stealth shaping and small size, adds to the low observability of the weapon, reducing detection range.

Launch-Platform Versatility

The use of a helicopter as a launch platform makes the weapon particularly versatile. Air launch increases the drone's effective range, while helicopter carriage allows it to be launched without the early warning that could accompany the radar detection of a fighter aircraft.

It is likely that the drone is programmed to operate mostly outside the engagement envelope of Ukraine's MANPADS and SHORAD systems.

By leveraging the Dan-T's superior flight performance, Russia could compel Ukraine to engage these drones with medium-range air-defence systems such as NASAMS, IRIS-T and SAMP/T. Not only are these systems available to the AFU in limited numbers, but their missile stocks are also scarce—both in Ukraine and among their original manufacturers.

Additionally, despite its improved performance, the Dan-M is likely to be a relatively affordable platform. Its unit cost is probably considerably lower than that of a medium-range air-defence missile.

By forcing Ukraine to expend its limited and expensive interceptor stocks against comparatively inexpensive drones, Russia could further erode the country's already strained air-defence capabilities.

Conclusion

The Banderol is known to be inexpensive, giving Russia the ability to ramp up production of the missile relatively easily. In mid-August 2026, HUR (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) told Militarnyi that Russia can produce up to about 80 S8000 Banderol missiles per month. Plants are described as working three shifts.

Serhii “Flash” Beskrestnov, an adviser to Ukraine’s defence minister, stated in July that Russia’s planned rate for 2026 was 120 per month (roughly four a day if fully used). Later, in August, Beskrestnov said Moscow was trying to raise jet-powered munition output and that Banderol production could be pushed toward 300–400 per month.

The increased use of the Banderol bears testimony to its cost-effectiveness, if not its sophistication. Assuming that the Banderol and the Dan-T are similar weapons, if not the same weapons, Russia's El Alamein pitch for the sale of the missile could have many takers.

Russia’s Coca-Cola Strike: Retaliation, Deterrence or Coincidence?

During the past year or so, the US and its Western allies have increasingly become directly involved in Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia, including through the provision of targeting, intelligence and navigation-related information for Ukrainian long-range strike systems.

Russia now appears to be responding in kind by striking US and Western commercial interests in Ukraine. The apparent objectives are twofold: retaliation for Western involvement in attacks on Russian commercial and economic interests, and deterrence of further Western investment in Ukraine.

On September 3, Russian drones struck the Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine plant in Velyka Dymerka, in Kyiv region. The facility is Coca-Cola's only production site in Ukraine and one of Europe's larger bottling plants.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the strike as “a clear Russian signal to America,” arguing that Russia could not be unaware that it was striking an American-owned facility. 

In its account of the September 3 strikes, the Russian MoD did not specifically identify the Coca-Cola facility. Instead, it broadly claimed to have struck “enterprises of the military-industrial and fuel-energy complexes” involved in producing missiles, drones and components, supplying fuel to Ukrainian forces, and logistics facilities allegedly handling dual-use goods and UAV components.

Reports from Ukraine said a drone struck warehouses containing finished products, causing a large fire. No casualties were reported.

The Russian account therefore leaves the purpose of the Coca-Cola strike deliberately ambiguous. If the facility was intentionally selected because it belongs to an American company, the MoD's broader description provides Moscow with plausible deniability.

Coca-Cola and the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine said the company was assessing the damage with Ukrainian authorities and that employee safety remained the priority.

Not the First

The September 3 strike was not the first Russian attack on US commercial interests in Ukraine. A May New York Times investigation documented Russian strikes since mid-2025 on facilities linked to Coca-Cola, Cargill, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Flex and Bunge.

Representatives of several companies told visiting US senators that they believed the attacks were deliberate. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said the businesses believed they were being targeted intentionally. Andy Hunder of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine argued that Russia was attempting to deter further American investment.

There is, however, another plausible explanation. Some Ukrainian business figures and observers believe the attacks are part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukraine's industrial and logistical infrastructure, with the nationality of the company being incidental. In that interpretation, US companies are being hit because their facilities happen to be part of Ukraine's economic infrastructure.

Zelenskyy's “a clear Russian signal to America” characterisation could well have been a "cheeky" interpretation as it could well be possible that Ukrainian forces were using Coca Cola warehouses for military purposes thinking that Russia would not dare to strike them. 

The most plausible explanation may be that both motives are operating simultaneously: Russia is attempting to weaken Ukraine's economy while also signalling to Washington and other Western capitals that their commercial assets in Ukraine are not immune from the consequences of Western involvement in the war.

The Coca-Cola plant's highly visible American branding would have made it an especially potent symbolic target.

At the same time, the use of plausible deniability is important. There is no publicly available evidence establishing conclusively that Russia deliberately selected the Coca-Cola plant because it was American-owned. The strike can therefore be explained as an attack on Ukrainian economic infrastructure, even if its selection was in fact deliberate.

US Reaction

The US government has so far not publicly reacted to the September 3 Coca-Cola strike. Earlier in 2026, Washington's response to similar incidents was muted; a State Department spokesperson said the US had urged both sides to refrain from targeting American business interests.

Some US lawmakers and analysts have criticised this posture, arguing that Washington's restraint could establish a precedent in which American commercial assets in a war zone can be struck with little consequence.

But a more belligerent US response would carry its own problem: Washington would have to confront, rather than brush under the carpet, the extent of US involvement in enabling Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia.

Doing so could turn attacks on American commercial interests from an uncomfortable side-effect of the war into a direct US-Russia confrontation—and escalate an already dangerous conflict considerably further.