The Rafale Deal: A Necessary Compromise Explained

The recent ANI report states that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is poised to begin negotiations on a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter jets from France.

According to the ANI report, the indigenous content in the aircraft would be limited to around 30 per cent. There is no additional transfer of technology (ToT) commitment beyond this 30 per cent indigenous content.

The source codes will remain exclusively with the French side.

Widespread Consternation

There is widespread consternation on account of the following:

1. Rafales manufactured in India will have only 30 per cent indigenous content.

2. The deal encompasses no additional transfer of technology.

3. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will not receive the source code for integrating indigenous weapon systems without French assistance.

“What happened to Make in India?” is the lament. Why cannot India look for an alternative? Russia, for example, has offered full transfer of technology and local production for the Su-57!

In the following paragraphs, I will place the proposed deal and its limitations in the correct perspective. We begin with the imperative for the new deal.

TINA – There Is No Alternative

The Indian Air Force proposes to acquire additional Rafales under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme. The IAF has also proposed that the government acquire two to three squadrons of a stealth fighter to plug the operational gap that will exist until at least one squadron of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is inducted.

These two acquisitions are proceeding on parallel tracks. One cannot substitute the other.

The MRFA programme is a follow-on to the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme. The Ministry of Defence initiated procurement under the MRFA programme in April 2018. Aircraft that competed under the MRFA programme included the Gripen NG, MiG-35, Su-35, and F/A-18E/F.

Under the MRFA procurement track, there is no real alternative to the Rafale for two compelling reasons:

1. The IAF evaluated the competing fighters during the MMRCA programme and concluded that the Rafale was the best option.

2. The IAF has already invested heavily in infrastructure, training, and logistics to operate and maintain the Rafale.

The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:

“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”

“Now, whether it is Rafale or something else, it really doesn't matter, but yes, Rafale is easy to absorb,” he added.

MRFA and LCA Mk-2

Given France’s decision to cap transfer of technology at 30 per cent, and considering that the IAF has already waited eight years for the MRFA programme to materialise, could the IAF wait longer in support of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-2?

The problem is that, based on past Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivery records, it will be quite some time before the LCA Mk-2 project takes off and reaches an operationally viable stage. A protracted wait would further erode IAF's squadron strength.

What must be clearly understood is that raising or re-raising squadrons to full operational status, after they have been number plated, is a process that takes years.

Adding to the uncertainty, the LCA Mk-2 will be powered by the General Electric (GE) F414 engine, increasing India’s vulnerability to United States pressure or sanctions.

Limited Transfer of Technology

During the interaction referred to earlier, the Chief of the Air Staff notably expressed his reservations regarding French unwillingness to transfer technology for local manufacture of the Rafale to the extent desired by India.

The 2018 Request for Information (RFI) for the MRFA programme mandates transfer of technology, along with a guarantee of 75 per cent aircraft availability at all times.

“So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he said.

Viewed pragmatically, the proposal is worth consideration despite limited ToT. Higher percentage of technology transfer could prove counter productive. Indigenous content beyond what Indian industry can deliver quickly would only lead to delays and mutual recrimination.

Whatever Indian industry can manufacture rapidly and reliably should be made in India; the rest should be imported.

DRDO and HAL have already designed and developed two fighter aircraft—the HF-24 Marut and the Tejas. They do not need 100 per cent technology transfer. What they need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps, such as the inability to develop aircraft engines capable of sustaining higher turbine inlet temperatures. Such technology transfers should be negotiated separately, rather than being tied to acquisitions that are critical for maintaining the operational readiness of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

After all, the acquisition of additional Rafales is intended to arrest the decline in fighter squadron strength, which is currently reported to be 29 squadrons against an authorised strength of 42.

Source Code Issues

According to the ANI report, the Indian side is also seeking French support to enable the integration of Indian weapons and indigenous systems into the aircraft under the government-to-government deal.

However, the source codes will remain with the French side.

It may be recalled that during negotiations for the 2015 deal to acquire 36 Rafale F3R fighters, the IAF had sought access to operational source codes from Dassault Aviation and Thales Avionics for the mission avionics and the fly-by-wire flight control system, in order to retain a “unilateral upgrade” capability.

Access to the source code would have enabled the IAF and HAL to implement mid-life weapons and avionics upgrades by leveraging open architecture, without having to revert to Dassault and Thales.

The ANI report appears to confirm that the Rafale variant now proposed is the F4 variant, not the F3 variant acquired earlier, and that the source code architecture of the F4 has changed.

Rafale F4 Variant

The Rafale F4 incorporates significant upgrades, including:

1. A new Thales software-defined radio (CONTACT), offering improved security, enhanced data links, and integrated civil and military satellite communication capability.

2. An improved RBE2 radar capable of detecting mobile ground targets.

3. An upgraded infrared optronic system.

4. An enhanced SPECTRA self-protection suite, with expanded low- and high-frequency coverage to counter future threats.

5. New weapons, including a mid-life-upgraded SCALP cruise missile, MBDA’s MICA-NG air-to-air missile, and a new version of the AASM air-to-ground weapon. The MICA-NG offers longer range and improved detection and acquisition capability.

6. Predictive maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capability to improve dispatch reliability.

It was earlier reported that the French Ministry of the Armed Forces had publicly confirmed that India is pursuing a plan to acquire 90 Rafale F4 fighters, with an additional option for 24 Rafale F5 aircraft.

Conclusion

The proposed acquisition of 114 additional Rafales is essentially a continuation of the earlier deal under which India acquired 36 aircraft.

In September 2018, following sustained criticism of the government over the limited purchase, then Raksha Mantri Nirmala Sitharaman clarified that the induction was restricted to 36 aircraft because the Indian Air Force’s infrastructure and technical capacity did not permit a larger induction at the time.

The induction of just two squadrons was the outcome of an emergency purchase, she explained:

“Air Force … will tell you that for any emergency-based induction, it is always two squadrons and not more than that.”

Notably, even under the current proposal, 12–18 Rafale jets are expected to be acquired in fly-away condition, most likely because the IAF is inducting the Rafale F4 variant.

Finally, it is worth noting that strategic imports from France have historically come with no political strings attached—albeit often with an ever-increasing price tag. France also remains the only fighter aircraft supplier capable of resisting sustained United States pressure.

Update on January 16, 2026:

My discussion with Abhijat Shekhar on the proposed Rafale deal on Navbharat Times. Some plain speaking and rabble rousing! 1. Why does HAL pay an increasing amount as dividend to the GoI every year? Why not invest the amount in R&D? In the past three financial years, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) paid the following dividend amounts to the Government of India (GoI): FY 2022-23: ₹1,257 crore FY 2023-24: ₹1,413 crore FY 2024-25: ₹1,820 crore 2. For 25 years, MoD / IAF have made no serious attempt to upgrade Su-30MKI. In contrast, with the Rafale, it plans to quickly move from F3R to F4 to F5 variants. 3. The reasons why Dassault will not and can not part with the full source code of the Rafale. Dassault is not exploiting an Indian weakness, it is protecting it is safeguarding its own competitive edge. 4. DRDO appears more interested in adding to the number of projects that it is working on rather than focusing on the projects that are most critical to India's defence requirements. Is it more focused on increasing its establishment, rather than delivering on its promise?

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

India’s Great Power Secret Revealed

 

Image by @Grok with my prompts

India is the only “great power” that has never stolen technology to become self-sufficient in defence production.

Which is, perhaps, exactly why we are not self-sufficient in defence production.

And never will be!!

We don’t steal technology—not because we are a civilisational state operating from some lofty moral high ground.

We don’t steal technology because we wouldn’t have the faintest idea what to do with it after stealing it.

After all, we are intellectuals, not visionaries.

Tell us what to do and how to do it.

Give us the tools, the materials, the jigs, the fixtures, the software, and the manufacturing machinery—and behold!

We will become Atmanirbhar in manufacturing the weapon system overnight.

We already figured out how to make all the submarines we operate — Kilo class, HDW Type-209, Scorpene, Arihant class, Arihant Stretch class.

So now, please tell us how to make the Type-214, the submarine that is so very good.

When we negotiate Transfer of Technology (ToT), we don’t actually want a transfer of technology.

We want a transfer of technicians—people who can assemble, integrate, and service the system locally.

What would we do with the technology anyway?

By the time you’re willing to transfer it, it’s already old.

We prefer to buy your latest technology—under the comforting label of ToT.

And when we negotiate local manufacture, we don’t threaten to reduce your market share.

Oh no!

We guarantee its permanence.

This is how it works:

You supply all the expensive components and materials making good .profit

We assemble your system under ToT (Transfer of Technicians).

We sell it to our armed forces at exorbitant prices making good profit.

And then we proudly pay fat dividend cheques to our own government.

What you call a win-win arrangement.

Our concept of R&D is simple: Read and Do.

Read the manuals.

Do exactly what is written.

Neither our government babus, nor our corporate leaders—and certainly not our politicians - their Arjun eyes permanently fixed on the next election - have any appetite for a riskier interpretation of R&D.

Historically, India’s rich and powerful have always been traders—experts at currying favour with whoever happens to rule, regardless of where they come from.

They don’t take risks. 

They work exclusively on cuts.

Why change culture, heritage, or tradition now?

I could go on.

But do you really care…?

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

PSLV-C62 Failure: Why the Loss of Hyperspectral Imaging Matters

Visualisation of a HySI satellite over India Pakistan border: Image credit @Grok

The back-to-back failures of the PSLV-C61 mission in May 2024 and the PSLV-C62 mission today (January 12, 2026) are significant setbacks to India’s space-based military capabilities.

Worryingly, both missions failed for similar reasons—anomalies in the performance of the PSLV third stage (PS3).

The PSLV-C61 failure resulted in the loss of EOS-9 (also known as RISAT-1A), while the PSLV-C62 failure led to the loss of the EOS-N1 (Anvesha) satellite. Both were primarily military satellites.

RISAT-1A was a radar imaging satellite capable of imaging the Earth’s surface day or night, and through all weather conditions.

The Anvesha satellite (EOS-N1) was a hyperspectral imaging Earth-observation platform developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).

Earth Observation Satellite Imaging

Earth-observation satellite imaging may be confined to the visual spectrum, in which case sensors capture imagery either in black-and-white (panchromatic) or in full colour.

Alternatively, imaging can extend beyond the visual spectrum using multispectral or hyperspectral sensors.

Multispectral Imaging

Multispectral satellites capture images in a limited number (typically 3–10) of discrete spectral bands, each about 50–500 nm wide.

ISRO has previously launched several multispectral satellites under the IRS series, supporting applications such as agriculture, forestry, water resources management, and urban planning.

Multispectral imaging resolutions typically range from 10–30 metres per pixel.

Hyperspectral Imaging

Hyperspectral satellites capture imagery across hundreds of narrow, contiguous spectral bands—typically 5–20 nm wide—providing a near-continuous spectrum for every pixel.

ISRO has previously launched and operated a hyperspectral satellite: the Hyperspectral Imaging Satellite (HySIS), weighing 380 kg, launched aboard PSLV-C43 on November 29, 2018. The 400-kg Anvesha (EOS-N1) satellite was developed by DRDO in collaboration with ISRO.

Hyperspectral imaging resolution is lower than multispectral imaging, typically in the range of 30–100 metres per pixel.

Military Imaging Reconnaissance

Most military imaging reconnaissance satellites rely on panchromatic (black-and-white) imaging, with effectiveness judged primarily by image resolution. Panchromatic imaging enables very high spatial resolution, measured in centimetres rather than metres.

For example, U.S. Keyhole-series satellites (e.g., KH-11) and their modern equivalents reportedly achieve resolutions of 15 cm or better.

Military Advantages of Hyperspectral Imaging

From the point of view of the military, high-resolution panchromatic satellites are essential for accurate targeting and precise geolocation while hyperspectral imaging (HySI) is primarily aimed at situational awareness.

Panchromatic imagery can identify the precise coordinates of a parked fighter aircraft to enable a missile strike. HySI, however, can determine whether the observed object is an actual aircraft or a decoy—often with close to 90% accuracy—by analysing the unique spectral signatures of constituent materials.

By capturing data across hundreds of narrow wavelength bands, HySI enables precise identification of surface compositions such as metals, composites, paints, and synthetic materials like plastics or inflatables commonly used in decoys.

Such material discrimination is not possible using panchromatic or multispectral imaging.

Beyond decoy identification, hyperspectral imaging offers several unique military reconnaissance capabilities:

Missile Launch Detection and Early Warning

HySI can detect ballistic missile launches by identifying and analysing their infrared signatures immediately after launch, enabling early warning and cueing radar sensors for tracking.

Camouflage Penetration

HySI can penetrate camouflage—such as vegetation, netting, or paint—by analysing subtle spectral differences. It can distinguish natural foliage from synthetic coverings used on vehicles, bunkers, or troop positions, aiding in the detection of concealed assets like missile launch sites.

Detection of Buried or Obscured Threats

HySI can detect buried objects such as landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) by identifying soil disturbances and anomalous material signatures.

By effectively “seeing” a minefield, HySI can help ground forces clear routes safely, reducing uncertainty in mission planning.

Asset Maintenance and Corrosion Detection

For military hardware such as aircraft and naval vessels, hyperspectral sensors can identify early signs of corrosion or metal fatigue through spectral analysis, enabling proactive maintenance and reducing downtime and lifecycle costs.

Pakistan's Hyperspectral Imaging Capability

Pakistan launched its first hyperspectral imaging satellite on October 19, 2025, called HS-1 (Hyperspectral Satellite-1). Pakistani officials say that the satellite data will support major infrastructure initiatives linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that connects Xinjiang to Gwadar Port. However, the military significance of the satellite is obvious.

Conclusion

Through consecutive PSLV mission failures, India has lost critical, sovereign military space capabilities that cannot be sourced from abroad. The restoration of the all-weather radar imaging capability lost with RISAT-1A, and the reconstitution of the hyperspectral imaging (HySI) capability lost with Anvesha, could take up to two years or more. This gap carries real operational consequences, weakening India’s independent ISR posture at a time when timely, high-fidelity space-based intelligence is increasingly central to deterrence and warfighting.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Russia Poised to Unleash Three New Air-Launched Missiles on Ukraine

Representative Image of a Tu-22M bomber. Credit RuMoD.

A Ukrainian Telegram channel has reported that Russian forces are poised to operationally deploy three new air-launched cruise missiles. Two of these missiles are designed for launch by strategic bombers, while one can be launched by both bombers and heavy fighters.

The missiles expected to begin targeting Ukrainian forces are:

1. Kh-BD

2. Kh-95

3. Kh-MTsh

All three missiles reportedly feature exclusively Russian-made components and incorporate no foreign parts.

Kh-BD

The Kh-BD is a high subsonic (≈900 km/h), long-range (≈3,000 km) cruise missile developed for use by the Tu-160M2 supersonic bomber.

Development of the Kh-BD reportedly began in August 2013, following the signing of a contract between the Russian Ministry of Defence (RuMoD) and Raduga Co. for a cruise missile under Project Romans. Under the contract, Raduga was to begin flight testing in 2018 and complete state acceptance trials in 2020.

The missile was to be produced at a facility in Smolensk, where Raduga manufactures Kh-101/Kh-102 (Product 504) cruise missiles used by Tu-160 and Tu-95MS bombers, at a rate of approximately three missiles per month.

The Kh-BD has never been publicly displayed. Like the Kh-101, it is likely to incorporate radar low-observable shaping. Given its longer range, the Kh-BD is expected to be significantly longer than the 7.45 m Kh-101.

The Soviet-era Tu-160 was originally designed to carry the Kh-45 missile (later abandoned), which had a length of 10.8 m. Its internal weapons bays therefore have the capacity to carry missiles longer than the Kh-101.

According to Izvestia, the Kh-BD has also been integrated with the modernised Tu-95MSM long-range strategic bomber.

The extended range of the Kh-BD offers a significant operational advantage, as launch platforms can remain well outside the detection and tracking range of NATO airborne ISR assets. After launch, the low-observable missile would evade detection by flying a terrain-hugging profile.

By contrast, the shorter-ranged Kh-101 must be launched closer to Ukrainian territory, often while launch platforms remain within NATO tracking range. Once tracked at launch, adversary radars can extrapolate missile positions even if tracks are later lost due to terrain masking.

Tu-160M Bomber Refueling

Kh-95

In August 2021, Vladimir Zarudnitsky, head of the Academy of the General Staff of Russia, stated in an interview that Russia was developing a new long-range hypersonic missile designated Kh-95, to be carried by the Tu-22M3M and Tu-160M strategic bombers.

The missile’s range remains undisclosed. However, based on the 4,500 km range of the nuclear-armed Kh-102 stealth cruise missile, some sources estimate the Kh-95’s range could reach up to 5,000 km.

A missile with such extraordinary range would allow its launch platform to remain well outside the engagement envelope of even the most advanced air defence systems. The Tu-160M would effectively gain intercontinental strike reach without relying on stealth.

Kh-MTsh

On March 14, 2023, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu visited the headquarters of Tactical Missiles Corporation (KTRV) near Moscow, accompanied by Deputy Defence Minister Alexey Krivoruchko, who oversees procurement. The delegation was escorted by KTRV CEO Boris Obnosov.

RuMoD released video footage of the visit showing Shoigu urging plant personnel to double production of air-launched weapons to meet the demands of Russian forces engaged in the special military operation in Ukraine.

Notably, Shoigu stated:

“We hope that the commitments you have made … for 2023, 2024, and for the entire program will be fulfilled and, in addition to what we already have, there will be a new product that … the armed forces of other countries do not have.”

The “new product” Shoigu alluded to may be the missile Obnosov referenced in a June 2021 interview with TASS. At the time, Obnosov stated that KTRV was conducting “research and development work to create a new-generation high-speed anti-ship missile with increased range and speed, with improved jamming resistance.”

Obnosov made the remark while responding to a question on the future of the Kh-31 missile, which flies at speeds up to Mach 3.5 and has a range of about 250 km.

“This advanced model will complement the existing range of air-launched weapons created by KTRV,” Obnosov said.

His use of the word complement suggests he was referring to a longer-range missile with enhanced speed and electronic warfare resistance.

According to Aviation Week, the Kh-MTsh would be capable of engaging maritime, ground, and large airborne targets such as AWACS and aerial tankers. The missile is expected to be compatible with both fighter and bomber platforms.

Guidance would reportedly combine active and passive radar, possibly supplemented by an infrared sensor for terminal homing. Such multi-mode guidance would allow launches without precise target coordinates, even in heavy electronic warfare environments.

The missile’s trajectory would be programmable. It could execute a steep climb to 30–35 km altitude, dive onto the target at a 70–80° angle, and then transition to a nap-of-the-earth flight profile at 3–5 m altitude during the terminal phase.

Conclusion

Notably, all three missiles were in development well before the start of the war in Ukraine. When they were conceived, exclusive reliance on Russian components was likely not a top priority. Deployment delays may therefore have resulted from a post-2022 shift in priorities driven by Western sanctions.

Interestingly, some Ukrainian sources view the forced reliance on Russian components as a blessing, assuming that it will result in reduced accuracy—an assumption that remains unproven.

Update

A RIA Novosti report on January 12 appeared to confirm the introduction of the above new missiles. Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister, Denis Manturov, in a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, said, "In the near future, we also plan, literally this quarter, to demonstrate an additional number (of new and modernized models of military equipment)."

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

RUSI’s Rafale Downing Story: Big Claims, Zero Forensics

Western Think Tanks Are Now Disinformation Banks Here is a classic example of Western disinformation and deception. In a recent (January 2026) report, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), a UK-based defence think tank, relying exclusively on PAF claims, concluded that during Operation Sindoor a PAF J-10CE fighter downed an IAF Rafale using a PL-15 missile fired from approximately 200 km away. The RUSI report also draws on speculation by unnamed US officials, as reported by Reuters, that the IAF underestimated the range of the PL-15, believing the PAF was equipped only with the 140-km-range export variant of the missile. However, just before the start of Operation Sindoor, China had reportedly surreptitiously transferred PL-15 missiles with a 200–300 km range (depending on launch height) from PLAAF inventory to the PAF. The fact is, merely having range does not assure an air-to-air missile of a kill. IAF Rafales are equipped with the SPECTRA self-protection suite, which includes active RF jamming and active cancellation jamming to reduce RCS. One would expect a serious think-tank report to examine how the PL-15 allegedly penetrated the Rafale’s electronic defences. The RUSI report does not mention whether the Rafale took evasive action. Nor does it claim access to PL-15 cockpit displays or supporting radar recordings that would substantiate the PAF’s assertion. An analysis based on a single source, unsupported by evidence and built on speculation, is a bogus analysis—as RUSI itself would know. Yet it is presented as fact. The intent is clear: to seed doubt in Indian minds and sap the confidence of the Indian public.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

DRDO Cracks Scramjet Propulsion for Sustained Hypersonic Flight — BrahMos-2 Moves from Concept to Reality

 

@Grok generated visualisation of the Brahmos-2 hypersonic missile in flight

The Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL) successfully conducted an extensive, long-duration ground test of its Actively Cooled, Full-Scale Scramjet Combustor, achieving a run time of over 12 minutes at its state-of-the-art Scramjet Connect Pipe Test (SCPT) Facility on January 9, 2026.

Earlier, on April 25, 2025, DRDL had successfully ground-tested a subscale actively cooled scramjet combustor for more than 1,000 seconds at the same facility.

The maiden ground test of the full-scale combustor, lasting 120 seconds, took place on January 21, 2025.

With these successful tests, the scramjet combustor is now poised for full-scale, flight-worthy testing.

So what exactly is an “Actively Cooled Scramjet Full-Scale Combustor,” and why is this technology significant? The following sections explain.

The Need for a Hypersonic Cruise Missile

An actively cooled scramjet combustor is the most critical component of a scramjet engine.

A scramjet engine differs fundamentally from a ramjet engine—such as those powering the Akash and BrahMos missiles. In a ramjet, airflow inside the combustion chamber is subsonic, whereas in a scramjet, the airflow remains supersonic throughout the combustion process.

A scramjet engine is an absolute prerequisite for sustained, level hypersonic flight within the atmosphere. The only alternative method of achieving atmospheric hypersonic flight is through boost-glide vehicles.

Boost-glide flight involves lofting a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) to altitudes of approximately 40–100 km using a booster rocket. The HGV then dives steeply toward Earth, achieving hypersonic speed due to gravity, before transitioning into a flatter glide trajectory, trading altitude to counter atmospheric drag. Importantly, the HGV is unpowered during this phase. (DRDO is also developing an HGV under the BM-04 project.)

HGVs have inherent operational limitations. Because they are lofted to high altitudes—or even beyond the atmosphere—by a booster, they are easily detected by radar and infrared sensors. Once detected, they can be readily tracked. During the boost and early glide phases, HGVs are particularly vulnerable to adversary air and missile defenses.

In contrast, hypersonic cruise missiles need not be lofted to extreme altitudes. For maximum range, they can climb to 20–30 km to minimize drag and then cruise at hypersonic speed. When operating at shorter ranges, they can fly at much lower altitudes, significantly reducing the probability of radar detection and tracking.

Understanding the DRDL Breakthrough

DRDL has taken the lead in developing long-duration, scramjet-powered hypersonic propulsion technology.

This effort is highly likely based on technology matured under the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) programme.

The HSTDV programme demonstrated a scramjet-powered flight lasting 20 seconds. The current objective is to develop an engine capable of sustained hypersonic flight, enabled by an actively cooled scramjet combustor.

Twelve minute ground test of DRDL's Actively Cooled, Full-Scale Scramjet Combustor at its state-of-the-art Scramjet Connect Pipe Test (SCPT) Facility on January 9, 2026.

Scramjet Propulsion Challenges

One of the most formidable challenges in scramjet development is igniting the engine in supersonic airflow and maintaining stable combustion. Igniting a scramjet is often likened to lighting a matchstick in a hurricane.

The DRDL-developed scramjet combustor incorporates an innovative flame-stabilisation technique that sustains continuous combustion at airflow speeds exceeding 1.5 km/s.

Before arriving at the current engine configuration, DRDO evaluated several novel ignition and flame-holding techniques using advanced computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations and extensive ground testing.

Active Cooling

Long-duration scramjet operation necessitates active cooling, which allows engines to operate longer and at higher speeds without structural failure.

In active cooling, a coolant—often the fuel itself, such as an endothermic hydrocarbon fuel—is circulated through channels embedded in the combustor walls before being injected for combustion. The coolant absorbs heat from the structure, preventing overheating.

After absorbing heat, the now preheated fuel burns more efficiently, making the process thermally regenerative.

The indigenous development of endothermic scramjet fuel, jointly by DRDL and Indian industry, was a major breakthrough contributing to the success of the programme.

According to DRDO, these endothermic fuels undergo chemical reactions when heated, absorbing large quantities of heat. This not only cools the engine structure but also conditions the fuel for improved combustion efficiency.

Other Hypersonic Flight Challenges

Scramjet propulsion is only one of several challenges associated with hypersonic cruise missile development. Others include maintaining structural integrity and flight control at hypersonic speeds.

At Mach 5 and above, atmospheric drag generates intense frictional heating. The missile airframe must withstand extreme temperatures without structural degradation. Additionally, frictional heating can cause the missile to become enveloped in a plasma sheath, which can disrupt radio communications and guidance signals.

It is likely that DRDL addressed many of these challenges during the HSTDV programme. However, given that HSTDV demonstrated hypersonic flight for only 20 seconds, further work is likely required to validate long-duration performance.

ET-LDHCM

In July 2025, ET had reported that India is developing a new hypersonic missile that can travel at eight times the speed of sound and strike targets as far as 1,500 kilometres away. The Extended Trajectory Long Duration Hypersonic Cruise Missile (ET-LDHCM) is being developed under DRDO's Project Vishnu.

Conclusion

At present, Russia’s Tsirkon (3M22 Zircon) is the only operational hypersonic cruise missile. The missile has been used extensively against Ukrainian targets.

Tsirkon reportedly cruises at speeds of up to Mach 9, with a range of 400–450 km at low altitudes and up to 1,000 km when cruising at 20–40 km or along a semi-ballistic trajectory.

Ukrainian forces acknowledge that Tsirkon is extremely difficult to intercept. While occasional shootdown claims have been made, none have been supported by incontrovertible evidence.

China completed development of its YJ-20 hypersonic cruise missile with scramjet propulsion in 2025. With capabilities broadly comparable to Tsirkon, the missile is expected to enter operational service in 2026.

DRDO’s sustained progress in hypersonic propulsion suggests that India could field an operational hypersonic cruise missile within the next five years. It's moot whether the missile will ultimately be called ET-LDHCM, Brahmos-2 or something else. 

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

How Outrageously Ambitious Indian Navy QRs Paved the Way for Project 75I Submarine Import

Representative Image by @Grok

The ET reports that Germany and India are poised to sign a deal worth over $8 billion for the supply of six SSKs, with transfer of technology, during Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s visit to India next week

Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) and Indian state-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd. (MDL) will work together to manufacture the vessels.

In August 2024, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) cleared MDL to build six submarines in partnership with Germany’s TKMS.

The diesel-electric submarines, being procured by the MoD under Project 75I, will feature Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) and will be larger and more advanced than the current Indian Navy (IN) submarines.

TKMS, which had initially declined to bid for Project 75I due to the RFP’s “terms and conditions,” entered the competition after the German government backed the project.

Why the Need for Import

It is intriguing that India—having built four SSBNs and currently building two SSNs (with a total of six SSNs planned)—still needs to acquire SSKs from Germany, especially after already inducting seven Scorpene-class SSKs with technology transfer from France.

There are three possible explanations:

1. The SSBNs and SSNs are being built in India with foreign (Russian?) assistance, assemblies, equipment, and materials. No real ToT took place as part of Project 75. 

2. Despite trumpeting the Atmanirbhar Bharat mantra, the Government of India continues to use defence procurement as a geopolitical ingratiation tool.

3. Indian shipyards capable of building submarines are fully committed to existing submarine projects.

The Need for Fast-Paced Procurement

We will set aside the first two explanations as overly speculative and assume that Project 75I procurement through a foreign OEM is driven by the Indian Navy’s urgent operational need to replenish its ageing submarine fleet.

It is noteworthy that the Indian Navy had initially stipulated that only operational submarine designs would be considered under Project 75I. TKMS, however, has proposed a submarine based on its Type 214 design, incorporating specific modifications for the Indian Navy, such as enhanced stealth and AIP. Clearly, TKMS is not offering a fully operational, off-the-shelf design. As such, the possibility of delays runs counter to the objective of fast-paced procurement.

According to Khalil Rahman, head of TKMS India, the company successfully demonstrated the AIP capability on its Type 212 submarine during evaluation.

India’s Limited Options

The qualitative requirements (QRs) stipulated by the Indian Navy (IN) when Project 75I was initiated were extremely ambitious. They included construction of all boats at Indian shipyards, fitment of DRDO-developed AIP, and the ability to launch land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs).

The draft RFI mandated that, in addition to DRDO-developed AIP, the submarine should be fitted with Indian steel, missiles, and torpedoes, including the DRDO-developed heavyweight torpedo. The Navy also wanted all intellectual property rights for the submarine to rest with India after the initial batch of six boats, enabling India to export the design.

No submarine OEM was able to meet these QRs. As a result, the QRs were repeatedly diluted, delaying procurement by nearly a decade.

Only Germany and Spain eventually submitted bids for Project 75I, after multiple deadline extensions, culminating in July 2023. However, Spain's Navantia was unable to immediately demonstrate an AIP system while submerged, having demonstrated the system only on a surfaced submarine.

Procurement negotiations progressed under the Strategic Partnership model of the defence acquisition procedure. L&T and MDL were shortlisted as Indian partners to collaborate with foreign submarine manufacturers.

Robust Existing MDL–TKMS Relations

Fortunately for India, MDL and TKMS share a long-standing working relationship dating back to the early 1980s.

In December 1981, India signed an agreement with Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) to procure Shishumar-class diesel-electric attack submarines. The Shishumar boats are Indian variants of the HDW Type 209, featuring a larger-diameter pressure hull.

HDW later became a subsidiary of TKMS following its acquisition in January 2005.

Under the 1981 contract, HDW was to build two submarines in Kiel, Germany, and supply knock-down kits to MDL for assembling two more submarines in Mumbai.

In 1984, an agreement was announced for the construction of two additional submarines at MDL, but this was subsequently cancelled due to the economic crisis of the late 1980s.

Shishumar-class submarines were commissioned between 1986 and 1994. These submarines displace 1,660 tons when surfaced, have a top speed of 22 knots (41 km/h), and carry a complement of 40 personnel, including eight officers.

In 2018, the Indian Navy awarded a $151 million contract for the Medium Refit and Life Certification (MRLC) of INS Shishumar. MDL carried out the refit in Mumbai with technical cooperation from TKMS.

TKMS also supplied new equipment, maintenance and component support, on-site technical assistance, documentation, training, and spare parts. The MRLC aimed to extend the submarine’s service life by a decade.

TKMS in Good Financial Health

A year back, there were concerns about the financial health of TKMS. However, the conglomerate is now in good financial health having won major submarine orders.

Under the German–Norwegian 212CD programme, TKMS will build six boats each for Germany and Norway, modernise six Type 212A submarines for Germany, and build four Type 212A submarines for Singapore.

Additional orders that TKMS is likely to secure—besides the six Project 75I submarines for India—include up to 12 boats for Canada and two Type 218SG boats for Singapore

Conclusion

The DAC approved procurement of 6 submarines under Project 75I in October 2014. 

Project 75I has been delayed primarily because the Indian Navy drafted qualitative requirements that were excessively ambitious.

This import was not inevitable. Had the Indian Navy set realistic qualitative requirements at the outset, L&T—armed with SSN-building experience—could have built what the Navy is now buying from TKMS, filling gaps through partners of its own choosing.

The Indian Navy may then have obtained far more than it is getting now—including submarines built with Indian steel, missiles (vertical launch Brahmos), torpedoes, and full intellectual property rights for future exports.

Updated on January 11, 2026

Some more facts to corroborate my contention that the IN QRs were too ambitious. My information is based exclusively on news reports. The following were reportedly the original qualitative requirements (QRs): 1. Air Independent Propulsion 2. High degree of stealth 3. Land-attack capability. (At least 12 LACMs with 500-km range) 4. Anti shipping missile attack capability. 5. Ability to launch missiles from under water, preferably the Brahmos missile 6. Salvo launch of missile at a single or multiple targets 7. Ability to carry and launch 18 heavyweight torpedoes in the sea. 8. Ability to launch both torpedoes and cruise missile from torpedo tubes. It was believed that the Indian Navy preferred a submarine with a vertical launch segment capable of firing BrahMos missiles to increase overall firepower. According to an April 4, 2019, Business Standard report, a draft EoI released by the IN specified that the submarines must carry at least 12 land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), in addition to anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). The IN also specified that the boats should be able to carry and launch 18 heavyweight torpedoes. The Navy further wanted all intellectual property rights for the submarine to vest with India once the initial batch of six submarines was constructed, enabling India to export the platform. Clearly, to induct the TKMS Type 214, the IN had to drop several QRs. The IPR for the Project 75I submarines will certainly not rest with MDL. Particularly so when indigenous content will likely not exceed 45%! Had the QRs been more realistic, MDL and L&T—drawing on their HDW-209, Scorpene, SSBN, and SSN experience—could have built an Indian-designed, developed, and manufactured submarine. Perhaps not as capable initially as the Type 214, but with the potential to surpass it through sustained development over time.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.