HAL Bets on Locally Produced Russian SJ-100 as Udan Workhorse

Ahead of the Wings India 2026 air show in Hyderabad from January 28 to 31, HAL has released a video promoting the Russian short-haul airliner SJ-100 as a game changer for short-haul connectivity under India's UDAN scheme.

HAL will showcase its growing civil portfolio at @WingsIndia2026. Visit us at Hall A | Stall No 27.
Centre-stage: H-228 commuter aircraft, Dhruv NG helicopter & the SJ-100 regional jet, which will make its debut. pic.twitter.com/8OR2ShuWtz

— HAL (@HALHQBLR) January 23, 2026

HAL intends to locally manufacture the complete aircraft in India in partnership with Public Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation (PJSC-UAC). The two companies signed an MoU for production of the aircraft in Moscow, Russia, on October 27, 2025.

The partnership is intended to be a landmark event in the civil aviation sector, fulfilling India’s ambition to build commercial aircraft.

The SJ-100 is a twin-engine, narrow-body aircraft. As of date, more than 200 aircraft have been produced and are being operated by more than 16 commercial airline operators.

According to the HAL video, the SJ-100 features state-of-the-art avionics, fly-by-wire controls, unmatched aerodynamics, a new PD-8 engine, wingtip vertical winglets, and lower fuel burn.

SJ-100 Development History

In 2000, Russia’s Sukhoi started development of the country’s first airliner—the Sukhoi Superjet SJ-100. The pace of development of the regional jet was impressive: the SJ-100 made its maiden flight on May 19, 2008, and its first commercial flight on April 21, 2011.

The aircraft was powered by two 77–79 kN PowerJet SaM146 turbofans developed by a joint venture between French Safran and Russian NPO Saturn. It typically seated 87 to 98 passengers.

Western Sanctions

In early 2022, the US and its Western allies imposed sanctions that brought collaboration between Russian and Western commercial aviation entities to a complete halt. The intent was to derail Russian commercial aviation. It didn’t work.

Russia’s partly revived industry immediately hunkered down to continue development and production of the SJ-100 regional airliner and the MS-21 medium-haul airliner. An immediate decision was taken to substitute Western engines and airframe components in the two aircraft with domestically developed analogs.

On April 7, 2022, Russia’s Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin, directed that the substitution of domestic assemblies be completed within 2–3 years, with the percentage of domestic components in the MS-21 reaching 97% by 2022–2024, making it independent of imported equipment.

Domestic Power Plant

With considerable foresight, the Russian leadership had already initiated development of state-of-the-art commercial aircraft engines.

In 2010, Russia’s Aviadvigatel started development of the PD-14 high-bypass turbofan engine to power the MS-21 airliner. The PD-14 was conceived as a successor to the PS-90 (which powers IAF Il-76 airlifters), and Aviadvigatel developed it as an “engine core” around which it would build other lower- or higher-thrust engines for use by Russia’s new-generation commercial airliners.

The “engine core” alludes to critical hot parts such as the high-pressure compressor, combustor, and turbine.

The letters “PD” stand for forward-looking engine, while the number 14 represents the 14-ton thrust of the engine in its basic configuration. PD-14 variants will feature thrust ranging from 8 to 18 tons.

The PD-14 is the first engine in Russia created digitally from scratch, using paperless 3D design modelling. Aviadvigatel first developed a digital twin of the engine, based on an electronic database of engineering calculations and material characteristics. The digital twin supports engine production, bench and flight tests, as well as the development of operational documents.

The PD-8 variant of the PD family was developed to power the SJ-100, replacing the PowerJet SaM146.

The imposition of Western sanctions prompted Russia to accelerate development of the PD-14 and PD-8 engines.

The airframe of the SJ-100 had to be tweaked to accommodate the PD-8 engine.

The SJ-100 made its first flight with the Russian PD-8 engine in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur on March 17, 2025.

The MS-21 with PD-14 engines and the SJ-100 with PD-8 engines are both currently undergoing certification trials. Series production for both, with the new all-Russian engines, is expected to start in 2026.

The PD-14 powered variant of the MS-21 is referred to as MS-21-310, and the SJ-100 with the PD-8 engine is sometimes referred to as SSJ-NEW.

Conclusion

The revival of the Russian commercial aviation industry presents Make-in-India tie-up opportunities for India. New Russian airliners are now completely Russian and technologically at par with Western analogs.

Domestic air travel in India is surging. The time is ripe for the Indian civil aviation manufacturing industry to venture into production of domestic airliners.

Under its tie-up with UAC, HAL will have the rights to manufacture SJ-100 aircraft for domestic customers.

UAC is confident that HAL will be off to a flying start with local production of the SJ-100 because of its experience producing the Su-30MKI aircraft.

In August 2023, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) CEO Yuri Slyusar spoke with the “Russia-24” television channel about the proposed tie-up.

“We still believe that under the import licence at the HAL factory, which produces combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force—where they manufacture Su-30 aircraft, with over 270 aircraft made there—it is indeed a significant base with trained personnel, equipment, and refined processes. We could start producing SJ-100 aircraft for the Indian market there in a fairly short period of time.”

This will also be the second instance in which a complete passenger aircraft will be produced in India. The last such project was HAL’s production of the Avro HS-748, which started in 1961 and ended in 1988.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

LR-AShM: India’s Hypersonic Answer to Carrier Strike Groups

Photo credit: AIR

The DRDO is set to display its most lethal non-strategic missile to date—an aircraft-carrier killer—during this year’s Republic Day parade. The Long Range Anti-Shipping Missile (LR-AShM) is a hypersonic missile being developed to arm Indian Navy (IN) coastal batteries. It is designed to ensure that no carrier group—US or Chinese—can approach within 1,500 km of the Indian coastline in an attempt to exert military pressure on the nation. Currently, IN coastal batteries are armed with BrahMos missiles.

According to the MoD press release, the missile follows a quasi-ballistic trajectory. It achieves hypersonic speeds starting at Mach 10, maintaining an average speed of around Mach 5.0 through a “multiple-skip” manoeuvre.

A quasi-ballistic trajectory differs from a ballistic trajectory. In the latter, the missile follows a largely predictable flight path. In contrast, a quasi-ballistic trajectory is inherently unpredictable. Equally important, such a trajectory allows the missile to fly at relatively low altitudes, evading detection by ground- or ship-based radars during much of its flight. The missile’s extreme speed and manoeuvrability further complicate interception.

The LR-AShM has been indigenously developed by laboratories of the Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Missile Complex, Hyderabad, along with several other DRDO laboratories and industry partners.

Terminal Guidance

An anti-shipping missile carrying a conventional warhead requires extremely precise terminal guidance, given that an aircraft carrier is a fast-moving and manoeuvring target.

Typically, a long-range missile intended to strike a moving target employs a dual-mode seeker combining Active Radar Homing (ARH) and Imaging Infrared (IIR) guidance. ARH enables target acquisition and tracking in all weather and lighting conditions, while IIR facilitates target discrimination in clear weather, allowing the missile to distinguish the carrier from other warships in the strike group.

Without specifying the nature of the terminal guidance, the MoD press release states:

“Indigenously developed sensors are provided for engaging moving targets in the terminal phase.”

DRDO developed and refined its ARH capability through the BrahMos programme, particularly the land-attack variant. Similarly, it honed its IIR homing capability while developing advanced variants of its Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs).

Maiden Test

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) conducted a successful flight trial of India’s first long-range hypersonic missile from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island, off the coast of Odisha, on November 16, 2024.

At the time of its maiden test, the MoD release referred to the LR-AShM simply as the Long Range Hypersonic Missile (LR-HM).

Missile Launch Video Analysis

DRDO released a video of the maiden test. The following observations are based on that footage.

As the missile emerged from its container following a cold launch, it appeared to employ its attitude-control thrusters twice before first-stage solid-rocket-motor ignition.

The missile transitioned from a vertical to a horizontal trajectory in roughly six seconds, beginning about eight seconds after liftoff. This early transition suggests the missile is designed to fly within the atmosphere for the entire duration of its flight.

The missile’s physical configuration indicates a two-stage solid-propellant design.

The first stage functions as a booster. The second stage is the hypersonic sustainer, featuring cruciform, short-span, long-chord aerodynamic surfaces along the mid-body and four short triangular fins at the aft section. The mid-body surfaces likely provide manoeuvrability and flight control, while the aft fins contribute to stability.

According to the MoD press release, the missile

“features a two-stage solid propulsion system. The first stage separates after burnout, while the second stage boosts the vehicle to hypersonic speeds before transitioning into an unpowered glide to the target.”

At hypersonic velocities, the cruciform configuration can reduce drag compared to planar wing designs.

Future Development

As stated in the MoD press release, the missile will initially be deployed with coastal batteries. A logical progression would be upgrades enabling deployment aboard IN warships and, eventually, submarines. Such deployment would push adversary carrier groups well beyond 1,500 km from India’s coastline.

The demonstrated cold-launch capability from a container strongly suggests eventual deployment on ships and potentially on future submarines.

YJ-20

China fields several ballistic missiles with hypersonic warheads capable of anti-shipping strikes, including the DF-21D (1,500 km, Mach 10), DF-26 (4,000 km, Mach 10+), DF-17 (1,800–2,500 km, Mach 5–10), and DF-27 (5,000–8,000 km, Mach 5+).

Because ballistic missiles follow relatively predictable trajectories, they can be intercepted by ship-borne air-defence systems within a carrier group.

More recently, China has fielded hypersonic quasi-ballistic anti-ship missiles, notably the YJ-20 and YJ-21, capable of launch from air, surface, and undersea platforms.

Chinese state media released footage showing a YJ-20 launch from the PLAN Type 055 destroyer Wuxi on December 28, 2025.

The YJ-20 cruises at speeds exceeding Mach 6, has a reported range of 1,500 km, and reaches terminal speeds of Mach 10. It is compact enough for air launch from the H-6K bomber and vertical launch from Type 052D and Type 055 destroyers. It may also be deployable from both nuclear- and diesel-electric-powered submarines.

Russia’s Zircon is another hypersonic anti-shipping missile deployable from ships and submarines; however, it is a scramjet-powered cruise missile, not a boost-glide system.

YJ-20 and LR-AShM Comparison

There are notable similarities between the LR-AShM and the YJ-20.

Both are hypersonic boost-glide systems designed for anti-ship roles. However, the YJ-20 employs biconic aerodynamics, likely enhancing manoeuvrability.

Both have publicly stated ranges of around 1,500 km, though actual operational ranges are likely higher.

Both achieve Mach 5+ speeds with high terminal velocities, attack targets in a near-vertical dive, and present significant interception challenges.

Conclusion

Despite its prominent display during the Republic Day parade, the LR-AShM remains in an early stage of development. It may take several years before DRDO can demonstrate the accuracy required to reliably cripple a manoeuvring aircraft carrier using a conventional warhead.

Given its intended deployment with coastal batteries, fitting a nuclear warhead is unlikely, even though the MoD press release notes that the missile “is designed to carry various payloads.”

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Russian Tech Breakthroughs Enable 100 km Lancet Drone Strikes

According to a RIA Novosti report, Lancet drones are now striking targets at ranges of over 100 km.

In the past, it has been reported that the Product 51 (Lancet-3) variant of the drone has a range of 40–70 km, with an endurance of approximately 60 minutes.

The increase in range and endurance is attributed to increased battery capacity. In addition, the use of machine vision and EW-hardened SATNAV now facilitates more efficient routing to the target, effectively increasing range. 

Using machine vision, the drone can quickly recognise its target or select a target of opportunity without the need to loiter. 

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, machine vision assisted terminal guidance facilitates strikes on stationary, moving and camouflaged targets, including artillery installations, armored vehicles and military infrastructure facilities in the depth of Ukrainian defense.

It is interesting to note that Lancet developer ZALA has focused on improving endurance and efficiency without radically altering the drone’s core design—X-shaped wings, electric propulsion, and a maximum take-off weight of around 12 kg.

Earlier this month, Alan Lushnikov, CEO of the Kalashnikov Concern, told TASS in an interview that the Skat-350M reconnaissance drone and the KUB-2 guided munition can now be integrated into a single system. When the Skat-350M spots a target, a KUB-2 is launched and then autonomously guided to the target by the Skat-350M.

This capability is part of broader integration within Russia’s unmanned systems, in which reconnaissance drones provide targeting data to strike assets. Similar integration with the Skat-350M would allow a Lancet to operate effectively at extreme ranges, such as 100 km.

The Skat-350M is an enhanced variant of the Supercam 350M.

The Skat-350M can use optical navigation and target identification in GPS-denied zones and can be controlled from well outside the battle zone, as explained in my earlier Thumkar post. Once the drone exits the jamming area, it can transmit coordinates to the kamikaze drone.

Lancet drones can also receive target coordinates from Orlan-10 drones for direct targeting.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

HAL Pursuing Su-57 Joint Production Offer with Sukhoi

The Indian Express reported on January 19, 2026, that Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has tasked a Russian team with calculating the costs HAL would incur if it were to participate in a joint venture with Sukhoi to locally manufacture the Su-57. While calculating the total cost, the team will include expenses related to technology transfer (ToT), infrastructure, supply-chain development, and human resources.

Two months earlier, representatives from the Sukhoi Design Bureau and other Russian defence entities stated in a proposal to HAL that the company already possesses roughly half of the infrastructure required for the local production of the Su-57. This assessment is based on the fact that HAL has been locally manufacturing the Su-30MKI at Nashik, Maharashtra (airframe); Koraput, Odisha (engine); and Kasaragod, Kerala (avionics).

The Russian team is expected to submit its report later this month.

Indian Express sources have clarified that the Government of India (GoI) has yet to take a decision on which stealth fighter to acquire to meet the Indian Air Force’s (IAF’s) projected operational requirement of two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter, intended to bridge the projected 10-year gap until the induction of the AMCA.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

New Russian Technology Removes Drone Pilots from the Battlefield

Preparing a Supercam 350M reconnaissance drone for launch.

A simple Russian innovation, displayed at the UMEX 2026 expo in Abu Dhabi, may change the nature of drone warfare by making it less susceptible to counter-drone operations.

Currently, an important facet of counter-drone warfare involves eliminating drone piloting teams as a higher priority than eliminating the drone itself. After all, drone operators are far more difficult to replace than drones.

The tactic involves pinpointing the location of adversary drone operators as soon as a drone is spotted, and immediately launching strikes against the team using precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

Simple triangulation of control telemetry can help pinpoint the location of drone operators.

At UMEX 2026, the developer and manufacturer of the Supercam 350M reconnaissance UAV—the Unmanned Systems Group of Companies—showcased technology that facilitates piloting drones not only from outside the adversary’s counter-fire zone, but from virtually anywhere in the world.

The innovation involves placing a well-protected communications antenna and modem at the drone’s launch point. Drone control commands travel to the launch point over a low-latency communication link, from where they are relayed to the drone using RF telemetry. The low latency of the link facilitates real-time control, allowing operators to leverage the drone’s full combat capability.

Presumably, low latency is ensured through the exclusive use of terrestrial overland and undersea cables, rather than satellites in geostationary orbit.

Field technicians set up the launch point, launch the drone, and later recover it.

It is claimed that Russian forces have operationally tested the technology extensively while fighting Ukrainian forces.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Indian Army to Field Jet Powered Kamikaze Drones with Chinese Engine

The Indian Army (IA) is reportedly set to field the Berkut-BM jet-powered kamikaze drone developed by the Indela company in Belarus, according to Defence-Blog.

Interestingly, the drone is reportedly powered by a micro turbojet engine developed by the Chinese company Swiwin.

Swiwin Turbojet Equipment Co., Ltd. specializes in the research, development, and production of small-scale turbojet engines and related accessories.

Their products, such as the SW800 Pro and SW400 Pro models, are primarily used in hobbyist applications like model aircraft and personal flying devices, though they have appeared in military-related contexts in recent reports.

China has now placed export restrictions on the sale of the company’s engines.

It is possible that either Russia or Belarus is now locally manufacturing Swiwin engines. Recently, fragments of an SW800 Pro jet engine were found among the debris of a Russian UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bomb in Ukraine. Microjet-powered Russian glide bombs are now reportedly able to strike targets at ranges of 120 to 150 km.

Indian Purchase

According to Defence-Blog, the IA has acquired dozens of Berkut-BM drones.

Białoruś opracowała najnowszego „domowego” drona UAV, który okazał się być wyposażony w chiński silnik odrzutowy Swiwin SW300B, który można kupić na AliExpress za 5846 USD. I wisienka - na opublikowanych zdjęciach rozdają zautomatyzowany cel powietrzny "Berkut-BM" dla "Rozjemcy" pic.twitter.com/UPL9UznIrQ

— Marcin K | Forza Robert Kubica | F1 (@Jona_Mar78) October 21, 2022

The catapult-launched drones have an operational range of around 150 km and can attain speeds in excess of 400 km/h. They feature a 10 kg HE fragmentation warhead designed to damage non-armoured surface targets such as radar installations, missile batteries, artillery positions, and logistics nodes.

If the Berkut-BM acquisition report is accurate, the drone will be the first jet-powered kamikaze drone in the IA’s inventory.

Belarus has previously exported the Berkut-BM to several countries and armed groups, including Russia, Venezuela, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces militia.

Whether the microjet powering the Berkut-BM being acquired by the IA is manufactured in China or outside China—in Russia or Belarus—is largely moot, as the engine is disposable and requires no maintenance or spare-part replacement. As such, the acquisition is entirely in order.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Menacing Chinese Stealth Threat : IAF Needs Adversary Sobering Combat Capability, Not Make-in-India!

Nearly eight years after initiating procurement under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is finally poised to sign a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).

Roughly speaking, India currently operates around 600 fighter aircraft and is now poised to acquire 114 more.

In contrast, in 2025 alone, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is estimated to have inducted an additional 120 J-20A/J-20S heavy stealth fighters. (The J-20A is the dual-seat variant of the J-20.)

Also in 2025, the PLAAF inducted between 100 and 170 additional fighters, including the J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT, and J-10A/B/C.

In other words, the PLAAF may have added up to 300 heavy stealth and non-stealth fighters to its inventory in a single year.

A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projection suggests that by 2030, around 1,000 J-20A/S fighters and 900 J-16s will be in service with the PLAAF.

The number of J-20s manufactured increased from around 150 in August 2022 to 208 in November 2023. Production rates likely reached 100 aircraft per year in 2023 and have since stabilised at approximately 120 aircraft annually.

In addition to the projected 1,000 J-20A/S stealth fighters, the PLAAF may also induct several hundred land-based J-35 variants. The J-35 is believed to be in low-rate initial production, but output is expected to ramp up in the coming years. Based on the rapid ramp-up of J-20 production, between 200 and 300 J-35s could be operational by 2030. Notably, the J-35 will field highly capable sensors and weapons derived from systems painstakingly perfected for the J-20.

India's Foolhardy Nonchalance

Oblivious to this burgeoning threat, Indians are hotly debating the need for additional Rafale fighters. Worse still, the Indian government appears to be ignoring the Russian offer, despite the fact that the IAF has projected the need for two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter to plug a widening operational gap.

Frankly, the only plausible explanation for India sitting on the Russian offer appears to be deep Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States military–industrial complex (MIC) penetration of Indian corporates, the bureaucracy, and the political leadership. If so, Indian sovereignty is largely illusory. I hope this assessment is wrong—but the issue warrants serious reflection.

Photo Credit: RuMoD

Urgent Need to Delink ToT from Weapon Acquisition

The primary reason for the approximately 30 per cent decline in the IAF’s squadron strength—from 42 to 29 squadrons—has been persistent delays in the delivery of the Tejas fighter and its follow-on variants, including the Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-2.

Shockingly, the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership never moved beyond superficial tinkering with procurement procedures to address these crippling delays. The outcome was predictable: the process stalled and eventually ran aground. Was this paralysis by analysis? Possibly. More likely, despite the optics, defence has never been more than a desultory priority for the political leadership.

Let us focus on the optics. No one disputes the need—or urgency—of Make in India for defence-related equipment. But where is the logic in allowing defence procurement to collapse because Make in India timelines cannot be met?

The problems with Make in India cannot be addressed through procurement policy changes alone; they are endemic to the current state of India’s industrial base.

For many technologically advanced components used in modern weapon systems—such as aero and marine engines, sensors, and advanced materials—India possesses neither the industrial base nor the technical know-how required for local manufacture. Indeed, the absence of know-how is itself a consequence of the absence of a mature industrial base.

The industrial base of any country evolves in response to market dynamics. When substantial demand emerges, the private sector—driven by profit incentives—moves rapidly to meet it. Firms upgrade industrial capacity, enter technology transfer arrangements, raise capital, hire skilled personnel, and undertake a range of other, often complex, adjustments necessary to compete.

India’s inability to develop several critical weapon-system components is not a failure of intelligence or talent. It stems from the absence of a mature industrial base, which in turn limits engineering excellence, advanced semiconductor fabrication capability, materials science depth, and related competencies. The gap is so fundamental that India is not even positioned to reverse-engineer, let alone replicate, cutting-edge technologies.

Defence Procurement and Make in India Are Parallel Processes

For reasons that remain unexplained, the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India (GoI) have tethered India’s defence preparedness to the Make in India programme. This flawed linkage has allowed national security to be held hostage to industrial policy.

It is a dangerous and indefensible conflation.

A familiar refrain follows: India should not buy Rafales because France has not agreed to transfer technology. This framing is faulty. It is not France but Dassault Aviation that has declined extensive transfer of technology—and understandably so. How can a private design house be expected to part with its core intellectual property when India lacks the industrial base and the pool of trained, experienced personnel required to absorb it? Moreover, Dassault’s very survival depends on intellectual property accumulated painstakingly over decades.

This raises a more fundamental question: why is India insisting on transfer of technology as part of every fighter aircraft procurement deal?

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) already know how to design and manufacture fighter aircraft. They have done so twice—first with the HF-24 Marut, and later with the Tejas.

What they may need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps—high-temperature engine technology, for instance. Such transfers should be negotiated independently, rather than being tied to acquisitions meant to address urgent operational shortfalls.

Indeed, Safran and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) are reportedly poised to sign a contract to co-develop an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter. The deal—reportedly cleared by the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and the Finance Ministry—is awaiting final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).

The proposed agreement, valued at over ₹30,000 crore, reportedly involves full transfer of technology for a 120–140 kilonewton thrust-class engine, with joint intellectual property ownership and manufacturing in India.

So why does India need Rafale engine technology at all? After all, HAL has been assembling and partially manufacturing the AL-31F engine for the Su-30MKI locally for decades.

The core issue is this: if every fighter aircraft acquisition is made contingent on comprehensive transfer of technology, will India ever acquire fighters from abroad at all? Revisit the opening paragraphs and ask whether India can realistically counter the Chinese threat through local production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, LCA Mk-2, and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), supplemented by roughly 150 Rafales and about 270 Su-30MKIs—many of which have not undergone a major upgrade in nearly 25 years.

Conclusion

China’s military build-up has already reached overwhelming proportions.

Indian Air Force light fighters such as the Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-1A lack the range and payload required to effectively defend Indian airspace against the PLAAF—particularly against its stealth fighters (J-20A/S, J-35) and heavy multirole aircraft (J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT).

The IAF must urgently rebuild its combat strength to the authorised level of 42 fighter squadrons—and not with just any aircraft, but with platforms capable of credibly countering the PLAAF’s current and emerging threat.

Make in India remains an important long-term objective. It cannot, however, be India’s immediate operational strategy.

 Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.