Over the past one month or so, Russia has absorbed many painful blows delivered by Ukrainian long range strike drones. Ukraine has struck Russian energy infrastructure and logistics to an extent where Russians are now being forced to cope with fuel and energy shortages, not just the loss of energy exports. The advance of Russian forces has slowed to a crawl that suggests that it may take years for them to completely 'liberate' Donbas.
For some in Russia and abroad, the situation may appear dismal. However, Russia has some good cards to play on account of its industrial capacity, resilience, and patience. To counter the drone menace it appears to be abandoning a "border defence" philosophy in favour of distributed vital-area defence.
There is a perception that Russia has no effective counter to the threat posed by Ukraine's long-range strike drones. Deployed in sufficient numbers, such drones are likely to continue penetrating Russian airspace and striking targets deep inside the country. Unless Russia develops more effective countermeasures, the economic and military costs imposed by these attacks are likely to grow as Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to evolve.
Russia may still achieve some of the objectives of its Special Military Operation, such as the liberation of Donbas. However, even if Russian forces were to secure Donbas, there is little reason to believe Ukraine would cease hostilities. Instead, it could continue using long-range drones to impose economic costs on Russia and gradually erode its war-fighting capacity.
In that sense, drones may provide Ukraine with a viable means of waging a prolonged war of attrition, one that seeks to compel Russia to negotiate on terms more favourable to Kyiv.
Understanding Russia's Air Defence Limitations
Russia has largely relied on its integrated layered air defence network—designed primarily to detect, track, and engage high-value aerial assets such as combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—to counter the threat posed by low-cost, slow-flying long-range drones. The endeavor has been ineffective, besides its high economic cost.
Border Length
Russia's land border with Ukraine extends for approximately 1,974 km. However, drones are not restricted to crossing the land border. They can approach via the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, cross territorial waters, or exploit the airspace of neighbouring countries before entering Russia.
Russia also has approximately 800 km of coastline vulnerable to drone ingress. Ukrainian drones have, on occasion, reportedly transited the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before entering Russian airspace to strike targets around St. Petersburg. Russia's borders with the Baltic states extend for another 862 km.
In effect, Russian air defence systems must monitor potential drone approaches along more than 3,600 km of land and maritime frontiers.
Air defence coverage across such distances will inevitably contain gaps. Existing Russian systems were primarily designed to detect aircraft and missiles flying above approximately 500 ft. Ukrainian drones, equipped with Starlink terminals that provide low-latency communications, are known to fly at much lower altitudes. Using electro-optical sensors, they can also be remotely piloted along river valleys, lakes, and other terrain features that reduce the likelihood of detection.
Western ISR Support
Ukraine's Western allies also employ space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor Russian air defence deployments and operational status.
These assets may detect temporary gaps created by system relocation, maintenance, or technical failures, allowing drone routes to be planned around them. It is conceivable that some drones can even be dynamically rerouted during flight as new opportunities emerge.
Why Ukraine Has Been Successful
In many respects, the perception that drones can occasionally penetrate even heavily defended airspace reflects reality. Both Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated the ability to do so against sophisticated air defence networks fielded by Russia, the United States, and Israel.
With extensive assistance from its Western partners, Ukraine has developed tactics that exploit the inherent limitations of legacy air defence systems through the use of Starlink communications, space-based ISR, and airborne surveillance assets.
Russia Pivots Towards Dedicated Drone Defence
Recent Ukrainian successes appear to have prompted Russia to complement its legacy air defence network with systems specifically designed to counter drones.
Unlike traditional air defence systems, which are optimised to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, these new systems are intended to defeat slow-flying autonomous or remotely piloted drones.
There will inevitably be overlap between the two defensive architectures as drones themselves increasingly assume traditional combat roles.
Russia's changing priorities are reflected in the variety of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) introduced over the past few months. The emphasis appears to have shifted from preventing drone penetration to limiting the damage once drones enter defended airspace.
Vital Area and Vital Point Defence
Broadly speaking, Russia appears to be focusing on protecting vital areas and vital points.
For vital area defence, Russian forces have introduced:
1. Specialised drone-detection radar (Sokol)
Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system capable of denying connectivity over an area of approximately 18 sq km
2. Medium-range interceptor drones (Rita-2 and Molniya)
3. Passive RF and electro-optical drone detection systems
4. Medium-range electronic warfare systems
5. Rapidly deployable protective net systems for roads and convoys
6. Yak-130M light combat aircraft for engaging larger drones
For vital point defence:
1. Krona-E ultra-short-range missile system (450 m–1.3 km)
2. Zak-30 Citadel 30 mm automatic cannon firing programmable air-burst ammunition
3. Zubr automated gun systems
4. Yolka hand-launched interceptor drones
5. Rita-2 reusable interceptor drones
6. Redut-UR automated kinetic defence system firing unguided rockets
7. Shrapnel-dispersing small-arms ammunition
8. Duplet net-firing handgun
These lists are not exhaustive.
With the notable exception of the Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jammer, most of these systems appear relatively inexpensive. They therefore lend themselves to large-scale production and widespread deployment.
It is likely that Russia's next priority will be manufacturing these systems in sufficient numbers to protect critical infrastructure and strategic facilities across the country.
An interesting feature of nearly all these new systems is that they possess their own dedicated radar and/or electro-optical sensors. They are therefore far less dependent on the sensor network of Russia's legacy air defence system.
It is also likely that the legacy air defence network will continue to evolve and become more tightly integrated with this new layered drone defence architecture.
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