Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russia. Show all posts

Friday, September 4, 2026

Russia’s Coca-Cola Strike: Retaliation, Deterrence or Coincidence?



During the past year or so, the US and its Western allies have increasingly become directly involved in Ukraine's long-range strikes on Russia, including through the provision of targeting, intelligence and navigation-related information for Ukrainian long-range strike systems.


Russia now appears to be responding in kind by striking US and Western commercial interests in Ukraine. The apparent objectives are twofold: retaliation for Western involvement in attacks on Russian commercial and economic interests, and deterrence of further Western investment in Ukraine.


On September 3, Russian drones struck the Coca-Cola Beverages Ukraine plant in Velyka Dymerka, in Kyiv region. The facility is Coca-Cola's only production site in Ukraine and one of Europe's larger bottling plants.


Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy described the strike as “a clear Russian signal to America,” arguing that Russia could not be unaware that it was striking an American-owned facility. 


In its account of the September 3 strikes, the Russian MoD did not specifically identify the Coca-Cola facility. Instead, it broadly claimed to have struck “enterprises of the military-industrial and fuel-energy complexes” involved in producing missiles, drones and components, supplying fuel to Ukrainian forces, and logistics facilities allegedly handling dual-use goods and UAV components.


Reports from Ukraine said a drone struck warehouses containing finished products, causing a large fire. No casualties were reported.


The Russian account therefore leaves the purpose of the Coca-Cola strike deliberately ambiguous. If the facility was intentionally selected because it belongs to an American company, the MoD's broader description provides Moscow with plausible deniability.


Coca-Cola and the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine said the company was assessing the damage with Ukrainian authorities and that employee safety remained the priority.


Not the First


The September 3 strike was not the first Russian attack on US commercial interests in Ukraine. A May New York Times investigation documented Russian strikes since mid-2025 on facilities linked to Coca-Cola, Cargill, Boeing, Mondelez, Philip Morris, Flex and Bunge.


Representatives of several companies told visiting US senators that they believed the attacks were deliberate. Senator Jeanne Shaheen said the businesses believed they were being targeted intentionally. Andy Hunder of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine argued that Russia was attempting to deter further American investment.


There is, however, another plausible explanation. Some Ukrainian business figures and observers believe the attacks are part of a broader Russian campaign against Ukraine's industrial and logistical infrastructure, with the nationality of the company being incidental. In that interpretation, US companies are being hit because their facilities happen to be part of Ukraine's economic infrastructure.


Zelenskyy's “a clear Russian signal to America” characterisation could well have been a "cheeky" interpretation as it could well be possible that Ukrainian forces were using Coca Cola warehouses for military purposes thinking that Russia would not dare to strike them. 


The most plausible explanation may be that both motives are operating simultaneously: Russia is attempting to weaken Ukraine's economy while also signalling to Washington and other Western capitals that their commercial assets in Ukraine are not immune from the consequences of Western involvement in the war.


The Coca-Cola plant's highly visible American branding would have made it an especially potent symbolic target.


At the same time, the use of plausible deniability is important. There is no publicly available evidence establishing conclusively that Russia deliberately selected the Coca-Cola plant because it was American-owned. The strike can therefore be explained as an attack on Ukrainian economic infrastructure, even if its selection was in fact deliberate.


US Reaction


The US government has so far not publicly reacted to the September 3 Coca-Cola strike. Earlier in 2026, Washington's response to similar incidents was muted; a State Department spokesperson said the US had urged both sides to refrain from targeting American business interests.


Some US lawmakers and analysts have criticised this posture, arguing that Washington's restraint could establish a precedent in which American commercial assets in a war zone can be struck with little consequence.


But a more belligerent US response would carry its own problem: Washington would have to confront, rather than brush under the carpet, the extent of US involvement in enabling Ukrainian strikes deep inside Russia.


Doing so could turn attacks on American commercial interests from an uncomfortable side-effect of the war into a direct US-Russia confrontation—and escalate an already dangerous conflict considerably further.


Friday, August 14, 2026

Russia's Semiconductor Lithography Breakthrough: No More Washing Machines for Chips



The Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center (ZNTC), together with the Belarusian Planar, has reportedly completed the development and manufacture of a prototype photolithography unit with a design standard of 130 nm. This is the most advanced lithograph ever created on the territory of Russia and the Union State.


Microchips based on the 130-nm standard on 200-mm wafers are widely used in industrial electronics — car controllers, converters for the power industry, chips for communication base stations, secure microcontrollers for payment systems, and interface components for aviation and space. Russia has been manufacturing 130-nm microchips using photolithography systems imported from Nikon, Canon and ASML. Following Western sanctions, access to such equipment was severely restricted.


In the past, ZNTC has successfully developed and delivered to industry photolithography systems with 350-nm resolution. It has also created two prototypes of an electron-beam lithography system with a 150-nm standard, which are undergoing testing. Electron Beam Lithography (EBL) is distinct from photolithography — EBL is a semiconductor lithography technique that can be used for research, mask fabrication and low-volume manufacturing of semiconductors.


The new Russian breakthrough follows Russian success in developing an excimer laser, a critical component of photolithography technology.


In September 2024, Moscow-based LASSARD Group of Companies announced that it had produced two experimental high-power excimer-laser samples, at 193 and 248 nm, under the Russian "Progress 130" project.


In February 2026, Denis Manturov, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, reportedly said that this year Russia would master the production of lithography equipment with a 130-nm standard.


LASSARD is attempting to develop and industrialise a Russian excimer-laser light source specifically for semiconductor photolithography. Its work began with a 248-nm prototype for a 130-nm lithography system, followed by development of a 193-nm source for 90–45-nm lithography.


LASSARD is developing just the laser. The lithography machine is vastly more complicated than the laser. Other critical components include optics, the mask, wafer stage, photoresist, and alignment and focus systems.


Based on the report, the Zelenograd Nanotechnology Center, together with the Belarusian Planar, is developing the entire lithography machine.


Photolithography Explained


Making a semiconductor chip involves printing an extraordinarily complicated microscopic drawing onto a silicon wafer.


The wafer is coated with a light-sensitive material called photoresist. A pattern — representing transistors, wires, etc. — is projected onto the wafer through a mask. When photons interact with the photoresist, it changes chemically. The exposed or unexposed portions can then be removed, allowing the underlying silicon or other material to be etched or otherwise processed.


The smaller the wavelength of the light, the smaller the features that can potentially be printed.


That's why semiconductor manufacturing progressed from visible/near-UV light to deep ultraviolet (DUV).


Excimer Laser


An excimer laser produces extremely intense pulses of very short-wavelength ultraviolet light.


For semiconductor lithography, two wavelengths are relevant:


KrF (Krypton Fluoride) — 248 nm


ArF (Argon Fluoride) — 193 nm


These are deep-ultraviolet wavelengths. Modern DUV lithography systems use these lasers as their light source. 


The highly specialised excimer-laser light sources required for DUV photolithography are supplied essentially by two major foreign companies — ASML-owned US company Cymer and Japan's Gigaphoton. Nikon and Canon manufacture complete DUV lithography systems, but do not provide the same independent excimer-laser-light-source capability.


EUV Lithography


Even after LASSARD fields a 193-nm excimer-laser system, there will continue to exist a yawning gap between Russian-manufactured microchips and those manufactured by Taiwan-based TSMC, a global leader in semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC is already mass-producing 7-nm-class chips, with its more advanced 7-nm variants using ASML EUV lithography.


ASML has now achieved an extraordinary technological position by developing EUV lithography in which a laser-generated tin plasma produces 13.5-nm light. Extremely short-wavelength ultraviolet light — typically 13.5 nanometres (nm) — can be used to print very tiny features on a silicon wafer. ASML is currently the only commercial supplier of EUV lithography systems.


Semiconductor Manufacturing


With 130-nm lithographic capability, Russia could push its optical lithography capability to potentially approach 65-nm-class features using multipatterning.


Multipatterning involves printing complicated patterns by photo-etching two or more simpler patterns sequentially over the same wafer surface.


Multipatterning is technologically challenging and pushes up cost, processing time, and defect rates.


Though so far Russia has only now acquired photolithography capabilities to manufacture 130-nm chips, it is already designing and manufacturing chips with finer topography.


Mikron already produces chips with a 90-nm topology, which are used in bank cards. For the 90-nm process, Mikron uses lithography equipment from STMicroelectronics.


In January 2026, it was reported that Element Microelectronic Holding was building a plant in Tatarstan for the production of semiconductor wafers with 55–40-nm technology. In the future, the enterprise should reach a more advanced level — 28 nanometers.


55–40-nm technologies cover more than half of the Russian market for electronic components. Among the main customers are Rosatom, Rostec, defence industry enterprises and critical information infrastructure facilities.


Russia has possibly acquired the capability to manufacture finer-topology chips by using imported second-hand ASML photolithography systems, optics, lasers, wafer stages and control electronics.


China's Shanghai Micro Electronics Equipment reportedly has been developing 28-nm immersion lithography systems.


Ambitious Plans


Russia reportedly has around 25–40 imported 130-nm photolithography units operational at Russian enterprises. These will eventually need to be replaced, creating a potential demand for 15–25 new units by 2030–32. The market is small, but sanctions and the urgent need to reduce import dependence leave Russia with little choice.


Despite the sanctions — or perhaps because of them — Russia has drawn up ambitious plans to ramp up its semiconductor manufacturing capability. It aims to mass-produce 28-nm chips by 2027 and 14-nm chips by 2030. However, it is likely that the targets will be pushed back based on delays in establishing the capability.


The recent development of a prototype photolithography system with a 130-nm design resolution is an important step towards realising Russia's semiconductor ambitions. What Russia has created so far is a prototype that will be used for preliminary testing and for developing and refining the technological processes required to manufacture specific products.


Most importantly for Russian strategic planners, ZNTC's success with the 130-nm photolithography system has cemented its reputation as an organisation that Russia could rely on for its semiconductor ambitions in the future.


Monday, June 8, 2026

In Ukraine, Cornered by US Supplied Hornet Drones, Russia Bounces Back with Molniya Purpose-Built Hornet Hunter

Molniya Interceptor Drone Undergoing Factory Testing. Screen grab from RuMoD released video.


Russian forces appear to be reeling under a sustained campaign of mid-range interdiction attacks on their logistics network by Ukrainian forces using US-made Hornet AI-powered autonomous attack drones. The Hornet can navigate using machine vision and autonomously hunt, recognize, prioritize, and attack targets moving along Russian supply routes.


As a result, over the past month, the flow of fuel, ammunition, and reinforcements to the front line is drying up.


Logistics Lockdown


Ukraine has succeeded in imposing a logistics lockdown on Russian forces using Hornet drones, a lockdown that appears to have significantly slowed the Russian offensive along the Donbas frontline..


It's conceivable that supplies reaching the frontline are barely allowing Russian forces to hold territory.


Breaking Out of the Lockdown


To retain the offensive capability of its forces, the Russian military leadership has taken immediate measures such as shortening convoys and avoiding highways by using alternative routes and dirt roads.


Short-term measures being considered to ease Ukraine's "logistics lockdown" include relocating depots deeper within Russian territory and redeploying short-range mobile air-defense systems, such as Tor and Pantsir, to protect highways from drone attacks. However, when resources are limited, strengthening the rear can weaken the front.


Relocating depots deeper within Russian territory will slow the flow of supplies. Redeploying air-defense assets will weaken the integrated air-defense network and make forward-deployed artillery and command posts more vulnerable.


Long Term Measures


It is the long-term measures that the Russian leadership is likely betting on, including 


1. Improving drone detection and tracking through the use of more capable radar and optical sensors. 


2. Deploying large numbers of interceptor drones to engage attacking Hornet drones.


Yolka Interceptor Drone


Yolka is a handheld, man-portable kinetic interceptor drone launched from a pistol-like device. It's extremely simple to use. The operator points it roughly toward a target, launches, and the drone autonomously tracks and rams the enemy UAV using electro-optical (daylight camera) + infrared sensors plus an onboard AI/processor ("Igolka" module). 


Weighing approximately 1.3 kg, the Yolka can reach speeds of 200–250 km/h and operate at altitudes of up to 2 km.


Russian forces began operational deployment of the autonomous Yolka interceptor drone in early 2026.


The Yolka's portability, ease of use, and very low cost (approximately $500) enable widespread and distributed deployment. 


The Yolka provides a credible counter-drone capability for mobile counter-drone ("drone hunting") teams, small infantry and special-forces units, and for protecting personnel, vehicles, and equipment in the field. 


Though the Yolka has been a success story, it was developed and operationally deployed before former Google CEO Eric Schmidt dug into his deep pockets to fund the development of the Hornet strike drone that is now causing anguish along the front line and at command centers. 


The speed and routing flexibility of the Hornet are often beyond the interception capabilities of the Yolka. The Hornet has a cruising speed of 100-120 kph but is capable of higher dash and dive speeds. However, if launched and positioned in time, Yolkas can successfully intercept Hornet drones. Drone interception video released by the RuMoD and other official sources such as the Zvesdamews often show footage of Yolka drones intercepting Hornets.   


Screen grab from RuMoD released video.



Molniya Interceptor Drone


Developed by the Scientific and Production Center for Unmanned Aviation Systems in Russia's Tomsk Region, the Molniya interceptor is somewhat similar in shape (bullet-like) to the Ukrainian Sting interceptor. Both use a quadcopter flight and control scheme.


Currently, Molniya is undergoing factory tests. 


Significantly, the Molniya is heavier (2.5 kg versus 1.3 kg) than the Yolka and offers a greater maximum engagement range (5 km versus 3 km).


Unlike the Yolka, which lacks a warhead and relies entirely on kinetic interception, the Molniya carries a 300-gram warhead. 


Both the Yolka and Molniya can be hand-launched and feature AI-powered autonomy that makes them resilient to control channel jamming. 


The Yolka starts using its optical / thermal sensors and AI interception algorithms from before launch in order to engage its target. The Molniya has optical and thermal sensors and can likely use onboard AI to fuse radar and optical sensor data for autonomous positioning and interception. 


While the Yolka needs to be visually cued onto its target before launch and cannot be effectively used under poor visibility conditions, the Molniya is cued by ground-based radar  facilitating use under all visibility conditions. Radar cueing also leverages the interceptor's longer engagement range making it more versatile than the Yolka. Early launch allows the drone to position optimally for an interception. 


Reusable Interceptor?


Perhaps its most intriguing feature is that the Molniya appears to be a reusable interceptor drone. It is equipped with landing struts that protect its propellers during landing. Footage of Molniya trials recently posted on social media shows the drone returning for a controlled landing. Indeed, the footage focuses almost entirely on the drone's return capability. 


For an interceptor drone to be reusable, it needs the ability to take down its target without destroying itself. Could the 300-gram warhead on the Molniya be ejectable, allowing it to return from a successful engagement? A close look at the drone video does not rule out the capability. However, most likely, the drone is just capable of aborting an interception. 


Screen grab from RuMoD released video.



Conclusion


Russia has a proven track record of countering sophisticated, versatile, and expensive Western weapon systems with less sophisticated, more focused, significantly lower-cost but effective alternatives.


Russia countered the Ukrainian deployment of the Sting interceptor drone with the significantly cheaper yet highly capable Yolka interceptor. 


The Molniya's longer range, radar cueing, and autonomous sensor-fusion tracking capabilities are reminiscent of the US Merops AS-3 interceptor drone used by Ukrainian forces, the development of which was also funded by Eric Schmidt. Unlike the Merops, however, the Molniya appears to be designed for mass production and widespread deployment. If it proves capable of reliably countering the Hornet, it may only be a matter of time before Russian forces are able to regain the operational momentum necessary to resume offensive operations in Donbas.


Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Tuesday, May 26, 2026

In Ukraine, US-Supplied Drones Strangulate Russian Supply Lines, Blunt Geran Threat

 

ChatGPT Image

Russia has steadily lost its advantage in drone warfare in Ukraine and is now reeling under the onslaught of Western-supplied drones in general and US-supplied drones in particular.

At one point, Russian innovations — such as Lancet and Kub kamikaze drones, fiber-optic cable-controlled kamikaze drones, and inexpensive long-range one-way attack drones — had given Russian forces a significant edge over Ukraine.

Now, not only has the Russian edge been blunted, Ukrainian forces have seized the initiative using interceptor and strike drones featuring advanced US technology.

The sophistication of US-supplied drones has put Russian forces on the back foot and brought the Russian offensive in Donbas to a grinding halt.

Among the several US companies that have developed potent drones for use by Ukrainian forces is Perennial Autonomy, a company owned by Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google.

Two drones developed by Perennial Autonomy are giving Russian forces a hard time — the Merops interceptor drone and the Hornet strike drone.

Merops AS-3 Surveyor

The Merops AS-3 Surveyor has reportedly proven effective in intercepting Russian drones.

The fixed-wing Surveyor interceptor was first combat-tested in Ukraine around June 2024. By late 2025, it had reportedly achieved over 1,900 intercepts. In some sectors, it is claimed to have brought down roughly 40% of Russian Geran drones. Recent reports claim 4,000 successful Russian drone interceptions.

The propeller-driven drone is roughly three feet long and is capable of attaining a maximum speed of 280 km/h.

It can be launched pneumatically from the bed of a standard pickup truck alongside a ground control station. The entire system is highly portable and requires minimal training.

Its success in Ukraine reportedly prompted the US Army to order 13,000 units shortly after the US and Israel launched an unprovoked large-scale aerial attack on Iran on February 28, to counter Iranian Shahed drone barrages.

The drone is currently priced at $15,000, but its cost is projected to fall below $10,000.

The Surveyor is an effective interceptor on account of its greater autonomy, speed, and jam resistance. The drone features electro-optical, thermal, and RF sensors. More importantly, it can fuse inputs from its different sensors into highly effective machine vision. Using AI-based autonomy and machine vision, it can home in on targets even when SATNAV and communication signals are jammed. With its maximum speed of 280 km/h, the drone outpaces Russian Gerans.

Its 2 kg fragmentation warhead increases the probability of a successful interception. Combined with its $15,000 price tag, it offers an optimized cost-to-kill ratio.


Hornet Strike Drone

The effectiveness of US interceptor drones has substantially relieved the financial and operational burden on Western-supplied Ukrainian air defence (AD) systems deployed to defend Ukrainian airspace, despite the adverse cost-to-kill ratio resulting from the use of high-cost interceptor missiles to destroy low-cost strike drones such as the Geran. More effective interception of Russian attack drones will reduce Russia’s ability to degrade Ukraine's warfighting potential. It would allow Ukraine to continue the fight much longer.

The introduction of the US-supplied Hornet strike drone has yielded a more immediate gain. Along with other factors, Hornets can be credited with bringing the Russian offensive in Donbas to a crawl along the line of contact, and even to a complete halt in some sectors.

The Hornet drone is estimated to cost less than €5,000. Its takeoff weight is approximately 15 kg, its wingspan 2.2 m, and its fuselage length 1.4 m. Its maximum payload reaches 5 kg.

The technological features that make the Hornet potent include stealth, long range, autonomy, navigational accuracy, and EW resilience.

Stealth & Range

The drone uses a conventional airframe that allows RF signature reduction. It also cruises at low altitudes, sometimes extremely low altitudes.

It mostly operates at altitudes of up to 200 m but has reportedly been seen flying as low as 5 m.

It is claimed to have a maximum range of 160 km.

Navigational Accuracy

The drone autonomously tracks along adversary logistics routes using its optical sensors, identifying and prioritizing targets.

It features two daylight cameras — forward-facing and downward-facing — that facilitate terrain orientation, altitude stabilization, target recognition, and target lock-on.

When it detects a target, the system seeks operator clearance to attack. Once clearance is granted, the low-audio-signature drone autonomously dives onto or approaches the target, giving the adversary little reaction time.

EW Resilience

Tracking along logistics routes enhances both navigational accuracy and resilience to EW.

The drone’s built-in autonomy minimizes communication with the operator.

The drone is controlled using the following non-traditional protocols and frequencies:

1. Radio communication in non-standard frequency bands of 1800–1900 MHz, 2000–2300 MHz, and 3300–3800 MHz

2. Starlink or MESH networking

3. LoRa (Long Range)

A large number of operationally deployed Russian EW systems cannot disrupt the non-standard frequency bands used by the Hornet.

Starlink and MESH networks are inherently resilient to jamming.

The LoRa protocol facilitates the transmission of small amounts of data over long distances using very little power. The fact that Russian forces use DMR (Digital Mobile Radio) systems for tactical communication complicates their option of jamming the LoRa spectrum.

Hornet’s SATNAV module can simultaneously receive and process signals from all major satellite constellations — GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, and Galileo. It can additionally leverage SBAS support to improve signal accuracy.

The drone’s unique communication architecture reportedly enables positioning accuracy of 1.5 m RMS in the absence of EW jamming, significantly exceeding that of previous-generation SATNAV modules.

It has been reported that Ukrainian forces leveraged the accuracy of Hornet drones to destroy the support poles and framework holding protective nets in place over a logistics supply route, collapsing the barriers and opening the routes to follow-on attacks.

Technologically, Russian forces have no effective counter to the Surveyor interceptor drone except making their Gerans fly faster. As far as attack drones are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that Russia is attempting to seize back the initiative with its Geran-5 jet-powered drone — a clean-sheet design bearing no physical resemblance to earlier Geran variants. According to Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate, the Russian Armed Forces plan to ramp up production of jet-powered drones and increase their share to 50% of all long-range drones launched.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Saturday, January 24, 2026

HAL Bets on Locally Produced Russian SJ-100 as Udan Workhorse



Ahead of the Wings India 2026 air show in Hyderabad from January 28 to 31, HAL has released a video promoting the Russian short-haul airliner SJ-100 as a game changer for short-haul connectivity under India's UDAN scheme.




HAL intends to locally manufacture the complete aircraft in India in partnership with Public Joint Stock Company United Aircraft Corporation (PJSC-UAC). The two companies signed an MoU for production of the aircraft in Moscow, Russia, on October 27, 2025.


The partnership is intended to be a landmark event in the civil aviation sector, fulfilling India’s ambition to build commercial aircraft.


The SJ-100 is a twin-engine, narrow-body aircraft. As of date, more than 200 aircraft have been produced and are being operated by more than 16 commercial airline operators.


According to the HAL video, the SJ-100 features state-of-the-art avionics, fly-by-wire controls, unmatched aerodynamics, a new PD-8 engine, wingtip vertical winglets, and lower fuel burn.


SJ-100 Development History


In 2000, Russia’s Sukhoi started development of the country’s first airliner—the Sukhoi Superjet SJ-100. The pace of development of the regional jet was impressive: the SJ-100 made its maiden flight on May 19, 2008, and its first commercial flight on April 21, 2011.


The aircraft was powered by two 77–79 kN PowerJet SaM146 turbofans developed by a joint venture between French Safran and Russian NPO Saturn. It typically seated 87 to 98 passengers.


Western Sanctions


In early 2022, the US and its Western allies imposed sanctions that brought collaboration between Russian and Western commercial aviation entities to a complete halt. The intent was to derail Russian commercial aviation. It didn’t work.


Russia’s partly revived industry immediately hunkered down to continue development and production of the SJ-100 regional airliner and the MS-21 medium-haul airliner. An immediate decision was taken to substitute Western engines and airframe components in the two aircraft with domestically developed analogs.


On April 7, 2022, Russia’s Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin, directed that the substitution of domestic assemblies be completed within 2–3 years, with the percentage of domestic components in the MS-21 reaching 97% by 2022–2024, making it independent of imported equipment.


Domestic Power Plant


With considerable foresight, the Russian leadership had already initiated development of state-of-the-art commercial aircraft engines.


In 2010, Russia’s Aviadvigatel started development of the PD-14 high-bypass turbofan engine to power the MS-21 airliner. The PD-14 was conceived as a successor to the PS-90 (which powers IAF Il-76 airlifters), and Aviadvigatel developed it as an “engine core” around which it would build other lower- or higher-thrust engines for use by Russia’s new-generation commercial airliners.


The “engine core” alludes to critical hot parts such as the high-pressure compressor, combustor, and turbine.


The letters “PD” stand for forward-looking engine, while the number 14 represents the 14-ton thrust of the engine in its basic configuration. PD-14 variants will feature thrust ranging from 8 to 18 tons.


The PD-14 is the first engine in Russia created digitally from scratch, using paperless 3D design modelling. Aviadvigatel first developed a digital twin of the engine, based on an electronic database of engineering calculations and material characteristics. The digital twin supports engine production, bench and flight tests, as well as the development of operational documents.





The PD-8 variant of the PD family was developed to power the SJ-100, replacing the PowerJet SaM146.


The imposition of Western sanctions prompted Russia to accelerate development of the PD-14 and PD-8 engines.


The airframe of the SJ-100 had to be tweaked to accommodate the PD-8 engine.


The SJ-100 made its first flight with the Russian PD-8 engine in the city of Komsomolsk-on-Amur on March 17, 2025.


The MS-21 with PD-14 engines and the SJ-100 with PD-8 engines are both currently undergoing certification trials. Series production for both, with the new all-Russian engines, is expected to start in 2026.


The PD-14 powered variant of the MS-21 is referred to as MS-21-310, and the SJ-100 with the PD-8 engine is sometimes referred to as SSJ-NEW.


Conclusion


The revival of the Russian commercial aviation industry presents Make-in-India tie-up opportunities for India. New Russian airliners are now completely Russian and technologically at par with Western analogs.


Domestic air travel in India is surging. The time is ripe for the Indian civil aviation manufacturing industry to venture into production of domestic airliners.


Under its tie-up with UAC, HAL will have the rights to manufacture SJ-100 aircraft for domestic customers.


UAC is confident that HAL will be off to a flying start with local production of the SJ-100 because of its experience producing the Su-30MKI aircraft.


In August 2023, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) CEO Yuri Slyusar spoke with the “Russia-24” television channel about the proposed tie-up.


“We still believe that under the import licence at the HAL factory, which produces combat aircraft for the Indian Air Force—where they manufacture Su-30 aircraft, with over 270 aircraft made there—it is indeed a significant base with trained personnel, equipment, and refined processes. We could start producing SJ-100 aircraft for the Indian market there in a fairly short period of time.”


This will also be the second instance in which a complete passenger aircraft will be produced in India. The last such project was HAL’s production of the Avro HS-748, which started in 1961 and ended in 1988.


Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Friday, December 5, 2025

Revived Flight Trials of Il-114-300 Renew HAL’s Interest in Regional Airliner Program

 



Sputnik India has reported, quoting the Rostec Chief, that India and Russia have begun talks on the joint production of the Il-114-300 aircraft.

The Il-114-300 is a modernised variant of the Il-114. Powered by the newly developed Klimov TV7-117ST turboprop engine, the aircraft is a 52-64-seat regional airliner, an analog of the ATR-42, intended to meet the requirements of regional civil aviation carriers.

Development History

The Il-114 was created in the eighties, taking into account the needs of civil aviation of that time and the capabilities of the Soviet aviation industry. It was a regional liner with a payload of several tons. The first flight took place on March 20, 1990. However, fewer than 20 aircraft were built. Production was halted due to industrial difficulties and lack of customer interest.

In 2014, the Russian leadership ordered the launch of the Il-114-300 variant.

The Il-114-300 variant retains the original airframe but features an improved power plant, high-performance propellers, and avionics, resulting in improved flight performance and operational economic characteristics.

The maiden flight of the aircraft took place at the Zhukovsky airfield on December 16, 2020.

Certification was expected to be completed in 2022, with serial production and deliveries expected to commence in 2023.

Indian Interest

In November 2019, ET reported that HAL is contemplating local assembly of the aircraft for Indian regional commercial flights.

HAL planned to start offering maintenance services for this aircraft in India and later progress to local assembly.

Development Setback

However, flight testing of the airliner was suspended in 2021 due to a problem with the engine. An under-development Il-112V light airlifter, which also uses a TV7-117ST engine, crashed during flight testing due to an engine fire.

The suspension of flight testing enabled the engine manufacturer, UEC-Klimov, not only to correct the fault in the engine but also to significantly expand its operational parameters, including temperature range, altitude, and service life.

At the same time, the design of the Il-114-300 itself underwent some changes. The wings were tweaked to “raise” the engine and thereby increase the distance from the propeller blade tips to the ground surface. Now, according to the designers, the aircraft will be able to land not only on concrete runways but also on unpaved surfaces. In addition, the wing modification provides a larger flap angle and, accordingly, a lower landing speed.

Development Resumption

Flight testing has since resumed. As of September 4, 2024, the aircraft had made more than 30 flights, some of which lasted more than seven hours.

As of February 2025, the aircraft had completed more than 70 flights, including more than 20 certification flights, and had flown more than 200 hours. Serial aircraft planned for delivery to operators are already in production.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

After Defense, Space & Nuclear Energy, Shipbuilding Joins India-Russia Strategic Pillars

Image by Grok via X


Update


During the course of the just concluded 23rd India - Russia Summit in New Delhi, the two nations signed a MoU on Training of Specialists for Ships Operating in Polar Waters: Between India's Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways and Russia's Ministry of Transport, to train Indian seafarers for Arctic navigation.


Also, they signed a MoU on Shipbuilding Cooperation Framework: Covering joint ship design, technology transfer, local manufacturing, and maritime infrastructure. 


The MoUs signal India's readiness to partner with Russia in developing and using the NSR (Northern Sea Route) through the Arctic and build Ice-class ships.


Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov told Sputnik in an interview, "Organizing joint production of Arctic-class vessels could become a promising area of cooperation."


Joint ice-class shipbuilding will not only add more depth to the strategic relationship between India and China, it will facilitate increased trade between the two countries.


Ice-class ships are vessels with reinforced hulls designed to safely navigate areas with floating or broken sea ice, such as those seen during Arctic summers.


They differ from icebreakers, which are specialized vessels—often equipped with very powerful propulsion systems, including nuclear power—that can break through solid ice, including winter ice cover. Icebreakers typically have rounded, sloping bows that ride up onto the ice and break it under the ship’s weight and forward motion.


Jointly constructing ice-class ships would be mutually advantageous for both countries. It would allow India to leverage its robust shipbuilding infrastructure, while Russia would leverage its extensive experience in building icebreakers and ice-class ships.


Russia and India have been negotiating to boost trade by developing the Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), also known as the Chennai–Vladivostok corridor, and the Northern Sea Route (NSR)—through investments in port infrastructure and shipbuilding, particularly the construction of ice-class tankers to transport oil, and training Indian crews to operate cargo ships safely in the Arctic Ocean, negotiating ice blocks and frozen waters.


Northern Sea Route (NSR)

The NSR stretches about 5,600 km (≈3,500 miles) through the Arctic Ocean from Murmansk near Russia's border with Norway eastwards to the Bering Strait near Alaska. The route is an alternative to the Suez Canal and is around 40% shorter. It passes through challenging Arctic waters that are navigable mainly during ice-free months or with the assistance of Russian nuclear and diesel icebreakers.


With climate change reducing sea ice, the NSR is becoming increasingly navigable and is emerging as a more economic alternative to the Suez Canal.


Reduced shipping costs through the NSR make Russian resource exports—crude, LNG, and coal—more competitive, particularly for large consumer countries like China and India.


Currently, annual cargo volumes through the NSR fluctuate between 35 and 40 million tons.


To facilitate volume growth and transform the NSR into a major international shipping corridor, Russia is seeking partners to invest in support infrastructure, nuclear icebreakers, and ice-class cargo ships. Currently, the number of ice-class ships is insufficient to achieve the target of 200 million tons.


Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC)

The Eastern Maritime Corridor (EMC), also known as the Chennai–Vladivostok Maritime Corridor, connects Chennai Port in India with Vladivostok in Russia's Far East. Spanning approximately 5,600 nautical miles (10,300 km), the corridor links India to the NSR. The EMC-NSR combination reduces cargo transit times from the traditional 40 days via the Suez Canal to about 24 days, bypassing congested chokepoints and avoiding West Asian regions prone to geopolitical instability.


The corridor was first proposed during PM Modi's 2019 visit to Vladivostok. Its relevance surged when India's trade with Russia grew over 200% year-on-year in early 2024. The importance of the route for energy security and supply chain diversification became evident.


Joint Working Group on the NSR


Following the 22nd India-Russia Annual Summit on July 9, 2024, in Moscow, India and Russia established a Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Northern Sea Route under the India–Russia Intergovernmental Commission.


The JWG aims to enhance bilateral maritime ties with a focus on Arctic navigation and trade routes.


Conclusion


With India and Russia targeting $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, the imperative to exploit the potential of the EMC and NSR—through collaboration in building infrastructure and ice-class ships—is obvious. As such, it is likely that India and Russia will firm up a partnership during President Putin's forthcoming visit to India.


By deepening its strategic partnership with Russia, India can prevent Moscow from becoming overly dependent on China, thereby preserving a more balanced Russia-India-China (RIC) dynamic. 


Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.