Humanoid Combat Robots: Weapon Systems or the World's First Artificial Soldiers?

China will produce over 100,000 humanoid robots in 2026, according to Gan Xiaobin, Deputy Director of the Department of Science and Technology under the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. He was speaking at a press conference in Shanghai. (via TASS)

"Large language models, AI agents, and AI chips are advancing at a rapid pace. We expect humanoid robot output to exceed 100,000 units this year," Gan Xiaobin noted.

In February, CNBC reported that the US has started testing two humanoid combat robots in Ukraine, marking the first known deployment of humanoid robots in a combat zone. Developed by San Francisco-based startup Foundation Future Industries, the robots, named Phantom-1, were deployed to Ukraine for frontline logistics and reconnaissance.

Foundation Future has secured approximately $24 million in Pentagon research contracts (from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force) to test the humanoids.

Phantom-1 is roughly 5'9"–5'11" tall and weighs 176–180 lb. It is designed to use human weapons and infrastructure such as doors, stairs, and vehicles. It can lift approximately 90 lb and perform physical tasks in complex or high-risk environments. The robot has five-fingered hands, camera-based vision, and an LLM-driven autonomy system that supports both independent operation and supervised teleoperation.

Foundation Future aims to send an upgraded humanoid variant—Phantom-2—to Ukraine later this year.

China is also actively experimenting with humanoids for military applications, including teleoperated demonstrations of complex battlefield tasks.

Operational Fielding Timeline

If current technological progress continues:

Over the next one to three years, platforms like Phantom are likely to be upgraded and fielded in supervised autonomous or teleoperated combat roles. They will undertake high-risk tasks such as urban clearing, resupply under fire, and acting as decoys that draw enemy fire or absorb risk.

It is plausible that, starting as early as 2028—or perhaps as late as 2035—armed humanoid robots will actively participate in direct combat.

Between 2035 and 2045, fully autonomous squad-level humanoid "soldiers" will likely begin replacing human infantry in many battlefield roles.

Why Humanoid Robots?

There is a good reason why robotic soldiers will initially take humanoid form. Battlefield equipment—including transport and combat vehicles, firearms, and drone-launching systems—is designed for human use. Humanoids will be able to operate all equipment developed for humans. Interchangeability between humans and humanoid robots will be critical during the transition period, which could last for decades.

Challenges Persist

Humanoid robots outperform humans in many aspects of soldiering. They possess greater strength, higher load-carrying capacity, superior endurance, greater environmental tolerance, and higher precision. They can also be deployed in numbers limited only by manufacturing capacity. Most importantly, robots completely trounce humans when it comes to expendability.

However, humans outperform robots in mobility over rough terrain, adaptability, judgment, and field-acquired dexterity. As long as food and water are available, humans also exhibit far greater endurance than electrically powered robots.

It is interesting to note that companies developing humanoid robots worldwide are focused on improving endurance, fall recovery, rough-terrain mobility, and dexterity.

Humanoid Vulnerabilities

The vulnerability of humanoid robots to cyberattacks and spoofing, the logistics infrastructure required to support their operation, and their limitations in leadership and command roles will likely require humans and humanoids to operate as teams in the near future—and perhaps even in the more distant future.

However, there can be little doubt that deploying humanoid soldiers will provide a nation with an overwhelming military advantage, particularly if they can be upgraded more rapidly than those of an adversary.

It is also possible that humanoids, together with quadruped robots and UGVs, will never evolve beyond being sophisticated weapon systems that reduce the number of humans required on the battlefield. They may significantly reduce the demand for human soldiers, but they are unlikely to eliminate it entirely.

To some extent, the widespread use of drones has already reduced the number of soldiers required to hold a front in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

 

Why Do Russian Forces Fly Their Stealth Fighter in a Dirty Configuration?

Social Media post showing a Su-57 with external stores - One targeting pod and two R-74 air-to-air missiles

A photograph widely published on social media recently showed a Su-57 parked in a hangar fitted with externally carried 101KS-N targeting pods and R-74 missiles.

It is widely speculated that the Su-57 was configured for a counter-drone role.

The photograph highlights just one of the many roles the Su-57 has assumed during the Ukraine conflict. Beyond stealth strike missions, the aircraft has served as an airborne battle manager, network node, long-range interceptor, MUM-T controller, operational testbed for new weapons, and now, possibly, a counter-UAS platform.

The 101KS-N (part of the broader 101KS "Atoll" electro-optical system) is a multi-channel optical navigation and targeting pod designed for detecting, identifying, tracking, and designating ground (and some air) targets in daylight and infrared ranges. It includes laser designation and spot-tracking capabilities, with its own thermal stabilization system for stable imagery.

The R-74 (also known as izdeliye 740) is a short-range, Within-Visual-Range (WVR) close-combat air-to-air missile developed by Russia's Tactical Missile Weapons Corporation (TRV) / GosMKB Vympel. It represents an incrementally improved successor and direct derivative of the widely deployed R-73 (AA-11 "Archer") infrared-guided missile family.

The use of an electro-optical targeting pod, instead of the fighter's radar, to cue R-74 missiles could similarly be aimed at avoiding revealing the characteristics of the Su-57's five radars (three X-band AESAs and two L-band AESAs).

Contrary to what many would think, mounting external stores and pods on a stealth aircraft does not represent poor use of a valuable asset's stealth capability.

When flying clear of heavily contested airspace and outside the reach of adversary air-defence systems, stealth fighters may carry external stores to deliberately alter their radar signature and deceive adversary radars. In the past, the Su-57 has been observed carrying external payloads such as the Kh-59M2 missile.

This external carriage alters and enhances its radar cross-section (RCS) to confuse Ukrainian ground radars and US/NATO AWACS aircraft, preventing them from mapping the aircraft's true stealth radar signature.

If the Su-57 in the photograph posted on social media was configured for C-UAS operations, it would be yet another role that it has taken on since the start of the Ukraine conflict.

Stealth Mode Operations

The Su-57 has been participating in Russia's Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine since its very beginning. It has penetrated Ukrainian airspace in "full stealth mode" to deliver precision missile strikes.

When entering contested airspace, it has deployed weapons adapted for its internal bomb bay to preserve its low-observable stealth profile. Specific air-to-surface weapons utilized or available for these missions include:

Kh-59MK2 Stealth Cruise Missile: A fire-and-forget standoff missile with a 285-km range used to target stationary ground coordinates and penetrate hardened structures.

Kh-58UShKE Anti-Radiation Missile: An internally carried weapon with a range of up to 245 km used to target radar systems.

There have been several instances of Kh-59MK2 missile strikes on Ukrainian targets attributed to the Su-57. According to Russian social media, the TV tower in Kharkiv and a military facility in the Nikolaev region were destroyed by Su-57 aircraft using the Kh-59MK2.

Networking Support

The Russian Aerospace Forces also use the Su-57 for networking support. In July 2024, the UAC told TASS that the Su-57 is part of the central combat link of the SMO along with the Su-34 and Su-35. The joint use of these three aircraft types facilitates a comprehensive response to emerging threats. Such a role would not require the Su-57 to enter contested airspace.

Data Fusion and Sharing

Flying as an airborne tactical network, Su-57 fighters can detect Ukrainian air-defence radar emissions. Leveraging their S-111 communication system and advanced sensor fusion suite, the fighters share a real-time, consolidated picture within the air group and with ground control to engage active adversary radars.

Air-to-Air Engagements

Russia first announced the use of its Su-57 fighters against Ukraine in October 2022, when General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the joint group of troops in the area of the SMO, told reporters on Tuesday, October 18, 2022:

"In terms of the quality of combat use, I would especially like to single out the Su-57 fifth-generation multifunctional aircraft. Having a wide range of weapons, it solves multifaceted tasks of hitting air and ground targets in each sortie."

General Surovikin clearly implied that Su-57s have brought down adversary fighters.

For air-to-air engagements, the Su-57 is equipped with the R-37M (RVV-BD) long-range missile, the K-77M medium-range missile, and two types of short-range missiles—the R-74M2 and K-MD (izdeliye 300). The R-74M2 is an upgrade of the R-74 adapted for internal carriage, while the K-MD is a clean-sheet design.

There have been no reports of close combat between a Su-57 and a Ukrainian fighter, nor has there been a radar or visual sighting of a Su-57 in Ukrainian airspace. Any air-to-air kills by the Su-57 would therefore have to be credited to either the K-77M or the R-37M.

The R-37M has a range of 300 km and the K-77M, 190 km. Both missiles use dual-pulse motors and are consequently very energetic during their endgame, making it difficult for an adversary aircraft to break lock. Equally importantly, they use active-homing AESA seekers for terminal guidance.

Manned-Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T)

Su-57 fighters have teamed up with the S-70 Okhotnik heavy Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV) to execute strike and reconnaissance missions in Ukraine.

Operational Testbed for New Weapons

The Su-57 has also been utilized for operational flight testing of the S-71 air-launched combat drones. Captive trials of the weapon system were initiated in April 2024.

The S-71 Monochrome is an air-launched UAV that can be tasked with target identification, marking, or destruction.

The drone is optimized for radar stealth, featuring a trapezoidal fuselage similar to the foreign Shadow Storm, folding wings, and an inverted V-shaped tail.

It is powered by a small-sized TRDD-50 turbofan engine. This engine is also used in the Kh-59M and Kh-101 cruise missiles. The drone is capable of reaching a speed of about Mach 0.6 and rising to a maximum altitude of 8,000 metres.

There are two variants of the drone: the S-71M Monochrome and the S-71K Carpet.

It is noteworthy that the S-71K is externally carried by its launch aircraft, while the S-71M can also be housed in the weapons bay of a Su-57 or an S-70 Okhotnik UAV.

External carriage of the S-71K is logical because it performs the role of an air-to-surface cruise missile. Consequently, it is launched well outside contested airspace. It features a modular (cluster, high-explosive, and shaped-charge) warhead with electro-optical guidance for target acquisition.

The S-71M functions as a reconnaissance UAV, allowing its operator to scan the target area using its electro-optical sensors. Once the operator designates a target, the S-71M can illuminate it with a laser for precision attack by weapons launched from a Su-57 stealth fighter or an S-70 Okhotnik stealth drone.

Factories, Patience and Resilience: Russia's Answer to Ukraine's Drone Offensive

Interceptor Drone developed by Rostec : Photo Credit Rostec

Over the past one month or so, Russia has absorbed many painful blows delivered by Ukrainian long range strike drones. Ukraine has struck Russian energy infrastructure and logistics to an extent where Russians are now being forced to cope with fuel and energy shortages, not just the loss of energy exports. The advance of Russian forces has slowed to a crawl that suggests that it may take years for them to completely 'liberate' Donbas.

For some in Russia and abroad, the situation may appear dismal. However, Russia has some good cards to play on account of its industrial capacity, resilience, and patience. To counter the drone menace it appears to be abandoning a "border defence" philosophy in favour of distributed vital-area defence.

There is a perception that Russia has no effective counter to the threat posed by Ukraine's long-range strike drones. Deployed in sufficient numbers, such drones are likely to continue penetrating Russian airspace and striking targets deep inside the country. Unless Russia develops more effective countermeasures, the economic and military costs imposed by these attacks are likely to grow as Ukraine's drone capabilities continue to evolve.

Russia may still achieve some of the objectives of its Special Military Operation, such as the liberation of Donbas. However, even if Russian forces were to secure Donbas, there is little reason to believe Ukraine would cease hostilities. Instead, it could continue using long-range drones to impose economic costs on Russia and gradually erode its war-fighting capacity.

In that sense, drones may provide Ukraine with a viable means of waging a prolonged war of attrition, one that seeks to compel Russia to negotiate on terms more favourable to Kyiv.

Understanding Russia's Air Defence Limitations

Russia has largely relied on its integrated layered air defence network—designed primarily to detect, track, and engage high-value aerial assets such as combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles—to counter the threat posed by low-cost, slow-flying long-range drones. The endeavor has been ineffective, besides its high economic cost.

Border Length

Russia's land border with Ukraine extends for approximately 1,974 km. However, drones are not restricted to crossing the land border. They can approach via the Black Sea or Baltic Sea, cross territorial waters, or exploit the airspace of neighbouring countries before entering Russia.

Russia also has approximately 800 km of coastline vulnerable to drone ingress. Ukrainian drones have, on occasion, reportedly transited the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia before entering Russian airspace to strike targets around St. Petersburg. Russia's borders with the Baltic states extend for another 862 km.

In effect, Russian air defence systems must monitor potential drone approaches along more than 3,600 km of land and maritime frontiers.

Air defence coverage across such distances will inevitably contain gaps. Existing Russian systems were primarily designed to detect aircraft and missiles flying above approximately 500 ft. Ukrainian drones, equipped with Starlink terminals that provide low-latency communications, are known to fly at much lower altitudes. Using electro-optical sensors, they can also be remotely piloted along river valleys, lakes, and other terrain features that reduce the likelihood of detection.

Western ISR Support

Ukraine's Western allies also employ space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to monitor Russian air defence deployments and operational status.

These assets may detect temporary gaps created by system relocation, maintenance, or technical failures, allowing drone routes to be planned around them. It is conceivable that some drones can even be dynamically rerouted during flight as new opportunities emerge.

Molniya Interceptor Drone: Screen grab from RuMoD video

Air defence coverage within Russia's interior is generally less dense than along its borders and tends to focus on protecting major cities and strategic facilities. Once drones penetrate the border defences, they may find it easier to avoid known air defence sites and populated areas while remaining undetected for extended periods.

Why Ukraine Has Been Successful

In many respects, the perception that drones can occasionally penetrate even heavily defended airspace reflects reality. Both Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated the ability to do so against sophisticated air defence networks fielded by Russia, the United States, and Israel.

With extensive assistance from its Western partners, Ukraine has developed tactics that exploit the inherent limitations of legacy air defence systems through the use of Starlink communications, space-based ISR, and airborne surveillance assets.

Russia Pivots Towards Dedicated Drone Defence

Recent Ukrainian successes appear to have prompted Russia to complement its legacy air defence network with systems specifically designed to counter drones.

Unlike traditional air defence systems, which are optimised to engage combat aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, these new systems are intended to defeat slow-flying autonomous or remotely piloted drones.

There will inevitably be overlap between the two defensive architectures as drones themselves increasingly assume traditional combat roles.

Russia's changing priorities are reflected in the variety of counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) introduced over the past few months. The emphasis appears to have shifted from preventing drone penetration to limiting the damage once drones enter defended airspace.

Vital Area and Vital Point Defence

Broadly speaking, Russia appears to be focusing on protecting vital areas and vital points.

For vital area defence, Russian forces have introduced:

1. Specialised drone-detection radar (Sokol)

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jamming system capable of denying connectivity over an area of approximately 18 sq km

2. Medium-range interceptor drones (Rita-2 and Molniya)

3. Passive RF and electro-optical drone detection systems

4. Medium-range electronic warfare systems

5. Rapidly deployable protective net systems for roads and convoys

6. Yak-130M light combat aircraft for engaging larger drones

Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink Jamming: Photo Ukrainian Defence Sources

For vital point defence:

1. Krona-E ultra-short-range missile system (450 m–1.3 km)

2. Zak-30 Citadel 30 mm automatic cannon firing programmable air-burst ammunition

3. Zubr automated gun systems

4. Yolka hand-launched interceptor drones

5. Rita-2 reusable interceptor drones

6. Redut-UR automated kinetic defence system firing unguided rockets

7. Shrapnel-dispersing small-arms ammunition

8. Duplet net-firing handgun

These lists are not exhaustive.

With the notable exception of the Volna-Kupol-Garant Starlink jammer, most of these systems appear relatively inexpensive. They therefore lend themselves to large-scale production and widespread deployment.

It is likely that Russia's next priority will be manufacturing these systems in sufficient numbers to protect critical infrastructure and strategic facilities across the country.

An interesting feature of nearly all these new systems is that they possess their own dedicated radar and/or electro-optical sensors. They are therefore far less dependent on the sensor network of Russia's legacy air defence system.

It is also likely that the legacy air defence network will continue to evolve and become more tightly integrated with this new layered drone defence architecture.

A day after my above post, in this interview, President Putin corroborates conclusions that I had independently reached through my own analysis. It is reassuring to see that my assessment aligns with his remarks.

Putin on Ukraine's Strikes Against Russia's Energy Infrastructure

Russian President Vladimir Putin comments on Ukraine's strikes against Russia's critical and energy infrastructure, discussing the impact on fuel supplies, air defense production, repairs, and the situation in… pic.twitter.com/PYOsyaVQVX

— Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil (@ivan_8848) June 29, 2026

America Wants an Extreme-Range Air-to-Air Missile. India Already Has the Foundation.

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) reportedly plans to acquire a new air-to-air missile with a maximum range of at least 1,000 nautical miles (nm). It also wants the weapon to be capable of engaging ground-based targets and has consequently dubbed it the Air Force Long Range Weapon (AFLRW).

India Already Has It!

Most of us would consider the AFLRW concept bold and technologically ambitious. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the technological challenges that must be overcome to develop such a weapon. Before doing so, however, let me offer an intriguing observation: India already appears to have the basis for an AFLRW-like weapon in its inventory, albeit with roughly half the range sought by the USAF. Yes, Brahmos Aerospace has been working on an air-to-air variant of the missile for over seven years now! 

Current Air-to-Air Capability

Currently, the longest-range air-to-air missile in widespread USAF service is the AIM-120D-3 AMRAAM, which reportedly has a maximum range of 87 nm.

Lockheed Martin is developing the AIM-260 Joint Advanced Tactical Missile (JATM), a next-generation beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

The JATM reportedly offers a significantly greater range (more than 108 nb) and a higher speed (around Mach 5), giving it an advantage over China's PL-15.

The missile retains the same general dimensions and form factor as the AMRAAM, enabling seamless integration with existing rail launchers and the internal weapon bays of stealth fighters such as the F-22 and F-35.

Production of the missile commenced in 2024. The missile is still undergoing flight testing and is expected to enter service later this decade.

Also, the U.S. Navy has already begun fielding an air-launched version of the multi-role Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), designated the AIM-174B. The missile, intended to arm the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, has a maximum range of 130 nm. It also retains secondary capabilities for anti-ship, land-attack, and counter-hypersonic roles.

Technological Challenges

Extremely long-range air-to-air missiles are primarily intended to neutralize high-value force multipliers such as aerial refuelling tankers and AWACS aircraft.

Developing such missiles presents four major technological challenges:

1. Weight and size

2. High-speed propulsion

3. Warhead effectiveness

4. Targeting and guidance

Weight and Size

Achieving a range of 1,000 nm would require a very large propellant load, increasing both the missile's weight and dimensions to the point where most fighter aircraft would be unable to carry it. The AFLRW, for example, is expected to be launched from a bomber such as the B-52.

High-Speed Requirement

Against a target 1,000 nm away, even a hypothetical high-supersonic missile would require approximately 13–26 minutes to reach its target, depending on its average speed and the target's speed and flight path.

By comparison, current BVR engagements at ranges of 100–200 km typically involve missile flight times of just 1–3 minutes.

A weapon capable of reaching 1,000 nm would therefore require revolutionary advances in propulsion—likely involving hypersonic ramjets, scramjets, multi-stage rockets, or boost-glide technology—effectively creating an entirely new class of stand-off weapon.

Reduced Accuracy and Larger Warhead

The missile's large size and sustained high cruise speed would inevitably reduce its manoeuvrability. Long flight time poses tracking and guidance challenges. Tracking and guidance inaccuracies and lower terminal agility, combined with the large size of its intended targets, would necessitate a heavier warhead to achieve a sufficiently large lethal radius. The heavier warhead would, in turn, further increase the missile's dimensions and weight.

Targeting and Guidance

The greatest challenge in developing an AFLRW lies in target detection, tracking, and mid-course guidance over a 1,000 nm engagement.

Unlike shorter-range missiles such as the AIM-260, whose launch aircraft can often provide continuous radar updates, an AFLRW would remain in flight for 15–25 minutes. During this period, the launch platform would be unable to maintain radar contact with distant or manoeuvring targets such as AWACS aircraft or tankers.

Instead, the missile would depend on a networked "kill web" of off-board sensors—including satellites, drones, other aircraft, and ground-based systems—for initial cueing and continuous mid-course updates via robust datalinks. These links would have to withstand jamming, latency, and line-of-sight limitations while providing highly accurate updates to compensate for inertial navigation drift over such vast distances.

Achieving reliable, real-time coordination across multiple platforms in a contested electromagnetic environment represents one of the programme's greatest technical challenges.

BrahMos Air-to-Air Variant

In March 2019, speaking to Financial Express Online, Dr Sudhir Mishra, then CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace, spoke of an air-to-air variant of the BrahMos-NG. He stated that the missile, when launched from the Tejas or Su-30MKI, would target the enemy's "radar in the air" capability by engaging AWACS, aerial refuelling, and transport aircraft.

The BrahMos-NG is a clean-sheet design rather than a derivative of the current BrahMos. It is being developed to enable carriage by medium-weight fighter aircraft.

Dr Mishra's remarks suggest that an air-to-air capability for the BrahMos-NG is a qualitative requirement projected by the IAF.

There is no obvious technological reason why an air-to-air version of the existing BrahMos-A, the air-launched version of the in-service BrahMos missile, could not also be developed.

Such a missile would already possess sustained high-supersonic speed, carry a large warhead, and could eventually achieve a range of around 800 km. And we have the best possible platform to launch such as missile - the Su-30MKI!

The shorter range of the Brahmos-A would significantly reduce the complexity of establishing the required kill web.

India could further bridge gaps in its space-based surveillance capability by accelerating the development of relatively affordable High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) and Airship-based High-Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (AS-HAPS) systems.

HAPS is a solar-powered unmanned aircraft designed to remain airborne for more than 90 days while operating at an altitude of approximately 65,000 ft. It is being developed by NewSpace in collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), which serves as the prototype development partner.

AS-HAPS is being developed for the Indian Air Force to provide persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic intelligence, telecommunications, and remote sensing.

As an airship platform, AS-HAPS could potentially accommodate a radar capable of providing all-weather surveillance and target tracking.

In addition to long-range target detection, AS-HAPS could also provide a low-latency communications relay for long-range missile engagements.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Back to the Wall, Russia Turns to Satellite Jamming. Has Space Warfare Begun?

Google translated graphic published by Militarnyi

Russia has deployed the newly developed Volna-Kupol-Garant electronic warfare (EW) system to protect its forces from attacks by medium-range drones equipped with Starlink terminals, such as the US-supplied Hornet drone, whose development was funded by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt.

Jamming a communication terminal in a war zone is generally considered a legitimate military activity. However, traditional electronic warfare systems seek to disrupt the receiver. Garant appears to reverse the approach by targeting the satellite instead. In effect, the system attempts to deny access to a Starlink satellite over a defined area rather than disable individual terminals operating within it.

Starlink Communications

Conventional drones communicate with their operating crew using line-of-sight RF links which sometimes involve ground based or airborne relays. Such links are easy to disrupt using

ground-based jammers. In contrast, Starlink terminals use narrow electronically steered beams directed towards satellites overhead. The geometry significantly reduces the effectiveness of conventional jamming systems.

Starlink terminals mounted on drones are difficult to jam using ground-based EW systems because they are pointed skywards towards Starlink satellites orbiting approximately 500 km above the Earth. Any EW system attempting to jam a Starlink terminal directly would ideally need to be positioned above the drone's altitude.

Garant System

The Garant system takes advantage of the fact that while the Starlink terminal mounted on the drone is facing skywards, the Starlink satellite with which it is communicating is facing the Earth's surface.

The Garant system disrupts communication between a drone-mounted Starlink terminal and a Starlink satellite by saturating the satellite with interference signals across its entire communication band (14–14.5 GHz). Although Starlink satellites can frequency-hop across eight channels, the Garant system employs eight antennas, each covering 62.5 MHz.

The interference signals generated by Garant effectively blind the satellite passing overhead. The system can isolate an area of approximately 18 sq km from Starlink satellite signals. Its coverage extends through 360 degrees in azimuth and 110 degrees in elevation.

A Starlink terminal can communicate with multiple Starlink satellites simultaneously. At present, it is not clear whether, or how, the Garant system prevents drone-mounted terminals from communicating with satellites visible outside the area affected by the interference.

Initial reports from Ukraine suggested that the Garant system could interfere with only one satellite at a time. If that were the case, the system would be of limited effectiveness, since a terminal could simply switch to one of the 10 to 20 satellites (an approximation) typically visible overhead.

More recent Ukrainian reports suggest that the Russian capability is both comprehensive and credible, to the extent that Ukrainian forces reportedly respond by immediately launching drones to locate, attack, and disable any deployed Garant system.

A graphic published by Militarnyi suggests that the system can interfere with all satellites within its operating cone.

The Garant electronic warfare system typically consists of eight satellite dishes. It weighs approximately 120 kg and can be operated by a single individual.

Garant Vulnerabilities

Locating and attacking the system is relatively straightforward because SpaceX can instantly detect interference affecting its communication channels, while radio reconnaissance assets operated by Western countries supporting Ukraine can detect the powerful emissions generated by the system.

While the Garant system can disrupt attacks by Starlink-guided drones, it remains vulnerable to attacks by FPV drones and machine-vision-guided kamikaze drones.

Russian forces have reportedly begun using the Garant system to protect the Novorossiya Highway, which has come under repeated attack by Hornet drones equipped with Starlink terminals.

Conceptual Shift

The conceptual shift from jamming communication terminals to jamming satellites has ramifications. Interfering directly with a satellite serving other users could be viewed as an escalation. However, Russian forces have apparently concluded that such escalation, if it indeed constitutes one, is justified because the Starlink network is being used to facilitate attacks on Russian military personnel and civilians.

TASS quotes technical and information security expert Sergey Trukhachev as saying:

"Hundreds of companies from the United States and Europe are directly involved in the Ukraine conflict and complicit in the deaths of our servicemen and civilians. This cannot go on forever. Volna-Kupol-Garant systems are just the first step in a set of means for destroying any enemy infrastructure."

Perhaps the expert is alluding to a possible future escalation involving the use of more powerful directed-energy weapon systems to temporarily or permanently disable satellites.

Russia could also justify satellite jamming by arguing that the system merely incapacitates a particular satellite visible over contested territory for the duration of its passage through the area. The incapacitation is temporary.

Looking Ahead

The use of Starlink as a dual-use communication network which prompted the deployment of the Garant system heralds the inevitable extension of warfare into space. 

The deployment of the Garant challenges the assumption that commercial satellite constellations can provide invulnerable communications in wartime. Garant demonstrates that even massive constellations such as Starlink may be vulnerable to localized denial techniques.

In the past, SpaceX has demonstrated a lot of agility with Starlink by quickly upgrading software to thwart attempts at disrupting the network. It remains unclear whether SpaceX could modify the Starlink network software to mitigate the effects of the Garant system. With Russian sources already alluding to potentially more potent Russian EW capability, the battle may ultimately evolve into a contest between Russian electronic warfare engineers and SpaceX software developers.

Indeed, the possibility exists of space warfare going beyond EW. If attempts at satellite jamming are repeatedly frustrated, Russia could eventually opt for the use of directed-energy systems or kinetic anti-satellite weapons against communication satellites supporting military operations.

Added on July 11, 2026

For the fifth consecutive day, Ukrainian drones have struck Russian commercial shipping in the Sea of Azov.

The attacking drones may not be capable of sinking tankers or other vessels carrying supplies to Crimea, but they are causing significant damage and disrupting supply… https://t.co/h2KZwSqBJk

— Vijainder K Thakur (@vkthakur) July 11, 2026

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

Successful Ukrainian Iskander-M, Kinzhal Interceptions Plummet Due Missile Upgrades

AI visualisation of a Patriot vs Iskander-M engagement

 The interception rates of Russian Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles have dramatically dropped because of Russian missile upgrades. 

Interception Statistics

According to aggregated data compiled from Ukrainian official claims, Russia launched 939 Iskander and Kinzhal ballistic missiles against targets in Ukraine between September 2022 and October 2025. Of these, 227 were reportedly intercepted, representing an interception rate of 24 percent.

It is likely that the interception rate increased steadily over the period as the number of deployed Patriot systems grew. Not just the number of Patriots deployed, the missile's interception tactics and algorithms were also refined to counter the speed and manoeuvring advantages of the Russian missiles.

As a result, by the summer of 2025, the interception rate had increased to 37 percent.

However, in September–October 2025, the interception rate dropped sharply to as low as 6–17 percent.

The decline could be attributed to the limited availability of Patriot interceptors, improved survivability of the Russian missiles, or a combination of both factors.

However, there can be little doubt that technological upgrades and possibly improved tactics have enhanced the survivability of Russian missiles. Russia has improved both the lethality and penetration capability of its Iskander-M missile through greater emphasis on electronic warfare and the use of decoys.

The painstaking effort to improve missile penetration suggests that Russia expects future conflicts to involve dense and sophisticated missile-defence networks.

Iskander-M Upgrades

In the following paragraphs, we take a closer look at recent upgrades to the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile aimed at improving its lethality and penetration capability.

The Iskander-M now incorporates an updated 9B899 submunition as a self-protection and penetration aid. The 9B899 module features a radar jammer to disrupt RF-guided interceptors and dispenses decoy submunitions—dipole reflectors and heat traps—to create false targets during the terminal phase of flight, confusing RF- and IR-homing interceptor missiles. The Iskander-M can release six or more dart-shaped modules fitted with fins.

The missile uses active scanning, likely through its radar seeker, to identify gaps in adversary radar coverage and then manoeuvres to exploit those gaps. The algorithms used to detect blind spots or weak signals can be continuously updated.

New versions of the missile feature a more powerful microprocessor for faster processing of target-area images captured by the optical seeker, improving accuracy.

Almost 90 percent of the electronic components in the missile are now of Russian origin.

The missile can now be fitted with seven different types of warheads. A concrete-piercing warhead is specifically intended for targeting F-16s in hardened shelters.

Russia has ramped up production of the missile to 60 units per month.

A longer-range (1,000 km) version of the missile—unofficially referred to as the Iskander-1000—is still under development, despite limited orders having already been placed.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.

China's Railgun Breakthrough Is a Wake-Up Call for DRDO

ChatGPT visualisation of a PLAN warship firing a railgun

China has achieved a significant breakthrough in electromagnetic railgun (EMRG) technology. It has successfully demonstrated the ability to integrate guidance and control systems into a railgun projectile.

The breakthrough paves the way for precision-guided railgun projectiles capable of self-steering to distant targets. The achievement highlights China's ongoing progress in electromagnetic launch systems for potential naval and long-range strike applications.

The breakthrough could give PLAN ships a formidable anti-shipping and surface-attack capability.

Hypervelocity projectile (HVP) railguns can also be employed very effectively for air defence. Their extremely high projectile velocity can facilitate the interception of not only aerodynamic targets but also fast-moving threats such as hypersonic missiles, relying on kinetic impact rather than explosive warheads.

Railguns Explained

Conceptually, railguns are straightforward weapon systems that use electromagnetic force, instead of explosive detonation, to accelerate a conductive projectile along two parallel conductive rails to extremely high velocities, often Mach 5–7 or higher.

The use of electromagnetic force facilitates sustained acceleration of a projectile to much higher speeds than those achievable using explosives. For example, bullets fired from conventional military guns typically reach muzzle velocities of around 1–2 km/s. Railguns, in contrast, can potentially accelerate projectiles to speeds potentially exceeding 10 km/s.

The high speed of railgun projectiles considerably reduces flight time, improving accuracy. In addition, their higher kinetic energy provides greater destructive potential, obviating the need for an explosive warhead.

Railgun Development Challenges

Conceptually, the science behind railguns is straightforward. However, implementing the concept poses formidable technological challenges.

Railguns do not involve explosions, but the enormous electrical currents involved result in resistive heating, friction, arcing, and plasma formation at the projectile-rail interface, causing severe wear and tear.

The weapon requires massive electrical currents, measured in mega-amperes, to generate the intense magnetic fields needed to propel the projectile. Consequently, railguns require compact yet powerful electrical generation and storage systems.

Perhaps the most formidable challenge in developing railguns arises from the forces experienced by the projectile as it accelerates from rest to Mach 7 within the length of the barrel. Depending on barrel length, the projectile can experience accelerations ranging from 15,000 g to 65,000 g. In contrast, conventional artillery shells typically experience accelerations ranging from hundreds to a few thousand g.

Projectile Control and Guidance

The extremely high g-forces experienced by a railgun projectile would be of merely academic interest if there were no need to fit guidance equipment and electronics within the projectile. However, that is not the case.

The relatively higher accuracy of a railgun projectile, arising from its greater speed, becomes less significant as engagement range increases. The longer the desired engagement range, the greater the need for seekers and guidance systems to correct trajectory errors.

The real challenge is developing electronic and mechanical guidance components capable of surviving accelerations exceeding 20,000 g as well as the intense magnetic pulse generated during launch.

The US Navy almost shelved its naval railgun programme after failing to solve the guidance-survivability challenge. Japan has largely sidestepped the issue by focusing on a smaller-calibre railgun intended for short-range defensive applications.

US and Japanese Efforts

The US Navy began developing a railgun around 2005. The concept was first tested in October 2006 at the Dahlgren facility. In July 2017, the Navy conducted a public demonstration involving multi-shot salvos. The demonstration marked a significant step towards proving a practical rate of fire capable of delivering several rounds per minute.

The railgun tested demonstrated a range capability exceeding 100 nautical miles.

In July 2021, the programme was paused due to technical challenges involving barrel life, power generation, and rate of fire. Prototype testing resumed in 2025 at White Sands. The weapon has yet to be operationally fielded.

The United States is also developing technology that could provide guided projectiles under the Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) programme. HVPs have been successfully tested from existing 5-inch naval guns, including aboard USS Dewey in 2018. Guidance-system development and at-sea testing remain active.

Following initial development, the US Navy explicitly expanded the railgun's role to include air and missile defence, highlighting the potential of HVPs.

In 2022, Japan's Ministry of Defense announced its intention to develop electromagnetic guns capable of countering hypersonic missiles.

Chinese Breakthrough

It was recently reported that a Chinese prototype projectile survived a 20,000 g overload lasting eight milliseconds and exposure to a 7-tesla magnetic pulse during an actual railgun firing test. A magnetic flux density of 7 tesla is roughly 140,000 times stronger than Earth's magnetic field.

The projectile carried a delicate guidance chip housed within a protective silicon shell featuring a multilayer shielding system that included copper, iron, polyurethane dampers, and μ-metal.

The Chinese breakthrough is a landmark achievement. So far, there has been no publicly available evidence of an HVP surviving actual railgun launch stresses while retaining guidance functionality.

Notwithstanding the breakthrough, broader challenges such as rail erosion remain unresolved.

India's Quest for EMRG

In 2017, it was reported that DRDO had successfully developed an electromagnetic railgun capable of accelerating projectiles to Mach 6, or approximately 4,600 miles per hour.

DRDO stated that a 12 mm square-bore EMRG had been successfully tested and that work was underway on a 30 mm version. The objective is to accelerate a one-kilogram projectile to a velocity exceeding 2,000 m/s using a 10-megajoule capacitor bank.

Copyright © Vijainder K Thakur. First published on Thumkar.