The Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) has denied any damage or casualties as a result of a Ukrainian attack on December 15 on a Russian submarine docked at the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk.
Following the attack, Ukrainian sources posted a video showing an explosion in close proximity to a Project 636 Varshavyanka submarine, an advanced variant of the Kilo-class submarine. The attack is claimed to have been executed by the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) using a Sub Sea Baby UUV.
A naval attack by the SBU is, in reality, a euphemism for an attack by British special services.
The head of the fleet's press service, Captain 1st Rank Alexei Rulev, stated that the enemy’s attempt to carry out sabotage using an Underwater Unmanned Vessel (UUV) did not achieve its objectives and that no ships or submarines, nor their crews, sustained any damage and are operating as normal.
Going by the video footage posted online, the Ukrainian UUV struck near the stern of the Varshavyanka submarine, where critical propulsion and control systems are located, such as the propeller, vertical rudder, and aft horizontal rudders.
Interestingly, in the past, the BSF has not commented on the outcomes of Ukrainian attacks on Russian warships and submarines.
Sub Sea Baby
The Sub Sea Baby UUV is likely a derivative of the Sea Baby unmanned surface vehicle (USV) designed for operation on the water’s surface. The USV has a maximum speed of 90 km/h and a range of at least 1,000 km.
It is highly likely that the Sub Sea Baby has the capability to cruise on the sea surface as well as subsurface. Based on its likely routing, the Sub Sea Baby UUV would have travelled a distance of approximately 700 km for the attack. In order to achieve the extended range, it is likely that it used an optimum cruising speed of 40 km/h (22 knots). If so, it would have taken the drone 17 hours to traverse the distance.
Major Technical Advance
Clearly, the UUV attack represents a major Ukrainian technical advance. During subsurface cruise, the UUV would have to be capable of remote piloting, which is technically challenging. Executing the attack would require real-time ISR and situational awareness over a vast expanse of the sea to avoid detection by Russian drones.
The Sub Sea Baby could have evaded detection by drones patrolling the Black Sea by switching to subsurface cruise. On other occasions, the drone would have switched to surface cruise to avoid nets guarding the port against subsurface attacks.
Notably, Ukrainian sources were never secretive about their intent to use UUVs against the BSF. They flaunted the capability as soon as they achieved it.
It is not clear why the BSF was not able to intercept the UUV. The most likely reason would be that NATO ISR assets participated in the attack by providing real-time intelligence.
Also, it is conceivable that, in the days leading up to the attack, the SBU struck Russian commercial shipping in the Black Sea to divert Russian attention away from the threat posed by its UUVs.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the strike, extended-range UUVs have added a new dimension to the threat faced by Russian warships and commercial shipping in the Black Sea.
Update
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