Preparing a Supercam 350M reconnaissance drone for launch.
A simple Russian innovation, displayed at the UMEX 2026 expo in Abu Dhabi, may change the nature of drone warfare by making it less susceptible to counter-drone operations.
Currently, an important facet of counter-drone warfare involves eliminating drone piloting teams as a higher priority than eliminating the drone itself. After all, drone operators are far more difficult to replace than drones.
The tactic involves pinpointing the location of adversary drone operators as soon as a drone is spotted, and immediately launching strikes against the team using precision-guided munitions (PGMs).
Simple triangulation of control telemetry can help pinpoint the location of drone operators.
At UMEX 2026, the developer and manufacturer of the Supercam 350M reconnaissance UAV—the Unmanned Systems Group of Companies—showcased technology that facilitates piloting drones not only from outside the adversary’s counter-fire zone, but from virtually anywhere in the world.
The innovation involves placing a well-protected communications antenna and modem at the drone’s launch point. Drone control commands travel to the launch point over a low-latency communication link, from where they are relayed to the drone using RF telemetry. The low latency of the link facilitates real-time control, allowing operators to leverage the drone’s full combat capability.
Presumably, low latency is ensured through the exclusive use of terrestrial overland and undersea cables, rather than satellites in geostationary orbit.
Field technicians set up the launch point, launch the drone, and later recover it.
It is claimed that Russian forces have operationally tested the technology extensively while fighting Ukrainian forces.
The Indian Army (IA) is reportedly set to field the Berkut-BM jet-powered kamikaze drone developed by the Indela company in Belarus, according to Defence-Blog.
Interestingly, the drone is reportedly powered by a micro turbojet engine developed by the Chinese company Swiwin.
Swiwin Turbojet Equipment Co., Ltd. specializes in the research, development, and production of small-scale turbojet engines and related accessories.
Their products, such as the SW800 Pro and SW400 Pro models, are primarily used in hobbyist applications like model aircraft and personal flying devices, though they have appeared in military-related contexts in recent reports.
China has now placed export restrictions on the sale of the company’s engines.
It is possible that either Russia or Belarus is now locally manufacturing Swiwin engines. Recently, fragments of an SW800 Pro jet engine were found among the debris of a Russian UMPB-5R jet-powered glide bomb in Ukraine. Microjet-powered Russian glide bombs are now reportedly able to strike targets at ranges of 120 to 150 km.
Indian Purchase
According to Defence-Blog, the IA has acquired dozens of Berkut-BM drones.
Białoruś opracowała najnowszego „domowego” drona UAV, który okazał się być wyposażony w chiński silnik odrzutowy Swiwin SW300B, który można kupić na AliExpress za 5846 USD. I wisienka - na opublikowanych zdjęciach rozdają zautomatyzowany cel powietrzny "Berkut-BM" dla "Rozjemcy" pic.twitter.com/UPL9UznIrQ
— Marcin K | Forza Robert Kubica | F1 (@Jona_Mar78) October 21, 2022
The catapult-launched drones have an operational range of around 150 km and can attain speeds in excess of 400 km/h. They feature a 10 kg HE fragmentation warhead designed to damage non-armoured surface targets such as radar installations, missile batteries, artillery positions, and logistics nodes.
If the Berkut-BM acquisition report is accurate, the drone will be the first jet-powered kamikaze drone in the IA’s inventory.
Belarus has previously exported the Berkut-BM to several countries and armed groups, including Russia, Venezuela, Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces militia.
Whether the microjet powering the Berkut-BM being acquired by the IA is manufactured in China or outside China—in Russia or Belarus—is largely moot, as the engine is disposable and requires no maintenance or spare-part replacement. As such, the acquisition is entirely in order.
Nearly eight years after initiating procurement under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is finally poised to sign a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF).
Roughly speaking, India currently operates around 600 fighter aircraft and is now poised to acquire 114 more.
In contrast, in 2025 alone, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is estimated to have inducted an additional 120 J-20A/J-20S heavy stealth fighters. (The J-20A is the dual-seat variant of the J-20.)
Also in 2025, the PLAAF inducted between 100 and 170 additional fighters, including the J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT, and J-10A/B/C.
In other words, the PLAAF may have added up to 300 heavy stealth and non-stealth fighters to its inventory in a single year.
A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) projection suggests that by 2030, around 1,000 J-20A/S fighters and 900 J-16s will be in service with the PLAAF.
The number of J-20s manufactured increased from around 150 in August 2022 to 208 in November 2023. Production rates likely reached 100 aircraft per year in 2023 and have since stabilised at approximately 120 aircraft annually.
In addition to the projected 1,000 J-20A/S stealth fighters, the PLAAF may also induct several hundred land-based J-35 variants. The J-35 is believed to be in low-rate initial production, but output is expected to ramp up in the coming years. Based on the rapid ramp-up of J-20 production, between 200 and 300 J-35s could be operational by 2030. Notably, the J-35 will field highly capable sensors and weapons derived from systems painstakingly perfected for the J-20.
India's Foolhardy Nonchalance
Oblivious to this burgeoning threat, Indians are hotly debating the need for additional Rafale fighters. Worse still, the Indian government appears to be ignoring the Russian offer, despite the fact that the IAF has projected the need for two to three squadrons of an interim stealth fighter to plug a widening operational gap.
Frankly, the only plausible explanation for India sitting on the Russian offer appears to be deep Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and United States military–industrial complex (MIC) penetration of Indian corporates, the bureaucracy, and the political leadership. If so, Indian sovereignty is largely illusory. I hope this assessment is wrong—but the issue warrants serious reflection.
Photo Credit: RuMoD
Urgent Need to Delink ToT from Weapon Acquisition
The primary reason for the approximately 30 per cent decline in the IAF’s squadron strength—from 42 to 29 squadrons—has been persistent delays in the delivery of the Tejas fighter and its follow-on variants, including the Tejas Mk-1A and Tejas Mk-2.
Shockingly, the Ministry of Defence and the political leadership never moved beyond superficial tinkering with procurement procedures to address these crippling delays. The outcome was predictable: the process stalled and eventually ran aground. Was this paralysis by analysis? Possibly. More likely, despite the optics, defence has never been more than a desultory priority for the political leadership.
Let us focus on the optics. No one disputes the need—or urgency—of Make in India for defence-related equipment. But where is the logic in allowing defence procurement to collapse because Make in India timelines cannot be met?
The problems with Make in India cannot be addressed through procurement policy changes alone; they are endemic to the current state of India’s industrial base.
For many technologically advanced components used in modern weapon systems—such as aero and marine engines, sensors, and advanced materials—India possesses neither the industrial base nor the technical know-how required for local manufacture. Indeed, the absence of know-how is itself a consequence of the absence of a mature industrial base.
The industrial base of any country evolves in response to market dynamics. When substantial demand emerges, the private sector—driven by profit incentives—moves rapidly to meet it. Firms upgrade industrial capacity, enter technology transfer arrangements, raise capital, hire skilled personnel, and undertake a range of other, often complex, adjustments necessary to compete.
India’s inability to develop several critical weapon-system components is not a failure of intelligence or talent. It stems from the absence of a mature industrial base, which in turn limits engineering excellence, advanced semiconductor fabrication capability, materials science depth, and related competencies. The gap is so fundamental that India is not even positioned to reverse-engineer, let alone replicate, cutting-edge technologies.
Defence Procurement and Make in India Are Parallel Processes
For reasons that remain unexplained, the Ministry of Defence and the Government of India (GoI) have tethered India’s defence preparedness to the Make in India programme. This flawed linkage has allowed national security to be held hostage to industrial policy.
It is a dangerous and indefensible conflation.
A familiar refrain follows: India should not buy Rafales because France has not agreed to transfer technology. This framing is faulty. It is not France but Dassault Aviation that has declined extensive transfer of technology—and understandably so. How can a private design house be expected to part with its core intellectual property when India lacks the industrial base and the pool of trained, experienced personnel required to absorb it? Moreover, Dassault’s very survival depends on intellectual property accumulated painstakingly over decades.
This raises a more fundamental question: why is India insisting on transfer of technology as part of every fighter aircraft procurement deal?
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) already know how to design and manufacture fighter aircraft. They have done so twice—first with the HF-24 Marut, and later with the Tejas.
What they may need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps—high-temperature engine technology, for instance. Such transfers should be negotiated independently, rather than being tied to acquisitions meant to address urgent operational shortfalls.
Indeed, Safran and the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) are reportedly poised to sign a contract to co-develop an engine for India’s Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) stealth fighter. The deal—reportedly cleared by the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council, and the Finance Ministry—is awaiting final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS).
The proposed agreement, valued at over ₹30,000 crore, reportedly involves full transfer of technology for a 120–140 kilonewton thrust-class engine, with joint intellectual property ownership and manufacturing in India.
So why does India need Rafale engine technology at all? After all, HAL has been assembling and partially manufacturing the AL-31F engine for the Su-30MKI locally for decades.
The core issue is this: if every fighter aircraft acquisition is made contingent on comprehensive transfer of technology, will India ever acquire fighters from abroad at all? Revisit the opening paragraphs and ask whether India can realistically counter the Chinese threat through local production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-1A, LCA Mk-2, and Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), supplemented by roughly 150 Rafales and about 270 Su-30MKIs—many of which have not undergone a major upgrade in nearly 25 years.
Conclusion
China’s military build-up has already reached overwhelming proportions.
Indian Air Force light fighters such as the Tejas Mk-1 and Mk-1A lack the range and payload required to effectively defend Indian airspace against the PLAAF—particularly against its stealth fighters (J-20A/S, J-35) and heavy multirole aircraft (J-16/D, J-15/T/DH/DT).
The IAF must urgently rebuild its combat strength to the authorised level of 42 fighter squadrons—and not with just any aircraft, but with platforms capable of credibly countering the PLAAF’s current and emerging threat.
Make in India remains an important long-term objective. It cannot, however, be India’s immediate operational strategy.
The recent ANI report states that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is poised to begin negotiations on a ₹3.25 lakh crore deal to procure 114 Rafale fighter jets from France.
According to the ANI report, the indigenous content in the aircraft would be limited to around 30 per cent. There is no additional transfer of technology (ToT) commitment beyond this 30 per cent indigenous content.
The source codes will remain exclusively with the French side.
Widespread Consternation
There is widespread consternation on account of the following:
1. Rafales manufactured in India will have only 30 per cent indigenous content.
2. The deal encompasses no additional transfer of technology.
3. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will not receive the source code for integrating indigenous weapon systems without French assistance.
“What happened to Make in India?” is the lament. Why cannot India look for an alternative? Russia, for example, has offered full transfer of technology and local production for the Su-57!
In the following paragraphs, I will place the proposed deal and its limitations in the correct perspective. We begin with the imperative for the new deal.
TINA – There Is No Alternative
The Indian Air Force proposes to acquire additional Rafales under the Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft (MRFA) programme. The IAF has also proposed that the government acquire two to three squadrons of a stealth fighter to plug the operational gap that will exist until at least one squadron of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is inducted.
These two acquisitions are proceeding on parallel tracks. One cannot substitute the other.
The MRFA programme is a follow-on to the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) programme. The Ministry of Defence initiated procurement under the MRFA programme in April 2018. Aircraft that competed under the MRFA programme included the Gripen NG, MiG-35, Su-35, and F/A-18E/F.
Under the MRFA procurement track, there is no real alternative to the Rafale for two compelling reasons:
1. The IAF evaluated the competing fighters during the MMRCA programme and concluded that the Rafale was the best option.
2. The IAF has already invested heavily in infrastructure, training, and logistics to operate and maintain the Rafale.
The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, in his interaction with the press on October 3, 2025, confirmed the IAF’s interest in acquiring additional Rafale fighter jets under the MRFA programme, stating:
“This is one of the options that is available with us because we had already done our own homework in terms of the earlier MMRCA contract. In that, we found Rafale to be the best aircraft suited for us amongst those candidates.”
“Now, whether it is Rafale or something else, it really doesn't matter, but yes, Rafale is easy to absorb,” he added.
MRFA and LCA Mk-2
Given France’s decision to cap transfer of technology at 30 per cent, and considering that the IAF has already waited eight years for the MRFA programme to materialise, could the IAF wait longer in support of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Mk-2?
The problem is that, based on past Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) delivery records, it will be quite some time before the LCA Mk-2 project takes off and reaches an operationally viable stage. A protracted wait would further erode IAF's squadron strength.
What must be clearly understood is that raising or re-raising squadrons to full operational status, after they have been number plated, is a process that takes years.
Adding to the uncertainty, the LCA Mk-2 will be powered by the General Electric (GE) F414 engine, increasing India’s vulnerability to United States pressure or sanctions.
Limited Transfer of Technology
During the interaction referred to earlier, the Chief of the Air Staff notably expressed his reservations regarding French unwillingness to transfer technology for local manufacture of the Rafale to the extent desired by India.
The 2018 Request for Information (RFI) for the MRFA programme mandates transfer of technology, along with a guarantee of 75 per cent aircraft availability at all times.
“So whichever design house is ready to come up with the proposal to Make in India, to give us technology, give us more freedom, I think that design house should be chosen,” he said.
Viewed pragmatically, the proposal is worth consideration despite limited ToT. Higher percentage of technology transfer could prove counter productive. Indigenous content beyond what Indian industry can deliver quickly would only lead to delays and mutual recrimination.
Whatever Indian industry can manufacture rapidly and reliably should be made in India; the rest should be imported.
DRDO and HAL have already designed and developed two fighter aircraft—the HF-24 Marut and the Tejas. They do not need 100 per cent technology transfer. What they need is targeted transfer of technology to plug specific capability gaps, such as the inability to develop aircraft engines capable of sustaining higher turbine inlet temperatures. Such technology transfers should be negotiated separately, rather than being tied to acquisitions that are critical for maintaining the operational readiness of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
After all, the acquisition of additional Rafales is intended to arrest the decline in fighter squadron strength, which is currently reported to be 29 squadrons against an authorised strength of 42.
Source Code Issues
According to the ANI report, the Indian side is also seeking French support to enable the integration of Indian weapons and indigenous systems into the aircraft under the government-to-government deal.
However, the source codes will remain with the French side.
It may be recalled that during negotiations for the 2015 deal to acquire 36 Rafale F3R fighters, the IAF had sought access to operational source codes from Dassault Aviation and Thales Avionics for the mission avionics and the fly-by-wire flight control system, in order to retain a “unilateral upgrade” capability.
Access to the source code would have enabled the IAF and HAL to implement mid-life weapons and avionics upgrades by leveraging open architecture, without having to revert to Dassault and Thales.
The ANI report appears to confirm that the Rafale variant now proposed is the F4 variant, not the F3 variant acquired earlier, and that the source code architecture of the F4 has changed.
Rafale F4 Variant
The Rafale F4 incorporates significant upgrades, including:
1. A new Thales software-defined radio (CONTACT), offering improved security, enhanced data links, and integrated civil and military satellite communication capability.
2. An improved RBE2 radar capable of detecting mobile ground targets.
3. An upgraded infrared optronic system.
4. An enhanced SPECTRA self-protection suite, with expanded low- and high-frequency coverage to counter future threats.
5. New weapons, including a mid-life-upgraded SCALP cruise missile, MBDA’s MICA-NG air-to-air missile, and a new version of the AASM air-to-ground weapon. The MICA-NG offers longer range and improved detection and acquisition capability.
6. Predictive maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capability to improve dispatch reliability.
It was earlier reported that the French Ministry of the Armed Forces had publicly confirmed that India is pursuing a plan to acquire 90 Rafale F4 fighters, with an additional option for 24 Rafale F5 aircraft.
Conclusion
The proposed acquisition of 114 additional Rafales is essentially a continuation of the earlier deal under which India acquired 36 aircraft.
In September 2018, following sustained criticism of the government over the limited purchase, then Raksha Mantri Nirmala Sitharaman clarified that the induction was restricted to 36 aircraft because the Indian Air Force’s infrastructure and technical capacity did not permit a larger induction at the time.
The induction of just two squadrons was the outcome of an emergency purchase, she explained:
“Air Force … will tell you that for any emergency-based induction, it is always two squadrons and not more than that.”
Notably, even under the current proposal, 12–18 Rafale jets are expected to be acquired in fly-away condition, most likely because the IAF is inducting the Rafale F4 variant.
Finally, it is worth noting that strategic imports from France have historically come with no political strings attached—albeit often with an ever-increasing price tag. France also remains the only fighter aircraft supplier capable of resisting sustained United States pressure.
Update on January 16, 2026:
My discussion with Abhijat Shekhar on the proposed Rafale deal on Navbharat Times.
Some plain speaking and rabble rousing!
1. Why does HAL pay an increasing amount as dividend to the GoI every year? Why not invest the amount in R&D?
In the past three financial years, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) paid the following dividend amounts to the Government of India (GoI):
FY 2022-23: ₹1,257 crore
FY 2023-24: ₹1,413 crore
FY 2024-25: ₹1,820 crore
2. For 25 years, MoD / IAF have made no serious attempt to upgrade Su-30MKI. In contrast, with the Rafale, it plans to quickly move from F3R to F4 to F5 variants.
3. The reasons why Dassault will not and can not part with the full source code of the Rafale. Dassault is not exploiting an Indian weakness, it is protecting it is safeguarding its own competitive edge.
4. DRDO appears more interested in adding to the number of projects that it is working on rather than focusing on the projects that are most critical to India's defence requirements. Is it more focused on increasing its establishment, rather than delivering on its promise?
India is the only “great power” that has never stolen technology to become self-sufficient in defence production.
Which is, perhaps, exactly why we are not self-sufficient in defence production.
And never will be!!
We don’t steal technology—not because we are a civilisational state operating from some lofty moral high ground.
We don’t steal technology because we wouldn’t have the faintest idea what to do with it after stealing it.
After all, we are intellectuals, not visionaries.
Tell us what to do and how to do it.
Give us the tools, the materials, the jigs, the fixtures, the software, and the manufacturing machinery—and behold!
We will become Atmanirbhar in manufacturing the weapon system overnight.
We already figured out how to make all the submarines we operate — Kilo class, HDW Type-209, Scorpene, Arihant class, Arihant Stretch class.
So now, please tell us how to make the Type-214, the submarine that is so very good.
When we negotiate Transfer of Technology (ToT), we don’t actually want a transfer of technology.
We want a transfer of technicians—people who can assemble, integrate, and service the system locally.
What would we do with the technology anyway?
By the time you’re willing to transfer it, it’s already old.
We prefer to buy your latest technology—under the comforting label of ToT.
And when we negotiate local manufacture, we don’t threaten to reduce your market share.
Oh no!
We guarantee its permanence.
This is how it works:
You supply all the expensive components and materials making good .profit
We assemble your system under ToT (Transfer of Technicians).
We sell it to our armed forces at exorbitant prices making good profit.
And then we proudly pay fat dividend cheques to our own government.
What you call a win-win arrangement.
Our concept of R&D is simple: Read and Do.
Read the manuals.
Do exactly what is written.
Neither our government babus, nor our corporate leaders—and certainly not our politicians - their Arjun eyes permanently fixed on the next election - have any appetite for a riskier interpretation of R&D.
Historically, India’s rich and powerful have always been traders—experts at currying favour with whoever happens to rule, regardless of where they come from.
Visualisation of a HySI satellite over India Pakistan border: Image credit @Grok
The back-to-back failures of the PSLV-C61 mission in May 2024 and the PSLV-C62 mission today (January 12, 2026) are significant setbacks to India’s space-based military capabilities.
Worryingly, both missions failed for similar reasons—anomalies in the performance of the PSLV third stage (PS3).
The PSLV-C61 failure resulted in the loss of EOS-9 (also known as RISAT-1A), while the PSLV-C62 failure led to the loss of the EOS-N1 (Anvesha) satellite. Both were primarily military satellites.
RISAT-1A was a radar imaging satellite capable of imaging the Earth’s surface day or night, and through all weather conditions.
The Anvesha satellite (EOS-N1) was a hyperspectral imaging Earth-observation platform developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO).
Earth Observation Satellite Imaging
Earth-observation satellite imaging may be confined to the visual spectrum, in which case sensors capture imagery either in black-and-white (panchromatic) or in full colour.
Alternatively, imaging can extend beyond the visual spectrum using multispectral or hyperspectral sensors.
Multispectral Imaging
Multispectral satellites capture images in a limited number (typically 3–10) of discrete spectral bands, each about 50–500 nm wide.
ISRO has previously launched several multispectral satellites under the IRS series, supporting applications such as agriculture, forestry, water resources management, and urban planning.
Multispectral imaging resolutions typically range from 10–30 metres per pixel.
Hyperspectral Imaging
Hyperspectral satellites capture imagery across hundreds of narrow, contiguous spectral bands—typically 5–20 nm wide—providing a near-continuous spectrum for every pixel.
ISRO has previously launched and operated a hyperspectral satellite: the Hyperspectral Imaging Satellite (HySIS), weighing 380 kg, launched aboard PSLV-C43 on November 29, 2018. The 400-kg Anvesha (EOS-N1) satellite was developed by DRDO in collaboration with ISRO.
Hyperspectral imaging resolution is lower than multispectral imaging, typically in the range of 30–100 metres per pixel.
Military Imaging Reconnaissance
Most military imaging reconnaissance satellites rely on panchromatic (black-and-white) imaging, with effectiveness judged primarily by image resolution. Panchromatic imaging enables very high spatial resolution, measured in centimetres rather than metres.
For example, U.S. Keyhole-series satellites (e.g., KH-11) and their modern equivalents reportedly achieve resolutions of 15 cm or better.
Military Advantages of Hyperspectral Imaging
From the point of view of the military, high-resolution panchromatic satellites are essential for accurate targeting and precise geolocation while hyperspectral imaging (HySI) is primarily aimed at situational awareness.
Panchromatic imagery can identify the precise coordinates of a parked fighter aircraft to enable a missile strike. HySI, however, can determine whether the observed object is an actual aircraft or a decoy—often with close to 90% accuracy—by analysing the unique spectral signatures of constituent materials.
By capturing data across hundreds of narrow wavelength bands, HySI enables precise identification of surface compositions such as metals, composites, paints, and synthetic materials like plastics or inflatables commonly used in decoys.
Such material discrimination is not possible using panchromatic or multispectral imaging.
Beyond decoy identification, hyperspectral imaging offers several unique military reconnaissance capabilities:
Missile Launch Detection and Early Warning
HySI can detect ballistic missile launches by identifying and analysing their infrared signatures immediately after launch, enabling early warning and cueing radar sensors for tracking.
Camouflage Penetration
HySI can penetrate camouflage—such as vegetation, netting, or paint—by analysing subtle spectral differences. It can distinguish natural foliage from synthetic coverings used on vehicles, bunkers, or troop positions, aiding in the detection of concealed assets like missile launch sites.
Detection of Buried or Obscured Threats
HySI can detect buried objects such as landmines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and unexploded ordnance (UXOs) by identifying soil disturbances and anomalous material signatures.
By effectively “seeing” a minefield, HySI can help ground forces clear routes safely, reducing uncertainty in mission planning.
Asset Maintenance and Corrosion Detection
For military hardware such as aircraft and naval vessels, hyperspectral sensors can identify early signs of corrosion or metal fatigue through spectral analysis, enabling proactive maintenance and reducing downtime and lifecycle costs.
Pakistan's Hyperspectral Imaging Capability
Pakistan launched its first hyperspectral imaging satellite on October 19, 2025, called HS-1 (Hyperspectral Satellite-1). Pakistani officials say that the satellite data will support major infrastructure initiatives linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that connects Xinjiang to Gwadar Port. However, the military significance of the satellite is obvious.
Conclusion
Through consecutive PSLV mission failures, India has lost critical, sovereign military space capabilities that cannot be sourced from abroad. The restoration of the all-weather radar imaging capability lost with RISAT-1A, and the reconstitution of the hyperspectral imaging (HySI) capability lost with Anvesha, could take up to two years or more. This gap carries real operational consequences, weakening India’s independent ISR posture at a time when timely, high-fidelity space-based intelligence is increasingly central to deterrence and warfighting.
